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PREFACE. 
W I T H the issue of this concluding volume it may be 
well to state briefly the scope and purpose of the work. 
Since the publication of J . S. Mill's Principles the appli-
cation of the historical and comparative methods on 
the one side and on the other mathematical analysis 
have given a broader and also a more accurate meaning 
to general economic conceptions and economic laws, whilst 
in every department an immense amount of labour has 
been devoted to specialisation. The present work is 
intended to give a survey of economic principles in the 
light of these advances and to provide an introduction 
to the more special t reatment of pure theory, economic 
history, and the economic side of social questions. The 
work, however, is not a mere compilation, and there are 
parts which may lay claim to originality, as, for example, 
in the present volume the chapters on Relative Prices, 
Rents, Profits and Wages, and the relations of Public 
Expenditure to Taxation. 
In style and form the li terary method has been adopted, 
and wherever possible purely technical language has been 
avoided; but I have never at tempted to attain simplic-
i ty by avoiding difficulties, and I have given my own 
opinion on disputed questions. 
As intimated at the outset, the subject has been treated 
throughout f rom the positive s tandpoint ; but as this 
purely scientific a t t i tude is liable to be misunderstood, 
I have indicated in the final chapter my own views of the 
relations of political economy to morality and religion. 
I t is scarcely necessary to state tha t the various chap-
ters must be regarded as parts of a whole and not as a 
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number of separate t reat ises. I t is clearly impossible to 
condense into chapters such vast subjects as Economic 
Progress , W a g e s and Progress , F ree T r a d e and Pro tec-
tion, Local Finance, Colonial Policy, Publ ic Debts , etc. 
One of the grea tes t difficulties has been to preserve the 
due sense of propor t ion . 
I have indicated in the proper places my obligations to 
par t i cu la r books and authors , b u t I ough t to ment ion spe-
cially the g rea t works of Thoro ld Rogers and Vicomte 
D ' A v e n e l on the h is tory of prices, and of Dr . Cunning-
ham and Professor Ashley on general economic h i s t o r y ; 
the s t andard books of Professors Bastable and Seligman, 
and the original and ingenious wr i t ings of Professor 
E d g e w o r t h , on Pub l i c F inance and Taxa t ion ; and the 
valuable and suggest ive works of Mr . and Mrs. W e b b on 
T r a d e Unions and Indus t r i a l Democracy. Dr . Keynes 
has looked over all the proofs and made valuable sug-
gest ions t h roughou t , and Professor Bastable and Mr. C. S. 
Devas have per fo rmed the same f r i end ly deed for port ions 
of the work . Fo r the Index I am indebted to Mr. A . B. 
Clark, M . A . , my assistant in the Univers i ty . 
In conclusion I m u s t again express my regre t t ha t the 
completion of the work should have been so long delayed 
t h r o u g h unavoidable causes, — at first illness, and la ter 
t h e increased pressure of official duties, — and now I will 
make an end of apologies in the words of the au thor of 
the Book of Maccabees : " If I have done well, and as is 
fitting the s tory, it is t h a t which I desired ; but if s lenderly 
and meanly, i t is t ha t which I could a t t a in un to . " 
J. SHIELD NICHOLSON. 
U N I V E R S I T Y O F E D I N B U R G H , 
November, 1901. 
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C H A P T E R I . 
T H E NATURE AND T H E MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC 
PROGRESS. 
§ 1. The Idea of Progress in General. Before entering 
on the examination of the nature and tests of economic 
progress, it seems desirable to state explicitly that, however 
wide be the interpretation given to the term " economic," 
it cannot embrace the idea of progress in general whether 
as applied to the individual or the nation. How large that 
idea is, how variable from age to age, and how related to 
the great ideas of humanity and freedom, it is the business 
of the philosophy of history to gather from the evidences 
of literature and art, law and custom, morality and religion, 
and the other components of civilisation.1 Perhaps the 
most remarkable result of such a wide survey is the dis-
covery that in the past the idea of progress has generally 
fallen short of the actual reality, and the comprehension 
of the meaning has generally lagged behind the making 
of history. Even as regards China we are told that the 
actual development and filiation of thought is scarcely less 
traceable in history and literature than in the case of Greece 
itself. But in place of the idea of progress, among the 
Chinese as among the Egyptians, Babylonians, and Hindus, 
the theory of cosmical and human cycles appears in vari-
ous forms. The Jews also seem to have attained to no 
conscious apprehension of the idea of progress, and there 
is no distinct enunciation of tha t idea in the Old Testa-
ment. The Greeks and Romans conceived of the course 
of history, not only, as is commonly supposed, as a down-
ward movement of the ages indicated by the nobler and baser 
1 See Professor Flint 's Philosophy of History, pp. 88-136. 
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metals f rom gold to iron, but also conceived of it some-
times as a cycle and sometimes as a progress; and the clas-
sical idea of progress when it comes to the surface is 
ra ther poetical and philosophical than historical in the 
sense of being founded on a wide induction of facts. 
" T h e teaching of C h r i s t " — s u c h is the judgment of the 
philosophical theologian — " applied directly only to man 
in his moral and religious relations, and did not contain 
even in germ a doctrine of his industrial, scientific, aes-
thetic, or political development, al though not only consis-
ten t with, bu t calculated to lead up> to, the true doctrine 
thereof." 1 A n d by way of commentary it may be added that 
the history of the mediasval Church is one long contest or 
series of contests between the literal interpretation of the 
teaching of the Sermon on the Mount and the strivings of 
the na tura l man for wealth and political power. " T h e 
general conditions of life and thought in the Middle Ages," 
says Professor Fl int , " w e r e extremely unfavourable to the 
growth and spread of the idea of progress " ; and yet in the 
actual history of mediasval England we find the legislation 
and the cathedrals of Edward I., the science of Roger 
Bacon, the poetry of Chaucer, the theology of Wiclif , and 
a mass of other evidences of original power, and all tha t 
we are enti t led to say seems to be that , as in the earlier 
ages, the idea of progress again fell short of the reality. 
From the sixteenth century onward we find a number of 
a t tempts to express the general idea of progress — some-
times involving the perfection of God, sometimes the per-
fectibility of man — and culminating in the nineteenth 
century in the theory of evolution. How far that theory 
is of service in explaining and estimating economic prog-
ress will be considered l a t e r ; in the meantime enough 
has been said to just ify the position that economic progress 
is not coextensive with, or deducible from, any general idea 
of progress. 
Tha t idea is still shadowy and vacillating. To the 
1 Fl int , op. citpp. 90, 97. 
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ordinary mind not firmly fastened to the faith of religion 
or to the transcendental reason that is akin to such faith, 
the long procession of empires that pass over the world 
is appall ing; and when the habit of analysis forces the 
spectator to break up the life of every nation into multi-
tudes of human beings, — of living spirits, — the effect is 
overwhelming: the individual becomes a speck and his 
life a moment. 
And yet the living representative of Kant, M. Renouvier,1 
still maintains that the secret of progress is to be found in 
the exercise of the rational freedom of individuals, and that 
the ethic races of mankind — akin in moral i deas—are of 
far greater significance in the unfolding of history than 
the merely ethnic races determined largely by physical con-
ditions. As already explained, the estimation and com-
parison. of standards and ideals of morality are excluded 
from the plan of this work; but it seems necessary to guard 
against the assumption tha t economic progress is naturally 
associated with moral degradation. The brilliant and sug-
gestive work of M. Lor ia 2 on the economic bases of the 
social constitution has given new life to the materialistic 
interpretation of history. His leading contention is that 
all the moralities, religions, and policies of the past are only 
connective institutions by which capitalism has enslaved 
and bound in fetters the societies of mankind. " I n effect," 
he writes,3 " whoever is penetrated with this fundamental 
t ru th that capitalistic property or the suppression of free 
land is not a natural and spontaneous fact, but the violation 
of laws human and divine — the impossible erected into a 
system — will understand that to guarantee the persistence 
of this absurd and contradictory system it is necessary to 
appeal to all the passions, to all the sentiments, to corrupt 
their purest sources and to metamorphose them into the 
docile instruments of this monstrous engine — capital -
1 Cf. Fl int , op. cit., p. 668. 
2 Les Bases Economiques de la Constitution Sociale (Paris , 1893). 
3 p. 424. 
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ism. . . . " I t is to be observed, however, tha t M. Loria 
himself in his forecast of fu ture progress looks forward to a 
golden age of simple morality. " I n the economy of equal-
ity and association the social organism in perfect equi-
librium by its own virtue will have no need to seek the 
guarantee of its persistence in the possession of the most 
diverse manifestations of human activity, which will hence-
for th soon resume their natural and normal development." 
Thus M. Loria as regards the fu tu re is as extremely idealist 
as with reference to the past he is extremely materialist —• 
and in my judgment is wrong in both extremes. Certainly 
as regards historical progress the connective insti tutions of 
society are not to be summarised as examples of conscious 
tyrannical chicanery; the eyes of children, if there is any 
t r u t h in the doctrine of heredity, declare that more has 
gone to the making of them than ages of corruption and 
suffering. 
If, however, we reject the morbid simplicity of M. Loria, 
with his exaggerated consequences of the suppression of 
free land and of the dominance of the love of money, we 
cannot accept as much nearer the t ru th the optimistic idea 
tha t progress is necessary and continuous. 
I t is difficult to trace any continuity in general progress 
or even to discover the conditions favourable to the prog-
ress of humani ty as a whole. The civilisation of Egyp t 
under the Pharaohs endured four thousand years, but it 
made less impression on history than the single generation 
of Pericles. " Progress," sa}rs M. Renouvier, " is possible 
for individuals and nations in all spheres of human life 
and activity. A n d it is not only possible, but the analysis 
of facts shows tha t it has actually taken place during cer-
tain periods in the history of many peoples. No facts 
warrant us, however, to ascribe to it universality, con-
t inuity, or necessity. Deterioration has been as prevalent 
as amelioration. There has not been anywhere or in any 
respect uninterrupted progress. If we compare mediaeval 
Europe with ancient Greece and Rome in their prime, and 
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apply proper criticism in an impartial manner, the former 
must be acknowledged to have been on a lower intellectual 
and moral level. If we examine into the history even of 
such a phenomenon as slavery, it will be found that for long 
periods and over wide spaces it was not liberty which 
gained ground. Europe is no more entitled to believe 
herself at present secure against fu ture slow decadence or 
rapid collapse than Asia was when in her glory. Those 
who have discoursed on progress have generally erred as 
to its point of departure. They have supposed it to have 
started from conditions which can only have been gradually 
produced. They have imagined a perfectible brutali ty for 
which there is no evidence to be found in history. They 
have not deemed it necessary to inquire by what marks 
societies are to be ranked as superior or inferior to others. 
They have not seriously endeavoured to determine what 
constitutes progress, and have consequently failed to see 
how inseparable it is from morality, and how necessary 
it must be to the work of individuals and societies them-
selves. . . ." 
I t is, on this view, in the exercise of rational freedom 
that societies as well as individuals have risen or sunk, 
elevated or debased themselves. And as already indicated, 
and as will appear more ful ly in the sequel, the dominat-
ing force in economic progress is the exercise of the 
rational freedom of individuals, and therein is to be sought 
— it seems to the present writer — the reconciliation of 
economic with moral ideals. A t present, however, all that 
is contended for is that economic progress demands a 
separate analysis; in the cultivation of the sciences as 
in that of land the method of large open fields has given 
way to enclosures and specialisation. 
§ 2. The Nature of Economic Progress. The simplest 
and still the most common idea of economic progress is 
quantitative. " A l l the nations," Mill naively remarks, 
" which we are accustomed to call civilised increase gradu-
ally in production and population." Even as regards the 
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progress of production, however, we cannot get very far 
wi th the simple rules of political arithmetic. W e may, 
indeed, measure the increase of national wealth in terms 
of the monetary standard, and for certain purposes such 
measurement is sufficiently accurate. In the United 
Kingdom, for example, a penny in the pound of income 
tax has for some years given an increasing return, and 
the na tura l explanation or deduction is tha t there is a 
corresponding increase in the wealth of the nation. This 
estimate is confirmed by the yield of other taxes and by 
the monetary statistics of t rade and consumption. 
In the reference to such statements, however, we natu-
rally take account of quantit ies of wealth as well as 
values, and the consideration of quantit ies logically leads 
to an estimation of qualities. Especially in comparing 
relatively distant periods it is obviously [necessary, not 
only to allow for variations in the value of the mone-
ta ry standard, but to give a ful ler meaning to the money 
valuations by referr ing to the quantit ies and qualities of 
the forms of wealth. Quanti t ies remaining the same, a 
large advance (or retrogression) may be estimated in 
respect of improvements (or the reverse) in qualities. 
The youngest of the golden ages, and perhaps the only 
one tha t still clajms to be considered as historical, viz., 
the f i f teenth century in England, has suffered grievously 
under the test of this qualitative method, and its rude 
abundance has become very rude indeed. On the other 
hand, the material prosperity of the nineteenth century 
has been proportionately elevated by similar allowances 
for quali ty. 
The improvement in the qualities of old things again 
leads to the consideration of substi tutes and additions, 
and the national valuation in progressive societies is again 
increased by a long list of scientific discoveries. 
The idea of economic progress, however, even in its 
simplest form, is not exhausted by the increased improve-
ment and discovery of the various forms of material wealth. 
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Side by side with the progress of wealth we must set the 
progress of population. Here, again, the simplest and most 
common method of estimation is quanti tat ive. " Though 
North America," said Adam Smith, " i s not yet so rich as 
England, i t is much more thriving, and advancing wi th 
much greater rapidi ty to the fu r the r acquisition of riches. 
The most decisive mark of the prosperity of any country 
is the increase in the number of its inhabitants." A 
century of Mal thus and half a century of Mill have not 
sufficed to discredit al together the decisiveness of this 
mark even with persons of culture, and still less with 
the masses of the people. The arrest of the growth of the 
population of France is regarded with dread, whilst the 
enormous expansion of the Uni ted States is viewed with 
patriarchal pride, by the respective peoples. 
A t the same time, however, the simple numerical test 
of the progress of population needs even more than tha t 
of opulence a quali tat ive supplement, though, it is true, 
the difficulties of such a modification are in this case much 
greater . 
A t the present time, the most fashionable terminology 
for the expression of social and economic progress is tha t 
derived f rom the theory of evolution. I do not deny that , 
in some cases, this terminology may be useful, or tha t the 
analogies with biological development may be sugges t ive 1 ; 
bu t we are not. within sight at present of any deduction 
of the principles of economic progress f rom a general 
evolution of humani ty . There is, for example, no stronger 
opponent of the self-called evolutionary socialists than 
Mr. Herber t Spencer. W e may indeed speak of the dif-
> ferentiation of division of labour and of the integration of 
cooperation, of the tendency to variation in industr ial 
processes, of the survival of the fittest in schemes of dis-
tribution ; and in every depar tment of economics we may 
1 Pare to has worked out the theory of economic progress in terms of 
evolution in an interesting way. Cours d'Economie Politique, Vol. II . , 
Livre I I I . 
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discover examples of adaptation to the environment and 
of reversions to atavism; but we cannot discover the 
nature of industrial progress by the simple adoption of 
the language of evolution; we might as well expect to 
discover the history of China by a translation of the his-
tory of England into Chinese. 
Every special science needs its own special evidence, 
and the natural evolution of the nineteenth century is no 
better adapted to provide substitutes for induction than 
was the natural theology of the eighteenth.1 
Accordingly, in estimating the economic progress of 
population as regards quality, we shall find it necessary 
to apply different tests; and one of these tests is to be 
found in the money valuation of the people and its com-
ponent classes. 
§ 3. On the Progress of Population in Terms of Money. 
The estimation in terms of money of the qualities of 
persons, classes, and nations, as I have shown elsewhere,2 is 
neither new nor unscientific. 
The principle of compensation for accidents and in-
juries to persons was fully recognised in Saxon times. 
Injuries and assaults were dealt with on a minute scale of 
fixed compensations, the amount payable ranging accord-
ing to the rank of the persons concerned. IVer was the 
value set on a man's life, and the amount of a man's own 
iver was often the measure of the fine to be paid for his 
offences against public order. Contumelious outrage (e.g., 
binding a free man or shaving his head in derision) was 
visited with heavier fines than any but the gravest wounds. 
I t is most interesting to note, tha t in the case of harm 
ensuing even by pure accident, the actor was liable, how-
ever innocent his intention, and the question of negli-
gence was not considered at all. Wer unwillig gethan 
1 Cf. Historical Progress and Ideal Socialism, for fu r the r t rea tment 
of this argument . 
2 Strikes and Social Problems, p. 97, " E s s a y on the Living Capital of 
the United Kingdom." 
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musz willig zalilen: such was the principle of all old 
Germanic laws.1 The recent British legislation on com-
pensation for accidents has reaffirmed this principle which 
depends for its administration on money valuations of per-
sons and parts of t hem; and the common law has still 
to pu t a money value on shocks to the system through 
accidents on railways and shocks to the feelings through 
breaches of marriage vows. 
Money valuations of economic persons may be estimated 
on two principles, viz., cost of production and earning 
capacity. The production and education of children up 
to maturi ty or independence consume a large part of the 
resources of their parents, which otherwise might have 
been converted into material capital. I t is of course true 
that the value of education (as it appears in the finished 
child) cannot be measured simpty by the cost, but in 
general as in material things (ceteris paribus) the greater 
the cost so much greater the value. And in a survey of 
the economic progress of the nation one decisive mark of 
an improvement in quality is an increase in the cost 
of education. The prohibition of work for wages under a 
certain age increases the expense of rearing the family 
of the working-man, but the increase of cost improves 
the value of the children. From the national point of 
view, the fact that school fees are paid by the rate-payers 
makes no difference to the real cost directly, and in-
directly it may even increase it, that is to say, education 
supplied by the State may cost more than that supplied 
by the parents. The history of the effects of machinery 
and of the factory system is ful l of examples of the deg-
radation of child labour, and that degradation may be 
roughly measured in the lessened net cost of education 
and maintenance. 
The element of time is of still greater importance in 
waiting for the results of living than of dead capital, and 
so also is the element of risk. 
1 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, Vol. I., p. 31. 
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The part icular parent is by no means sure that he 
will benefit by giving a long and expensive education 
to his par t icular child, whilst his immediate share in 
the child's earnings is at tractive to his greed. But 
to the nation at large an improvement in the quality 
of the people — such an improvement as involves heavy 
expendi ture — is not counterbalanced by these draw-
backs. A nation can afford to wait, and the risk of 
emigration is small, and smaller still the more extensive 
the empire. 
I t is, of course, possible tha t in education, as in other 
forms of production, there may be needless waste; but, 
a f te r making allowances of this kind, it is generally t rue 
tha t education that costs l i t t le to the nation is generally 
worth little, and conversely of great cost and great 
worth. 
The value of people and peoples may, however, be esti-
mated from the point of view of earning capacity. W e 
are all familiar with the distinction between skilled and 
unskilled labour, and it needs li t t le reflection or observa-
tion to discover tha t in both groups there are a mult i tude 
of subdivisions. These various subdivisions' have differ-
ent degrees of earning capacity. A n d again, one of the 
decisive marks of economic progress is found in the in-
crease of the numbers of the classes with higher earnings 
relatively to those with lower earnings. 
Sir Robert Giffen's calculations for a recent and notable 
half century have popularised this method of estimating 
the progress of the working-classes.1 
Before going fu r the r witli this explanation of the nature 
of economic progress, it may be well td set forth the results 
already obtained. The economic progress'of a nation may 
be estimated, first, by the increase in its wealth, measured 
in terms of money — allowance being made for any varia-
tions in the standard, which again involves a series of com-
1 " Progress of the Working Classes in the Last Half Cen tu ry , " Essays 
in Finance, Second Series, p. 365. 
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plex problems;1 secondly, we may take account of the 
increase of the population; thirdly, combining these two 
methods, we may roughly estimate progress by the increase 
per head in accumulated wealth and in income; and 
fourthty, we may consider the money values of the whole 
nation, and of its various component classes, either on the 
basis of cost or of earning capacity. 
The nature, however, of economic progress can be repre-
sented only very imperfectly by the application of these 
monetary methods of valuation. W e must next endeavour 
to pass behind the money cost and the money earnings to 
the real cost and the real earnings, and for this purpose 
the general Conceptions of economic Util i ty and Disutility 
may be first adopted. 
§ 4. Progress of Population in Terms of Utility and Dis-
utility. Even from the point of view of the individual 
Epicurean the money value of his wealth is of importance 
only so far as it indicates its utility, including, of course, 
on the one hand, the satisfaction and pride in relatively 
large possessions, and on the other the sense of increased 
power of well-doing. Money is only a measure of ex-
change value, and a rise or fall in the exchange value of 
a man's wealth may or may not correspond to a rise or 
fall in its utility to him. If a man falls blind his pictures 
to him lose their utility, though their prices are unaffected; 
and if he loses his strength beyond a certain point, the bur-
den of managing his wealth may exceed the total satisfac-
tion which he derives from it. Still more obviously the 
disutility of the acquisition may exceed the utility of the 
fruition of precious things. Such, expressed in more 
familiar language, have always been the commonplaces 
of poetry, philosophy, and proverbial wisdom. 
But, on the other hand, under ordinary conditions, an 
increase of wealth (measured in money) generally means 
also an increase in utility or happiness to the individual. 
We suppose that no one will labour to acquire wealth be-
»C/. Book I I I . , Chs. X I . - X V I I . 
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yond the point at which the disutili ty or real cost of the 
labour to him seems greater than the uti l i ty of the corre-
sponding reward. 
There may be mistakes of judgment , but the general 
rule applies to any individual whose freedom of choice is 
unfet tered. Thus to the free individual an increase of 
money generally means an increase of uti l i ty (even if he 
has to earn the money) . The uti l i ty, moreover, of a free 
man's weal th may rise, whilst its money value remains 
constant, or even falls. A n y improvement in the physical, 
moral, or intellectual condition of the man may raise the 
uti l i ty of his possessions. Similarly any improvement in 
the conditions of acquisition may increase the total posi-
tive util i ty by diminishing the disutil i ty involved. 
T h a t uti l i ty has only a meaning with reference to the 
feelings of human beings, is still too often overlooked. 
For brevity and convenience we speak of utilities fixed 
and embodied in material things, but so far they are at 
most potential utilities, and can only be realised by sen-
tient individuals. Mr. Ruskin, in his tirades against rail-
ways, forgets tha t lakes and mountains must be seen to be 
appreciated. 
When we pass from the individual to the nation, the old 
distinction between value and riches, or the modern dis-
tinction between price and total util i ty, becomes of funda-
mental importance. Under certain conditions, it is t rue 
tha t a rise in the money wealth of a nation may be held 
to point to an increase of uti l i ty. Take, for example, the 
money values of the houses, and suppose that the value 
of the standard is unaltered. 
A rise in the money value of the houses may point to 
various improvements as regards size, convenience, sanita-
tion, aesthetics. A rise in the value of house property may 
thus be one of the best signs of material progress. Another 
good example is found in the rise in prices of various kinds 
of breeding stock.1 Again, the assumption by th ings of 
1 Cf. Rogers, Agriculture and Prices. 
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exchange value (which formerly possessed none) may also 
be a sign of increased uti l i ty to the nation. A n improve-
ment in the education of the people or in their powers of 
enjoyment may create or intensify a demand, and improve-
ments in the means of production may lead to the utili-
sation (and valuat ion) of waste products. There are 
certain cases, however, in which a rise in money value 
is due to causes which point to a diminution of the total 
uti l i ty to the nation of the valuables concerned. The 
exhaustion of natural supplies may be marked by a rise 
in the price of the remainders; or .a rise may be due to 
the artificial restrictions of monopolies or to increased tax-
ation, or to lessened efficiency of labour and capital, or to 
checks on foreign trade. In all these cases — and they 
are examples only — a rise in price may mean a fall in 
utility. 
There are also cases in which a fall in price may point 
to an increase of utili ty. A fall in price may point to 
greater abundance due either to the exploitation of fresh 
natural resources or to improvements in production. 
From the national point of view it seems natura l to look 
on increased cheapness per uni t as necessarily involving 
increased util i ty. But the connection is by no means neces-
sary, and the benefits of cheapness to the nation are liable 
to be overrated. If the cheapness is due to greater natural 
abundance or to lessened real cost, it indicates, no doubt, 
a gain of national uti l i ty. There is, however, a danger of 
underest imat ing the real cost. In making a balance of 
the gain and loss to the nation of cheapened processes 
of production, it is sometimes desirable or even necessary 
to leave out money, whether as a medium or a measure. 
Consider, for example, the development of the factory 
system in Britain.1 The uti l i ty to the consumers of the 
cheapened goods was but small compensation for the disu-
tility of the degraded labour of the chi ldren; the language 
of util i ty indeed seems ridiculously feeble in indicating the 
1 Cf. Von Plener ' s English Factory Legislation. 
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loss to the nation. The processes of exchange often con-
ceal the true character — from the national standpoint — 
of the production and consumption of wealth. 
A free individual making things (or catching things) 
for his own immediate consumption would not be likely 
to overwork himself ; though most people are ready to 
overwork for money — making the means an end by a 
moral fallacy. And in earlier stages of society, on the 
institution of slavery, the owner of another person feels 
directly none of the disutilities of labour; he may, indeed, 
even take a gloomy pleasure in seeing his slaves suffer 
the hardships of toil. Thus, under a system of slavery, if 
we were to make the supposition that the slaves and their 
owners have equal and similar capacities of pleasures and 
pains, the balance of disutility would be enormous, as 
shown in many historical instances (e.g., Roman slavery). 
And if we make a similar supposition regarding the con-
sumers of cheap goods and their makers, under similar 
conditions, we shall often find a similar large balance of 
disutility. If men and women were still obliged to 
undergo directly the actual toil of making their own 
clothes (from the raw material) they would not undergo 
for a month the pains which the makers of cheap clothes 
in sweated industries endure throughout their lives for the 
clothing of other people. 
I t is, of course, true that the makers of the cheap 
clothes work, not for the utility of the clothes, but for 
the money that buys necessaries, and the utility of this 
amount of money is to them immeasurable. 
From the national point of view, however, it is some-
times desirable to regard the producers simply as agents 
of production. Thus regarded, there can be no question 
that the utility of extra cheapness may be purchased at 
an enormous real cost (or disutility) that is only possible 
under a system of exchange. 
I have already explained my objections to the monetary 
measurements of consumers' rents or surpluses. If, how-
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ever, such measurements are to be retained for theoretical 
purposes, they should be supplemented by similar calcula-
tions for producers' deficits.1 
Fortunately, however, we are not obliged to take the 
case just examined as typical. A fall in price does not 
generally mean an increase of producers ' real cost, and 
may indeed be accompanied by a more than corresponding 
fall in the disutility of production. In less technical lan-
guage, whilst the great body of consumers may gain by 
cheapness and plenty, the great body of producers may 
also gain by improved conditions of work. Under present 
conditions the real cost of labour (or the disuti l i ty) is least 
in the largest businesses, and greatest in the small work-
shops and in the domestic industries.2 
A n d it is false also to look on all labour as necessarily 
involving disutility. The average healthy Englishman 
does not look on a day's work of ten hours as he would 
look on the extraction of ten of his teeth. The day's work 
may not be a continuous ecstatic delight (probably such a 
continuity is psychologically impossible, and the very idea 
is s ickly) , but it may afford a warm glow to body and 
mind ; and, at any rate, involves no more real discomfort 
than si t t ing in a train. 
Except in matters of sport, where it for tunate ly still sur-
vives in fu l l vigour, there is, however, some danger of los-
ing the idea that work is good and sloth bad. I t is to be 
hoped, however, tha t the presumption is not to be alto-
gether reversed, and sloth to be elevated into a cardinal 
virtue and labour considered as a cancer of the soul. 
1 We have only to suppose tha t the consumer himself provides directly 
his share in the necessary labour and to calculate how much he would be 
willing to pay rather t han undergo this toil. "We might then discover 
that though for his box of matches every week he would {qua consumer) 
be willing to pay £ 1 and thus make 239 pence of consumer 's rent , he 
would gladly qua producer (if matchmaking were conducted by State 
conscription) pay more than £ 1 a week to find a substi tute. And thus 
on balance there is a deficit. 
2 Cf. Webb ' s Industrial Democracy, Vol. I I . , pp. 539-550. 
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There are, no doubt, forms of labour that are disgusting, 
degrading, and intolerable to a high-spirited people, and 
one par t of economic progress consists in their mitigation 
or abolition. But , 011 the other hand, a very large part of 
the work of the nation involves no real sufferiner, and if o ' 
replaced by complete idleness would certainly cause a 
loss of happiness. Even apart from the scantiness of the 
pay the pleasures of idleness in a strike tend to nausea. 
To lead a life of leisure is a difficult art.1 
By these and similar reasonings we reach the conclusion 
that , although the conceptions of util i ty and disutility may 
assist in the elucidation of the nature of economic progress, 
the assistance they give is rather formal and suggestive than 
substantial and historical. I t is indeed necessary to go 
behind the money to the utilities and the disutilities, but 
these again have to make way for other tests of progress. 
The theory of utility, like the theory of evolution or the 
theory of final causes, puts more questions than it answers. 
§ 5. The Progress of Population further considered. 
Before going fur ther it is worth considering more in 
detail the grounds of the opinion tha t an increase of popu-
lation is in general a decisive mark of increasing economic 
prosperity. In the first place, defence is still of more 
importance than opulence, and an increase in numbers 
means in general an increase in military power — actual 
or potential. Equally obvious is the increase in man's 
power over nature. Even simple combination of labour 
has its advantages, as has been admirably shown by Mr. 
Gomme.2 Still greater are the advantages of complex 
cooperation, as we see in our own days in the rapid 
development of new countries in which the progress of 
centuries is forced into a few decades. The growth of 
population is necessary to the improvement of the means 
of communication and of t rade ; trade brings capital, and 
1 Cf. Veblen 's Theory of the Leisured Class. 
2Village Community, e.g., see Ch. IV., on " T h e Origin of Terrace 
Cult ivat ion." 
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capital and land both give for a time an increasing return, 
and thus the increase of population means an increase of 
wealth per unit. 
Again, the actual increase of numbers shows that 
neither positive nor preventive checks are counteracting 
the natural growth. A natural increase of population 
that is kept down by positive checks points to a state 
of misery. Such was the state of England during the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. War , pestilence, and 
famine 1 laid low the people. The Black Death was only 
one example of a plague that was constantly recurring, 
just as Agincourt was one battle in an age when there 
was no peace. In the judgment of impartial historians, 
indeed, Agincourt was as disastrous to England as Ban-
nockburn was to Scotland. In the mediaeval period, in 
addition to the plague from the E a s t — t h e same in char-
acter as that now scourging Bombay — there was the 
typhoidal plague of the country, due to bad drainage, 
rot ten and insufficient food, dirty clothes, and filthy and 
crowded hovels; every town had its lazar-house for lepers, 
and yet they overflowed with bell and box in the high-
ways; smallpox was first chronicled in 1365, and, need-
less to state, came to s tay ; the sweating sickness which 
swept away thir ty thousand Londoners followed on the 
victory of Henry of Richmond, and consumption is the 
most probable translation of the morbus Anglicanus of 
the chronicles. The average death-rate of young children 
was equal to that which now obtains only in the worst 
slums. The stress of life wore down the vigour of those 
who escaped the fatality of recognised diseases. " We 
must bear in mind the fact that in the fourteenth century 
men were deemed old at an age which we should now 
esteem as almost young. Chaucer's pupil, Hoccleve, de-
scribes himself as worn out with old age and ready to 
1 On famines and food, see Denton 's England in Fifteenth Century, 
pp. 92, 3, 95 n. But compare Cunningham's English Industry and Com-
merce, Vol. I., p. 389. 
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die at the age of fifty-three; and all that he can look 
forward to is making a translation of a treatise 011 learn-
ing to die. 
" ' Of age a m I fifty win te r a n d th ree ; 
Ripeness of dea th fas t upon me has te th . ' " 1 
The principal, if not the only preventive, check that was 
in force during this period was religious celibacy, fourteen 
being the usual age for marriage in the aristocracy, both 
of boys and girls. But neither early marriages nor the 
immorality of religious persons kept the population from 
declining, and with the decline of population there was 
general decay. " Throughout England the progress of 
society in material wealth, which was so marked a feature 
of the reign of Edward I., had not merely been arrested; 
civilisation and refinement had gone back, and England 
at the accession of Henry VI I . was far behind the 
England of the thir teenth century."2 
The retrogression in Scotland was more pronounced and 
more prolonged. " Scotland in 1286," says Cosmo Innes,3 
" was more civilised and more prosperous than at any other 
period of her existence down to the year in which she 
ceased to be a separate kingdom, in 1707." 
Next to improvements in the physical condition of 
the people — which form, for example, such striking marks 
of progress in the Victorian era —• we may notice the 
improvements in morals and manners. The treatment of 
these topics by Porter in his classical work on the Progress 
of the Nation and that by Macaulay in his immortal chap-
ter 011 England in 1685, show that it is not necessary to 
apply any very metaphysical tests. The nation may have 
made more progress, perhaps, measured by the standard of 
Bentham than by the standard of K a n t ; but the direction 
and the magnitude of the progress effected in morals and 
manners cannot be disputed. To make reference again to 
1 Skeat ' s Chaucer, Vol. I., p. 16. 
- Denton, p. 120. 
3 Early Scottish History, p. 158. 
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the fifteenth century, we are told that the standard of 
morality could not well have been lower.1 And yet I am 
inclined to agree with Dr. Cunningham that the social in-
fluence of Puritanism in the seventeenth century 2 was most 
mischievous, and that it caused a deliberate acceptance 
of a lower tone of public duty, as for example in degrad-
ing the condition of labour, in the reckless treatment of 
native races, and in the development of the worst forms of 
slavery. 
The progress in morals and manners in the reign of Vic-
toria is shown by the diminution in ignorance, drunkenness, 
pauperism, vice, and crime, by the higher standard of the 
theatre and the press, and by the substitution of healthy 
for degrading amusements. A t the same time the quan-
tity of immorality and degradation, though proportionately 
less, is absolutely g rea t ; and, with all our economies and 
substitutions, human life and feeling are of all the prod-
ucts of civilisation still the most recklessly wasted. 
§ 6. Progress in Productive Powers. The progress in 
the productive powers of a nation may be considered from 
a purely objective standpoint, and from this point of view 
there can be no question of its reality. Whether or not, 
through the course of ages, nations have increased in hap-
piness per unit of population, or have approached nearer 
to any other standard of morality, may be a matter for 
argument; but there can be no doubt that the course of 
history shows an enormous, and, on the whole, a continu-
ous, increase in man's power over nature. The Roman 
roads, straight over the hills, and their bridges over great 
rivers, were in their day marvels of construction ; but they 
cannot be ranked with the railways that are tunnelled 
through mountains and carried over the great arms of the 
sea; and the Roman posts were, compared with our own, 
as snails to lightning. Transport and communication by 
land and water, the bases of industrial organisation, dur-
1 Denton, p. 119. 
2 Growth of English Industry and Commerce, Vol. I I . , p. 107. 
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ing the present century have revolutionised the world, 
and we have already ceased to wonder at powers which 
former ages could not even imagine as attributes of their 
deities. The extractive industries — mining, fisheries, even 
agriculture — show extraordinary advances, and the prog-
ress in manufactures, in the widest sense of the term, is 
astounding. The growth in man's power over nature ex-
tends to the control over pestilences; as already observed, 
the same plague was formerly as fatal and as recurrent in 
Europe as at present in India. There is no science which 
has not added to the knowledge and power of mankind. 
A given amount of human energy, working with the requi-
site mental and material capital, has greater and greater 
efficiency. 
§ 7. Progress in Exchange. Progress in exchange is co-
incident with progress in production, of which, indeed, it is 
logically a part. The greatest improvements of the nine-
teenth century have been in transport and the means of 
communication. The development of trade and commerce 
is shown by so many indisputable signs that the point 
requires no elaboration. The survival of the fittest and 
the law of substitution again find manifold exemplifica-
tion. 
I t is not, however, only in the present century that the 
principle of exchange has become of vital importance in 
economic progress. The greatest agent in such progress 
has been the substitution of a money for a natural economy. 
The advantages of commutation have already been dis-
cussed, and the evidence might be indefinitely extended.1 
I t is perhaps more to the purpose at the present time to 
point out some of the clangers of the unfettered develop-
ment of a money economy. The owner of money is in 
some respects like the owner of slaves. I t has already 
1 Of. the " Dialogue on the Exchequer , " Stubbs 's Select Charters. The 
Indian evidence {e.g., in Baden-Powell 's Land Hevenue Systems of India) 
gives, perhaps, the most striking examples of the progress of commuta-
tion. See also Cunningham's Western Civilisation, "Vol. II . , p. 70 sq. 
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been observed that slavery may be considered as a stage in 
industrial progress, and that the owner of slaves will com-
pel them to produce what it would not be worth his while 
to produce for himself or theirs for themselves. And the 
idea is capable of a far wider application. Any one who 
can dispose of any power over others —- whether in the 
form of superstition, custom, or law — may force them to do 
for him what they would never do for themselves. This 
is the principal element of t ru th in M. Loria's great argu-
ment. And under a money economy, the power of the 
owner of money over the person with no money is often 
a power of life and death. In old times in periods of 
scarcity free men sold their children, their wives, and 
themselves into absolute slavery — they bartered their 
liberty for their lives. Under a money economy people 
barter day by day fragments of liberty for fragments of 
life — it may be they barter fragments of what they call 
their souls for the support of what they feel to be their 
bodies. And just as in many fundamental characters the 
progress of society consists in the substitution of money 
payments, based on contract for payments in kind, based 
on law or custom, so in other matters of vital importance 
to the State, progress lies in the complete or partial 
abolition of money payments and of freedom of contract, 
and retrogression lies in the extension of a money economy 
and of the license of individuals. 
The idea of material progress must on any view be 
subordinate to the ideas of freedom and humanity.1 
Equali ty before the law, one great practical principle 
derived from these ideas, rests on the maxim tha t justice 
cannot be bought and sold. The administration of justice 
no doubt has a real money cost, and it is generally de-
sirable, even if we descend no nearer to principles than 
the expediency of a finis litium, to put some of the expense 
upon unsuccessful l i t igants; and the expense of counsel 
no doubt also favours the rich, although with a strong 
1 See below, Bk. V., Ch. II . 
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unbribable judicature this danger is lessened.1 But the 
ideal of justice is to treat rich and poor alike. The wliple 
t reatment of the " m e r e " labourer as he used to be 
called2 has in the present century been guided by the 
principle that some portions at least of health, morality, 
and freedom ought not to be salable for money. It has 
probably always been the theory, and to some extent 
always the practice, of Christianity that its services 
ought not to be bought and sold; and undoubtedly the 
worst corruption of the Church has begun through the 
corruption through money,3 and the poorest churches, as 
Adam Smith pointed out, have kept nearest the Christian 
ideal. 
The tendency of modern times is to make education a 
free gift , and already in England the working-classes can 
obtain education more cheaply than religion or justice. 
The fur ther development of this topic may be deferred 
to the following book, on the principles of governmental 
action. W e shall then see that the progress achieved by 
a money economy is at tended by serious drawbacks. 
§ 8. Progress hi Distribution. In production and ex-
change, economic progress is in the last resort an economy 
of means for the fulfilment of various ends that are sup-
posed to be given, or taken for granted. Man requires 
food, clothing, shelter, and ornaments in increasing abun-
dance and variety, and in the course of progress a certain 
amount of economic effort satisfies his wants in these 
respects to a greater and greater degree. 
Progress in the distribution of wealth, however, seems 
only to be intelligible as progress toward a recognised 
ideal of justice or happiness, and thus to demand an ethical 
1 Cf. Pareto, dp. cit., I I . , p. 57, on some of the advantages of the venality 
of justice. 
2 E.g., J acob in the Inquiry into the Production and Consumption of 
the Precious Metals (1831). 
3 In the fourteenth century it is complained that all the sacraments mus t 
be paid for except ashes, i.e., penance. Skeat 's Chaucer, Vol. VII . , p. 490. 
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and subjective standard. W e might discover, for example, 
progress in the sense of greater happiness coupled with 
retrogression in self-reliance and f reedom—and how is the 
balance to be struck ? Fortunately this conflict between 
moral standards is generally more formidable in casuistry 
than in economics. Freedom and self-respect bulk so largely 
in estimates of happiness, and indeed all the ordinary 
virtues are in general to such an extent consciously or 
unconsciously utilitarian,1 that, taking the nation as a 
whole, progress in happiness and progress in freedom and 
virtue are largely the results of similar conditions. There 
are no doubt fundamental differences and deep-rooted ex-
ceptions, at certain times of vital impor tance; 2 but most 
of the signs of economic progress in distribution would 
be generally accepted by different schools of morality, just 
as the normal signs of health are accepted by different 
schools of medicine. The economic principle of distribu-
tion may be described as tha t which insures maximum 
efficiency in jjroduction at a minimum cost, which tends 
to proportion reward to effort, which secures the fruits 
of the productive agents to their creators and preservers, 
which demands a minimum of the authoritative control 
of a force majeure and extends the freedom of each with 
the freedom of a l l : and this economic principle of distribu-
tion may be easily reconciled with any recognised system of 
moral philosophy. If we take distinctive periods of English 
economic history, — and I take England on account of the 
continuity and variety of its experience, — we find this 
economic principle becoming of greater and greater influ-
ence. The Roman occupation of Britain was, as regards 
production and exchange, an advance in civilisation, but 
the Roman methods of distributing wealth were the destruc-
tion of their empire. The masters worked their slaves to 
death, and the officials taxed the masters to dea th ; there 
we have the great cause of the fall of Roman power. In 
the Saxon period we have an improvement, but the powers 
1 Cf. Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics. 2 See Bk. V. , Ch. I. 
26 ECONOMIC P R O G R E S S . 
of privilege and authority are still altogether in the as-
cendant over the economic principle. The Saxon Land 
Charters are to us amongst the most amusing documents 
of history. Nearly every one narrates that the king grants 
so much land to some churchman or churchwoman in 
consideration of so much prayer for his soul, and only 
occasionally we find the more material consideration pro 
ejus amabili pecunia. The lands are granted with all the 
customary rights over the people living on them, and with 
or without exemptions of services and dues to the king or 
other superior. But the point is that the whole scheme of 
distribution from the share of the king to the share of the 
tlie6w is pervaded by privilege and authority. The sphere 
of contract is as limited as the rights of labour. From 
the Norman Conquest to the end of the mediaeval period 
with the fif teenth century, the economic principle of dis-
tribution makes great progress,—at destroys the privileges 
of the king, the nobility, and the Church ; it destroys even 
the power of the land-owner over his serfs. The destruc-
tion does not amount to annihilation, but i t marks the 
advent of a new system. The rights of the land-owners 
to rents and of the Church to tithes are still defended, 
but mainly on the grounds of security and prescription. 
The powers of guilds and corporations are restricted or 
abolished. Monopolies and similar methods of private 
taxation are made unlawful and unconstitutional. 
The method of distribution by privilege and authority 
in the present day survives in inheritance in combinations 
and in forms of custom and public opinion, but it survives 
on sufferance only. The working-man who pays for a 
seat in church and the gentleman who tips his host's 
servants do so of what is called their free w i l l — b u t the 
compulsion is generally custom and the authority of 
opinion. In our own times in the last fifty years the 
acceptance of the economic principle as an ideal has be-
come even more remarkable than its adoption as a practi-
cal rule of politics. " To each the product of his own 
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labour," is held up as the ideal by those who confess 
their inability to determine how the portion of each is to 
be separated and assigned.1 And once this principle be-
comes as effective as the older principles of birth or the-
ology which it has displaced, we may look for a fur ther 
vast contraction of privilege. Quieta non movere is a 
good maxim for those in possession, but does not appeal 
to revolutionaries. Account must be taken also of the 
rush and hurry of modern life. In all ages we find refer-
ences to the shortness of life and the certainty of death. 
But in general it is only in times of pestilence or other 
great disasters tha t this idea has become predominant over 
the ordinary sentiments of morality and religion. In our 
day, however, we incline to live as if surrounded by plague 
and fire, and we cannot afford to wait — we think that to 
lose time is to lose l i fe ; like Christian in one thing, we 
take up our burdens and run. Under such an emotional 
atmosphere every one is stimulated to discover short cuts 
to fortune, and every one is anxious that no one shall 
have more than his fair share. And, however difficult it 
may be to effect an ideal distribution on the principle of 
each according to his deserts or his needs, it is very easy 
to discover particular cases in which the minority appear 
to the majority to have far more than they deserve or 
need, or than is required by any idea of security of prop-
erty and person. 
Security is only one of the conditions of industrial prog-
ress, and security has proved to be compatible with very 
different systems of distribution. To revolutionaries in a 
hurry this is the first and the last lesson of history. 
§ 9. Summary of Characteristics of Economic Progress. 
W e may now summarise the general characteristics of a 
1 Cf. The Bight to the Whole Produce of Labour of Anton Menger 
(translation 1899), with the excellent introduction of Professor Fox-
well. The ideal was recognised before the Peasan t Revolt (1381). 
" Ech man shall live by his travayl, 
Who best doth shall have most mede." 
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progressive society from the economic standpoint. W e 
may place, first, an increase in population, the growth in 
numbers being associated with an improvement in quality 
indicated by various signs, e.g., as regards health, morals, 
and manners, cost of education and earning capacity, rise 
in the general s tandard of life and standard of comfor t ; 
and negatively as regards the diminution of pauperism, 
crime, and the lessened need of the authori tat ive control 
of governments. 
W e have, secondly, an increase in material and immate-
rial weal th — the increase in its aggregate money value 
(measured by a uniform or adjusted s tandard) being asso-
ciated with improvements in quali ty and variety. 
Thirdly, we find improvements in the means of produc-
tion, including the processes of exchange, involving a dimi-
nution in real cost, and an increase in productive power as 
shown by economies of time, energy, and disutil i t j ' . 
Fourthly , as regards the distribution of wealth, we find, 
as regards the whole society, an increase of general happi-
ness and well-being, and as regards the consti tuent indi-
viduals, an increase of personal freedom, whilst reward 
is more proportioned to the efficiency of labour, and less 
wealth is accorded to privilege or extracted by public or 
private taxation. 
I t is plain that economic progress being so complex, we 
may find progress in some directions associated with retro-
gression in others, and the balance may be indeterminate, or 
irreducible to the same common measure. If, however, we 
compare the last quarter of the nineteenth century with 
any corresponding period of progress, it will, I think, 
appear that the modern industrial system involves for the 
nation, as a whole, far higher and more complex moral and 
intellectual capacities and activities; and that the mental 
and moral factors of production are now more than ever 
of greater moment than physical conditions. 
And it seems tha t in the coming century economic prog-
ress will more than ever be governed by intellectual and 
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moral forces. The p h y s i c a l sciences are increasing man's 
power over nature and extending his knowledge of natural 
laws at an astonishing r a t e ; and at an astonishing rate 
also man's insight into moral laws is advanc ing ,—witness 
the progress of the sciences of comparative rel igions1 and 
of comparative moralities. 
1 Cf. Flint, op. cit., p. 165. See also J . G. Frazer ' s Golden Bough 
(2d edition), Preface and Ch. I. 
C H A P T E R II . 
PROGRESS AND MONEY. 
§ 1. Progress with Reference to Money and its Functions. 
The definition and functions of money have been dis-
cussed in an earlier book.1 W e have seen that in modern 
civilised societies, an exact definition of the standard meas-
ure of value is laid clown by the law of the country, just 
as in the case of other measures, and that, although sim-
plicity is not essential to exactness, it is highly convenient. 
Such exactness is required for the interpretation of mone-
tary contracts. 
Similarly as regards the definition of money as a medium 
of exchange, particular governments define by law what 
is to constitute legal tender, so that the monetary obliga-
tions may be fulfilled. In general also they provide a cer-
tain portion of this legal tender, but in general a portion 
only. As regards standard metallic money, in the normal 
case the quanti ty issued depends on the quanti ty of the 
metal brought to the mints by private persons. Thus if 
there are no laws against melting or exportation, and no 
seigniorage, the amount of such money in circulation is 
regulated automatically. 
In general, governments have found it expedient to sup-
plement the standard metallic money by other forms of 
legal tender, over the issues of which they exercise more 
control (e.g., token coins and bank-notes), and also to al-
low the legal extinction of monetary debts by payments 
of " representat ive" money. Economic progress largely 
depends upon or is associated with the development of the 
1 Vol. II . , Bk. III . , Ch. XI., p. 95. 
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two primary functions of metallic money, namely, certainty 
in the definition of the monetary standard and certainty in 
the medium of exchange that conforms thereto. 
The interpretat ion also of the history of prices,1 which 
is always a fundamenta l par t of economic history, requires 
in the different periods an examination of the na ture of 
the standard and the condition of the medium of exchange. 
From the Norman Conquest downward we have very 
ful l and accurate records of the principal changes in the 
metallic money of England, both as a s tandard and as a 
medium. In both respects there have been vast changes, 
sometimes gradual and protracted, sometimes sudden and 
violent, sometimes forced upon, sometimes initiated by, 
government. 
In English monetary history, we have examples of a single 
s tandard and currency of silver, of various forms of ra ted 
and unrated bi-metallism, and of a single s tandard of gold 
wi th silver as subsidiary. W e have important examples 
also of depreciation and debasement of the currency and 
of recoinages; of convertible paper, of inconvertible, and of 
the resumption of specie payments. I t is not too much 
to say that there is scarcely any present monetary problem 
which cannot be i l lustrated f rom past English experience, 
whilst the history of English indust ry and commerce re-
quires a continuous reference to monetary conditions 
which can only be adequately understood by the aid of 
highly developed economic theories. The great historian 
of Engl ish prices, — Thorold Rogers, — as will be shown 
presently, falls into the most serious errors in his inter-
pretation, owing to his neglect of the guiding hypotheses 
of theory. 
I propose in the following sections to trace the princi-
pal changes in the Engl ish s tandard and in the medium 
of exchange. I t will be found necessary, in consequence 
of the interaction of these functions, to blend the two in-
quiries, which logically might be bet ter separated. This 
1 See next chapter. 
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examination of the anatomy of the monetary sj^stem is a 
necessary preliminary to any interpretation of movements 
in prices.1 
Changes in the value of the standard or the purchasing 
power of money are best considered separately in the form 
of movements in general prices.2 
§ 2. The Silver Pound and the Silver Penny. These 
are two portions of the existing English monetary system 
that can be traced to time immemorial, or at any rate to 
the time of the Norman Conquest. First, the " ancient 
r ight s t anda rd" of silver, except during the brief Tudor 
debasement (begun 1543 and rectified by Elizabeth in 1560), 
was never disturbed and still survives, viz.: 11 ounces, 2 
pennyweights of fine silver to 18 pennyweights of alloy.3 
Secondly, from the Conquest the monetary pound, con-
sidered as the standard measure, has always been equiva-
lent to 20 shillings, and the shilling to 12 pennies, which 
proportion still survives. In this case, however, the iden-
tity is only of words and arithmetical proportion, the 
meanings have undergone complete transformation. To 
trace the transformation of the silver pound into the 
golden sovereign as the standard measure is one of the 
most interesting and instructive inquiries in monetary 
history, and it brings out most clearly the influence of the 
actual currency upon the standard, and of the power of 
circumstances over the " mere " 4 will of kings. 
In order to bring out as clearly as possible the chief 
1 See below, Chs. I I I . and IV. 
2 See next chapter. 
3 There was a slight debasement of silver under Edward I I I . (1335-
1344). For the sake of comparison it may here be observed by anticipa-
tion tha t there is no such remarkable continuity in the quality of the gold 
coins. The gold pennies of Henry III . were of pure gold. From Edward 
III . (1343) to Henry VI I I . (1526), the fineness of gold was 23 carats 3J 
grains fine to J grain of al loy; f rom 1527 to 1600 it varied between this 
limit and 20 carats, and was finally fixed at 22 fine to 2 of alloy in 1634. 
Thus for the fixed fineness of gold we have only three centuries — whick is, 
however, remarkable, in comparison with other changes. Cf. below, § 5. 
4 The monetary term for arbi trary. 
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stages in the development, I shall deal only with the prin-
cipal coins and moneys of account.1 
To begin with — from 1066 to 1 3 0 0 — t h e pound weight 
(Tower ) of silver was coined into 240 pennies, and with the 
exception of some foreign coins the silver penny was the 
only coin in use ; round silver farthings and halfpence 
were seldom coined till 1300. Twelve pennies were called 
a shilling (solidus) ; and the shilling was a convenient money 
of account ; but the first coinage of actual shillings was in 
1504 (18th Henry V I I . ) , b}r which time the penny had 
fallen in weight f rom 22.} gra ins 2 to 12 grains. 
The principal stages in the fall of the weight of the sil-
ver penny (which is still coinable and occasionally coined 
for royal ceremonies) are as fo l lows : 3 — 
W i l l i a m I . . 1066 . 901 g ra ins 
28th E d w a r d I . . . . . . 1300 . 22 u 
18th E d w a r d I I I . . . . . 1344 . . 20 i u 
20th E d w a r d I I I . . . . . 1346 . . 20 (( 
25th E d w a r d I I I . . . tt 
13th H e n r y IV . . . . . . 1412 . . 15 u 
4th E d w a r d IV. . . . . 1464 . . 12 a 
18th I l e n r y V I I I . . . . . 1527 . • 101 a 
34th H e n r y V I I I . . . . . 1543 . . 10 u 
6th E d w a r d VI . . . . . 1552 . . 8 a 
43d E l i z a b e t h . . . . . . 1601 . • 74 it 
56th George I I I . . . . . 1816 . • n a 
The principal changes in the seigniorage of silver (or 
the amount charged by the mint for coinage) are the 
fol lowing: From 1280 to 1464 the average was about Is . 
in the p o u n d ; it then rose to 4s. 6cl., fell in 1470 to 2s., in 
1482 to Is. Qd., and in 1509 to Is., a t which it remained 
unt i l the great debasement of 1543. From 1552 to 1666 
the seigniorage varied from Is. to 2s., and was then 
1 Cf. Hawkins (edition 1887), and Kenyon (edition 1884), for the Silver 
and Gold Coins of England respectively. 
2 The Tower pound of 5400 grains divided by 240. 
3 This table is taken f rom Hawkins ' s Silver Coins of England (1887), 
p . 7. 
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abandoned, till in 1816 silver ceased to be the standard, 
and silver coins became tokens. 
Thus, except during the ten years of debasement, the 
seigniorage was not very heavy, and was tolerably uniform; 
but the abolition of the seigniorage on silver and on gold 
in 1666 led to important consequences, which will be 
considered after dealing with the gold coinage. 
The other silver coins issued at various periods (e.g., 
groats) may be regarded as convenient amalgamations 
of pennies, and the uses and abuses of various tokens 1 may 
be removed from the main path of inquiry. 
§ 3. The Gold Penny and Early Forms of Bi-metallism. 
I t is important to notice tha t from the earliest times down 
to 1816 (when the practice was abolished by law) for-
eign coins were frequently made current in England at 
certain specified values by royal proclamation. The in-
fluence of foreign upon English coinage was greatly 
increased by this practice, and must always be borne in 
mind. From the end of the ninth century to the middle 
of the th i r t een th 2 there was no national gold coinage, 
either in England or in any of the neighbouring countries. 
Gold bezants, s t ruck in Byzantium, and some Arabic coins 
in Sicily were used as bullion and occasionally penetrated 
to this country. They had, however, no legal currency 
and no official rating. 
In the middle of the thirteenth century, which even 
the numismat is t 3 is forced to call " an age of revolution 
and of new ideas all over the world," a native gold coin-
age was almost simultaneously adopted by the European 
nations. The first gold florin was issued by the Republic 
of Florence in 1252.4 
In 1257 Henry I I I . issued gold pennies, and made a 
1 Cf. Bk. I I . , Ch. XI I I . , § 3. 
2 Kenyon, Gold Coins of England (edition 1884), p. 14. 
3 Kenyon. 
4 For the early history of gold coins in Europe generally, see W . A. 
Shaw's History of the Currency. 
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proclamation tha t they should be cur ren t wi th in the realm 
of E n g l a n d in all t ransact ions of buy ing and sel l ing a t 
the ra te of twen ty pennies or s ter l ings (i.e., silver pennies) 
for every gold penny. T h e amoun t of gold contained in 
one of these pennies t ha t s u r v i v e s 1 is 45 grains, t ha t is 
about two-fifths of the fine gold of the present sovereign 
(113 grains) , and the value gives a rat io of gold to silver of 
less than 10 :1 . I t is in teres t ing to notice t h a t in less than 
three months the k i n g had to issue another proclamat ion 
tha t no one should be obliged to t ake them, and tha t any 
one who did migh t obtain the va lue a t which they had 
been made cur ren t a t the k ing ' s Exchange , deduc t ing only 
a ha l fpenny in silver for each gold piece. In 1265 the i r 
value was raised by proclamat ion to twen ty- four pence. 
No f u r t h e r a t tempts a t gold coinage were made til l 
1343. I n t ha t year i t was agreed tha t , to encourage t rade , 
one k ind of gold money should be made both in E n g l a n d 
and in F landers . T h e coin chosen was called the florin, 
and was declared equal in va lue to 6s.2;, i t was soon dis-
covered t h a t the new coins were va lued too high, and they 
were consequent ly genera l ly r e f u s e d ; accordingly, by a 
proclamation of the nex t year , they were to be t aken only 
wi th the consent of the receiver, and shor t ly a f te r they 
were to be considered simply as bull ion. T h u s we have a 
s ta r t l ing example of the rapid t rans i t ion of ra ted in to 
un ra t ed bi-metallism — a bi-metallism, moreover, in i ts 
origin in ternat ional . 
In the nex t year (1344) , however , was issued the cele-
bra ted n o b l e ; in weight 1 3 8 ^ - grains, and conta in ing a 
f i f th more fine gold than the modern sovereign.3 T h e 
value procla imed was 6s. 8c?., which, a t 20^ gra ins to t h e sil-
ver penny, gives a rat io of about 1 1 : 1 . T h e principal 
object was again to faci l i ta te foreign t rade , and no o ther 
gold or silver except these nobles could be expor ted . 
I n 1346 the we igh t of both gold and silver money was 
1 Kenyon, p. 15 and frontispiece. 
2 Ibid., p. 17. 'Ibid., p. 18. 
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diminished, but in spite of this diminution it was found 
that the English coins were so much better than those of 
other nations that they were exported and base money 
brought into the realm, and accordingly the weight of 
both gold and silver coins was still fur ther diminished. 
Other significant facts in the evidence are : In 1381 the 
" intr insic" value of the gold coins was higher than the nomi-
nal, and as a consequence gold coins of this date are very 
rare ; in 1411, because of the great scarcity of money in 
the realm, the weight of all the coins was reduced, the no-
ble falling to 108 grains; in 1421 gold coins are less scarce 
than silver, so that silver money could not be obtained in 
exchange for a noble even of ful l we igh t ; in 1464 the 
weight of the silver coins was reduced, and the weight of 
the gold coins remaining the same they were raised in 
nominal value (e.g., the noble from 6s. 8d. to 8s. 4rf.) ; in 
1465 the weight of the noble was raised to 120 grains, and 
its nominal value to 10s. This new noble was officially 
called the rose noble — the white rose, the Yorkist badge, 
being prominent in the ornamentation ; but popularly it 
became known as the real or royal, a name borrowed from 
a French coin with the figure of a king in his robes. The 
influence of the French name is noteworthy, as it was inap-
propriate to the English coin. 
§ 4. The Sovereign first coined. I t is remarkable how 
many different events combine to mark the end of the 
mediieval period. One of these is the coinage of the sov-
ereign by Henry VI I . in 1489. This sovereign was double 
the weight of the royal (240 grains — that is, about double 
the weight of our present sovereign), and its most signifi-
cant ornament was the double rose, indicating the union of 
York and Lancaster. The nominal value of the sovereign 
was 20s. and it may be recalled that for the first time silver 
shillings were coined in 1504. In 1522 and 1525 — it must 
be presumed in consequence of the deficiency of English 
coinage — several fresh foreign coins, both of gold and 
silver, were proclaimed current in England at certain de-
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clared values, and it was made penal to refuse them.1 
Notwithstanding, it appears that there was a scarcity of 
gold coins, and in 1526 Wolsey was commanded to make 
such alterations in the king's gold money as might reduce 
it to an equality with that of foreign countries. Accord-
ingly the sovereign was raised in nominal value to 22s., and 
a little later to 22s. 6d., the old weight and fineness being 
still preserved. 
§ 5. " Crown " Gold. In this year also gold crowns 
and half-crowns were struck of the French standard of 
gold fineness, viz., 22 fine to 2 of alloy — the first instance 
of a gold coin of less than the old English standard fine-
ness. This new " c r o w n " gold eventually became the 
standard of fineness. In 1543 the fineness of the sovereign 
was somewhat debased, in 1544 still fur ther , and in 1545 2 
the lowest point ever reached in England for gold was at-
tained, viz., 20 carats fine to 4 of alloy. 
In 1548 the standard of " c r o w n " gold was reverted to, 
and in Mary's reign the old English standard was resumed. 
Elizabeth, however, by her first proclamation reintro-
duced a baser gold currency and issued sovereigns of 
" c r o w n " gold of 20s. value. Gold coins during this 
reign were, however, also issued of the old standard. 
This curious combination of gold coins of different stand-
ards continued with various oscillations unti l 1634, since 
which time " c rown" gold has been the only standard 
used. 
§ 6. The Unite and the Guinea. In 1604 James I. 
issued coins called unites of 20s. value, in commemora-
tion of the Unions of England and Scotland, but neither 
name nor coin displaced the old sovereign. 
In 1663 new gold money was issued of 20s. (and other 
multiples and sub-multiples thereof) . The new 20s. piece 
was called the guinea (as much of the gold was supposed 
to come from that quarter) , and Avas marked with a small 
e l ephan t—la te r an elephant and castle. 
1 For details, see Kenyon, p. 80. 2 Ibid., p. 95. 
38 ECONOMIC P R O G R E S S . 
Iii 1661 the value of all the old current gold coins had 
been raised by proclamation, and thus the new guinea was 
made lighter in weight. These old coins, however, re-
mained in circulation at various values. 
In 1670 the guinea was fur ther reduced in weight to 
129|-£ grains, and all subsequent guineas were of this 
weight and of the " crown " gold standard. The effort, 
however, to keep the principal gold coin of the realm of 
the value of 20s. in silver was doomed to failure, if for 
no other reason, through the great depreciation of the 
actual silver coinage. 
In 1691 the silver coins in circulation had become so 
clipped and worn that the guinea, nominally worth 20s., 
was usually given and received for 30s. 
§ 7. Review of Six Centuries. Before considering the 
effects of the great recoinage of 1696, it will be useful 
to give very briefly the principal results of this survey 
of six centuries of English experience (1066-1696). 
(1 ) Dar ing the whole period the real standard metal 
was silver, and with the exception of a very brief inter-
val the ancient fineness was undisturbed. 
(2 ) The quanti ty of standard metal which constituted 
the standard measure of values was the pound; and, to 
begin with, 240 silver pennies weighed exactly one pound, 
and silver pennies (sometimes broken into halves and quar-
ters for change), constituted the whole native coinage. 
(3 ) As wealth and trade increased, foreign gold coins 
became current, and eventually the national silver was sup-
plemented by national gold coinage. 
(4 ) Throughout the whole period after the effective in-
troduction of gold coins, such coins were used as equiva-
lent to varying amounts of silver. The usual course was 
for the king to proclaim the nominal silver value of new 
issues of gold, and to adjust the value of the old coins 
tha t remained in circulation. But in England, as in every 
other country of Europe, the legal ratio was constantly 
diverging from the market ratio, and from the ratio pre-
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vailing in other countries. As a consequence, the dearer 
metal (i.e., the undervalued metal in the coinage) was con-
stantly melted down and exported. Thus bi-metallism by 
proclamation was constantly breaking down. Gold coins 
were always in use, but the tendency was for rated bi-metal-
lism to become unrated, and then, owing to the inconven-
ience of this system, or want of system, to be again officially 
rated — and then to break down again into unrated. 
(5 ) The difficulty in fixing the ratio was increased by 
the progressive fall in the weight of the silver coins down 
to 1601. There was no idea of fixing a ratio as such, i.e., 
between gold and silver as metals, but the value of go ld 
coins was expressed in terms of silver coins — so many 
silver pennies, or aggregates of such penn ies—actua l or 
ideal (e.g., shillings). The name pound was retained, but 
a pound of silver actually made three times as many pen-
nies when the silver penny obtained its fixed weight 
(7|- grains in 1601) as it did in the early mediaeval period 
(221 grains, 1066-1300). 
(6 ) Four causes may be assigned for this progressive 
fall in weight of the silver coinage during the mediaeval 
period: — 
(a ) The natural (and f raudulent ) wear and tear of 
the coins gradually reduced the actual currency below 
the nominal weight, and from time to time the government 
recognised the de facto depreciation, and on a new coinage 
altered the meaning of the standard (i.e., the number of 
pennies to be made from a pound of silver), whilst retain-
ing the old names and propor t ions—the pound, shilling, 
and penny. 
(5) The effect of this natural depreciation was increased 
by the use of inferior foreign coins, which were allowed to 
be current and were often overvalued. As a consequence 
the better national coins were melted or exported. 
(<?) The national gold coin was also occasionally over-
valued with the same result. 
( d ) In the mediaeval period there was an increasing 
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scarcity of the precious metals as the old mines were 
exhausted, and there was also an increasing demand for 
them, and comparatively a small use of credit substitutes. 
No government could afford to under take the expense of 
a recoinage at the old s tandard of weight, and the only 
practical way to meet the scarcity of money was to recog-
nise the depreciation. 
Except in the short Tudor debasement it cannot be 
alleged tha t the k ing depreciated the coinage for his own 
gain.1 The preservation of the ancient s tandard of fine-
ness and the comparatively low and steady seigniorage 
also support this view. 
I t is a curious coincidence that the great debasement 
should have taken place just before the mines of Potosi 
were to give abundant supplies of new silver, and that the 
penny should have been fixed at its lowest weight as stand-
ard money after these supplies had become available. The 
effect on prices will be examined in the next chapter. 
(e) The abolition of the seigniorage on both gold and 
silver in 1666 — the insti tution of free and gratuitous 
coinage of both metals — increased the force and rapidity 
of the action of Gresham's Law. 
The slightest mistake on the par t of government in pro-
claiming the value of the gold coins — the addition, for ex-
ample, of a few pence to the nominal value of the sovereign 
—• was sufficient to cause an import of gold and export of 
fu l l value silver. Thus the actual silver currency became 
rapidly depreciated, and again the value of gold in that 
currency was gradually rated higher. 
The evils of the f luctuat ing and depreciated currency 
soon became so intolerable that a recoinage of silver and 
revaluation of gold became necessary.2 
1 See also " T h e Debasement under Edward I I I . , Economic Journal, 
June , 1897, p. 185. 
2 The efiects are examined in the following section. The table given 
by Kenyon is useful as showing the progressive depreciation of the silver 
penny (and its multiples) relatively to gold (Kenyon, p. 211). A com-
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§ 8. From the Recoinage of 1696 to the Grold Standard 
of 1816. In 1695 the guinea, nominally worth 20s., was 
usually given and received for 30s., and since estimates 
show that the silver coins contained on an average only 
half their proper quantity of silver, the price would have 
been higher still but for the limited quantity of these sil-
ver coins.1 
To anticipate a little, the amount of foreign gold coins 
current was also very large. This is shown by the fact 
that the edict of 1700, proclaiming that the French louis 
d'or and the Spanish pistole should not go for more than 
17s., brought to the mint (according to the report of Sir 
Isaac Newton) the enormous mass of £1,400,000 for re-
coinage. 
The specific measures introduced by Parl iament to re-
store the silver coinage, e.g., the fixing of dates after which 
the coins would not be accepted at their nominal values, 
and generally the remedies resorted to, have been described 
as vividly as the disorders of the depreciation once for all 
by Macaulay. Suffice it to note as a measure of the griev-
ance that the cost to the nation of the remedy was nearly 
£3 ,000 ,000—an enormous sum for the time. As the sil-
ver coinage was restored, the rating of the guinea grad-
ually fell, and by an Act of 1696 a penalty was imposed on 
all who paid or received guineas at a higher rate than 
22s. By 1698 the current price fell to 21s. 6d., at which 
rate the guineas were received in government offices. 
A report of Newton in 1701 states that the louis d'or or 
pistole, owing to a change in the ratio in France, would no 
longer be equal to 17s., and he calculated that the guinea 
was overvalued at 21s. 6d., the current rate.2 As a natural 
consequence the gold coinage again began to displace the 
parison with the table of ratios of gold to silver shows how much was due 
to the fall in the weight of the penny, and how much to the relative de-
preciation of the metal. See Table in Horton 's Silver Pound, p. 98, for 
amounts of gold and silver coined. 
i Horton, p. 72, date, 1695-1690. 2 Horton's Table, p. 98. 
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newly coined silver.1 In 1717 Newton reported tha t in 
silver bull ion the guinea was wor th only 20s. 8d. , and Par -
l iament went so fa r to meet him as to fix the value a t 21s. 
Th i s difference in favour of the gold coin was probably 
chiefly due to the influence of the gold in teres t (i.e., the 
moneyed classes), and par t ly perhaps , to the a t t ract iveness 
of a round number to those not in teres ted. B u t s l ight as 
the difference seemed, when it was t aken in conjunct ion 
w i t h open and gra tu i tous mintage for both gold and silver, 
i t sufficed to make gold the principal currency. T h e 
whole of the new ful l -weight silver coins had disappeared 
in a few years.' 
By 1774 the gold coinage itself had by progressive 
deter iorat ion become so depreciated tha t a recoinage was 
necessa ry ; and in 1776 all gold coins weighing less than 
128 grains to the gu inea were made no longer cur-
ren t . 
I n 1797, there being a g rea t dear th of silver money,2 a 
new gold coin of the th i rd of a gu inea was issued. 
In 1813 was the last coinage of guineas, and half and 
th i rd guineas. I n 1816 gold was made the sole measure 
of value and unl imi ted legal tender , and the silver coinage 
was definitely diminished in weight and became an avowed 
token wi th l imited tender . 
I n 1817 a new coinage of sovereigns was issued at 
123.27447 grains ( w i t h half sovereigns in propor t ion) of 
the s t andard of " crown " gold, and this marks the final 
vic tory in E n g l a n d of gold over silver, and the final dis-
p lacement of the silver pound. 3 
1 Note of Horton, p. 118 ; the full-weight silver disappeared and the 
effect of the recoinage was lost. 
2 From 1801 to 1815 practically no silver was coined at the mint , and 
the Bank of England was authorised to issue " t o k e n s " of the nominal 
values of Is. 6d., 3s., and 5 s . , — t h e last being a Spanish dollar with the 
impress changed. 
3 In 1774 the first step was taken toward making silver token money. 
Legal tender was limited to twenty-five pounds, all debts above that 
amount being payable in silver by weight only at its commercial value. 
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§ 9. Survey of Results of Period 1696-1816. In tlie 
light of the evidence of which (bristling with figures as it 
seems) only the most significant facts have been adduced, 
there can be no question tha t the bi-metallism of this pe-
riod was productive of serious evils. The costly recoinage 
of 1696 was wasted in a few years; the overrating of gold 
made the full-weight silver disappear, and silver became so 
scarce that gold had to be issued in relatively small pieces. 
Any convenience there might be in being allowed to use 
gold for larger payments was more than neutralised by the 
deficiency of silver for ordinary purposes. 
An enthusiastic bi-metallist,1 in writing a TJehronie of 
what might have been, could no doubt point out that all 
that was required was a constant or f requent readjustment 
of the rating of gold. But this is asking too much of any 
king's exchanger. I t was to the economic interest of the 
taxpayers and of the great moneyed interests to have their 
guineas rated highly, and to the interest of all concerned 
in the bullion trade to send their gold to the best market. 
Fixing the value of gold by proclamation and by the cus-
tom of public offices no doubt tended to fix the rate in other 
transactions, and to somewhat raise the market price of 
gold in England. 
The country suffered from a deficiency of currency in 
spite of the two metals. 
The adoption of the gold standard by England was 
forced on it by circumstances. The particular time (1816) 
and manner of adoption ( the curious weight of the sov-
ereign) were no doubt the outcome of a series of " for-
tuitous " circumstances. But the survey of monetary 
history from the first introduction of gold seems to show 
that the adoption was the natural result of the develop-
ment of trade and commerce. 
I t must now be generally admitted that national, as dis-
1 E.g., Dana Horton. The term " u c h r o n i e " was coined by M. Re-
nouvier on the analogy of Utopia. I t is a history of the "migh t -have-
beens " of ideals. 
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t inct from international, bi-metallism is extremely unstable, 
and this view is confirmed by the English evidence. 
Not only does the official rating constantly differ from 
(or fail to follow quickly enough) the market rating, but 
the customary rate of exchange of gold and silver coins 
differs f rom the official rate. Thus there is the constantly 
recurring danger of alternative depletion of one or other 
of the currencies. 
Even if the system of parallel standards is officially 
adopted, and gold coins are supposed only to pass as 
bullion, still, as a matter of fact, they may as coins obtain 
a higher price. In any case the inconvenience of parallel 
s tandards is so great that it is impracticable, and one offi-
cial rate succeeds another as rapidly and uncertainly as 
modern weather forecasts. 
Accordingly, if any nation (not supported by an inter-
national convention of the kind recently proposed) wishes 
to use both gold and silver for coinage, it has two alterna-
tives, and practically two only: — 
First, it may protect its coins from the melting pot by a 
heavy seigniorage, or by limiting the quanti ty issued — in 
the one case giving them a scarcity value, in the other an 
artificial value. 
But , as the historical survey shows, even in its origin 
the principal use of gold was to facilitate international 
payments, and the other main use was to facilitate large 
paymen^_within the country. The artificial valuation of 
gold coiriS^wquld have hindered both these uses. 
Secondly, the other alternative is to make one metal into 
tokens for convenience, which involves, as already explained, 
the limitation of mintage, and the limitation of legal tender. 
Such a subsidiary coinage is of course confined1 to the 
country concerned, and is never melted or exported. 
Now it is quite clear that if only one metal is to be 
unlimited tender, there are very strong natural reasons — 
abundant ly i l lustrated by the English history cited — for 
1 If it is not, the Latin Union shows the difficulties involved. 
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making that metal gold. A token coinage of gold, i.e., 
legal tender only for small amounts and incapable of ex-
port, would be in contradiction with the principal uses of 
gold, namely, for international payments and for the larger 
domestic payments. The alleged greater stability of sil-
ver in value (i.e., as regards general prices) is still too 
obscure to guide governments. T h u s — f a i l i n g a wide 
international agreement strong enough to secure a fixed 
ratio—-the natural result in the l ight of historical devel-
opment is the adoption of the gold s tandard with silver as 
subsidiary, and notes and other representative forms of 
" money " as supplementary. The final adoption of the 
gold standard by the Western world has been hastened by 
two recent events : First , the great increase in the supplies 
of gold has lessened the danger of an appreciation and 
of a pressure on bank reserves; and secondly, the dislo-
cation of the Indian silver currency from its metallic value 
has lessened the influence of a depreciation of silver in 
causing an appreciation of gold. 
In any case, as often pointed out, the governments of 
the world are much more moved by such obvious incon-
venience as the expense of recoinage, than by any fear of 
a fu r ther general fall in prices. 
The subject of progress in relation to general prices de-
mands, however, a separate chapter. 
I t may be observed, in conclusion, that the failure of 
the fine arts to show the same continuous advance as ma-
terial production — often a notable exception in general 
progress—is well i l lustrated in the history of the English 
coinage. The material progress of the Victorian era is un-
paralleled in history, but the Victorian coins are altogether 
inferior in design to most of the celebrated Euglish coins. 
N O T E ON M E D I A E V A L C U R R E N C Y . — " The English Currency under Ed-
ward I . , " by C. G. Crump and A. Hughes (Economic Journal, March, 
1895), and " T h e Debasement of the Coinage under Edward I I I . , " by 
A. Hughes, C. G. Crump, and C. Johnson (Economic Journal, June , 
1897), are valuable monographs on mediaeval money, and usefully sup-
plement the s tandard works relied on in the text. 
C H A P T E R I I I . 
PROGRESS AND GENERAL PRICES. 
§ 1. The History of Prices in England. Thanks to the 
labours of Tliorold Rogers 1 we have abundant materials 
for the history of prices in Eng land from 1260 to 1702, and 
from other sources (e.g., the works of Anderson and 
Macpherson, A r t h u r Young, Tooke, and Newmarch) the 
records can be continued with increasing fulness and 
accuracy down to our own times. The great work of Rogers 
must still be considered for the most pa r t as coal at the 
pit 's mouth, requir ing much additional labour to convert 
it into l ight and power. I t is perhaps to be regret ted 
tha t Rogers did not confine his energies to the collection, 
revision, and elucidation of his prices. A careful s tudy 
of the materials collected wi th such mighty labour and 
perseverance shows tha t his commentaries fall far short 
of the value of the text . Many of his detailed inferences 
and comments are indeed most s tr iking, suggestive, and 
picturesque, and he has done as much as any wri ter to 
restore the material realities of mediaeval life. Even in 
detail, however, he is of ten painful ly inaccurate and even 
inconsistent.2 
1 Rogers died in 1887, shortly after the publication of Vols. V. and VI. 
of the History of Agriculture and Prices. Vols. VII . and VIII. were to 
carry on the work to 1793, when the works of Tooke and Newmarch begin. 
2 Vol. I., p. 177, he states that by the reign of Henry VIII . the penny 
issued from the mint sinks to little more than seven grains (instead of 
10J), and the context shows that the error is not a misprint, but the basis 
of a serious argument; in Vol. IV., p. 64, he states that the average price 
of the tod of wool in the 140 years of the first two volumes was 4s. 3 \d. , and 
was advanced to double the price in 1547, and to nearly five times in 1575. 
And his comment runs, " We need not, therefore, be surprised at find-
46 
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In his more general conclusions Rogers is still more 
open to criticism.1 l i e was unfortunately hasty, narrow 
and biassed in his judgment, and he was so much im-
pressed by the originality and comprehensiveness of his 
own task that he neglected as of no account the valuable 
work of others. The most curious point about his gen-
eral conclusions is that they are often in reality drawn 
from the a priori theories of the economists whom he 
rated so vehemently — their theories being taken simpli-
citer and not secundum quid ; he is, for example, far more 
abstract and hypothet ical 2 than Ricardo in dealing with 
the principles of money and prices.3 
There can, however, be no two opinions as to the value 
of the raw materials of the evidence in his six centuries 
of prices, and as to the stupendous labour involved, not 
only in the discovery and transcription of documents, but 
in str iking the averages and noting the oscillations in 
years, tens of years, and centuries. 
In the preface to this great work Rogers observes tha t 
the laws which govern prices will be seen more clearly in 
these mediieval records than they could be in a modern 
price current . 
ing tha t the temptat ion to sheep farming was almost irresistible, and that 
s ta tute af ter s tatute failed to arrest the t endency . " But in the same Vol. 
IV. , p. 328, he writes that the average good English wool up to the de-
basement was 8s. Id. the tod (which is the actual average of his first two 
volumes, cf. I., pp. 366, 367); whilst tha t of 1400-1540 is given as 0s. 2{d. 
as against 8s. Qd. for 1260-1400 ; and in the chapter of averages, Vol. IV. , 
Ch. XXV. , in which the prices of 1401-1540 are compared with 1541-1582, 
the rise in the price of wool is put at 2.81 in the later period. I cite these 
examples in no captious spirit, but as indicating the great need there is 
for taking Rogers 's s tatements with caution. The whole work is much 
in need of a thorough Teutonic revision and supplement. 
1 See below, p. 50. 2 See below, p. 53. 
3 The corresponding work by Vicomte D'Avenel on French Prices from 
1200 to 1800 is introduced by two excellent chapters on the Value of Silver 
and on Changes in the Standard and Currency. The whole work should 
be compared with tha t of Rogers. Ilistoire Economique de la Propriete, 
des Salaires des Denrees, et de tous les Prix en general depuis Van 1200 
jusqu'aVan 1800, par Vicomte D'Avenel. 4 vols. Paris (1894-1898). 
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If the laws tha t govern prices are not so simple as 
Rogers imagined, there is no doubt that the records 
afford abundant material for the verification of abstract 
theories, and the discovery and illustration of disturbing 
causes. 
The popular idea tha t before the nineteenth century, 
or at any rate throughout the mediaeval period, prices 
were definitely fixed by law and custom, finds no support 
in the voluminous entries of Rogers ; in all kinds of 
vendible commodities ( including labour) we find varia-
tions in the prices from month to month and year to year 
— variations also in periods of tens of years and periods 
of hundreds. 
W e find also great changes in the general level of prices; 
and although the adjustments to a change may be made 
unequally in time and place, " i n the long r u n " they 
ar r ive ; and the length of run required (if that tedious 
and much abused expression may be so varied) can hardly 
exceed six centuries, even when the tendencies encounter 
most obstruct ion; and if more evidence is required in 
addition to the six centuries of Rogers, there are all the 
materials of the eighteenth and nineteenth. I t would 
appear, then, that if the laws of prices, whether general 
or relative, are not discovered, it will not be for lack of 
evidence. 
§ 2. The Comparison of General Prices at Different 
Periods. In the previous chapter it has been shown that 
although, from the Conquest downward, prices have been 
expressed in terms of pounds, shillings, and pence (L. s. d., 
libra, solidns, denarius), the pound being the unit and the 
shilling and penny definite sub-multiples, the meaning of 
the pound has changed. A pound means a t different 
periods different weights of fine silver, and finally it 
comes to mean about a quarter of an ounce of fine gold 
with a little alloy. 
W e also find at various epochs that the actual weight 
of a certain quant i ty of currency not only differs widely 
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f rom the legal weight, hut tha t sometimes the difference 
is, and sometimes is not, recognised practically ; and the 
depreciation in the weight of the currency may or may 
not be associated wi th a corresponding depreciation in its 
value. 
So long, however, as the silver s tandard was even nomi-
nally preserved, — so long as gold was ra ted in terms of 
silver, — it might be thought tha t all tha t is necessary 
to convert the measure of values of one period into that 
of another is to calculate the number of grains of fine 
silver in each parcel of twen ty shillings (or two hundred 
and for ty pennies) issued f rom the mint . This is, in 
effect, the method adopted in calculating the par of ex-
change between different countries wi th the same metallic 
s tandard but different coinages, the relative values of the 
respective s tandard coins being compared in terms of the 
fine metal which they contain. 
A n d if the pr imary object be simply to discover the 
variations in the value of silver (as a metal) , no doubt 
such a comparison is a necessary preliminary, and is 
r ight ly taken account of by Adam Smith in his t rea tment 
of this problem. 
In 1260, for example, when the tables of Rogers begin, 
the silver penny weighed 22-|- grains ; by 1540, before the 
debasement, it had by progressive reductions fallen to 10-|-
grains. As a consequence, at the later date an actual 
pound of silver would make more than twice as many 
pennies as at the former, and so far it would command 
more than twice as much of any part icular commodity 
(e.g., whea t ) having the same price in terms of pence — 
and we may say tha t the value of silver relatively to 
commodities in general, if general prices had remained 
the same, would have more than doubled. 
I t is, however, doubt fu l whether this simple method of 
comparison between distant t imes is not dangerously 
liable ra ther to suggest serious fallacies than to aid in 
solving difficult problems. W e are certainly not entit led 
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to assume tha t the general level of prices will tend to 
move exactly in response to the changes in the weight of 
the fine silver contained in the coins, or that , if prices do 
not so rise on progressive reductions, silver has become 
scarce exactly in that proportion. And yet this is the 
deduction made by Rogers, and to escape the consequences 
of such a curious preestablished harmony he supposes 
tha t throughout the mediieval period the prices refer to 
pennyweights of the original s tandard ; that is to say, 
if his meaning is taken strictly, if a quarter of wheat was 
sold in 1260 for 6s., and in 1340 for 6s., at the second 
date the seller would have received more than twice as 
many actual pennies as at the fo rmer—al though the 
nominal price was the same. 
As regards the progressive diminution of the weight of 
the silver penny Rogers writes: " If we suppose that the 
change was understood and effective, it is difficult to un-
derstand why all commodities should not have risen in 
money value to the whole of the amount, unless we accept 
not only the hypothesis of Adam Smith, tha t the relative 
value of silver (to commodities) was constantly increasing 
during the fifteenth and earlier part of the sixteenth cen-
tury, but that the increase corresponded with chronologi-
cal precision to the several changes which were made in 
the indentures of the mint. " 1 
And in another place he argues: Since prices of arti-
cles in general do not rise with these alterations in the 
weight of the currency, we are lef t to conclude either that 
silver was nearly three times as scarce as it was at the 
beginning of the fourteenth century, or that payments are 
made as they are expressed in pounds and pennyweic/hts.2 
I t would not conform to the proportions of this work to 
examine the curious hypothesis that, up to Elizabeth, pay-
ments were made according to the weight of the old stand-
ard of the pennyweight when that standard had been 
1 Agriculture and Prices, Vol. IV., p. 187. 
2 Vol. I. , p. 177. 
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legally altered several times, nor indeed is such an exami-
nation required.1 
I t is, however, well worth while to consider carefully 
the main assumption of Rogers; namely, that the prices 
of commodities should at once and exactly conform to 
changes in the weight of the currency — e.g., rising, as 
in the case supposed, with every fall in weight. This 
assumption is really drawn from the most simple abstract 
form of the quant i ty theory of money — a form of the 
theory that only holds good under hypothetical conditions,2 
which are always largely modified in practice. 
Rogers, however, takes no sufficient account of these 
disturbing causes; and he does not even seem to realise 
the fundamenta l position that the reduction in the weight 
of the coins could only raise prices if thereby the quant i ty 
of money was increased; and, fur ther , tha t the rise would 
only then be in exact proportion if " other t h i n g s " re-
mained the same. Bu t in the mediaeval period other 
tilings did not remain the same. The progressive diminu-
tion in the weight of the English penny would so far, no 
doubt, increase the supply of silver available for coinage; 
but some of this extra supply might have been taken for 
use in the arts, and we know tha t the use of plate and 
ornaments largely increased; and some might have been 
exported, as the continuous legislation against exportation 
showed was the case; and even supposing that every old 
penny was coined into two new ones, the effects of the 
increase in supply upon general prices might have been 
1 The s tudent may supplement the t reatment by Cunningham in "Vol. 
I. , p. 326, by reference to the following evidence f rom R u d i n g : Vol. I., 
p. 407, sub anno 1335 he shows it was declared illegal to choose out and 
weigh the old and heavy coins, and Vol. I I . , pp. 170, 171, 407, 464, he 
describes the use of the little instruments issued by the mint to test the 
weight of particular coins, whilst Rogers, to suit this extravagant assump-
tion, argues that these mint balances were issued, not to weigh small pieces 
of silver, but " a g g r e g a t e " amounts, whatever tha t may mean. (See 
also Economic Journal, June , 1897, p. 185 sq.) 
2 Cf. Book I I I . , Ch. XIV. 
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more than neutralised by the greatest revolution of the 
mediaeval period, namely, the substitution of a money for 
a natural economy. If the English monarchs, whom 
Rogers suspects of tampering with the currency for their 
own immediate gains, had rigidly kept to the penny of 
22^- grains (as they did to the old right standard of fine-
ness), they would have prevented, by the stringency of 
money thus created, a large part of this most salutary 
commutation. General prices might have maintained their 
stability, but they would have clone so by a diminution in 
the amount of monetary transactions and the persistence 
of payments in kind.1 
I t is obvious that when we are comparing changes in 
relative prices, the particular prices of each particular 
period are best compared with one another in the first 
place. Thus, for example, we may observe the move-
ments in money wages and in the price of wheat, and cal-
culate directly the changes (so fa r ) in real wages without 
calculating the grains of silver in the coinage of the time, 
either when newly issued from the mint or as reduced by 
the wear and tear of circulation.2 
§3. Further Illustrations—the Tudor Debasement. The 
stability of mediaeval prices — that is to say, from 1260 
to 1540, reckoned in £. s. d. (libra, solidus, denarius) and 
not in grains of fine silver — coincidently with the reduc-
tion in the weight of the coinage as issued •— is in marked 
contrast with the great rise in prices which took place 
after the debasement of Henry VI I I . and Edward VI. 
(1543-1552). The tables 3 compiled by Rogers for all 
1 In the valuable tables constructed by Newmarch (which, however, re-
quire to be corrected for England by the later work of Rogers) giving the 
history of the prices of wheat in France and England f rom 1401 to 1855, 
the prices are reduced to their English coinage values of the present time, 
through the measure of fine silver. In the period, however, f rom 1401 to 
1560, only the ancient actual prices are recorded, and it is pointed out 
tha t the conversion of ancient money prices into modern money prices is 
at tended with several disadvantages. 
2 See below, Ch. IV . 3 Vol. IV. , Ch. XXV. , p. 734. 
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the principal commodities, in which he compares the aver-
age prices from 1401 to 1540 with these averages from 
1541 to 1582 are very remarkable. In every commodity 
but one, namely, glass ( in which there is a slight fall 
in the proportion of 1 to .93), there is in the last 42 
years, compared with the previous 140, a notable, though 
variable, rise in price. The differences in the ratio of 
the rise in various cases must be accounted for by vari-
ous causes affecting relative prices,1 but the extent and 
degree of the general rise can only be explained on the 
assumption of some general and wide-reaching disturbing 
influence. 
Rogers, however, again shows that in dealing with the 
materials collected and arranged with such admirable 
historical energy, he was sadly in need of the guiding 
hypotheses of the theorists whom he so unsparingly con-
demns. 
He assumes that issues of base money must be " instantly 
and irremediably " mischievous, the mischief consisting in 
the fact that wages do not rise in proportion to the rise 
in the price of labourers' necessaries. And he goes so 
far as to state that the effect of these sixteen years (say 
rather nine) of base money in England can be traced in 
the history of labour and wages from that period to the 
present time.2 
In the first place, however, as had already been observed 
by Cliffe Leslie in his valuable s tudy on the distribution 
and value of the precious metals in the sixteenth and 
nineteenth centur ies , 3 prices in England before 1560 would 
rise in proportion to the increase of base money and not 
in proportion to its baseness. In fact, base money, in ac-
cordance with Ricardo's well-known argument , will only 
raise prices if the quant i ty of money is thereby increased. 
But , as Cliffe Leslie points out, there was a hole in the 
English purse, and the ancient fine coin of the realm ran 
out into the foreigner 's hands as fast as the new base 
1 See next chapter. 2 Vol. IV., p. 730. 3 Essays, p. 205. 
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money was poured in. Moreover, wars with France and 
Scotland drew much money out of England. Thus, so 
far as the quanti ty of money was concerned, the increase 
was certainly not in proportion to the degree of the de-
basement, and to ascribe the general rise to that cause only 
is a case of post hoc ergo propter hoc. 
And secondly, Rogers gives no satisfactory reasons why 
the debasement should affect the various classes of com-
modities so unequally. Taking the older prices as the 
unit of comparison (1401-1540), the prices of 1541-1552 
rise in the following proportions : oxen, calves, lambs, 
3.46 ; other live stock (excluding swans and rabbits), 2.44; 
different kinds of corn, 2.40; other farm produce (cheese, 
butter, hay, straw, wool, honey, candles, salt) , 2.53, — or 
taking the general average of these groups, the rise is 
2.71. On the other hand, taking the prices of eleven kinds 
of labour-—eight artisans and three husbandmen — the 
rise is only 1.60. No reason is suggested why the debase-
ment should affect the commodities named more than 
labour. Passing to other products, the average rise in 
eight kinds of fish is 1.62; in six kinds of fuel (fagots, 
charcoal, firewood, etc.) 1.71; in building materials (lime, 
laths, tiles, bricks, slates, nails, etc.) 1.71. 
Taking the general average of labour, fish, fuel, and 
building materials, we have 1.64; and Rogers concludes 
that this conformity of the rise in those products to that 
of labour is due to the fact that they owe most of their 
value to the labour spent on them. 
In metals the rise is 1.88, " a n excess, as might have 
been expected, over those articles which depend for their 
value on labour only, but considerably less than that wit-
nessed in provisions." Linen rises 2.08; clothing 2.12; 
paper 1.50 ; Western foreign produce 2.03 and Indian 
1.88. 
The argument of Rogers resolves itself into two propo-
sitions : first, the debasement affects money wages less 
in proportion to other things ; and secondly, other things 
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rise in price inversely to the quantities of labour (or the 
payments in wages) which they involve. For the first 
proposition no reason is given, and a survey of the tables 
shows that the second is unfounded. In the first table 
oxen, calves, and lambs rise compared with capons, geese, 
hens, ducks in the proportion 3.46 to 2.9 — but surely 
the labour bill for the former is greater than for the 
latter. Again, why should all kinds of grain rise 2.40, 
the rise in agricultural labour being 1.75, whilst the 
rise in fuel derived from the surface of the land is only 
1.71 ? Do fagots and firewood require more labour than 
wheat and barley ? And finally, why do the metals rise 
so little more than labour, when other produce of the kind 
is so much enhanced ? 
The debasement may have had some effect in the early 
part of the general rise in the sixteenth century, but it 
does not account for the whole rise any more than it 
accounts for the unequal distribution. 
And to ascribe to this debasement the degradation of 
English labour for three centuries is theoretically absurd, 
and finds no confirmation in Rogers's own evidences. The 
restoration of the coinage by Elizabeth, by bringing new 
silver to the mints and old coins from hoards and from 
abroad, increased effectively the quanti ty of money and 
so far raised prices, and any surviving influence from the 
debasement was altogether overpowered. 
§ 4. Further Illustrations : the Recoinage of 1696. 
The state of the currency which led to the great recoin-
age of 1696 and the effects of that recoinage are also 
most instructive. By the middle of the seventeenth cen-
tury, says Rogers, summarising the results of his evidence, 
general prices attained that level which, except in so far 
as they are affected by the seasons and by improvements 
in production and conveyance, they retained down to the 
beginning of the last quarter of the eighteenth century. 
Taking the period, 1583-1702, during the first sixty years 
prices creep up steadily during every decade; in the 
56 ECONOMIC P R O G R E S S . 
second sixty it is t rue the rise continues, but it is com-
paratively slight. 
Passing over the many topics of interest connected with 
these two general movements in prices, I wish to call at-
tent ion only to the depreciation of the currency. As 
already shown, the silver coinage had come to contain — 
before the recoinage — less than half its nominal value 
of fine silver. B u t the curious th ing is that this great 
depreciation is not reflected in general prices. And a 
careful comparison of the average prices of 1696-1702 
with the average of the years immediately preceding, or 
with those of the whole period, shows that the recoinage 
— which lowered the value of the guinea in a few months 
from 30s. to less than 22s. — also had no appreciable effect 
on general prices.1 
On the quant i ty theory of money in its extended form, 
this failure of general prices to respond to the deprecia-
tion and appreciation of the silver coinage need cause no 
surprise. Bu t to those who always look for a simple con-
nection between the actual coinage and prices this want 
of correspondence is inexplicable. 
§ 5. Other Causes affectirig General Prices. I t is evi-
dent f rom the foregoing inquiry that in explaining the 
movements of general prices over long periods, changes in 
the s tandard weight of the coinage and changes in the 
weight of the actual currency are only two of the elements 
to be considered, and often not the most important. The 
reduction in the weight of the mediasval penny no doubt 
assisted in preserving the stability of prices, but it was still 
more beneficial in aiding the development of a money econ-
omy. The reduction in the weight of the actual currency 
before 1696 had practically no effect on general prices, but 
1 Eor the six years (1696-1702), the average price of wheat rises above 
the average of the whole period about 7 per c e n t ; iron rises 5 per cen t ; 
candles 4 per cen t ; lead falls 6 per c e n t ; in labour generally there is a 
rise. (Rogers, op. cit., Vol. V., pp. 669, 670.) See also Tooke's History 
of Prices, Vol. I. , pp. 26, 34. 
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was productive of such great inconvenience that a restora-
tion at great expense was felt to be necessary. 
W e nmy now notice briefly the influence of other impor-
tan t elements as seen in the progress of English prices. 
The effects of the great silver discoveries of the sixteenth 
century (supplemented later by new gold) have been so 
often treated that fu r the r examination seems unnecessary.1 
We could have no better i l lustration of the fact that an 
increase in the quant i ty of s tandard money so far raises 
general prices. 
The increased efficiency of standard money, as shown by 
the ability of a given quant i ty of such money to effect an 
increasing amount of monetary transactions, is one of the 
most characteristic signs of economic progress. I t is asso-
ciated with the growth of credit in all its forms, and the 
latest developments reveal the most sensitive organisation, 
and are only possible with a corresponding development of 
mercantile law and commercial morality on the one side, 
and on the other great improvements in the material 
means, the organisation, and the rapidity of communica-
tion. 
In spite, however, of this enormous increase in its effi-
ciency, the quant i ty of s tandard money is always an ele-
ment of the first importance. The whole credit system as 
hitherto developed rests on a metallic basis, and any serious 
drain on banking reserves by crippling advances would 
lower general prices. 
I t may be noted fu r the r tha t an increase in the reserves 
of banks af ter a certain point has no such corresponding 
effect in raising prices. I t is plain tha t if, for example, 
the gold in the Bank of Eng land were doubled, tha t would 
not admit of all the credit transactions in England being 
doubled, or, indeed, of being increased beyond a small per-
centage. 
The economies in the use of gold have been carried to 
1 Cf. the able survey of L. L. Price, Money and its Relation to 
Trices (1896), Ch. I I I . 
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such a point that any serious pressure at once causes a se-
rious contraction of credi t ; but in normal times banks can-
not give a proportionate extension to credit generally, 
simply because their metallic reserves increase. Thus the 
reserve of the Bank of England oscillates between amounts 
tha t are dangerously small and uselessly large. 
The immense additions to the gold supplies of the world 
in recent years have had no appreciable effect in raising 
prices, whilst the discoveries of 1850 were marked by simi-
lar effects ( though less in degree) to those of 1645. 
The extension of foreign trade and the increasing inter-o o 
dependence of internat ional markets has rendered the gen-
eral level of prices in any one country more and more 
dependent on causes acting throughout the commercial 
world. Even in the mediaeval period prices were partially 
affected by internat ional influences, and the movements of 
the precious metals were of great importance and watched 
with anxiety by governments and merchants. 
One f ru i t fu l cause of disturbance was found in the 
course of the foreign exchanges, and even in the earliest 
times, a f te r the effective introduction of gold in interna-
tional commerce, the disturbances in the ratio between 
gold and silver, alike in the markets of the world and in 
the proclamations of governments, affected greatly the 
movements of the precious metals. I t is true, however, 
tha t the principal results were seen, not in corresponding 
adjus tments of general prices, but in the general incon-
venience caused by the dislocation of the exchanges and 
the export of ancient fine money. 
Bu t in the last quarter of the nineteenth century we have 
seen these disturbing causes affecting general prices on a 
large scale. I have given reasons in a former part of this 
w o r k 1 for supposing that so far as the general fall in prices 
since 1875 was to be ascribed to causes primarily affecting 
the currency, the predominant influence was the deprecia-
tion of silver relatively to gold. The immediate disturb-
1 Bk, III. , Ch. X V I I . ; more fully in Money and Monetary Problems. 
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ances from time to time in the exchanges between gold 
and silver using countries have been largely met by a de-
velopment of banking on the principles of insurance; but 
the more prolonged disturbances, such as the want of con-
formity of the legal to the actual ratio of various gold and 
silver coinages, the difficulty of investing and withdraw-
ing capital in silver using countries, and the increase in the 
burdens of the indebtedness of silver to gold using States 
have only been partially neutralised. The monetary sys-
tems recently and at present prevailing in the Uni ted 
States, the countries formerly composing the Latin Union, 
India, and Japan i l lustrate forcibly the difficulties in the 
ratio as affecting legal tenders. 
In a lesser degree the recent financial history of the same 
countries shows the difficulties in the transfer of capital, 
and India in particular illustrates the trouble of paying in-
terest in gold provided from revenues collected on a silver 
basis. The effects of the general fall in gold prices were 
perhaps best seen in England itself in spite of its gold stand-
ard, but the present state 1 of trade seems to show tha t the 
great mass of commercial transactions have been adjusted 
to the new basis. 
I t seems probable tha t as regards the fu ture the whole 
commercial world will effectively adopt gold as the stand-
ard measure of prices. If this takes place, it is to be 
hoped that the increase in the supplies of gold will con-
tinue, and that the various countries concerned ( including 
India) will, in the course of time, be enabled to pu t their 
s tandard currencies on an automatic gold basis. 
§ 6. The Connection between General and Relative Prices. 
There are various causes of the greatest importance as af-
fecting relative prices which, however, have comparatively 
little effect upon general prices. 
Take, for example, the case of improvements in produc-
tion. An improvement in any one thing tends to lower its 
price compared with the general level, as, for example, in 
1 1899. 
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the case of glass in the sixteenth cen tu ry ; but a general 
and continuous succession of improvements in production 
does not necessarily involve a general and continuous fall 
in general prices. This is at once evident theoretically 
from the abundance and complexity of the causes the 
resul tant of which is the general level of jDrices. And the 
theory is abundant ly confirmed by taking long historical 
periods. 
The comparative stability of prices from the middle of 
the thir teenth to the middle of the sixteenth century, 
was not due to stagnation or immobility in productive 
processes; the upheaval of prices dur ing the next century 
most certainly does not point to a retrogression in the arts 
of production, nor does the rise in prices af ter 1850. A 
comparison of mediaeval prices with prices at the present 
day — even if we take as the s tandard of comparison grains 
of fine silver — shows conclusively that the most extraor-
dinary and amazing improvements in the methods of pro-
duction are not accompanied by a corresponding amazing 
cheapness. Take, for example, wheat, which Adam Smith 
uses as the best practical measure of variations in the value 
of silver. W h e a t at 6s. per quar ter in the last century of 
the mediaeval period may be said to be equal in value to 
756 grains of fine silver. Wheat at 30s. per quarter ( the 
present price) maj r be said to be equal in value to 12 oz. of 
silver or 5760 grains. Tha t is to say, wheat reckoned in 
money (reduced to the measure of fine silver) is at present 
more than seven times as dear, and if we take actual prices 
(wi thout conversion) wheat is five times as dear as in the 
Middle Ages. Bu t at a moderate estimate a given amount 
of labour applied with the corresponding capital to the 
same land, would at present raise at least four times as 
much.1 
In the same way it may be shown also that improve-
ments in transport and the means of communication are 
1 On the yield of grain per sown acre at different periods, see A. H. 
Inman ' s Domesday and Feudal Statistics, p. 115. 
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not necessarily associated with increasing cheapness, in the 
sense of a general fall of prices. Similarly as regards the 
influence of great wars, plagues, and f a m i n e s — t h e dis-
turbances in relative prices are very great, whilst the 
effects on general prices are uncertain. 
I t may, however, happen that causes primarily affecting 
relative prices have secondary and ulterior effects on gen-
eral prices.1 They have such effects in so far as they alter 
the quant i ty of mone3r, or the nature of the whole work to 
be done by the money. Take first a simple case: Great 
improvements in the production ( including the processes 
of exchange) of all kinds of manufactures — agricultural , 
mining, and the extractive industries generally being pri-
marily unaffected — will cause a fall in the relative prices 
of manufactures compared with raw produce. I t may 
happen, however, tha t the consumers will spend the same 
aggregate part of their money incomes on those things as 
before, the consequence being that in the index numbers 
all manufactures are lower, and raw produce being the 
same, there is thus a general fall. 
I t is evident, however, tha t this is only one simple case 
out of many possible;2 and even in this case the demand for 
raw produce to supply the materials of manufacture and 
machinery must so far tend to raise its relative price, and 
the total effect on the index numbers will be difficult to 
estimate. The consumption of manufactures may also in-
crease, but less than in proportion to the increased cheap-
ness and thus more money may be set free directly to 
spend on agricultural products. 
Again, a rise in the price of certain classes of things 
may have a much greater effect on general monetary con-
ditions than a corresponding rise in other things,3 and con-
versely of a fall. A general rise in the price of labour 
1 For fuller t reatment , see Money and Monetary Problems, " Essay on 
Causes of Movements in General Pr ices . " 
2 Cf. Mill's argument in Bk. I I I . , Ch. X X I I . 
3 Cf. the general argument in Giffen's Slock Exchange Securities. 
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will so far cause a greater demand for metallic money 
than would a corresponding rise in stock exchange securi-
ties. Similarly a drain to meet the expenses of an adverse 
balance of trade, due to over-importation or exceptional 
dearness, has in general a much greater effect on general 
prices than the receipt of a corresponding balance for ex-
cess of exports. The relations of general price levels in 
various countries are also dependent largely upon relative 
prices. Relative prices, again, are subject to numberless 
causes of change according to changes in the conditions of 
demand and supply and of taxation. The only general 
proposition tha t seems to cover all these cases is tha t 
general prices between different " countries," and relative 
prices between different " things," must be so adjusted 
tha t relative values (qua changes in the value of money) 
remain undis turbed af te r all the necessary readjustments 
have been effected. 
I have introduced at this stage this somewhat abstract 
reasoning in order to guard effectively against any simple 
application of the quant i ty theory. 
A n d by way of i l lustration, I hazard the opinion that 
the rise of prices from 1540 to 1583, which Rogers ascribed 
exclusively to the debasement, was largely due to a dis-
turbance of relative prices. The extension of the woollen 
manufacture raised the price of sheep and wool and en-
couraged sheep-farming. The extension of sheepwalks 
so far tended to counteract this rise, but the necessary con-
traction of tillage raised the price of grain and of foods 
for cattle, and thus of cattle themselves. 
This revolution in production, involving as it did the 
relative concentration of labour in towns and the com-
parative depopulation of the country, involved also a 
concentration of money, and a filling of the great channels 
of trade from the little streams and wells of the country.1 
The efficiency of money was largely increased, and so far 
— apart f rom debasement — prices would tend to rise, and 
1 Cf. Cliffe Leslie's argument, op. cit. 
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would rise even if the debased money, as Cliffe Leslie 
supposed, simply displaced the old fine silver. Subse-
quent ly the increase in silver increased the quant i ty , and 
other causes s t imulat ing circulation increased the efficiency 
of money more than in proportion to the increase in the 
work to be done. 
In recent years the most notable disturbances in rela-
tive prices (apar t f rom the special depreciation of silver 
already examined) are due to improved transport, tending 
to lower the prices of various commodities, and to a rel-
ative rise in the prices of most kinds of labour. I t is 
probable that the relatively high value of l a b o u r — t h a t 
is to say relatively to commodities — has caused a greater 
demand for metallic money, and this may well be one of 
the causes of the appreciation of gold. Money wages 
would have risen higher nominally, and commodities would 
have fallen less, if other general causes had not been at 
work, also tending to produce a fall. 
§ 7. The Effects of Movements in General Prices — General 
Conclusion. W h e n we take a wide historical survey we 
do not find any uniform connection between general prog-
ress and appreciation or depreciation of the metal which 
constitutes the s tandard of value. This result might be 
theoretically anticipated from the fact that changes in the 
measure of values can only indirectly affect production 
and consumption, and once the changes have been com-
pletely effected, with all the consequent readjustments in 
monetary contracts, it is a matter of indifference whether 
general prices are high or low. Stability of value is no 
doubt desirable compared with instability, especially if tha t 
instability is due to the arbitrary influence of governments 
or to other causes which can be foreseen or allowed for. 
The instability of value may, however, in some cases be 
simply one of the signs of progress; as, for example, a 
rise of prices due to an expansion of credit and banking 
on a sound basis, or a fall in prices due to the expansion 
of trade, or to the development of new countries caus-
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ing an increased demand for money relatively to the 
supply. 
As a matter of history we find the gradual breakdown 
of the mediaeval system from the thir teenth to the fifteenth 
century accompanied by a gradual appreciation of fine 
silver, although, as already pointed out, prices remained 
comparatively stable, owing part ly to a corresponding 
depreciation in the coinage. The transition f rom the 
mediaeval to the modern period was marked by a great 
rise in prices, but it is obvious that this rise in prices in 
itself was of minor importance as regards progress com-
pared with such forces as the discovery of America, the 
extension of t rade and manufactures, the Reformation, 
the break-up of feudalism, the invention of printing, and 
the growth of constitutional liberty. 
In the nineteenth century we have in England progress 
in some directions with retrogression in others: the prog-
ress being on the whole less marked during the depre-
ciation of the bank restriction than during the appreciation 
of the nex t quar ter of a cen tu ry ; whilst tha t of the third 
quarter , with its high level of prices, is certainly less than 
tha t of the fourth, with its low level. The balance of 
progress dur ing the century as a whole — whatever meas-
ures are adopted — is undoubted, but the precise influence 
of general prices is difficult to determine, and from time 
to time has been greatly exaggerated. 
C H A P T E R IV . 
PROGRESS AND R E L A T I V E PRICES. 
§ 1. Progress and Relative Prices. " F r o m the high or 
low money price of some sorts of goods in proportion to 
tha t of others in any country at any t ime," says Adam 
Smith, " we can infer with a degree of probability that 
approaches almost to certainty tha t it was rich or poor, 
tha t the greater par t of its lands were improved or unim-
proved, and tha t it was either in a more or less barbarous 
state, or in a more or less civilised one . " 1 
Adam Smith himself gives some remarkable i l lustrations 
of the f ru i t fu lness of this test of economic progress ; and 
the advances made, especially in recent years, in every 
depar tment of economic history, ought to make similar 
enquiries still more productive. The value of the grea t 
work of Thorold Rogers can hardly be overestimated from 
this point of view, and his observation 2 tha t the laws which 
govern prices will be seen more clearly in mediaeval records 
than they could be in a modern price current , is specially 
applicable to relative prices. I t is certain, at any rate, 
t ha t the records of relative prices in England from the 
middle of the th i r teenth century to the end of the nine-
teenth must afford ample material, both for the verification 
of the theory of value, and for the application of that theory 
to the economic interpretat ion of history. The changes 
tha t have occurred in the methods of production and trans-
port dur ing the last century are best understood when 
regarded f rom the point of view of development, and are 
best i l lustrated when contrasted with the comparatively 
simpler and slower changes of the past. The longer the 
1 Wealth of Nations, Bk. I., Ch. XI. 
2 Preface to History of Agriculture and Prices, Vol. I., p. x. 
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period of their culmination, and the greater the influence 
of the counteract ing causes to be overcome, so much the 
greater does the force of the fundamenta l economic causes 
appear. If the modern position is approved, tha t the prin-
cipal differentia between normal and marke t values is to be 
found in the element of time, it s tands to reason tha t the 
continuous records of centuries will reveal the influence of 
this element more clearly than speculations on the fu tu re 
based upon a survey of the present. The history of rela-
t ive prices is also of service in showing the complexity of 
economic conditions, even in periods which we are accus-
tomed to regard as primitive. Above all (again to adopt 
modern terminology) , the history of relative prices is the 
history of the law of subst i tut ion. The discovery and the 
adoption of subst i tutes is one of the principal agencies in 
economic progress; and in the concrete, the subst i tut ion is 
shown by a disturbance of relative prices. This law of 
subst i tut ion is as effective and as apparent in demand 
as in supply — in consumption as in production. Even 
as regards the pr imary wants — where habit is s trongest 
— there is a tendency to subst i tute the cheaper for the 
more expensive modes of satisfaction — e.g., in food, dr ink, 
clothes, fuel — al though for a very long time custom, fash-
ion, or ignorance may re tard the process. In luxuries, 
where fashion very often ra ther favours novelties, the 
effect of cheapness is still more marked. 
In the following sections I propose to notice some impor-
tan t changes in relative prices which throw l ight on the 
na ture and causes of economic progress, especially in Eng-
land dur ing the last seven centuries. Economic progress 
is necessarily so complex tha t it seems preferable in deal-
ing with relative prices to take concrete facts as the basis, 
ra ther than to s tar t with preconceived theories and simply 
search for suitable illustrations. 
Adequate guiding hypotheses are provided by the laws 
of value already considered.1 
1 Cf. Bk. I I I . , Chs. I . - X . 
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§ 2. The Relative Prices of Agricultural Produce — 
Grain. When Adam Smith wrote, the average quant i ty 
of corn imported did not exceed one par t in 571 of the 
annual supply, and he expressed the opinion tha t if the 
importation of foreign cattle was made ever so free, so few 
could be imported tha t the grazing t rade of Great Britain 
would be little affected by it. Al though before the free-
trade era in food, foreign imports had in some years been 
considerable (e.g., in 1829-1830), on the whole, it may be 
said tha t up to the repeal of the Corn Laws, the prices of 
agricultural produce were mainly determined by the con-
ditions of demand and supply in the country itself. A t 
the present t ime prices depend mainly on foreign con-
ditions. From 1895 to 1898 the average annual produc-
tion of wheat in the Uni ted Kingdom was about 7,000,000 
quarters , whilst (excluding flour) about 15,000,000 quar-
ters were imported annual ly. In addit ion there were 
about 20,000,000 cwt. of flour.1 The total importat ion 
of agricul tural produce was in 1898 about £175,000,000, 
or nearly 40 per cent of the total imports. 
Before the era of free trade, however, foreign t rade 
affected the prices of wool and hides, and also, th rough the 
bounties on the export of corn, to some extent the prices 
of corn. Still, on the whole, it may be said that , as 
regards agricultural produce up to the middle of the nine-
teenth century, England was in the position of an isolated 
country, whilst, since tha t time, foreign influences have 
been predominant . 
The following table, which I have deduced from the 
averages of Thorold Rogers, gives the relative values of 
the principal kinds of grain produced in Eng land dur ing 
the mediaeval period. The price of wheat per quar ter is 
in every case taken as 100, and the other prices per quarter 
are adjusted in proportion. 
1 A quarter of wheat weighs (in official statistics) 4.28 cwts. , and is 
said to yield 13 lbs. of flour to 14 lbs. of grain. 
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Wheat. Baulky. 0at8. Peas. 
1260-1400 100 73 42 65 
1401-1540 100 71 40 62 
1541-1582 100 71 39 63 
This constancy in the relative values of wheat, barley, 
oats, and peas over a period of three centuries is very 
remarkable. I t might, perhaps, be thought at first sight, 
t ha t we have simply an example of mediaeval custom-
ary " prices ; but a reference to the actual prices on which 
these averages are founded shows tha t not only prices, 
bu t relat ive values, oscillated between wide ranges.1 
There were great variations in market values, both annu-
ally and in decennial periods, whilst the normal prices 
were in the proport ion of about 4 to 3. Accordingly, 
the constancy of normal relative values cannot be ex-
plained by any simple reference to " c u s t o m a r y " prices. 
Similarly it may be shown tha t the constancy of the 
proportion is not to be explained by a simple reference to 
the law of indifference, or that our ancestors consumed 
these grains indifferently at these normal proportions. The 
relative capacity of the respective grains in providing food 
for man exercised, no doubt, some influence. Taking bar-
ley and wheat, for example, it is t rue that a bushel of 
barley weighs less than a bushel of wheat (in mediaeval 
times probably the proportion was 50 to 5 8 | lbs.),2 and 
whilst barley is said to give 12 lbs. of flour, wheat gives 
1 Thus, for example, the average price of wheat from 1260 to 1400 is 
5s. lOfd. per quarter , and of barley 4s. 8fd. per quarter ; i.e., a proportion 
of 100 to 73. Bu t in 1315 wheat was 14s. 10JfZ. and barley 13s. Id., a pro-
portion of 100 to 88 ; and in 1316 wheat was 15s. 11 \d . and barley 8s. 9 J d , 
or 100 to 55. Again, in 1287 wheat was 2s. 10 |d. and barley 2s. 6 id . , a 
proportion of 100 to 88. Thus wheat fluctuated between 6s. and 2s. 
10(Z., and barley between 13s. lcZ. and 2s. 3d. 
2 These figures are taken f rom McCulloch's Dictionary of Commerce 
(Articles Barley and Whea t ) . 
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13 lbs. to the 14 lbs. of grain ; calculated on this basis, 
the food capacity of a bushel of barley is about 80 per cent 
that of wheat.1 
In the mediaeval period, however, the principal use of 
barley was to make malt, al though it was no doubt also 
used for fa t tening animals (especially pigs) and for feed-
ing poor men (occasionally monks) . We may say without 
much exaggeration that in the mediaeval period people ate 
the wheat and drank the barley.2 Accordingly, if the con-
stancy of the proportion is to be at t r ibuted to custom, we 
must suppose that the mediaeval man had a habit of drink-
ing so much beer to so much bread, and Falstaff must have 
had an uneasy feeling tha t he had transgressed the fashion 
of the times in this respect. 
W e cannot, however, be satisfied with any explanation 
which refers solely to demand; we must also consider supply. 
Taking the whole period, the rotation of crops in the 
main followed the custom adopted in the three-field system, 
the typical order being wheat, barley, fallow; oats, beans, 
and peas being partially subst i tuted for barley, and vetches 
sometimes being sown with the wheat. 
Thus the grain crops must be regarded to a great extent 
rather as joint products than as al ternat ives; and in this 
way, for example, the supply of barley relatively to wheat 
would remain comparatively constant. 
W e have then, on the whole, stationary methods of pro-
duction and customary adjus tments of demand, and the 
stability of the normal values is so far accounted for, 
1 According to Atwater and Bryant there is very little difference 
•between the food capacities of barley and wheat — the former having 1640 
the latter 1675 calories per lb.; the proteidsin barley are 10.5 in wheat 11.4 
per cent. Report on the Chemical Composition of American Food Supply. 
U. S. Department of Agriculture 1899. 
2 On the mediaeval beer-drinking, see Professor Mait land's Domesday 
Book and Beyond, p. 438. Some of his calculations, e.g., half a gallon 
daily to every mouth in England, are criticised in A. H. Inman ' s Domes-
day and Feudal Statistics, p. 117 ; but practically the only substitute for 
beer was water. 
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Wiikat. Barley. oat8. Peas. 
1583-1702 100 54 36 60 
1703-1765 100 62 39 
1765-1854 100 54 36 — 
1854-1856 100 58 40 
1856 100 71 43 — 
1854-1866 100 68 45 
1867-1887 100 88 63 — 
1888-1897 100 90 62 
1899 100 100 65 1 
though it is apparently impossible to determine the causes 
of the exact proportion. This apparent impossibility is 
confirmed by considering subsequent periods. 
I t is remarkable that from 1583 to 1702 the proportion 
of wheat to barley becomes 100 to 54 compared with an 
average of 100 to 72 in the three preceding centuries. 
This fall in the relative value of barley can only be 
accounted for by some considerable disturbance in the 
relations of supply and demand. On the side of produc-
tion, however, there seems to be no sufficient reason to 
account for the change. A n y improvements that are 
recorded are not very great (e.g., enclosures for tillage, 
and the introduction of the turnip and artificial grasses had 
little effect till the eighteenth century) , and are not such as 
to indicate a relative increase in the supply of barley or 
decrease in tha t of wheat. Accordingly, the explanation 
must be sought for on the side of demand. In the mediae-
val period wages were relatively high, and the poor man 
1 The table has been deduced f rom the averages of "Rogers for 1683-
1702, from the tables quoted in McCulloch's Dictionary for 1776-1800, 
f rom Tooke and Newmarch, History of Prices, 1864-1856, and from 
Mr. Sauerbeck's index numbers, 1867-1899. Eden ' s State of the Poor 
gives a table of Whea t and Malt, f rom 1595 to 1795 (Vol. III., Appendix 
LXXI . ) , f rom which it appears that the ratio of wheat to malt was 
100 :57 from 1595 to 1685, and 100 :63 from 1686 to 1795. This would 
give a probable ratio for barley of 100 : 52 in the first period and 100 : 59 
in the second. 
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was not robbed of his beer by taxation. In the later 
period under review there was, according to the records of 
Rogers, a very great fall in the wages of labour, and when 
wages rose, toward the end of the period, the natura l 
demand for beer was checked by taxation — a tax being 
first imposed in 1660, increased in 1694, and supplemented 
by a duty on malt in 1697. 
This fall in the demand for beer, regarded as a symptom 
of low wages, is naturally accompanied by an increase in 
the use of the cheaper kinds of bread, and with the common 
people barley is said to have been subst i tuted very largely 
for wheat. If, as is also maintained by Rogers, the popu-
lation was doubled dur ing the period, the fall in wages 
is also partly accounted for, and the relatively high prices 
of wheat probably points to an increase in the wealth of 
the upper and middle classes. Tha t there was a relative 
increase in the demand for wheat is also shown by the 
fall ( though not so great as in barley) in oats and peas. 
W i t h the imposition of taxes on beer we have official 
statistics, and we find that whilst f rom 1684 to 1693 nearly 
7,000,000 barrels of ale were annually charged to duty, 
from 1694 to 1703 the amount had fallen to less than 
5,500,000. 
From 1716 to 1765 there was a period of very good har-
vests, compared with the preceding 50 years, and wages were 
relatively high.1 The ratio of barley rises f rom 54 to 62. 
Then followed the period of the industrial revolution, 
the consuming power of the labouring classes being dimin-
ished by a series of bad harvests, great wars, and relatively 
low wages. The taxation of beer was also increased. 
As regards the middle and upper classes, there was no 
doubt also a substitution to some extent of tea and coffee 
for beer. The consequence was tha t barley again fell to 
54 compared with wheat as 100, and that number remains 
as the average from 1765 to 1854. 
In 1856 the relative rise in barley (or fall in whea t ) 
1 Tooke and Newmarch, Vol. VI . , p. 440, and p. 302. 
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commences, which has culminated recently in barley act-
ually obtaining higher prices than wheat. 
The recent relative rise in oats is also noteworthy. 
The effect on the acreage under wheat, barley, and oats is 
striking, and contrasts with the fixity of the joint produc-
tion of earlier periods.1 
The rise in barley is the more remarkable when it is 
remembered that recently many substitutes have been 
introduced, both for the manufacture of beer and the feed-
ing of stock. Barley, however, is still supposed to be the 
principal grain for whiskey. 
§ 3. Hay and Straw. From 1260 to 1400 Rogers has 
not obtained much evidence of the sales of hay, and 
apparent ly none of straw, both probably being almost 
al together consumed by the producers. Af te r 1400, how-
ever, the evidence is abundant , the fact in itself pointing 
to the extension of a money economy even in this depart-
men t of agricul ture. I t is remarkable that the average 
price of a load of hay from 1401 to 1540 is practically the 
same as tha t of a quar ter of barley. From 1541 to 1582 it 
is about 10 per cent less, and from 1582 to 1702 about 5 per 
cent less — that is to say, practically for three centuries this 
equivalence of the load of hay with the quarter of barley 
prevails. 
I have not been able to obtain the prices for the eigh-
teenth century, but from 1834 to 1856 there is a great rise 
1 Great Br i ta in : — 
W h e a t . B a r l e y . Oats . Beans. Peas. Pota toes . Turnips . 
1874 . 
1899 . 
acres 
3,360,300 
2,000,981 
acres 
2,287,987 
1,982,108 
acres 
2,596,384 
2,959,755 
acres 
559,044 
249,056 
acres 
310,547 
162,751 
acres 
520,430 
547,682 
acres 
2,133,336 
1,740,993 
The aggregate of the acreage under these crops has fallen from about 
12 millions to 9.6 millions, whilst the acreage of oats has actually in-
creased. The acreage under permanent pasture has increased from 
13,178,412 to 16,630,347 during the same period. 
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in hay. The relative prices are hay 86s. per load against 
32s. per quarter for barley, and the latest prices available 
give 87s. (hay ) against 25s. (bar ley) . The great rise in 
the price of hay, relatively to barley, had been fu l ly accom-
plished before the repeal of the Corn Laws ; on the average 
the load of hay being equal to quarters of barley from 
1834 to 1844, and also from 1845"to 1856. 
The disturbance of values is mainly accounted for by 
facilities of transport affecting barley more than hay . 1 
The relation of hay to s traw is very cons tant : 1401 
to 1552 hay is a little over 2-|- times the price of straw per 
load, from 1582 to 1702 is under 2J times, and f rom 1834 
to 1856 about 2^ t imes; the latest prices giving the same 
proportion. 
§ 4. Beef and Mutton and Wheat. A survey of seven 
1 Hay. Ba r l ey . S t r a w . 
load quarter load 
s. d. 8. d. «. d. 
1401-1540 3.8 J 3.8J 1.5 
1541-1582 9.6 8.5 J 4.1 
1583-1702 20.4* 21.3 8.10 J 
1834-1854 86 32 37 
The influence of changes in the cost of t ransport may be illustrated by 
the particular case of New South Wales (Howell, " Statistics of Aust ra-
lian Rai lways," Statistical Journal, March, 1900, p. 100) : — 
" The great reductions in rates of carriage tha t have taken place in the 
New South Wales lines within recent years have not only induced a 
greater volume of traffic, but have caused agricultural pursui ts to be 
carried fu r the r inland. In 1879, 36,249 tons of grain and flour were 
carried an average distance of 99.63 miles at a ra te of 1.03(Z. per ton per 
mile ; in 1895 the rate was reduced to 0.58<Z. per ton-mile, and the average 
distance rose to 158.58 miles with over seven times the quanti ty. 
" In hay, straw, and chaff, comparing 1895 with 1879, with a fall in ra tes 
from 1.48d. to 0.42(i per ton-mile, the quant i ty carried became 6.34 times 
greater and the distance 5.17 grea ter ." 
For the purposes of contrast it may be recalled tha t Ar thur Young, in 
his tour in Ireland, observed tha t in some places the farmers were burning 
their straw, for which they deserve to be hanged ( I r i sh Tour, Vol. I . , 
p. 42). 
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centuries shows tha t for similar qualities there has seldom 
been any appreciable difference between the prices of mut-
ton and beef. Rogers thinks tha t in the early mediaeval 
period beef was perhaps a li t t le dearer than mutton, and 
Eden states that at the end of the eighteenth century 
mut ton was generally about ^ dearer than beef. From 
1866 to 1899 Sauerbeck's figures give an average per 8 lb. 
( in the London meat market by the carcass) of beef 52c?., 
and mutton 57 \d . , which is just Eden's tenth in favour of 
mut ton . Ar thu r Y o u n g 1 makes beef and mutton the same 
in his three English tours, viz., 3d. per pound ; but in Ire-
land mutton is \d. a pound dearer, viz., 2 | d . against 2 \ d . 
Compared with this fixity in the two kinds of butcher 's 
meat, the relation of both to wheat is in striking contrast. 
The following table of relative values has been calculated 
on the basis of 14 lb. of beef, the common unit, to 14 lb. of 
wheat (a t 480 lbs. to the quar te r ) . 
Beef.2 Wheat. 
14 lbs. 14 lbs. 
1260-1400 . . . . . . . 100 50 
1400-1540 . . . . . . . 100 29 
1540-1582 . . . . . . . 100 26 
1582-1642 . . . . . . . 100 40 
1642-1702 . . . . . . . 100 37 
1730-1790 . . . . . . . 100 32 
1800 1825 . . . . . . . 100 30 
1830-1860 . . . . . . . 100 36 
1867-1877 . . . . . . . 100 21 
1878-1887 . . . . . . . 100 18 
1888-1897 . . . . . . . 100 15 
§ 5. Candles and Leather. I t is observed by Vicomte 
D 'Avene l that in the mediasval period candles were natu-
rally dear and shoes were cheap. The connecting link be-
tween these prices is found in the leanness of the sheep and 
cattle. Skins were plentiful , but fa t was scarce. Rogers 
has also called at tention to the very high price of hard 
fats, and to the luxury of any kind of artificial light, and to 
1 Irish Tour, Vol. I I . , p . 75. 
2 T h e beef is " m i d d l i n g " only fo r 1867-1897. T h e average of p r i m e 
beef would give 100 : 1 0 fo r 1888-1897. 
PROGRESS A N D R E L A T I V E P R I C E S . 75 
the real sacrifice involved in the offerings of candles to the 
saints. 
Practically the only substitute for candles was oil, and it 
will be found, on reference to Rogers's tables, that over the 
whole range of his prices (1260-1702) the price of one 
dozen pounds of candles is about the same as that of a 
gallon of oil (e.g., 1401-1540 candles per dozen pounds 
Is. oil per gallon Is. 2\d.)} 
The present price of olive oil is about 5s. per gallon, but 
petroleum (wholesale) is only about 6d. per gallon — an 
enormous reduction, allowing for the change in the value 
of money. 
If we compare the price of candles ( the dozen pounds 
i.e. the usual quotation) with beef ( the 14 lbs.) , the rela-
tive values are as follows: Candles (dozen pounds) being 
taken as 100, in each period the corresponding price of beef 
(14 lbs.) gives : — 
Candles. Beef. 
1260-1400 100 17 
1401-1540 100 43 
1540-1582 100 61 
1583-1642 100 60 
1643-1702 100 68 
That is to say, there is a fall in the relative value of 
tallow compared with the meat, consequent, no doubt, on 
the improvement in stock — the sheep and cattle became 
fatter, and were fat tened more easily. A t the end of the 
eighteenth century, and up to the conclusion of the French 
War , tallow was somewhat dearer than beef, but since 1815 
it has become cheaper; in 1867-1877 the proportion was 
69s. per cwt. beef (prime) to 45s. per cwt. tallow — the 
present quotation (1900) being 65s. per cwt. beef to 28s. 
tallow. 
W i t h reference to oxen and hides in the mediaeval period, 
1 From 1260 to 1400 the price of candles is relatively rather higher : 
candles, Is. 11 \d.; oil, Is. 0 \ d . to Is. 4 \ d . But on reference the candles 
prove to be of a fancy kind, made in Paris, for example. 
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the hide, to begin with (1260-1350), is 20 per cent of 
the value of the ox (viz., 2s. M. to 12s.), but falls to 
about 12 per cent ( Is . 10c?. to 15s.) in 1350-1400, at which 
proportion it remains till the end of the sixteenth century. 
I t is difficult to estimate the weight of the hides, but if we 
deduct a quarter from Adam Smith's estimate of 64 lbs. 
in his day for a good skin, the price will be about the same 
as that of beef per pound. The Eton prices (1566 1640) 
give the same price per pound for hides and beef (viz., 2d. 
to 2 p e r pound) ; at the end of the eighteenth century 
(Adam Smith) the relative prices are still the same, and 
the quotations from 1866 to 1899 (Sauerbeck) give practi-
cally the same prices per pound as that of prime beef. 
The constancy in the price of beef and hides over so long 
a period and through such vicissitudes is very remarkable. 
I t is only in very recent years that the price of the 
coarsest wool, weight for weight, has fallen to the level of 
the best meat — which shows, perhaps, inter alia, that man-
kind wear and wear out more value in clothes than in shoes. 
§ 6. Houses and Furniture. Relative prices do not throw 
so much light on progress in houses and furni ture as more 
direct evidence, because the meaning of " h o u s e s " and 
" f u r n i t u r e " is ut terly changed. " I think," said Ar thur 
Young, " the bad cabins and furni ture the greatest in-
stances of Irish poverty." His description 1 (1776-1779) 
might be used word for word of the dwellings and furni-
ture of the English peasants of the early mediaeval period. 
" They are " he says " the most miserable hovels that can well 
be conceived. They generally consist of only one room. 
Mud kneaded with straw is the common material of the 
walls ; these are rarely above seven feet high, and not always 
above five or six ; they are about two feet thick, and have 
only a door which lets in light instead of a window, and 
should let out the smoke instead of a chimney, but they 
rather keep it in. The furniture of the cabins is as bad 
as the architecture; in very many cases consisting only 
1 Tour in Ireland, Vol. I., p. 47. 
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of a pot for boiling their potatoes, a bit of a table, and one 
or two broken stools. Beds are not found universally, the 
family lying in straw, equally partook of by cows, calves, 
and pigs. 
" In my rides about Mitchelstown I have passed places 
on the road one day without any appearance of habitation, 
and next morning found a hovel filled with a man and 
woman, six or eight children, and a pig." 1 
Arthur Young, however, points out that the Irish spend 
more on food than on clothes, and on milk than on furni-
ture, and the mediaeval mud hovels were also, in general, 
scenes of rude plenty. 
§ 7. The Price of Wool. The price of wool is of great 
interest in connection with the development of agricul-
ture, of foreign trade, and of a most important manufac-
ture. For different purposes, the relative value of wool 
may be expressed in relation to different commodities, and 
first in relation to meat. 
To begin with, the price of wool was very high com-
pared with that of meat. From 1260 to 1400 wool per 
pound is more than 12 times the price of meat ; from 
1400 to 1582 it falls to 5 t imes; from 1582 to 17022 it is 4 
times, from 1730 to 1790 less than 2|- times the price of 
meat. Arthur Young calls attention to a great fall in the 
price of wool about 1779, viz., to about 6ii. per pound, 
which is about double the price of meat, and Adam Smith 
thinks that the price of wool has been subject to an un-
natural degradation through the laws forbidding exporta-
1 Tour in Ireland, Vol. I., p. 40. Cf. Eden, Vol. I. , p. 553, etc., on 
the building of mud houses in Dumfriesshire in a few hours. I am 
informed (1900) tha t in par t s of Lewes, where new houses have been 
built for the crofters, with grates and windows, the chimneys and windows 
have, in some cases, been stopped up, and the fire made in the middle 
of the floor,—such is the force of habit in the necessaries of fire and 
shelter. 
2 For 1582-1702 the records of the prices of wool are not so full as 
for the earlier period. The averages given are calculated from Rogers and 
Smith 's Memoirs of Wool. 
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tion. Adam Smith, also points out tha t the production 
of wool has not suffered much in quant i ty because it 
is a joint product with meat. There was, however, prob-
ably a deterioration in quality, especially dur ing the high 
prices of meat in the tirst quarter of this century. 1 
Up to the end of the eighteenth century, the imports 
of wool were comparatively small, and consisted mainly 
of fine Spanish wool. According to the estimates usually 
given,2 the amount of Spanish wool imported did not 
much exceed 3,000,000 of pounds weight before 1800, 
whilst the production of English wool was probably 10 
times as great (half a million of packs at 210 lbs. per pack). 
Dur ing the present century, however, the importation 
of wool has increased enormously. The total home pro-
duction of the Uni ted Kingdom is about 140,000,000 of 
pounds, whilst the average imports of the last five years 
are over 700,000,000 lbs., of which about 65 per cent came 
from Australasia. The total import has more than doubled 
since 1874, al though it must be observed tha t little more 
than half of the total import is retained for home consump-
tion. 
Quite recently the connection between wool and meat 
has been il lustrated by the course of prices in London. 
In 1872 fine colonial wool reached a price of 43<i. per 
pound, being nearly double of the price five years before. 
I t retained a comparatively high price for some years, 
but dur ing the last decade prices have been low. As a con-
sequence the farmers turned their attention to the develop-
ment of meat, and since 1875 the production of merino wool 
has lessened (aided recently by the drought in Austral ia) , 
and the price is now (1900) double of what it was five years 
ago. The adjustment of meat and wool to relative prices 
is characteristic of progressive and adaptable agriculture. 
The exportation of English wool was prohibited till 
1825. I t now amounts to more than one-seventh of 
1 For prices of wool and meat, see also Palgrave's Dictionary, p. 630. 
2 Report of Lords' Committee, 1828. 
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the animal home production, viz., 22,000,000 out of 
140,000,000. 
In considering the relative value of meat and wool, the 
relative weights of the fleece and the carcass, as well as 
the time requisite for maturity, must be considered. In the 
mediaeval period (1260-1400) the average weight of the 
fleece is given by Rogers at 1 lb. 7-f oz. This gives a 
value of nearly 5d. to the fleece against Is. 5d. for the 
average " m u t t o n " (i.e., wether) , and Is. 2d. for a ewe. 
The quality of the mediaeval wool, as may be seen from 
existing specimens of cloth, was coarse, and the fibre was 
full of hairs. 
A striking illustration of agricultural progress, as meas-
ured by wool, is found in the fact that at present a fleece 
of the finest wool often weighs more than the whole of the 
mediaeval sheep — bones and all. 
§ 8. Other Records and Readings of Agricultural Prices. 
There are many other records of prices of the products, 
the instruments, and the materials of agriculture which 
would serve to fill in the details of the picture of agricul-
tural progress. In 1270, for example, rabbits were sold at 
5d. each, whilst the highest price for a sheep ( " mutton " ) 
in the next year was only l\\d. For a long period after 
this rabbits are sold at 6d. to 8d. the couple — from 1400 
to 1510 the average is 5d. per couple. In 1405 the skins 
are Is. 4d. the dozen, in 1460 only 4^., in spite of the great 
demand for fu r trimmings. I t may be inferred tha t in the 
thirteenth century rabbits were evidently a novelty, in 
the fifteenth they were abundant . 
Gardens were considered as objects of value ; at any rate, 
as early as 1279, and before the end of the thirteenth cen-
tury, Eden is of opinion 1 that England produced most of 
the useful vegetables — certainly onions, leeks, mustard, 
fine peas, and beans. The clergy were great gardeners. 
Orchards were numerous, and most f rui t trees are ascribed 
to the Romans. From 1260 to 1400 the price of cider is 
1 State of the Poor, Vol. I„ p. 51. 
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from a halfpenny to a penny a gallon (the average of 
common wine being 4cZ.), and apples are about a penny per 
bushel. The price of apples, however, oscillates between 
the extremes of 3d. a bushel, e.g., 1336 and ^-d., e.g., 1339. 
In the former year wheat was below the average, in the 
latter above, from which it may be inferred that an inclem-
ent spring destroyed the apple blossom in 1336, and that 
the spring of 1339 was unusually favourable. 
The records of the prices of salt, so long as salt was 
obtained mainly fronj. evaporation of sea-water by solar 
heat, are still more instructive, and supplemented by other 
prices (e.g., grain, stock), a fair idea of the course of the 
seasons may be obtained. The importance of the seasons, 
as affecting prices in England up to the free-trade era, 
is one of the subjects best worked out in the great work of 
Tooke and Newmarch.1 The relative decline in the im-
portance of the seasons, with the extension of the area of 
supply of grain, may be shown by a remarkable example. 
The j^ear 1879 was the coldest of which we have any in-
strumental record in these islands, and there was a great 
failure of the harvest. So easily was the deficit met, how-
ever, by imports from America, that the price of wheat 
only rose to 53s. Qd. as compared with an average of 51s. 
for 1871-1880. 
Under old conditions there would have been a famine,2 
as there was in 1698,1800. I may here point out, also, that 
the extremes of abundance and scarcity prices were much 
greater at the end of the eighteenth century than they 
were a century before. In 1688 wheat was 17s. 10c?., and 
in 1698 53s. 4d., and in 1779 wheat was 30s. Id . in 1800 
134s. 9d. This again is partly a sign of the increase of 
national wealth, partly it is a consequence of the extension 
of poor relief.8 
1 See next chapter. 
2 An Essay on the Price of Wheat at Haddington, 1627-1897, by R. 
C. Mossinan, gives graphical illustrations of the inverse relations of prices 
and w a r m t h in the self-dependent era. 
3 See Tooke's History of Prices, Vol. I., p. 14, 72. 
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Bees were of great util i ty in tlie mediaeval economy. 
In the thir teenth century sugar was sometimes 2s. per 
pound, and the average was above Is. The higher figure 
is 50 times the price of meat, or as costly as 24 bushels of 
apples. Honey was the usual substi tute for sugar, and 
rents in honey were common from very early times. 
Wax for candles was dear, bu t fell in relative value af ter 
the Reformation,1 and rose a li t t le under the influence of 
Laud.2 
The prices of fish are extremely interesting. In mediae-
val times the prices were relatively extremely high, part ly 
owing to the general use of salt meat,— fish being an 
agreeable change, — partly to ecclesiastical influences, and 
part ly to difficulties in working fisheries. There is one 
remarkable exception : the price of oysters is recorded at 
one ha l fpenny per hundred, which may be contrasted with 
a pike a t Is . 6c?.; an enormous price for so coarse a fish, 
even if of unusual size. 
Many of the prices of edibles point to changes in taste, 
e.g., in the sixteenth century, in the same account, a swan 
is 2s., a wether 2s. 4c?., a curlew is Is . 4c?., a partridge 2c?, a 
dozen larks are 5c?., and a dozen pigeons 10c?. In 1572 four 
and twenty blackbirds cost 2s., being as dear as six of the 
best chickens, a heron is 2s. 6c?. whilst the best goose is only 
Is. 2c?. In no period of English history, however, have the 
prices of rare articles of food ever approached the insane 
prices paid by the gourmands of the Roman Empire.3 The 
glut tony of the most wealthy English was never fantasti-
cally morbid. 
The prices of eggs are recorded by Rogers from 1260 to 
1702. The mediaeval uni t is the great hundred (120) . 
From 1.260 to 1350 a quarter of wheat will purchase 16 great 
hundreds of eggs; 1350 to 1400,12 hundreds ; 1400 to 1540, 
10 hundred ; 1540 to 1582, 5 1 hundreds ; 1583 to 1642, 11 
hundreds ; 1643 to 1702, 12 hundreds. The great rise in 
1 Rogers, Vol. IV . , p. 719. 2 Ibid., Vol. V. , p. 753. 
8 Cf. Adam Smith (McCulloch), p. 100, 1. 
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the price of eggs in 1540-1582 (from 6d. to 2s. 6d. per 120) 
is proportionately in excess of that of any other article. 
I t was no doubt due to the great displacement of the rural 
population, and confirms the view that the general rise in 
prices was not mainly due to the debasement of the currency. 
In 1899 there were imported into the United Kingdom 
upward of 16,000,000 great hundreds of eggs (the old 
uni t is still used), of a value of about £5,000,000. This 
works out at 6s. 3d. the great hundred, which with wheat 
at 25s.Sd. makes a quarter of wheat equal 4 hundreds of eggs 
— the highest relative value of eggs yet attained. The 
modern imported egg, however, is certainly inferior in 
most respects to the fresh country egg of the earlier periods, 
and with similar eggs the price would probably give less 
than 2 great hundreds to the quarter of wheat. Fou-
rier's proposal to pay off the English national debt by hens' 
eggs no longer appears ridiculous. 
I t would be interesting to trace, in greater detail, and 
with other instances, the movements of relative prices in 
agriculture, and the corresponding changes in agricultural 
production, e.g., as shown by the gradual improvement in 
stock indicated by the increasing divergence from the aver-
age in the prices of superior specimens for breeding.1 
The redistribution of the industries of the people, 
and the development of foreign trade, may also be con-
nected with the disturbance in relative agricultural prices; 
but this aspect of the subject is treated in connection with 
other prices.2 
§ 9. Wool and Cloth. The history of the manufacture 
of cloth is one of the best examples of economic develop-
ment. From the vast mass of material I select one or two 
examples specially connected witli relative prices. 
Over very long periods there is a marked fall in the 
price of cloth compared with the wool of which it is 
made; in other words, the value of the raw material rises 
1 As I write, a filly of Persimmon has been sold for 10,000 guineas 
(£10,500). 2 See the following sections in this chapter. 
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(or the cost of the manufacture falls) in comparison with 
the finished product. In making such a comparison regard 
must of course be paid to quality, and in general changes 
in quality can only be estimated very roughly. On the 
whole, however, it may be taken that the quality of cloth 
(of the same material) has also improved with the increas-
ing cheapness of manufacture. 
The improvements in manufacture have extended to all 
qualities, but relatively-have been greatest in the finest. 
Thus the fall in the difference between fine and coarse 
cloth is one of the signs of economic progress. The price 
of some kinds of cloth described by Pliny passes all credi-
bility, says Adam Smith. And this high price he justly 
ascribes to the want of mechanical invention, and this 
again to#the prevalence of slavery.1 
The same idea of the progress of the English woollen 
manufacture may be obtained from taking the estimates 
of the aggregate values of the raw material and of the 
manufacture at different periods. I n Smith's Memoirs of 
Wool2 (1747) it is calculated that " u p o n a M e d i u m " 
wool is improved fourfold in manufacture, and the writers 
of political arithmetic in the preceding century estimated 
the value of the wool yearly shorn to be £2,000,000, and 
that of the woollen manufacture <£8,000,000. From 1859 to 
1861 the average annual value of the woollen and worsted 
manufactures is estimated at £40,000,000, the cost of the 
" w o o l " consumed being about £19,000,000. For 1880 
to 1882, however, the proportions are £53,000,000 to 
£23,000,000.3 The " w o o l " includes certain quantities of 
rags, cotton warps, and woollen yarn, and the products 
include yarns and worsteds as well as cloth. Still, making 
all allowances, the fall in the cost of manufacture is very 
great. 
§ 10. Cotton Wool and Cotton Cloth. The displacement 
of wool by cotton — as the first national manufacture — 
1 Adam Smith, Bk. IV. , Ch. IX. 2 Vol. II., p. 561. 
3 Ellison's Cotton Trade of Great Britain, p. 124. 
84 ECONOMIC P R O G R E S S . 
constituted a revolution in English industry and commerce, 
and affords abundant examples of the power of changes 
in relative prices. The history of the cotton manufacture 
is ful l of romantic incidents and startling contrasts, and 
nowhere is the powerlessness of the legislature to interfere 
with natural values more conspicuous nor the desires and 
weakness of vested interests more pronounced. As con-
firming one striking feature in the general view of eco-
nomic progress, it is interesting to notice that a thousand 
years before the invasion of Britain by the Romans, the 
leading peoples of India were luxuriating in garments so 
fine as to be called " woven wind." And what is still 
more surprising is that the cotton, to which this marvellous 
spinning and weaving were applied, was the much-despised 
Surats and still more despised Bengals of modern times. 
(Ell ison.) These fabrics were as fine as any that can be 
turned out at the present day by the most perfect machin-
ery of Lancashire, and indeed, Lancashire still waits on 
invention to satisfy many of the immemorial fashions of 
the East. The cultivation of the cotton plant and the art 
of spinning cotton gradually spread through Persia, Tur-
key, Greece, Egypt, North Africa, and Spain (under the 
Saracens) — the slow march of progress from the East 
to the Wes t under the leadership of Turks and Saracens 
is impressive — until, toward the end of the sixteenth cen-
tury, cotton spinning was established in England. I t is 
noticeable, however, that it was not till the close of the eigh-
teenth century that cotton yarn was woven into cloth except 
with warp spun from wool, flax, or silk. The Manchester 
cottons of the fourteenth century and onward are mixtures 
of cotton and wool. For centuries the principal use of 
imported cotton was to make candle-wicks. The first 
arrival of India cotton fabrics took place in 1631, and 
very soon an outcry was raised that the woollen and linen 
trades would be ruined. In 1700 the import of printed 
calico was prohibited (with, inter alia, a penalty of ,£200 
on the wearer), and in 1736, goods being all cotton, 
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and therefore presumptively foreign, were liable to a duty 
of 6d. per yard. 
The first piece of British calico was made in 1773 
(Arkwr igh t ) , and orders for goods were flowing in, when 
it was discovered or remembered that the wearing of 
printed calico was illegal, and that any goods all cotton 
were liable to a high duty. A n act of Par l iament to re-
duce the du ty and to repeal the prohibition was passed 
"aga ins t the strong opposition of the manufacturers of 
Lancashire," who had vested interests in mixed fabrics. 
The price of cotton relatively to woollen fabrics is 
interesting in two ways. To begin with, the Indian fabrics 
were fancied in spite of their high prices, and De Foe, of 
all people, complained of the " f a n s i e " of the people run-
ning upon East India goods, so that he avers, half of the 
woollen manufacture was lost. The prohibition of wearing 
India printed calico (unless dyed all blue like the body 
of an ancient Br i ton) led to the imitation of cotton wi th 
linen and other material, and it was the popular i ty of the 
imitations which st imulated the attempts to invent machin-
ery capable of producing fabrics entirely of cotton. 
Once, however, the cotton manufacture was fairly 
established at the close of the eighteenth century, i t was 
the relatively low prices 1 which led to the enormous expan-
sion of the trade, which was only seriously checked dur ing 
the cotton famine of the American Civil War . 
I t was the rapid growth of the cotton manufacture tha t 
carried England through the great Napoleonic wars, and 
the secret of the success was the fall in relative values 
brought about by the great inventions in spinning and 
weaving. Before 1815 the new manufacture of cotton 
had reached an annual value of £30,000,000. 
1 In 1779 yarn of 40 hanks to the pound cost 14s. to manufacture, in 
1812 only Is.; in 1786 yarn of 100 hanks to the pound cost to manufac-
ture 34s., in 1812 only 2s. 10<2. 
The progressive fall in the cost may also he seen by considering the 
proportionate cost of the raw material. In 1779, in the coarser yarn, the 
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Further great improvements in spinning machinery-
were made between 1820 and 1830, and in weaving 
machinery between 1830 and 1845 ; since that time the 
greatest improvements have been in transport and the 
development of foreign trade. 
The present importance of the cotton manufacture to 
the United Kingdom is shown by a few significant figures. 
The total export of cotton fabrics and yarn in 1899 was 
about £58,500,000, the amount of grain and flour imported 
being £58,000,000. Thus the exports of cotton more 
than pay for all the grain and flour. I t is true that the 
raw cotton imported costs over £27,000,000, but still 
the net balance of the export is over £30,000,000, to say 
nothing of the home market. Our total exports of woollen 
and worsted manufactures for 1899 only reach £21,500,000 
which falls, short of the value of the wool imported by 
£2,000,000. 
In the beginning of the cotton manufacture the aggregate 
value of cotton, woollen, and linen goods produced in the 
United Kingdom was about £22,000,000: (say) woollen 
£17,000,000, linen £4,000,000, and cotton £1,000,000; of 
recent years the value has been about £170,000,000, woollen 
£50,000,000, linen £20,000,000, and cotton £100,000,000. 
Thus the value of the cotton manufacture has increased a 
hundred fold against a threefold increase of wool. (Ellison.) 
If the attempts to protect wool against cotton had succeeded, 
the whole course of British history would have been changed, 
and also Britain's place amongst the nations of the world. 
Two other points deserve special attention : First, the 
great fall in the price of the raw cotton, in spite of this 
cost of the cotton was 2s. out of 16s.; in 1812 it was as much as Is. Od. 
out of 2s. 6d. 
In 1882 the selling price of yarn (40 hanks to the pound) was 10J<7., 
the raw material costing 7 \d . , thus showing a fall in the cost of manufac-
ture f rom 14s. to 3§d.\ and in 1885 the relative prices were 9 J d and 0 \ i l , 
leaving 3d. for cost of manufacture. 
The figures relating to cloth are equally interesting, e.g., calicoes sell-
ing at 13d. per yard in 1815 having fallen to 2 I d . per yard in 1856. 
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enormous increase in its use.1 From 1890 to 1899 the aver-
age of middling American was 4 p e r pound ; from 1793 to 
1800 prices of American cotton ranged between 12d. and 
60d. Secondly, the number of weeks' consumption in 
stock of all kinds of raw cotton at 31st December from 
1871 to 1880 was on the average 12 with a maximum of 15, 
whilst from 1811 to 1820 the number of weeks' stock was on 
the average 37 with a maximum of 69, and in the next ten 
years (1821-1830), the average stock was still 36 weeks. 
The organization of industry renders unnecessary or waste-
ful the accumulation of circulating capital in the shape of 
raw material.2 
The expansion of the British cotton manufacture to its 
present dimensions was only possible through the develop-
ment of machinery and transport, of which the raw mate-
rials and power are still derived mainly from coal and iron. 
§ 11. Wood, Coal, and Iron. Fire is not only a neces-
sary of life in providing warmth and in cooking food, but 
is still the foundation of most of the arts in the working 
of metals. In the economic history of England we find 
that for household purposes wood was for centuries the 
ordinary fuel, supplemented in some places by turfs and 
sedge, and partially by charcoal and sea-coal. With regard 
to firewood, the proverb holds good literally, tha t there are 
fagots and fagots, and as Rogers found, prices are hard to 
1 See Ellison, op. cit., Appendix, Table No. I., for prices f rom 1811 to 
1884. 
2 " T h e cotton p l an t , " says Adam Smith, in discoursing on the dis-
covery of the West Indies, " a f fo rded the material of a very important 
manufacture , and was at tha t t ime to Europeans undoubtedly the most 
valuable of all the vegetable productions of those islands. But though in 
the end of the fifteenth century the muslins and other cotton goods of the 
East Indies were much esteemed, the cotton manufac ture itself was not 
cultivated in any par t of i t " (Book IV., Chap. VII . , McCulloch's edi-
tion, p. 251). Adam Smith makes several references to the cotton 
manufacture (Ibid., pp. 251, 290), and it is inexplicable how his editor, 
McCulloch, should have given currency to the oft-quoted opinion tha t Dr. 
Smith has not made any allusion, either here or in any other par t of his 
work, to the cotton manufac ture (Ibid., p. 114). 
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interpret , but the general movement is clear. " Coals," 
said Adam Smith, " a r e a less agreeable fuel than wood, 
and they are said to be less wholesome. The expense of 
coals, therefore, at the place where they are consumed must 
generally be less than that of wood." Sea-coal indeed 
displaced wood simply by its increasing relative cheapness. 
The transition to sea-coal was made through charcoal — 
charcoal burning is one of the most ancient of industries — 
and the • relative prices sho w the process of displacement. 
Dur ing the whole period from 1583 to 1708, says Rogers, 
the price of charcoal steadily rises, till in the last thir ty 
years it is regularly nearly three times as dear as it was 
at the beginning. To take a particular example, the aver-
age of sea-coal at Eton from 1643 to 1652 was 39s. 2d. per 
chaldron, the average from 1693 to 1702 was 32s. Id., 
whilst charcoal rose from 29s. 2 \ d . the load in the earlier 
period to 50s. in the later. 
The substi tution of sea-coal for other forms of fuel for 
domestic use is, however, of comparatively small impor-
tance compared with the use of coal in the arts, and espe-
cially in working iron. 
If the spirit of man is the soul of industry, iron and fire 
are its bones and its breath. The records of Rogers show 
that iron and steel (asser or acier is the Anglo-Norman) 
are the most important materials in the mediaeval economy. 
The bailiff buys the raw material, and the village smith 
fashions it. The most f requent evidence of the seasons is 
the increased cost of iron, due to the dryness of the sum-
mer and the greater wear of the ploughs. The price of iron 
rises, just as the price of salt falls, through a dry season. 
" In the whole range of the science of public economy," 
says Porter , " there is no principle more clearly demon-
strable than the advantage of possessing, at the cheapest pos-
sible rate, the raw materials of manufacture ; and of all the 
materials there is not one (unless indeed food be considered) 
which is of more universal importance than iron." 1 
1 Progress of the Nation, p. 2'M. 
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Iron was imported from Spain in 1282, and Rogers 
repeats a story that the last considerable contract for 
Spanish iron was for the rails round St. Paul 's in the 
reign of Anne. Tha t story may once have been t rue ; but 
since the death of Queen Anne much has happened, and 
the United Kingdom now imports from Spain more than 
£3,000,000 of iron ore. The principal English iron for a 
long period was known as " f o r e s t " iron. The name is 
significant — " f o r e s t " iron shows how narrowly England 
escaped the loss of industrial supremacy.1 For tuna te ly 
for the development of her manufactures, af ter England 
had wasted her forests, the use of coal was rendered practi-
cable, and coal and iron fields were discovered to be in 
close proximity. 
The difficulty of working iron in earlier periods is 
shown by the relative prices of iron and lead. Through-
out the whole of the period covered by Rogers's researches 
(1260-1702) the price of wrought iron is about double 
that of lead, whilst dur ing the last thir ty years (1870-1900) 
the price of lead has been more than double tha t of 
iron. 
There was a grea t fall in all hardware prices from 1820 
to 1868, indicating grea t improvements in manufacture . 
The present position of the British coal and iron trades 
is of peculiar interest, if not of danger. The total exports 
from the Uni ted Kingdom of iron and steel in 1899 
was over £28,000,000, of which nearly £5,000,000 was 
pig-iron. In addition, machinery to the value of over 
£19,000,000, and coals and cinders over £23,000,000 
were exported. The exports of coal alone exceeded by 
nearly £2,000,000 the whole of our exports of woollen 
1 A t the beginning of the eighteenth century it is reported tha t two-
thirds of the iron in use was imported, and tha t the forests were being 
destroyed. In spite of legislation, or in lack of the right kind, the de-
struction of the forests continued, much to the alarm of those who saw in 
the oak the mainstay of the British power of the sea, to say nothing of 
the tannin of the bark for leather. 
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goods, or, s tated in another relation, our exports of coal 
just paid for our imports of wool. 
The exhaustion of our coal and iron fields may perhaps 
be met by the principle of fortuity, as in the case of our 
forests or by the progress of science; i t does not seem as 
if any serious a t tempt would be made to meet it by legis-
lation. 
I t is, perhaps, worth recalling tha t Adam Smith, whilst 
disapproving of the prohibition of the exportation of wool, 
strongly approved of heavy export duties. He even gave 
such duties the highest praise. His reasoning might 
be applied with still greater force to coal. The effects 
of the recent rise in the price of coal and of the opening 
of new markets are too fresh to require fur ther emphasis. 
I t may, however, be proper to indicate that in matters of 
finance for every pro there is a contra, and that develop-
ment under the guidance of taxation has not been very 
successful in the past. A check to exports means a check 
to imports an export du ty on coal might be met by 
selling at higher prices to the home consumer than to the 
foreigner, and to check production, the duty must lower 
prices considerably. Above all such a du ty would ap-
pear, to the foreigner at any rate, as an infr ingement of 
free t rade. 
The difficult problems of taxation are, however, reserved 
for the next book. 
The consideration of the prices of iron and coal natu-
rally leads to the consideration of the cost of carriage, and 
the transition may be made with the observation tha t 
Adam Smith approved of bounties being given on the 
transport of coal from places in which it was abundant 
to places within the country where it was scarce — another 
instance of his partiality to theoretical exceptions to free 
trade. 
§ 12. Prices of Transport and Carriage. The history of 
the prices of the t ransport of all kinds of baggage (includ-
ing man and beast) forms one of the main strands of the 
P R O G R E S S A N D R E L A T I V E P R I C E S . 91 
history of commerce. The records of Rogers again throw 
abundant l ight on the earlier periods, and he appears in 
this case to have been very happy, and at anjr rate suggest-
ive, in his commentaries. In the first period (1260-1100) 
the cost of carrying grain by cart with two horses and a 
man was about a penny a ton per mile,1 a rate which indi-
cates not only that the supply of such a service was abun-
dant, but tha t the roads were good. The same rate seems 
to have prevailed up to 1512, when the general rise in 
prices began. I t must not be supposed, however, tha t the 
sweet simplicity of a penny per mile, per ton, was a cus-
tomary charge ; on the contrary, we have the beginnings of 
classifications according to bulk, value, and " what the 
traffic will bear." Heavy goods, e.g., tiles and lead, cost 
something under 2d. a mile, while wine varies from 2d. to 
4d. Rogers finds evidence in his prices tha t af ter the 
Reformation 2 the roads deteriorated, and he ascribes their 
mediaeval goodness largely to the influence of the Church, 
through the necessities of its organisation and the manage-
ment of its widely scattered domains. 
The cost of carriage by river was on the whole about 
one-sixth of tha t of land carriage, this difference being 
one of the chief causes of the growth of the commerce 
and wealth of London, which drew cheap supplies f rom 
the Thames. 
From 1583 to 1613 the cost of carriage of a ton of fire-
wood was about 5-|<f.per mile, and dur ing the next th i r ty 
years 8 \ d . , and by the end of the century a shilling per 
ton per mile is a common rate. For more valuable articles 
and less bulky, the common carrier probably received double 
these prices. 
Wate r carriage bears its old proportion of about one-sixth 
of that of land carriage at the beginning of the period (e.g., 
1599), and is about Id. per ton per mile, but 50 years later 
it has risen to 4d. (for the same article, the same journey) . 
The eighteenth century saw not only the beginnings of 
1 Vol. I., p. 658. 2 Vol. IV., p. 711. 
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improvement in roads but also the institution of canals. I t 
is t rue tha t A r t h u r Young in a celebrated passage describes 
some roads as " infernal ," and the legislation regarding 
highways bears out his description. When vehicles were 
allowed to escape with half the usual tolls if the fore wheel 
and hind wheel together should roll on a space sixteen inches 
in breadth,1 the experience of deep ruts must have been con-
siderable. The eulogy of the roads of England by Henry 
Homer 2 (Young 's contemporary) after all only goes to prove 
that the badness of roads was relative, and that the badness of 
the beginning was in this estimate about double that of the 
end of the century. " Everyth ing wears the face of Dis-
patch " is an odd description of the roads of England before 
they were made by Telfer and Macadam. 
A r t h u r Young's account of the excellent roads of Ireland 
during his tour is suggestive. In many respects the agri-
culture was behind mediaeval methods, but the country 
roads were far better than those of England at the close 
of the eighteenth century. I t is tempting to extend the 
inference of Thorold Rogers, and to imagine that the 
roads were good, because Ireland had escaped the Refor-
mation. 
I t seems, however, tha t the excellence was due part ly to 
the general use of two-wheeled one-horse carts in place of 
heavy waggons,3 and in part due to local management be-
ing exercised in the local in teres t ; both, it may be, mediaeval 
customs. The turnpikes of Ireland were not good. " A 
turnpike in Ireland is a synonymous term for a vile road, 
which is the more extraordinary, as the bye ones are the 
finest in the world. I t is the effect of jobs and impositions 
which disgrace the k ingdom; the presentment (local) 
roads show what may be done, and render these villainous 
turnpikes the more disgusting." 4 Ar thu r Young's calcu-
lations and observations seem to show that in England 
instead of progress there had been retrogression in the 
1 Macpherson, Vol. I I I . , p. 416. 3 Young, Tour in Ireland, Vol. II., p. 81. 
2 Cunningham, Vol. II . , p. 376. 4 Ibid., Vol. I. , p. 116. 
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matter of transport of heavy goods by roads.1 The author 
of the Progress of the Nation2 also records that in 1798 
he left the town of Gosport at one o'clock of the morning 
in the " Telegraph," a " fast coach," and arrived at Char-
ing Cross at eight in the evening, thus occupying nineteen 
hours in travelling eighty miles — a little over four miles 
an hour. 
By 1837 there were in England 54 four-horse and 49 
pair-horse mail coaches.3 The greatest average speed of 
any was 1 0 | miles per hour, the slowest 6 miles, and the 
average 8 | . The number of stage-coaches, including mails, 
in 1837 was 3026, and of this number half began or ended 
their journeys in London. The fares per mile were 2d. 
to 3d. 
England had always had the great commercial advan-
tage of easy access to carriage by water either by the sea 
or navigable rivers; in most places being not more than 
ten miles distant. 
Our viabilite immense had always excited the envy of 
our neighbours and enemies. Although some efforts were o o 
made at earlier periods (e.g., before 1066), the greatest 
era of canal construction in England was during the latter 
half of the eighteenth century.4 The Duke of Bridgewater 
obtained his first Act of Parl iament in 1759, and in 1761 
Brindley had constructed his " castle in the air," as the 
scoffers called the aqueduct bridge for his canal over the 
navigable Irwell, and the wondering spectators saw ves-
sels sailing aloft in the air. Before their effacement by 
railways, the navigable canals in England alone exceeded 
2200 miles in length, 400 miles longer than the navigable 
rivers. 
The extension of the Bridgewater canal to Liverpool 
affords a good illustration of the economy of transport. 
The cost of carriage per ton fell to 6s. as compared with 
12s., the charge by the Mersey and Irwell, and with 40s., 
1 Young, Tour in Ireland, Vol. II., pp. 81-83. 3 Ibid., p. 303. 
2 Porter, p. 299. * Macpherson, Vol. I., p. 289. 
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the price of land carriage. " Navigable canals," said 
Adam Smith, " are among the greatest of all improve-
ments ," and Macpherson, who confesses he is not often 
gui l ty of transcribing poetry, condescends in a footnote to 
the verse of Mrs. Barbauld.1 
The substi tution of railways for canals is too familiar an 
instance of the power of relative values to revolutionise 
commerce to need much explanation. The case of Man-
chester and Liverpool may again be taken. The immedi-
ate effect of the opening of this line was a saving of a 
quar ter of a million a year in transport, viz., at the rates of 
2s. 6d. each to passengers, 2s. Qd. per ton on merchandise, 
and 2s. per ton on coal. The example was contagious. The 
value to be ascribed to the saving of time is unfor tunately 
incapable of estimation by any of the ordinary rules of po-
litical arithmetic. The recent proposal to make a mono-rail 
(all modern marvels seem to require a hybrid language for 
their monstrousness) to convey passengers from Man-
chester to Liverpool in twenty minutes seems to indi-
cate that the fur ther economy of time has also money in 
it. 
I t is in the development of transport and the means of 
communication tha t the present century most overtops its 
predecessors. I t cost the mediaeval man a silver penny to 
carry a ton of grain a mile by road. The carriage of some 
1 Macpherson, Annals of Commerce, Vol. I I I . , p. 335. 
Here is p a r t : — 
" The sons of toil with many a weary stroke 
Scoop the hard bosom of the solid rock. 
Compel the genius of th ' unwilling flood 
Through the brown horrors of the aged wood. 
Now through the hidden veins of earth they flow 
And visit sulph'rous mines and caves below ; 
The ductile streams obey the guiding hand, 
And social plenty circles round the l and . " 
Perhaps the economist of the next century may find our railways as 
curious as canals, and our Kipling as Mrs. Barbauld. 
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goods was cheaper — of others clearer — in mediaeval t imes; 
then, also, as already indicated, there were classifications 
of rates. But a penny per ton per mile may be considered 
fairly representative. 
At the present time a penny per ton per mile by railway 
may also be considered a fairly representative estimate 
when the fractions are pared off and the classifications 
averaged. The average cost of freight in all the United 
States is said to be only 0.8 cents, or less than a ha l fpenny 
per ton-mile.1 In England the rates are higher, making 
an extremely rough estimation of all traffic probably 50 
to 75 per cent higher than in the United States.2 I n 
South Aus t ra l i a 3 the average rate per ton-mile is 1.19c?., 
in New South Wales 1.44c?. A recent estimate of dif-
ferent European countries gave 1.01c?. per mile-ton.'1 
Thus making a rough calculation, we may fairly say that 
the modern penny will carry for a mile by railway the ton 
of goods which the mediaeval penny would carry by road. 
But without going again into the difficulties of measuring 
the relative values of money at different periods, it needs 
no demonstration tha t the silver penny of the Middle Ages 
represented a far greater real cost than its modern name-
sake — a carpenter, for example, at the present day earns 
as many pennies in an hour as his mediaeval predecessor 
earned in three days (3Jc?. per day being the mediaeval 
rate before the P lague ) . 
I t is, however, hardly necessary to observe tha t the 
cheapness of railway traffic is only one of its advantages — 
there is also the economy of time and the higher develop-
ment of the whole machinery of exchange. The modern 
penny will not only carry a ton-mile of goods, but will send 
a letter beyond the limits of the mediaeval wor ld ; whilst 
the present high-speed means of communication by tele-
1 Mayo-Smith, Statistics in Economics, p. 207. 
2 Hadley, Railroad Transportation, p. 158. 
3 Statistical Journal, March, 1900 : Howell on "Austra l ian Ra i lways . " 
4 Jean , Railway Problems, p. 277. 
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graph and telephone etc. were beyond the limits of the 
mediaeval imagination. In the Eastern world of ant iquity, 
if only time were allowed, marvels of construction and 
marvels of manufacture might be extorted from masses of 
servile labour ; but 110 amount of labour-time could be 
converted into our high velocities. The economy of time 
and the economy of labour have been the greatest pro-
moters of modern inventions. 
§ 13. Ocean Shipping. — Freights. — Exports and Imports. 
The sea has been well called the great free-trader. The 
competition of English rai lways 1 with the sea accounts 
for many of the curious anomalies in freight, e.g., tha t the 
same goods can be sent longer distances a t cheaper rates. 
It1 would, of course, be easy to compare the cost of carriage 
by rail and by sea between (e.g.) Edinburgh and London, 
of particular kinds of goods; but it is impossible to esti-
mate even roughly an average rate for all ocean freights. 
Railways have to a great extent displaced canals. In the 
United States 44 per cent of the canals constructed had 
been abandoned by 1880. But in general railways and 
ocean shipping are supplementary rather than antagonistic, 
and it has been calculated that the world's tonnage of 
f re ight waggons or railroads is about the same as the 
tonnage of all the ships on the sea — namely, about 
35,000,000.2 
In dealing with shipping and prices it may be permit ted 
to adopt the inverse method. During the last fifty years 
a complete revolution has taken place in shipping. The 
displacement of sailing vessels by steamers has been con-
tinuous. As late as 1850 the sailing tonnage of the world 
was 91.2 of the total, in 1893 it was 27.9 only. In the 
year 1900 there were building in the United King-
dom 1,306,751 tons of shipping, in the proportion of 
1,297,497 steam to 9254 sail. This substitution of steam 
for sail has been accompanied, and largely caused, by a 
1 Grierson, Railway Rates, p. SO, 1. 
2 Mayo-Smith, Statistics and Economics, p. 271. 
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radical change in material, size, machinery, speed. The 
resultant effect of all these changes has been tha t many 
typical freights are one-third or one-fourth of what they 
were fifty years ago. The chief factors in this grea t reduc-
tion have been the economy of time and the various 
" in te rna l economies" of large steam vessels. The rates 
of insurance have also fallen with security. The influence 
of insecurity, as in war, upon freights was well shown at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century, when freights 
rose about fourfold. 
The investigations of Sir Robert Giffen on the excess of 
the value of imports over that of exports give the materials 
for a comparison of progress in shipping and freights be-
tween 1880-1881 and 1898, and also indicate in the style in 
which he excels, the larger questions involved. In the 
earlier paper (1882) he estimated that taking the foreign 
trade of the whole world, the imports exceed the exports 
by about £160,000,000. This difference in the gross 
values of identical things is accounted for by the differ-
ence in place; the exjDorts being valued at the place of 
shipment and the imports at the place of arrival. Thus 
the £160,000,000 gives roughly the cost of ocean freights. 
In the later paper (1899) it is s tated that the figure had 
remained about the same. Everything, at the same time, 
tends to show that there had been dur ing the period an 
enormous increase in the volume of trade, so tha t there 
must have been a corresponding fall in the rate of f re ights 
if the total is the same. To take an important example — 
grain — the fall in freight appears to have been nearly 
one-half, e.g., f rom New York to the United Kingdom from 
6s. to 3s. 9cl. per quar te r ; from San Francisco from 62s. 6d. 
to 25s. per t o n ; from Odessa, f rom 20s. to l i s . per quarter . 
The progress of shipping in England over long periods 
may be il lustrated by reference to an account of the 
exports and imports for 1354.1 The total exports were in 
value £212,338 5s., on which customs duties of £81,846 
1 Quoted by Macpherson, Vol. I., p. 553. 
v o r . . t i t . — h 
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12s. 2d. were paid. The imports were £-38,383 16s. lOd. 
and the import duties £586 6s. 8d. In 1898 the imports 
into England and Wales were £423,469,000, and the ex-
ports (of home produce) £209,489,000. 
We know with approximate certainty, that the present 
population of England gives a value of exports and imports 
per head of nearly twenty-two pounds sterling. The popu-
lation of mediaeval England is a matter of dispute.1 If for 
the year in question (1354) we take it as 2,000,000 (a low 
estimate) this would give the value of the total foreign trade 
as Is. 2d. per head. The modern increase is thus nearly 
four hundred fold in nominal value, and whatever " multi-
p l ie r" we take to convert mediaeval into modern values 
(Rogers sometimes takes twelve, sometimes eight) we do 
not increase very much the relative importance of mediae-
val foreign trade. In the account quoted, indeed, the great-
est part of the trade (80 pe rcen t ) is wool valued at 4d. per 
pound, whilst the present price of a similar quality would 
probably not be 8d. per pound. A particular instance is 
in some respects more striking than a gross total. In 1297 
munitions were sent from Bristol to Carnarvon Castle. 
The ship with its complement of sailors is hired at less 
than 2s. a day, which shows not so much that freights were 
low as that ships were small. 
§ 14. General' Conclusion. In the preceding books 
it has been shown that exchange is logically part of 
production. In a survey of economic progress this inter-
connection of commerce and production in the narrow 
meanings of the term is perhaps the most striking charac-
teristic. The commerce of the towns improves the coun-
try, and the commerce of the world improves the towns — 
there we have condensed the larger part of economic 
history. But all commerce depends on relative prices; if 
relative prices differ in any two countries, a trade will 
naturally arise, unless it is prevented by cost of carriage, 
the imposition of duties, or other hindrances. In the 
I Cf. Cunningham, Vol. II . , p. 331. 
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course of progress, however, these hindrances on the whole 
tend to diminish, and thus smaller differences in relative 
prices are sufficient to create a trade. 
But conversely, also, the disappearance of differences in 
relative prices must cause a trade to cease. For the 
United Kingdom this is a fact of vital importance. The 
world's market governs the particular markets of particular 
countries. Changes of greater magnitude now occur with 
greater f requency than ever before. A nation, to retain 
its lead in industrial supremacy, must always be the first in 
adaptation and the quickest in mobility. 
C H A P T E R V. 
RENT AND PROGRESS. 
§ 1. Rent as a Measure of Progress. I t was generally 
maintained by the English economists of the seventeenth 
century, e.g., Petty, that rent was the best criterion of 
prosperity, and a rise in rent the surest sign of growing 
weal th; and this opinion was still strongly held in the 
eighteenth century. I t seemed only too natural to infer 
that whatever raised rents increased the national prosperity, 
and that whatever lowered rents was a national evil. Rents 
came to be regarded as the principal source of the demand 
for commodities; if rents rose, the landlords bought more 
cf the shopkeepers, these again of the wholesale dealers, 
and these of the manufacturers; if rents fell, " t h e landlord 
must disappoint the tradesmen he deals with, the trades-
men their wholesale dealers and merchants, by which 
means the mischief circulates, and by an unhappy chain of 
consequences one deficiency extends itself to an inconceiv-
able length and produces many." 1 
The author of the Memoirs of Wool (1747) pricked many 
economic bubbles, and was often approved of by Adam 
Smith, but he takes it for granted that a fall in rent is a 
national calamity. " As the landed is the most consider-
able national interest, so that of pasture ground is the most 
valuable of the landed, and wool the principal article for 
the support of both." 2 It is true that he distinguishes 
between a low price due to abundance and a low price due 
to prohibition of expor t ; in the former case he seems to 
think (contrary, however, to all the experiences of English 
1 The Lincolnshire .Grazier, quoted in Smith's Memoirs of Wool, Vol. 
II . , p. 523. 2 Ibiil., p. 555. 
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agriculture before free trade) that the cheapness will be 
neutralised by the abundance; but in the latter he finds 
no compensation — the landlords suffer, and the mischief 
circulates. 
The bounty on the export of corn and the prohibition 
or discouragement of import by duties were primarily 
intended to benefit the landed interest and raise rents, 
although attempts were made to show that indirectly on 
the average the consumer would also benefit. Protection 
to the landed interest remained the corner-stone of English 
commercial policy up to the repeal of the Corn Laws. 
From that time onward, however, largely owing to the 
influence of J . S. Mill, the increase of rent has been re-
garded popularly as an evil, although the necessary or 
natural concomitant of industrial progress — an opinion 
which was pushed to its logical extreme in Henry George's 
Progress and Poverty. In this work we have the exact 
opposite of the old seventeenth-century doctrines. The 
land-owners absorb by their rents the wealth which ought 
to relieve the labouring poor; rent instead of being the 
source of national prosperity is the cause of national 
povert j r ; the landlords gain, and the mischief circulates. 
The t ru th is — as shown in the theoretical analysis of 
the preceding books — that the term " r e n t " covers several 
totally distinct economic conceptions, and a rise of rent 
may or may not be a sign of progress and of national pros-
perity according to the variations in its nature and causes. 
No economist has appreciated this t ru th better than Adam 
Smith. Although, as usual, his language is lacking in the 
precision of modern theory, it may be doubted if any impor-
tant species of rent has escaped his attention. 
I propose, as in the last chapter, in the first place, to 
apply the historical method, taking advantage, however, of 
modern analysis to provide guiding hypotheses. 
I t is a matter for regret that Rogers has collected no 
materials for urban rents, and gives very scanty references 
to actual agricultural rents or sales of land. On the other 
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hand, the corresponding work of Vicomte D'Avenel for 
France is particularly rich, and I begin with a remarkable 
instance taken from the history of the urban land of Paris, 
which will serve to illustrate the theory and lighten the 
exposition.1 
§ 2. Progress and Urban Ground-rents. In 1231 an 
English shoemaker living in Paris bought a piece of land 
at the corner of the faubourg Montmartre and of the 
street Bergere. The land was about six English acres o o 
in extent, and was used for growing vegetables for 
the Paris market. The annual rent was 215 francs and the 
capital value 3000 francs. In 1261 this artisan and his 
wife gave the land to the IIotel-Dieu in exchange for 
certain prayers after their death and for the right of being 
supported during their lives as " brothers and sisters of 
the hospice." The hospice itself at first could not greatly 
congratulate itself on the bargain, for the rent fell until in 
about two centuries it had reached one-eighth of its 
former value, the six acres being let in 1426 for 32 
francs in place of 245. In the course of another century, 
1513, the rent rose to 78 francs, and by 1637 the figures 
had attained 1472 francs. In 1702 and 1763 the hospice, 
unmindful of the chances of unearned increments, sold the 
land in two portions at a loss in capital value of 20 per 
cent compared with 1637—say 60,000 francs as against 
75,000. The present (1894) capital value of the land is 
stated by Vicomte D'Avenel as 27,000,000 of francs — a 
rise of over 400 times in value having taken place in the 
last 125 years.2 
This example has the advantage of showing that a rise 
in the rental of land, even in or near a large city, is by 
no means continuous or inevitable, though it also shows 
1 Vicomte D'Avenel , Sistoire Economique, Vol. I. , Bk. II . , Ch. IX., 
p. 420. 
2 As I write, an illustration is afforded by the enquiry into the St. 
Mary le Strand charities. A gift of land lef t in the year 1667 by Alice 
Loveday, value £7 per annum, now produces £2257. 
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tha t under certain conditions the rise may be enormous in 
a comparatively short time. 
The principles applicable to the case are derived from 
the general theory of value. To begin with, the value of 
suburban land depends on agricultural conditions, or rather 
on primitive market gardening. The subsequent increase 
in building value is explained by the limitation of supply, 
the rise in demand, and the failure of substi tutes or alter-
natives. 
As regards the fu ture , it is certain tha t the supply of 
land in the heart of great cities cannot be increased in the 
literal sense of the words; and it is probable tha t even 
the greatest cities may still increase in wealth ; and thus 
so far the demand may rise. I t is doubtful , however, if 
the recent rate of increase in ground values in old cities 
will be maintained. The " s k y - s c r a p e r " shows that the 
same extent of land may support much more accommoda-
tion, and with modern mechanism the marginal story is 
not necessarily the worst. The improvements in transport 
and communication extend the area available for the most 
highly organised business. In brief, the principle of sub-
stitution is beginning to undermine the scarcity value of 
ground-rents. As regards dwelling-houses, there is ob-
servable in recent years, even amongst the working-classes, 
a more just estimate of elementary utilities, and comfort-
able and healthy accommodation is coming to be considered 
a fair compensation for increasing distance. I t seems 
probable that these improvements in methods of expendi-
ture and in the means of communication will continue, 
and that the fall in ground-rents will be accompanied also 
by a reduction of overcrowding. 
Two points of theoretical interest can only be alluded 
to. First , i t is possible tha t with a fall in particular 
ground-rents there may be a rise in the aggregate rental 
of building land, the extension of area more than com-
pensating the fall in value. Secondly, the increase of 
competition will neutralise the monopoly element tha t is 
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often found in ground-rents. Adam Smith partly explained 
the dearness of London ground-rent by saying that every 
landlord acted the part of a monopolist, f requently exact-
ing a higher rent for a single acre of bad land in a town 
than can be had for a hundred of the best in the country. 
Though the language is not to be commended, the mean-
ing ought not to be overlooked. There is no doubt that 
in many cases, even at present, the owner of the land has 
at any rate a partial monopoly; at least, he has the advan-
tages of the stronger in making a bargain. The occupier 
who wishes to renew his lease is generally willing to give 
something more than the market value by way of pretium 
affectionis, or good-will. 
But under modern conditions, at any rate, the greater 
part of the value of ground-rent in cities must be ascribed 
not to monopoly, but to scarcity. The influence of monop-
oly in the strict sense is best seen in the case of agri-
cultural rents before the era of competition. The ancient 
owner of land was enabled to exact a monopoly rent from 
his tenants because they were bound to the soil alike by 
law, custom, and economic conditions. One of the greatest 
achievements of economic progress is the displacement of 
monopoly rents of this k ind by competition rents. 
§ 3. Progress and Agricultural Rents. In the exposi-
t ion 1 of the pure theory of economic rent as applied to 
agricultural land, the law of diminishing returns is made 
fundamental . The marginal land and the marginal dose 
of capital yield no rent, and any superior lands yield a 
surplus in proportion to their superiority. In the pure 
theory, however, it is also shown 2 tha t even if all land 
were equally good and favourably situated, and the returns 
to every dose of capital equal, or, in other words, even if 
the law of diminishing return to land were not applied, 
pure economic rent might emerge. A rent of this kind 
must be distinguished from a monopoly rent, for it might 
1 See above, Bk. I I . , Ch. XIV. 
2 Bk. I I I . , Ch. IX. 
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arise under perfect competition, being indeed a case of 
scarcity value. 
Finally, however,'even if there is no scarcity, an economic 
rent, may be exacted (in the sense of a paj 'ment for the use 
of the natural qualities) if the various land-owners possess 
a complete or partial monopoly as regards their particular 
tenants. 
When we trace the historical progress of agricultural 
rent, we find that this after-thought of the pure theory is 
the first thought of the primitive fact. Land under the 
rudest systems of agriculture generally produces more than 
is sufficient to maintain the labour necessary to work it, 
and to replace the auxiliary capital. Thus there is a 
natural surplus, and by appropriation this surplus is taken 
by the land-owners in the form of rent. Natural rents of 
this kind, in which the real surplus is taken from labour 
directly, persisted for centuries, and were only gradually 
and slowly commuted into money-rents, and this commuta-
tion, as already indicated, is itself one of the great factors 
of economic progress. 
The history of the origin, development, and decay of the 
manorial system in England still affords a most f ru i t fu l 
field for conjecture and controversy; but as regards the 
main lines of the progress of rent there can now be little 
room for difference of opinion. The Saxon land charters 
find their analogues in every country in which feudalism 
has prevailed — and where has it not? And those early 
records show that with the dawn of history there is always 
an overlord to appropriate the natural surplus. I t may 
not be called rent, and it is not paid in money, but it is 
the most burdensome of all payments made for the use of 
the natural qualities of the soil. 
When the greater part of the cultivated land of England 
was split up into the yardlands or virgates of which Mr. 
Seebohm has engraved so indelible a picture, the greater 
part of the people were compelled not only to till ' their 
lord's land with their own ploughs and oxen, and to furnish 
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him with all the labour that he needed (even for his 
caprice), but they had to give up a considerable part of the 
produce of the land which they were simposed to cultivate 
for themselves. The fur ther we go back the greater is 
the amount of labour exacted, and the greater the propor-
tion of the produce. Up to the time of the Black Death 
— the watershed of English mediaeval history-—economic 
progress consisted largely in the curtailment of this natural 
rent. On the royal manor of King Alfred the tenants (if 
tenants they can be called) were to work as they are bid 
each week except three in the year, viz., one in mid 
winter, the second at Easter, and the third at "gang-days." 
In the time of Edward I., on a typical manor, the week-
work had come to be limited to two and a half or three 
days. Measured in time only, the villein had become half 
f ree ; measured in his release from merchet and other 
bonds, he was much more than half free. " Of all manorial 
exactions the most odious was incontestable the merchetum, 
a fine paid by the villein for marrying his own daughter. 
Our authorities often allude to this payment by the ener-
getic expression, — buying one's own blood (servus de san-
guine suo emendo) . " 1 When the week-work had been 
wholly commuted into a money-rent, the villein had be-
come a tenant farmer, and was on the way to become a 
yeoman. Thus the history of the commutation of natural 
into money rents is also the history of the freedom of 
labour. 
I t must not be supposed that rents of this primitive kind 
died of the Black Death. The essence of such rents is 
that the ownership of land enables the owner to reap where 
he has not sowed — in some cases to reap the harvest of 
the sea itself. Thus of Shetland we read that the rent of 
the landlord was in proportion not to what the farmer could 
make of the land, but to what he could make both of the 
land and of the water ; it was partly paid in sea-fisli. No 
wonder that Adam Smith, who above all was historical, 
1 Vinogradoff 's Villainage in England, p. 153. 
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concludes with the commentary: " The rent of land there-
fore, considered as the price paid for the use of land, is 
naturally a monopoly price. I t is not at all proportioned 
to what the landlord may have laid out on the improve-
ment of the land, or to what he can afford to take, but to 
what the farmer can afford to give." 1 
The use of the term "monopoly " with such generality may 
not be exact, but it is suggestive of more of the t rue than 
the false. And such a usage seems strictly exact when the 
owners of the land could prevent their serfs and their chil-
dren from leaving the bounds of the manor, and when nei-
ther law nor custom imposed limits on the price exacted 
from them in labour and in kind. 
Wi th the institution of money-rents, and with the growth 
of freedom of movement for labour, the monopoly element 
— or it might be called the private taxation element — 
becomes less and less. The rent paid for the occupancy 
of a portion of land falls to the surplus earned by the par-
ticular portion of l and ; in place of a monopoly rent it 
becomes a t rue competition rent . Ju s t as a monopoly rent 
is of all sorts the most burdensome, a pure economic rent 
is the least burdensome. W i t h effective competition, labour 
and capital must obtain the average earnings available in 
the economic conditions of the time before anything is paid 
for r e n t : rent is only a deferred dividend; wages and 
profits are preferred. 
I t sometimes happens, it is t rue, that excessive competi-
tion for land in effect gives the land-owners as much as they 
could exact on the primitive monopoly system. This is the 
case of land hunger . The earnings of labour and the up-
keep of capital are reduced by excessive competition to a 
necessary minimum. The standing example before the 
great reforms of the later Victorian era was Ireland, and 
the ful l measure of the abuses of the old Irish system has 
1 Wealth of Nations, Bk. I. , Ch. XI. Similar rents continued in some 
parts of Scotland down to our own times, unti l reduced by the Crofters ' 
Commission. 
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been heaped up, and in this case the heaped measure is 
just, by A r t h u r Young, who is in general the greatest en-
thusiast for economic rents and competition. The close 
resemblance between excessive competition and monopoly 
is brought out in the following passage : " The state of 
the poor in the whole county of Kerry is exceedingly mis-
erable, and is owing to the conduct of men of property who 
are apt to lay the blame on what they call land pirates or 
men who offer the highest rent and who in order to pay 
their rent must and do relet all the cabin lands at an 
extravagant rise, which is assigning over all the cabins to 
be devoured by one farmer. The cottars on a farm cannot 
go from one to another in order to find a good master as in 
England ; for all the country is in the same system, and no 
redress to be found. Such being the case, the farmers arc 
enabled to charge the price of labour as low as they please, 
and to rate the land as high as they please." 1 
The effect is the same ( though disguised by money pay-
ments) as in the primitive manorial system when the lord 
exacted the utmost amount of labour and produce from 
villeins who were bound to the soil; the Irish system was 
indeed probably far worse if a general average be taken. 
I t is beyond the range of the present chapter to describe 
how the cancer of cottier rents was natural ly associated 
with other social, political, and economic evils; but if 
any one is still inclined to complain of the slow response of 
Irish grat i tude for recent economic reforms, let him read 
the pages of Ar thur Young and remember that it takes 
time for a nation to forget. 
The progress of agriculture in England was for tunately 
never retarded by anything approaching in intensity to 
the evils of the Irish system : there are indeed periods in 
which English land-owners were denounced by their con-
temporaries; but they have been condemned to a less extent 
by posterity — not that their conduct has won our moral 
approval, but because it has seemed to form part of the 
1 Tour in Ireland (1776), Vol., II . p. 369. 
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necessary disturbances of the old social order incidental to 
economic progress. 
In the break-up of the mediseval economy, there are 
two significant changes on the surface : the substitution, 
namely, of broad acres lying together for long acres in scat-
tered strips and of enclosures for the great open fields. 
These superficial changes corresponded to deeper social 
movements of which the mainspring was a rise in money-
rents. There were two periods of rapid change,1 " of 
change so precipitate that it may almost be called revolu-
tion," namely, from 1170 to 1580 and again from 1760 to 
1830. The immediate object of the later enclosures, says 
Professor Ashley, was altogether different from that of the 
earlier. In the eighteenth century the object was to intro-
duce a better system of arable cultivation ; in the six-
teenth, it was to substi tute for arable the more profitable 
pasture. In both cases, however, as in the corresponding 
case of the later evictions in Scotland to make sheep farms, 
if the initiative was taken by agricultural improvers, the 
necessary assent of the landlords was obtained by the 
enhancement of rents. The earlier revolution was asso-
ciated with the development of the English woollen manu-
factures, and therewith of the towns and of foreign trade ; 
the later provided food for a rapid increase of population, 
which again was essential to the still greater development 
on the same lines. 
There can be no doubt tha t the break-up of the old 
agricultural system was a necessary preliminary to Eng-
lish economic progress; and the break-up of the system 
was only possible through the accentuation of private 
property in land. The enclosures for the extension of 
sheep farms in the sixteenth century were effected against 
great popular outcry, and it was fel t then and has been 
acknowledged since that the let ter of the law was allowed 
to overrule the spirit of immemorial custom as regards the 
1 Ashley, Economic History, "Bk. I I . , Ch. IV. , p. 286. 
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occupiers, and tha t the actual occupiers of the land were 
sacrificed to the nominal owners. 
I t must be remembered, however, tha t the legislature 
a t tempted by various measures to provide compensation, 
to prevent the depopulation of the villages, and to encour-
age tillage. The heavy duties on the export of wool, 
which later on grew into prohibitive penalties, were always 
regarded as inimical to the interest of the landlords, since 
the price of wool in the home market was lowered and 
with wool rent . I t may be observed for comparison that 
in Scotland, until the advent of the recent depression, 011 
most sheep farms the wool was supposed to pay the rent. 
If the State, on the disintegration of the mediaeval system, 
unduly favoured the land-owners, it was not by the method 
of legal enactment, but by the still more powerful methods 
of legal interpretation and enforcement. 
In the eighteenth century it is acknowledged even by 
Thorold Rogers tha t the great land-owners were also great 
improvers, and the rise in rents was in great part due to 
the improvement of agriculture, and this improvement was 
only possible with enclosed land. The small farmers who 
still used the old customary methods often paid their rents, 
not from the real product of their land, but from the by-
product of their labour. The mother and children spun 
the wool, the fa ther wove it into cloth, and the landlord 
arrayed himself in the cloth, or its value. When domestic 
spinning was displaced by machinery, the small farmer 
could no longer pay his rent, or indeed support his 
family. 
Thus it happened that whilst the new farmers were pay-
ing greatly increased rents and making fortunes, the old 
farmers were being ruined. The substitution of true 
economic rents — in the sense of a surplus arising from 
the land itself — for this survival of labour rents was in 
reality a step nearer the a t ta inment of the economic ideal 
of distribution. On the other hand, however, the protec-
tionist policy of the Corn Laws was one of the most glar-
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ing instances in English history of the infr ingement of 
this economic principle, so glar ing that it became im-
possible. 
§ 4. Greneral View of the Development of Agricultural 
Rent. Contrary to the popular idea, the actual history 
of agricultural rents in England may be shown to con-
form to the great movements of economic progress. The 
earliest forms of rents are rents in kind — in labour and 
produce. 
The far ther we go back the greater are the rents. The 
work of Fleta in the reign of Edward I. is described as the 
landlord's vade mecum. In the survey of the manor it is 
directed that enquiry be made, inter alia, de custumariis or 
villein tenants, — " to what amount they can be tallaged 
without reducing them to poverty and ruin ; what is the 
value of their operationes and consuetudines their day works 
and customary duties, — and what rent they pay ; and which 
of them can be tallaged ratione sanguinis nativi and who 
not." 
" W h a t rent they p a y " is obviously the smallest part of 
the total real rent since the land-owner, apart from custom-
ary day works, can tallage them down to the minimum of 
subsistence. 
The first great result of economic progress as regards 
rents of this kind is their diminution, the history of 
which has been so vividly portrayed by Mr. Seebohm. 
The second great result is the commutation of rents in 
kind into money-rents.1 This commutation, however, was 
1 In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, says Rogers, the rental of 
average arable land did not exceed Qd. an acre. 
If we take the normal virgate as 30 acres, and the normal labour rent 
before the commutat ion a t 3 days a week, we may say tha t the average 
rent of an acre of land was about 5 days ' labour a year. This is allowing 
nothing for other precarious services or for payments in kind, but also 
nothing for holidays. 
Now, in his earliest prices, 1260-1350, Rogers (op. cit., Vol. I., p. 321) 
finds that the lowest paid labour, tha t of the help in the fields ( the 
" h o m o , " who was generally a woman) , is one penny a day on the 
average. From 1351 to 1410 the price of this labour is 2 \ d . The corre-
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not so complete as might appear at first sight. The own-
ership of land still carried with it large powers over those 
who were not owners. The legislation of Elizabeth was 
obviously intended to check the migration of labour from 
the country to the towns, e.g., " all single persons between 
12 years old and 60 and married ones under 30 and unmar-
ried women between 12 and 40 not having a visible liveli-
hood are compellable by the justices to go out to service 
in the husbandry." 1 
The relation of the land-owner to the tenan t farmer 
af ter the commutation was still tha t of the predominant 
partner, and during the seventeenth century complaints 
are numerous of the in jury to agriculture through the 
want of security to the tenant . 2 Rogers indeed goes so 
far as to say that dur ing the seventeenth century some-
th ing very like the Irish system prevailed in England in 
which rent is all the value of the product beyond the 
bare subsistence of the owner, and is often paid, indeed, 
not out of the product of the land at all, but out of the by-
products of labour. 
In the eighteenth century the most noticeable feature is 
the progress of t rue competition rents. Those who farm 
land with the new improvements can pay higher rents out 
of the surplus product than the customary cultivators can 
pay out of their whole earnings. In the period of the 
industrial revolution the land-owners were enabled to 
sponding rates for thatcher and man are in the first period 3£<2., in the 
second 6\cl Thus, on any computation, the villein gained greatly by the 
commutation. 
I t is noteworthy tha t Walter de Henley, in his celebrated estimate of 
the cost of production of wheat, in which he shows tha t six bushels per 
acre is the marginal or no-profit return, makes no allowance for the rent 
of land. 
1 Eden ' s State of the Poor, Vol. I. , p. 125. 
2 Cf. Cunningham, Vol. II . , pp. 184-185; Rogers, Vol. V., pp. 802-
803. Macaulay (His tory of England, Ch. I I I . ) , describing the state of 
England in 1685, says tha t in some districts the rent of land had risen 
tenfold, and on the average had quadrupled in the course of the century, 
whilst agricultural wages were 4s. a week (without food). 
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raise their rents part ly through protection, and more 
through a series of bad seasons 1 ; and the power of bar-
gaining was still in their favour. 
The last quarter of the nineteenth century has wit-
nessed the ful l effects of competition (in the widest sense) 
on agricultural rentals. 
The land-owner has been deprived, by various reforms of 
the laws affecting landlord and tenant, of his remnant of 
legal superiority in making bargains and of his economic 
superiority through free trade and the immense improve-
ments in transport . In the main the agricultural rental 
of England is now paid out of surplus profits earned by 
the particular portions of land concerned. There are in 
different parts of the country still some survivals of the 
old powers and privileges, but they are only the shadows 
of the former substance. 
The development of transport and foreign trade — so 
far as agriculture is concerned — has in effect made land 
free. The elements of monopoly and private taxation 
have been destroyed, rent is paid only for superior advan-
tages, and such a payment inflicts no real burden on the 
payer. I t is well known that under purely economic 
influences the agricultural rentals of England have fallen 
through natural causes at least as much as the rents of 
Ireland by judicial intervention.2 
In some cases, indeed, to adopt the fashionable termi-
nology, the economic rent has become " negative " ; the 
owner of the land, in order to obtain part of the " quasi-
r e n t " for his buildings, drains, etc., has been obliged to 
surrender more than the rent formerly paid for the original 
and indestructible powers of the soil. In brief, a great 
part of the cultivated land of England does not yield 
under present conditions the minimum rate of interest on 
the capital sunk in it. 
1 See below, § 8. 
2 The Duke of Devonshire stated recently tha t his rents in Somerset 
had fallen 33 per cent, as against 17 per cent in Ireland. 
V O L . I I I . — I 
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§ 5. The Effects of Agricultural Improvements on Rents 
— General Conditions. A t this point an examination may 
be made of the effects of agricultural improvements on 
rents. Owing to the difficulty of isolating economic rent, 
and also to the opposing tendencies on which the result 
depends, to begin with it is best to adopt the deductive 
method as the basis of the exposition. 
In applying this method, the usual assumptions and 
hypotheses must be made in order to bring out clearly 
the most important influences. 
The country, then, in the first place, is assumed to be 
isolated or dependent on its own food supplies. Even 
this assumption is not so unreal as may appear under 
modern conditions, for the general a rgument will apply 
to the whole world considered as one great agricultural 
producer and consumer.1 
Secondly, it must be observed that the object is to trace 
the effect of general improvements upon the aggregate 
rental . I t is plain tha t if improvements are only adopted 
partially, (say) for simplicity on one estate, they will have 
no appreciable effect on the aggregate national product or 
its prices. The particular owner or tenant, according to 
the conditions of the lease, will alone benefit. In the case 
already cited, the improvements toward the end of the 
eighteenth century enabled the new farmers to pay far 
higher rents, and the old farmers were gradually displaced. 
Thirdly, it must be assumed that population remains 
stationary, and accordingly that there is no immediate 
increase in the demand for food or other rent-yielding 
products. 
This is only another way of saying that, in the first 
place, the immediate effects will be considered, other 
things remaining the same. And it is obvious that, if 
improvements are sudden and general, the increase of 
1 I t is well known tha t in all the great nations the dr ink consumed is 
for the most par t home-made (i.e., not imported), and, to a large extent, 
the observation holds good of food supplies. 
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population cannot be equally sudden and widespread, 
and also that any readjus tment in the demand for agri-
cultural products must take some time.1 
Agricultural improvements may be divided into three 
groups: (1 ) Improvements in t ransport and the means of 
communication which Adam Smith calls the greatest of 
all improvements. 
( 2 ) Improvements of such a kind that the same amount 
of produce can be raised from less land, e.g., improved 
rotation of crops. 
( 3 ) Improvements such that the same land is required to 
raise the same aggregate supply, but the expenses are less, 
or the most expensive application of capital may be dis-
pensed with, e.g., the substitution of machinery for labour. 
§ 6. Effects of Improvements on Rents — Special Con-
ditions. The principal effect of improvements in trans-
port is the substitution of land of superior, for land of 
inferior, qual i ty in productive power. The improvements 
so far counteract inferiority of situation. The conse-
quence is a recession of the margin of cultivation. Rents 
measured in produce fa l l ; rents measured in money fall 
still more, because the marginal cost of production is less. 
For purposes of theory it may be assumed that , before 
the improvements, there are lands beyond the margin 
through inferiority of situation relatively to markets, but 
well within the margin in natural productive power. 
Similarly also, before the improvements as regards the 
application of capital, there are lands which are only culti-
vated to a small degree of intensity, owing to the cost of 
the transport of materials and of produce. 
Thus, put t ing together the effects of improved trans-
port and of diminished marginal cost, there will in general 
be a double effect — intensive and extensive. 
This result, it is readily seen, is equivalent to combined 
improvements of the two remaining classes, viz., less land 
1 The effects of an ultimate increase of population and of demand will 
be considered later. 
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is required to produce the same produce, and the most 
expensive applications of capital on this amount of land 
are abandoned. 
The fu l l effect of improvements in transport and acces-
sibility to markets is, however, best observed when we 
consider the transition of an old country from a state of 
independence or isolation as regards its food supplies 
to a state of dependence on new countries. A str iking 
example is furnished by the recent fall in the agricultural 
rental of England. 
This fall, however, would have been much greater had 
it not been that a large part of the land could still be 
used for the production of supplies which were not so 
much affected by the improved transport as " c o r n " — the 
typical product of theory. 
Improvemen t s—such as a better rotation of crops — 
which involve the use of less land with the same amount 
of capital and labour cause the margin to recede, and in 
general there is a double fall in r e n t ; rents reckoned in 
produce are less, and each unit of produce obtains a less 
price. 
If the improvements are such that the same land is re-
quired but the most expensive application of capital can be 
dispensed with, produce-rents in general remain the same, 
but money-rents fall because the marginal cost is less. 
These results are derived from the pure theory of rent 
under the conditions that are usually assumed tacitly or 
explicitly. I t is, however, well worth observing that the 
complete working out of the problem, even when thus 
simplified, can only be effected by the aid of mathematical 
analysis. Professor Marshall many years ago called atten-
tion to a curious error on the part of Mill,1 who had uncon-
sciously argued to a general conclusion from the accidents 
of particular figures.2 
1 Bk. IV. , Ch. I I I . , § 4. 
2 Professor Marshall takes 115, 65, and 60 in place of 100, 80, 60 by Mill. 
I t may be proved generally that the new produce-rent is greater than the 
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One general consideration 011 the effects of improve-
ments in rents shows that the money-rents are likely to 
fall. Suppose that owing to improvements less capital is 
required on each portion of land to obtain the same prod-
uce, and suppose that the rate of profits remains the same. 
Since economic rent is the sum of the differential profits, 
if in each case there is less capital, in each case also there 
is less profits, and the sum of the differences is less. 
§ 7. Ulterior Effects of Improvements. Tha t rents 
should fall as the result of improvements has always 
seemed as paradoxical as the other Ricardian deduct ion; 
namely, that the abolition of rent would have no effect on 
the price of the produce. The exceptions to the lat ter 
position have already been examined.1 The paradox of the 
present deduction disappears if the preliminary assutnp-
tions are borne in mind. 
Ricardo himself s ta tes : " I hope I am not understood 
as undervaluing the importance of all sorts of improve-
ments in agriculture to landlords; their immediate effect 
is to lower rents ; but as they give a great stimulus to popu-
lation, and at the same time enable us to cultivate poorer 
lands, they are ultimately of immense value to landlords. 
A period, however, must elapse dur ing which they are 
positively injurious to h i m . " 2 
One criticism in the opposite direction may be offered. 
In the first place, the increase of population is by no 
means necessary as already explained in the chapter on 
the Malthusian theory.3 
Secondly, there may be a compensating effect apart 
from the increase of population. Owing to the general 
increase of wealth, there may be an increased demand for 
old if (<Z3 — ao) > 2;i («2 — where a i is the yield to the land, on the 
margin, a2 and <?3 the yield to the better land, - the rate of improvement, n 
and the aggregate yield remains the same. By substitution it may easily 
be shown tha t in any case money-rents fall. 
1 Bk. I I I . , Ch. IX. 
2 McCulloch's edition, p. 43, note. 8 Bk. I . , Ch. XI . 
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various forms of agricultural products which are not so 
susceptible of improvement as wheat. Even in the medi-
aeval period, when the average rental of arable land was, 
according to Rogers, only 6d. an acre, the rental of ordi-
nary meadow land amounted to 6s. and 7s. per acre.1 
In the preceding chapter it has been shown that, rela-
tively to other forms of agricul tural produce, the price of 
wheat has fallen greatly. 
On the whole, however, the effect of all kinds of improve-
ments ( including t ranspor t ) has been to lower agricultural 
rents in the countries that were formerly self-supporting, 
and it must always be remembered that a large par t of 
gross agricul tural rental is not pure economic rent, but 
of the nature of interest on permanent improvements. 
§ 8. The Effects of the Seasons on Re?its. The results 
of the inquiry into the effects of improvements upon 
rents may be confirmed by reference to a similar case in 
which there is less need of hypothesis — the effects, 
namely, of the seasons. 
A long period of comparatively good seasons, af ter a 
period of relatively bad or moderate seasons, is precisely 
equivalent to a general diminution of the cost of produc-
tion.2 The popular idea that the seasons balance one 
another in a very short series of years, or, at any rate, in 
nineteen years (a complete cycle of the moon), was shown 
to be fallacious by Tooke, who suggests that a series of 
one hundred years, at least, is requisite to reduce to a fair 
average the inequalities of the seasons.3 
The period of 1715-1765 was characterised by a 
marked exemption from seasons of scarcity compared with 
the fifty years preceding. As a consequence, provisions 
1 Rogers, op. cit., Vol. I., p. 249 ; Vol. IV., p. 299. 
2 Cf. Tooke's History of Prices, Vol. I., p. 59. 
3 Ibid., p. 84, note. In India, in A.D. 1582, the period of nineteen 
years was selected, in Todar Mai 's Settlement under Akbar, as the basis 
of average prices; because nineteen years being a cycle of the moon, the 
seasons were supposed in this t ime to undergo a complete revolution. — 
C. O. Field, Landholding and the Relation of Landlord and Tenant (1883). 
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were cheap and abundant, and the general condition of 
the people was greatly improved.1 
But we read also that the great fall in prices, which 
contributed so greatly to national prosperity, was pro-
ductive of grea t "agr icu l tura l distress," i.e. distress to 
the landed interest. This distress is indicated by the fall 
in rents, and the pamphlets of the time try to show that 
the fall is necessarily a national calamity, " since the 
flourishing condition of the landed interest supports all 
t rade ." 2 
The last thirty-five years of the eighteenth century were 
marked by unfavourable seasons, with a consequent rise 
in the price of produce, the result being to raise the 
average price of the entire century to a level with that 
of the preceding century, the price of wheat being £ 1 
18s. 2d. in the seventeenth century compared with £ 1 
18s. Id . in the eighteenth (per Winchester quar te r ) . 3 
The period of 1792-1819 was a period of famine 
prices, and the investigation of Tooke has shown that 
the principal cause was the seasons. The deficiency was 
aggravated by the war, — but this was a minor cause, — 
and the Corn Laws were inoperative, or nearly so. 
In many parts of England the rent of arable land per 
acre rose fivefold between 1790 and 1812, and throughout 
Great Britain rents were more than doubled.4 
So long as England was mainly dependent on its own 
supplies, the principal cause of fluctuations in prices was 
the course of the seasons. Wi th a series of bad seasons 
prices rose more than in proportion, and with prices, 
ren ts ; with good seasons there was a more than propor-
tionate fall in prices and rents. 
1 Tooke's History of Prices, Vol. I., p. HO. Hallam describes the reign 
of George II. as the most prosperous period that England had ever expe-
rienced. 
2 See quotations in Tooke, Vol. I., p. 41, 2. 
3 The average from 1701 to 1766 was £ 1 12s. 1 d.\ the average from 
1767 to 1800 was £ 2 10s. 6d. 
4 Por ter ' s Progress of the Nation (new edition, 1847), p. 151. 
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The natural course of prices was not much affected by 
foreign t r ade ; not so much on account of corn laws and 
inferior means of communication — for there had been a 
certain amount of trade in corn from time immemorial — 
but because the corn countries of Europe were subject to 
the same climatic influences. 
C H A P T E R VI . 
PROGRESS AND PROFITS. 
§ 1. Progress and Profits —General View. Mill arrives at 
the following result of his long investigation of the effects 
of progress on rents, profits, and wages : " The economical 
progress of a society constituted of landlords, capitalists, 
and labourers tends to the progressive enrichment of the 
landlord class, while the cost of the labourers' subsistence 
tends on the whole to increase and profits to fall ." Agri-
cultural improvements are stated to be a counteract ing 
force to the two last effects, but the increase of population 
tends to transfer all the benefits from agricultural improve-
ment to the landlords alone. 
How false (or hypothetical) is this view of the effects of 
progress on agricultural rents has been shown in the last 
chapter. As regards other forms of economic rents, the 
effects of progress are different in different cases, and it 
is probably impossible to form any general proposition as 
regards a tendency to rise or fall which would cover all 
these cases. Even the phrase the " enrichment of the 
landlord c lass" is open to question. If we take a similar 
large view of the profits of capital, the enrichment of the 
capitalist class seems in modern industr ial societies to 
exceed many times tha t of the landlords. 
Bu t as already shown in the preceding books, the term 
" profits " 1 includes classes of income tha t differ widely in 
character : it includes interest on loanable capital and 
interest on capital not loanable with a great variety of 
sub-species; it includes what is called compensation for 
1 C/.-Bk. II. , Ch. XIII . , and Bk. III . , Ch. XXII. 
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risk, which may mean anything between a sufficient 
inducement to gamble and a private mercantile insur-
ance ; and it includes earnings of the management of 
capital, by the owner and by the borrower, — in large and 
in small businesses, and in businesses of endless variety. 
I t follows that if it is difficult to summarise the effects 
of progress 011 rent, it is impossible to summarise the effects 
on profits. The tendency of profits to a minimum, which 
was perhaps the only really comfortable doctrine of Mill 's 
political economy, can only be retained as the title of a 
chapter of economic analysis. Whether the general rate 
of profits tends to rise or fall with industrial progress is so 
complex a question that an appeal to history even over 
long periods is not decisive, or rather a case for appeal 
cannot be stated — there is not one case but many cases. 
I t was well observed by Adam Smith that from the very 
na ture of the profits of stock it is much more difficult even 
than with wages to obtain an average for the whole of a 
great country at any time, and to judge of what the rate of 
profit may have been in former times with any degree of 
precision must be altogether impossible. Wi th the devel-
opment of industry since the t ime of Adam Smith these 
difficulties have increased. 
There is, however, one important element of profits, 
namely, the rate of interest to which the historical method 
may be applied with some hope of success. " And the 
progress of interest may lead us to form some notion of 
the progress of profit ." (Adam Smith.) 
§ 2. Progress and Loan-interest.1 An ancient legal con-
ception, it has been said, corresponds not to one but to 
several modern conceptions, and the proposition remains 
t rue when economic is subst i tuted for legal. Industr ial 
like all other development has involved processes of 
specialisation and differentiation, and if we at tempt to 
read economic history simply by the l ight of ful ly devel-
1 On the relation of loan interest to profit interest, see above, Bk. II., 
Ch. XIII . 
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oped modern conceptions, we are likely to lose the way in 
a mist of irrelevancy or to confine the attention to a few 
barren facts almost without meaning in isolation. If, on 
the other hand, we realise the ful l meaning of the ancient 
ideas and practices, l ight is thrown on survivals and re-
versions, and in turn the historical method is supplemented 
by the comparative. The history of usury, the ancient 
conception which included not only the modern usury and 
the modern interest but various other ideas, is a good 
example of the t ru th of these general reflections. 
In modern economic theory we are accustomed to sepa-
rate pure interest from interest combined with other ele-
ments (e.g., insurance of various kinds) . W e assume 
that , given perfect security and negotiability, the rate of 
pure interest is uniform throughout the country con-
sidered as throughout the whole range of investments. 
W e assume even that all capital, whether lent or not, 
earns this pure interest. W e say nothing of the nature 
of the security or the method of realisation, whether of 
interest or principal. This conception of pure interest 
corresponds in the modern world to an important eco-
nomic fact. This fact , however, is the result of a long 
process of evolution. The far ther we go back toward 
rudimentary conditions, the less it becomes possible to 
obtain examples of pure interest of this kind, either in 
fact or in economic opinion. Instead of simply assuming 
tha t the security afforded is perfect, we have to take ac-
count of the development of the law of debt. Ins tead 
of competition, the conditions are in general those of 
monopoly, whether we regard the needs of the borrower 
or the powers of the lender. A t the same time we can 
trace in very early times (or rather under primitive con-
ditions — for time is not the tes t ) the germs of competi-
tion and of borrowing for productive purposes. Probably 
one of the greatest gains of the nature of consumers' rents 
— to adopt the fashionable phrase — is the gain indicated 
by the fact that borrowers under modern conditions pay 
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not in proportion to their needs, but at the market rate. 
The exception shown by recent abuses only proves the rule. 
In tracing the development of interest, the history of 
ancient Greece and Rome is too valuable to be overlooked. 
§ 3. Loan-interest in Ancient Athens. In ancient Greece, 
generally, agriculture was the only industry worthy of free 
men, and even Aristotle 1 considered rude mechanicals as 
incapable of virtue, though in Athens there was much free 
labour. The Greek citizen worked hard to attain physical 
and mental culture, but as far as possible all other hard 
work he lef t to slaves. l i e worked for hire only if he 
had no slaves. The chief original sources of slavery were 
war and debt. The failure to repay a debt in due time 
involved the slavery of the debtor and tha t of his chil-
dren's children. 
Debts were incurred to meet the extreme necessities of 
famine, pestilence, or war. Debt and famine run together 
in the mind of the poet Hesiod. As the debtors, once 
enslaved, seldom regained their freedom, and as necessity 
( l ike death) in time struck at every door, society was 
divided into a very small class of rich creditors and a 
large mass of poor debtors and slaves. In Attica the bulk 
of the population ( the thetes) were originally small pro-
prietors or metayers.2 Before the time of Solon's legisla-
tion (594 B.C.) they had become weighed down by debts, 
many were enslaved, and some had been exported. Those 
who still kept their property were in the position of Irish 
cottiers — they owed more than they could pay, and the 
stone pillars erected on their lands and graven with their 
mortgages were like millstones about their necks. All 
the political and economic power of the state had fallen 
into the hands of the few. A t length the masses revolted 
and Solon was appointed Archon. The legislation of 
Solon is worthy of mention with the greatest efforts of 
1 Politics, Bk. I I I . , Ch. II. " F o r it is impossible for one who lives 
the life of a mechanic to practice a life of v i r tue ." 
2 Cf. Grote's History of Greece, Vol. III., pp. 125-299. 
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the Greek mind. Wi thou t it, indeed, the glory of Athens 
would not have shone. Solon swept away the mortgage 
pillars, released the debtors already enslaved, and brought 
back as many as possible from overseas. But the great 
merit of Solon's work was in the prevention of similar 
evils in the fu ture . This was effectively done by forbid-
ding all loans and contracts in which the person of the 
debtor was pledged as security. The remedy was simple 
but effective, and Athens was never again disturbed by 
a general revolt of debtors. " The poor do not get into 
debt," wrote Plutarch,1 " because no one will lend to 
them," and besides this the poor instead of becoming 
slaves became hired labourers. 
I t may be thought that the bearing of this history on 
the general argument is remote. I t can easily be brought 
near. The rapid growth of the old debts (and slavery) 
had been mainly due to usury, and yet Solon lef t the 
rate of interest to be determined solely by contract;2 the 
borrower might agree to any terms short of pledging his 
own freedom and tha t of his children. Most ancient legis-
lators (e.g., the Romans) 3 made vain a t tempts to fix the 
rate of interest at a certain legal max imum; but they al-
lowed arrears to accumulate and end in slavery. Solon was 
the first great free-trader (in the large sense), and it was 
largely due to his legislation that Athens, the capital of a 
poor tract of country, became wealthy. Capital being no 
longer able to feed on the necessities of the poor was di-
verted to t r ade ; and the poor cultivators being unable to 
borrow, swelled the ranks of hired labour. The commer-
cial position of Athens was in many respects similar to that 
of Holland. Athens like Holland was natural ly poor, but 
became the mistress of the seas and made large profits by 
the carrying trade. The trade of Athens was largely carried 
OH with borrowed money, and the rate of interest was high. 
1 Quoted by Grote, Vol. III . , p. 146. 
2 The popular idea that he lowered the rate of interest has no authority. 
8 See below, § 4. 
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Under this st imulus a system of banking was established on 
which the rest of Greece depended. Trading with borrowed 
money at high rates (12 to 30 per cent are quoted) com-
posed the chief part of the business of the bankers, and 
they at tained such a high reputation, and such confidence 
was placed in them that, says Boeckh,1 "business was 
transacted with them without witnesses, money and con-
tracts of debt were deposited with them, and agreements 
concluded or cancelled in their presence." 
The commercial prosperity of Athens is shown by the 
numerous regulations for the benefit of merchants, e.g., 
tha t mercantile trials should only take place in winter, 
and by definite statements. "A l l the business," says Xeno-
phon, "of Sicily, Italy, Cyprus, Lydia, Pontus, and the 
Peloponnese, Athens by her empire of the sea is able to col-
lect in one spot ." The empire of the sea has in general 
been short-lived, and Athens lost her commercial suprem-
acy through well-known political causes. 
This brief reference to the economic history of Athens 
brings out clearly two great causes of high rates of inter-
est : one a sign of the greatest misery, the other of the 
greatest prosperity. The rates exacted from poor culti-
vators on the security of their liberties were usurious in 
the worst sense of the term, and they caused disastrous 
social results. And it may be said generally that in every 
undeveloped agricul tural society where money-lending is 
possible, it is a curse; and the only remedy appears to be 
to strike at the so-called security of the lender. 
On the other haud, the high rates obtained from advances 
on bottomry and merchandise were due to the rapid growth 
of a highly profitable foreign trade, f rom which Athens 
1 Economy of Athens, p. 125 (translat ion). This work still gives the 
facts in a convenient form, and the comments are for the most par t too 
absurd to distract the attention, e.g., immediately af ter the sentence 
quoted B. states that the bankers and money lenders drew on themselves 
the merited hatred of all as being the most infamous of human beings; 
and he ascribes the high rate of interest to the want of security caused by 
Solon's legislation. 
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gained far more wealth than would have been possible by 
the most intensive cultivation of her terri tory. This 
wealth provided the necessary material basis for the unri-
valled works of the age of Pericles.1 
§ 4. Roman Economy and the Rate of Interest. The 
early economic history of Rome is similar to that of 
A thens ; the small farmers were led into debt by war and 
famine, and slavery was the only form of bankruptcy. 
Accordingly we find about 500 B.C. (a hundred years later 
than Solon's legislation) at tempts to deal with the evil. 
By the legislation of the X I I . Tables a maximum rate of 
interest was fixed, which, though apparently 12 per cent, 
was intended to be low, but the severity of the law of debt 
was lef t untouched. 
Repeated at tempts were made to deal with the abuses 
of usury by regulat ing the rates, but the root of the evil 
lay in the legal powers of the creditor, and these were only 
curtailed in form. The maximum rates were reduced, and 
as early as 342 B.C. usury was declared illegal. Bu t the 
law was evaded by fictitious loans, and for the principal 
of a debt ( though fictitious) the severity of the old law 
was practically unaltered. Dur ing the next period of 
Roman history from the subjugation of Italy (273 B.C.) 
to the conquest of Carthage and Greece (146 B.C.) the 
evils inherent in the social system increased. Ju s t as the 
Roman farmer of the earlier period had been destroyed 
by a pernicious law of debt and heavy taxes, so, in this 
period, the Italian small farmers were ruined indirectly by 
the same means. The conquered provinces were taxed to 
the ut termost f a r t h i n g ; 2 great quantit ies of cheap corn 
were poured into the capital ; none but the large holders 
of land with slaves on the footing of ca t t l e 3 could with-
stand competition of this kind, and the I tal ian farmers 
1 Cunningham ( Western Civilisation, p. 120) considers this unproduc-
tive expenditure on public works as a contributory cause to the downfall 
of Athens. 2 Cf. Mommsen 's History of Rome, Vol. III . , pp. 395-401. 
3 Ibid., Vol. II . , p. 366. 
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passed under the yoke of usury into slavery or degraded 
pauperism. 
This g lu t of corn from the provinces was again largely 
clue to the abuses of usury. The system of banking 
which the Athenians had developed for commerce was 
fashioned by the Romans into an instrument of extortion. 
The argentarii formed an important exclusive corporation 
with branches throughout the Roman Empire. Their 
accounts were kept with perfect accuracy, they received 
money7 on deposit and allowed interest, they used cheques 
and bills of exchange, and in the course of time they 
obtained an enormous business. The excellence of the 
Roman roads, it has been said, is to be ascribed as much to 
the organisation of the banks as to the necessities of war. 
In connection with the bankers, the speculative con-
tractors must be noted. These contractors were middle-
men monopolists and large capitalists. The state took 
the lead by let t ing all its more complicated revenues and 
all contracts for furnishing supplies to capitalists or asso-
ciations of capitalists for a fixed sum to be given or re-
ceived. Lands were leased or purchased in the colonies 
for producing corn and cattle on a large scale. 
The ty ranny of capital increased as the system of monej'-
lending obtained a more perfect organisation. I t was a 
tyranny of the most effective kind, and every banker had 
his debtors' prison. 
The wealth of the Roman capitalists at the time of the 
power of the Republic was obtained directly or indirectly 
from the plunder of the provinces. The cooperation of 
rude economic conditions and the unscrupulous employ-
ment of Rome's political ascendency for the benefit of 
the private interests of every wealthy Roman rendered a 
usurious rate of interest universal. The taxes were let to 
the highest bidder, and the provincials were at the mercy 
of officers who had purchased their offices by bribery. To 
what a pitch the extortion of these tax-gatherers attained 
is shown by a master hand in the oration of Cicero against 
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Verres. Organised robbery was a substi tute for com-
merce, and the provincials were obliged to borrow from 
their masters at usurious rates. The war tax imposed by 
Sulla in the province of Asia (84 B.C.) which was ad-
vanced by the capitalists, swelled with paid and unpaid 
interest within fourteen years to sixfold its original 
amount. The virtuous Brutus lent money to the people 
of Cyprus at 48 per cent. The wealth extracted from 
the taxpayers was part ly employed in large undertakings 
worked by slaves with an absolute disregard of humanity, 
and partly it was poured into the capital, where it was 
consumed in outrageous luxury or used to buy up the 
highest offices. The jeunesse doree of Rome borrowed at 
extravagant rates till they could no longer support the 
burden of their debts, and then redressed their fortunes 
by obtaining a province. Caesar before he had filled any 
office a t all was in debt to the extent of more than a 
quarter of a million of our money.1 
Caesar, however, rendered a service to Roman civilisa-
tion which, late as it came, was worth many millions. He 
abolished the old law of debt which had virtually been in 
force for five centuries, from the time of the X I I . Tables. 
He gave the debtor the right of formally ceding his estate 
to his creditors whether it sufficed to pay them or not, and 
the debtor was thus enabled to save his personal freedom 
and begin a new existence. The importance of this early 
bankruptcy law was very great. I t is t rue that the adop-
tion of the principle of Solon had come too late to save the 
old middle classes of Rome and Italy, but with the estab-
lishment of the Empire and the ultimate cession of civic 
rights to all persons this law ameliorated the condition of 
debtors and put a check to the omnipotence of capital 
throughout the civilised world. 
The real tyranny of capital in the later days of the 
1 For full details of the wealth and extortions of Roman capitalists see 
Marquardt and Mommsen, Handbuch der Somischen Alterthumer, Vol. 
II., pp. 51-68. 
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Republic, compared with the imaginary tyranny of the 
present day, affords one of the best practical tests of the 
economic progress of the civilised world. W e have a faint 
analogy in English history of the methods of Roman politi-
cal corruption in the case of the " N a b o b s " in the eighteenth 
century, who plundered India and then forced -up the price 
of seats in the House of Commons. But the plunder of 
India was relatively merciful, and the political power of 
the Nabobs at home was relatively nominal compared with 
the devastation of the Roman provinces and the effective 
control of the central government by the monied classes. 
I t is worth noting, however, tha t just as a t present usury 
in the old sense exists to some extent , so also interest in 
the modern legitimate sense was to some extent prevalent 
in ancient Rome. The tremendous concentration of capi-
tal in the city of Rome itself made the rate of interest on 
first-class securities extremely l o w ; 1 thus in 54 B.C. it 
was only 4 per cent, whilst in the anarchy which followed 
it only rose to 8 per cent. But in the city itself usury 
also was rampant for the purposes of political corruption 
and private debauchery, and in the provinces-—as already 
observed — usury of the worst type was universal. 
§ 5. Loan Interest under the Roman Empire. The history 
of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire might be writ-
ten with interest or usury as the principal character in the 
drama. In the golden age of the second century, which Gib-
bon has described " without hesitation " as the most happy 
and prosperous period in the history of the human race,2 
the rate of interest was low and the abuses of usury were 
slight. The contractors and politicians had been extruded 
or muzzled. There is abundant evidence, however, that in 
the third and four th centuries the evils of usury aj>peared 
on a large scale.3 As in earlier times, the root of the evil 
was to be found in excessive taxation. This was aggra-
1 Marquardt and Mommsen, Vol. II . , p. 01. 
2 Decline and Fall, Vol. I., Ch. III . 
3 Cf. Cunningham, Western Civilisation, p. 187. 
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vated by the unfavourable balance of trade experienced by 
the great mass of the provinces. There was a growing 
scarcity of bullion. The supplies f rom the mines probably 
diminished, and the drain to the East and the consumption 
in the arts constantly increased. Successive depreciations 
of the currency only increased the evil. The pressure of 
taxation and the diminution of capital gradually crippled 
the productive powers of the provinces. Coupled with 
their loss of productive powers was the contraction of 
economic freedom. I t is t rue tha t as regards the law 
there was a continuous amelioration in the condition of 
slaves proper, but there was a corresponding deterioration 
of hired labour. " The taxpayers' necessities were the 
usurers' opportunities," but as Dr. Cunningham observes, 
" it would be a mistake to suppose that the moneyed men 
who advanced money on usury and farmed taxes had an 
easy time of it. Their position corresponded with that of 
the .Jews in Angevin England ; they were the instruments of 
oppression, but they were mercilessly squeezed themselves." 
The pressure of public burdens, of which usury was one 
of the most str iking symptons, gradually restrained mate-
rial progress as it contracted economic freedom, in every 
depar tment of industry. Even Just inian, whose name is 
associated with the system of law that still governs a 
large part of the world, played a considerable part in this 
contraction of economic freedom. He inst i tuted the 
monopolies which later on did so much for the ruin of 
Constantinople 1 and the Empire of the East . Under this 
emperor, however, the evils were only beginning; and the 
rate of interest allowed by law was 6 per cent in ordinary 
transactions, 8 per cent for mercantile loans, or 12 per 
cent for advances on bottomry, and it is probable tha t the 
law only confirmed prevailing custom. 
The history of the decay of the Roman Empire is carried 
by Gibbon down to the sixteenth century, but in general 
for economic purposes, especially if England is taken as 
' See below, Bk. V., Ch. II . , § 4. 
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the centre of the inquiry the thousand years from the sixth 
to the sixteenth centuries may be considered separately 
under the title of the Middle Ages. 
§ 6. Loan Interest in the Middle Ages. " In the first 
years of the Empire," says Guizot,1 "every th ing indicated 
a society in course of development or civilisation in prog-
ress . . . . At the end of the fourth century not only 
had all social progress ceased, but a retrograde movement 
was sensibly felt ." Sir Henry Maine, in discussing the 
origin of primogeniture, argues that society had retro-
graded to a primitive type and was compelled to adopt 
primitive institutions. Passing over the larger question 
of general progress there can be no doubt that as regards 
material wealth there was decided retrogression, e.g., brick-
making and banking were lost arts, where once they had 
flourished, and slavery took a new lease of life. Feudal-
ism at its worst seemed to threaten the very existence 
of society — as in England, for example, in the reign of 
Stephen. A new civilisation had to be evolved of which 
Christ ianity and individual freedom were to be the spiritual 
life. The abuses of the mediaeval Church, which in the 
end rendered the Reformation a political and economic 
necessity, have blinded us (in England) to the economic 
benefits of Christianity dur ing the earlier mediaeval period. 
But in that period more than ever perhaps in the world's 
history a great effort was made to harmonise the conflict-
ing wants and activities of human nature. The watch-
word of the great Christian thinkers, the men of genius, 
of spiritual insight, and of fearless devotion whose thoughts 
at once expressed and guided the strivings of popular 
beliefs might be modernised in the imperative: moralise 
your economy and spiritualise your morality. The develop-
ment of the Canonist doctrine on loan interest affords a 
good illustration and at least a partial proof of this posi-
tion. I t was much more than a straining of the text of 
Scripture on the sinfulness of usury and of the text of 
1 History of Civilisation in France ( translation), Vol. 1., p. 303. 
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Aristotle on the barrenness of money. I t had no doubt 
its negative side, and its prohibitions and condemnations 
if applied verbatim et literatim to modern conditions would 
make Lombard Street as deserted as Pompeii. Such a test, 
however, is altogether unfair. The proper comparison so 
far as condemnation was concerned is not Lombard Street 
but Isaac Gordon. The Canonist writers in their prohibi-
tions were dealing with those very practices in the con-
demnation of which the last (1900) Money Lending Act 
is obliged to resort to the mediaeval term " unconscion-
able." The Canonist doctrine was an a t tempt to provide 
religious, moral, and legal sanctions against abuses that 
were universal in all early civilisations, and which survive 
as important exceptions at the present time. I t has been 
said that the thinkers of the Middle Ages only very gradu-
ally worked their way from the conception of a number 
of particular prices to the conception of a general pur-
chasing or exchanging power. Bu t the thought conformed 
to the fact. The development of interest on money is in 
many respects analogous to that of the rent of land. For 
many centuries the ownership of land enabled the owners 
to exact monopoly rents in the widest and rudest sense of 
the term. As shown in the preceding chapter, the rent of 
a piece of land was not paid out of the surplus produce 
of that land, but out of the general ability of the tenant, 
and similarly dur ing the sanie period the interest of money 
was in many cases not paid out of the profits made by its 
use, but out of the general ability of the borrower. In 
the case of land, the lord could exact from his bondsman 
all kinds of tallages, amercements, and precarious services, 
and in the case of money the lender under various names 
devoured the whole substance of the borrower. The 
mediaeval usurer of this type was in t ru th far more rapa-
cious and exacting than the worst mediaeval land-owners; 
the lat ter were restrained partly by custom, which gradu-
ally became more and more favourable to the serfs, and 
partly by the economic consideration that at least the land 
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and a minimum of subsistence must be lef t to the cultiva-
tors. Bu t the usurer had no such limitations — and he 
devoured his debtor body and soul. Thus, in one very 
important respect, villeinage may be regarded as compara-
tively beneficial to the masses of the people. I t was a 
natura l economy that protected them against the abuses 
of a money economy. Whatever interest custom might 
assign to the villein, he certainly had no interest which he 
could mor tgage ; if he could not leave the land, neither in 
general could the land leave him. The Jew plundered 
the lord of the manor and the king plundered the Jew, 
but the suckers of usury did not reach down to the villein. 
The custom of the country gave him a surer safeguard 
against the money-lenders than the wisest legislation of 
Solon and Jul ius Caesar.1 
In the nineteenth century the peasants of Germany and 
Russia, in the course of progress, have in many cases ex-
changed the serfdom of the lord for the bondage of the 
Jew — the whip for the scorpion. 
The condemnation of usury by the Church was for the 
1 The monograph by Dr. Cunningham on Usury, and the exposition of 
Professor Ashley of the Canonist doctrine on Interest (Usury) , bring out 
with remarkable clearness and judicial impartiali ty the growth of medi-
aeval opinion and the adaptat ion of opinion to changes in the economic 
environment. The chapter by Madox on the Exchequer of the Jews, 
supplemented by the work of Mr. Joseph Jacobs on the Jews in Ange-
vin England, affords materials which deserve special study. I t must not 
be forgotten that the exilium Judtzorum in 1290 was not entirely due to 
the popular detestation of usury, for to say nothing of religious and race 
animosity we read tha t many escheats both of lands and chattels came 
into the king 's hands (Madox). The regulations regarding the custody 
of mortgages, etc., were designed partly at any rate in the king 's benefit 
— tha t he might know how much his Jews could afford to pay. The king 
had borrowed money at interest of the brethren of the Temple as early 
as 1274, and it is probable tha t he hoped to make more by giving 
the monopoly of money-lending to the Lombards, otherwise he would 
hardly have consented to lose the large revenues obtained from the 
Jews. 
Progress in the concrete can hardly find a better illustration than a 
comparison of Bagehot 's Lombard Street with Madox's famous chapter 
on the Exchequer of the Jews. 
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most part aimed against exactions which have always been 
regarded as immoral and which the most civilised nations 
still endeavour to make illegal. This condemnation was 
enforced, especially against ecclesiastics, by religious sanc-
tions ; and in some cases the doctrine was carried to an ex-
t r e m e — just as the condemnation of gluttony, unchastity, 
and other deadly sins led to the extremes laid down by 
the original rules of the various religious orders. 
There can be little doubt that in condemning usury the 
Church did not go beyond the common-sense morality of 
the time. A case is recorded by M a d o x 1 in which a J e w 
sought a decision from the Court of the Exchequer of the 
Jews to the effect that by Jewish law one Jew could not 
lend to another on usury. In the same way whilst the 
Jews were suffered to lend to Christians (under minute 
and str ingent regulat ions) i t was thought sinful and im-
moral for Christians to exact usury from one another. 
On the positive side, however, it was soon recognised by 
the Canonist philosophers tha t there were various cases 
in which what we should call economic services deserving 
a reward were mistaken for usury. Accordingly much 
learning and analytic power were expended in transferring 
these services from the category of sins to the category of 
virtues. The principle of formal justice which is so effi-
cient in the application of morality to practical economics 
(e.g., the morality of taxa t ion) was sufficient to effect 
the transposition of one important class of these sins. 
I t was thought tha t the prohibition of lending for gain 
(ne quid ultra sortem) did not involve the duty of lending 
at a loss. Accordingly the lender might claim that the 
borrower should restore the loan under such conditions 
/ tha t the creditor suffered no loss. In the end the Canon-
ist doctrine was found to include any real loss suffered by 
the lender, owing to the deferred use of his means, and the 
term " i n t e r e s t " (inter esse) is supposed to represent the dif-
ference between the actual condition of a creditor and the 
1 Exchequer, Cli. VI I . 
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condition he would have been in if he had retained posses-
sion of his wealth. Thus it appears that the leading idea 
of Boehm-Bawerk had been revealed to the mediaeval 
monks. The Canonists also recognised the principle of 
insurance, especially as applied to the merchandise of for-
eign trade, and the sleeping par tner very early was adorned 
with tha t cloak of respectability which our modern purists 
still refuse to the sleeping landlord. 
This justification of interest, however, was a bridge by 
which a mult i tude of sins could troop over to the side 
of virtue. The very religious man who could not show 
to the satisfaction of his confessor that there was damnum 
emergens or lucrum cessans could probably plead periculum 
soj-tis, and tha t he was enti t led to a reward for the risk 
of the principal. This idea of reward for risk was of 
especial importance in the development of partnership 
and the application of the capital of private persons to 
the uses of t rade. A t the same time various other forms 
of economic activity which at first sight had seemed to 
partake of the nature of usury were brought under the 
approval accorded to social labour and the promotion 
of social good. I t is true, no doubt, tha t the method of 
legal fictions was also resorted to for the purpose of recon-
ciling ant iquated rules with new practices. On the whole, 
however, there was a gradual recognition of the economic 
principle tha t manual labour is only one species of eco-
nomic effort and that the ventures of capital also deserve 
their reward. 
The cities of northern I ta ly give the best materials 
regarding loan interest obtained from the profits of trade.1 
Of these Venice was at first the most important, but later 
on Pisa, Genoa, and Florence were prominent. These 
and other cities were enriched part ly by trade with the 
Eas t and part ly by the Crusades. The Doge Mocenigo 
is reported to have said of the wealth of Venice that the 
1 Cf. Hal lam's Middle Ages, Vol. I l l , p. 329; McCulloch, " T r e a t i s e 
on Economical Pol icy," History of Italian Commerce, p. 308. 
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city employed ten million ducats in mercantile capital in 
different parts of the world, and tha t the annual profits 
of the traders on this sum was four million.1 A t Modena, 
in 1270, the ordinary rate of interest was 20 per cent. 
By the end of the fourteenth century, just before the estab-
lishment of the Bank of Genoa (1407), the rate in Venice 
had fallen to 7 per cent. In 1479 the king of France 
agreed to pay the king of England an annuity of sixty 
thousand crowns, and it was specially st ipulated that the 
partners of the Bank of the Medici should be responsible 
for its punctual payment — a str iking testimony to the 
development of Italian banking and credit. 
The decline of the Italian cities through political causes, 
and through the discovery of America and of the Cape 
route to India, marks the transition from the mediaeval to 
the modern period in which Holland and later England 
gained the supremacy in finance. W i t h the close of the 
mediaeval period " u s u r y " more and more gives place to 
interest, just as " m o n o p o l y " exactions from land gives 
place to economic rents. 
§ 7. Loan Interest since the Mediaeval Period. In trac-
ing the effects of industrial progress on the rate of interest 
in modern times the differentiation already observed becomes 
more marked. Loans as before may be divided into two 
groups, according as they are obtained for profitable em-
ployment or for the necessities or desires of consumption. 
In both groups the variety of subclasses is greatly increased, 
and it is only necessary to note the principal points of con-
trast with earlier conditions. 
In the first place, with the exception of a few "survivals ," 
the monopoly of the lender has disappeared. In the case 
of pure interest, indeed, the competition of a well-organised 
market finds perhaps its best i l lustration. Given the same 
security, negotiability, and generally the same net advan-
1 Hallam's Middle Ages, Vol. I., p. 465. At the same time it is stated 
that the housing is valued at 7,000,000 ducats and the rental a t 500,000, 
i.e., the rental of houses is about 7 per cent. 
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tages, the rate of interest tends to equality more readily and 
over a wider area than is the case with any other prices. 
The needs of the particular borrower no longer place him 
in the power of the particular lender, and with a few rela-
tively unimportant exceptions loan capital has altogether 
lost its mediaeval particularity. 
Secondly, it follows that — given equal s e c u r i t y — t h e 
difference between loans for productive and unproductive 
purposes has entirely disappeared. The general rate of 
interest depends on the general conditions of demand and 
supply. Under present conditions at any time the demands 
of states and municipalities for loans may exceed in 
importance the aggregate demands of industrial concerns, 
and the sum total of public investments of this kind is 
enormous. 
Thirdly, as the result of this equalisation of interest its 
burden has great ly decreased. I t is plain that no one will 
borrow for productive purposes except with the hope of 
making an additional net profit, and thus every loan of this 
kind (assuming the calculation jus t ) points to the motive 
of an economic advantage. 
Fourthly, the development of the law of bankruptcy 
and of the principle of limited liability has rendered the 
lenders cautious on their side, and a check is again imposed 
on the waste of capital. 
Fifthly, at the same time the development of public credit 
has given greater security for public loans. 
The public creditor is not likely to suffer whilst the tax-
payer can be mulcted for the interest. But there is unfort-
unately no such guarantee that public loans will always 
promote the advantage of the borrowing society whether 
state or municipality. The policy of public debts must, 
however, be deferred for subsequent consideration.1 
§8. Progress and the Rate of Interest—Summary. The 
preceding inquiry has shown that even interest, apparently 
the simplest element in gross profits, is the resultant of a 
1 In Bk. v . , Ch. XVII I . 
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number of complex forces.1 I t is t rue that the rate of pure 
interest may now be ascertained by referring to the yield on 
first-class securities, but it does not follow that the causes 
of changes in the rate can be so easily ascertained and still 
less can they be accurately measured. I t is an old idea 
that a low rate of interest is associated with industrial prog-
ress. Sir Josiah Child, in his Discourse of Trade, calls the 
low interest of money the causa causans of the prosperity of 
Holland.2 He also tries to show by " impartially searching 
our books " that the riches and splendour of England have 
been increased with the fall in interest, and he supposes they 
would increase still fu r ther with a fu r ther fall. He sup-
ports the historical with the comparative method, and con-
cludes from references to Scotland, Ireland, France, Italy, 
and Spain that riches vary inversely' with the rate of 
interest . Dur ing the two centuries that have elapsed 
since Child wrote this idea has persisted, the only differ-
ence of opinion being as to the nature of the connection 
and the reasons to be assigned. I t cannot be said, how-
ever, tha t the appeal to history is conclusive. In the 
reign of George I I . , the net yield to the investors in 
British funds fell to £2 16s. 0d. per cent, which is the 
present (1901) re turn to the British W a r Loan and less 
than the re turn on average first-class securities. In 17763 
it is said tha t half a million of money was lent in Scot-
land at 3 per cent, which is the present official rate on 
first-class landed security. I t would, however, be mani-
festly absurd to maintain tha t England and Scotland have 
remained stationary. If the rate of pure interest can be 
said to measure progress at all, it is probably not by any 
absolute fall, but by the diminishing difference between the 
pure rate and the average market rate on all kinds of in-
vestments. As industrial conditions improve, more and 
' S e e also analysis of causes affecting the rate of interest, Bk. I I I . , 
Ch. XXII . 
2 Discourse of Trade (4th edition, p. 8) . 
3 Macplierson's Annals of Commerce, sub anno 1776. 
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more securities enter the first-class list. But this increase 
in first-class securities tends of itself to raise the pure rate. 
§ 9. Progress and General Profits — the Measurement of 
Profits. If, however, the connection between interest and 
progress is difficult to determine, to discover any precise 
connection between profits and progress seems hopeless. 
The complexity of the problem becomes obvious if we 
consider the mode in which profits are usually measured 
and the origin of this method of estimation. For a long 
period landed property of some kind was practically the 
only form of inves tment 1 open to persons not engaged 
in trade, and the yield on the purchase money was the 
only form of obtaining interest. Sometimes instead of 
the land itself being bought and sold, we find rent-charges ; 
and " i n the earlier centuries before the alienation of ser-
vile tenements became common it would often be possible 
to buy a ren t charge where it would not be possible to 
buy the land i t se l f . " 2 I t is probable that it was from the 
practice of rent-charges tha t the idea of percentages was 
introduced into the practice of interest.3 
For many purposes land may be considered a species of 
capital and rent a species of profit. Indeed, the old legal 
definition of rent adopted by Blackstone is that " r e n t is 
a certain yearly profit arising out of lands and tenements 
corporeal ."4 This profit must be certain (i.e., in the 
legal sense), must issue yearly, and must issue out of lands 
and tenements wherewith the owner or granter of the rent 
may have recourse to distrain. 
But, on the other hand,5 for many purposes it is more 
convenient to distinguish between land and capital and 
between rent and profit. A n d al though for most purposes 
1 For a curious instance see Paston Letters, Vol. III . , p. 162. 
2 Ashley's Economic History, Vol. I., Pt. II., p. 406. 
3 The German word for interest, Zins, is derived from census, i.e., r e n t ; 
whilst the French rente refers to interest on any form of property. See 
above, Vol. I., p. 402. 
4 Blackstone, Commentaries, Bk. II., Ch. I I I . 
6 See above, Bk. I., Ch. VI. , § 5. 
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the practice of measuring profits as a percentage on the 
capital obtained annually has been generally adopted, it 
is well to bear in mind the origin of the custom and to 
note the differences between a simple rent-charge and 
other species of profits. 
Trade profits, for example, are by no means certain 
(legally or otherwise), the profits do not issue yearly,1 
though a yearly estimate may be made, and the t rader has 
to venture his capital without any ulterior security for the 
profit in the shape of lands or tenements corporeal, and in 
the ordinary case without any legal security whatever. 
Profit per cent per annum is only a mode of estimating 
the actual profit derived from the turnover of the capital.2 
The capital value of any business at a particular moment 
of time is the sum total of all its assets less its liabilities, 
and the difference between any two dates is the gross 
profits over the period. 
How much of the gross profit of a business is put down 
as interest or as insurance (e.g., by creation of a reserve 
fund ) or as wages of management, will depend on the 
custom of the t rade ; but we may be sure that for the 
owner of the capital, if there is anything lef t over the term, 
profit will be elastic enough to cover it, and for purposes 
of theory there is the conception of quasi-rent. 
§ 10. Profits and Prices. In recent years much atten-
tion has been devoted under the leadership of Professor 
Marshall to the exposition of the resemblances between 
the rent of land and other forms of income, and in nearly 
every form of income for relatively short periods an ele-
ment of quasi-rent is discovered. The essence of the 
resemblance seems to be found in the development of 
the old proposition that price determines rent, not rent 
price. The income derived from any appliance or factor 
of production depends upon the price of the product (and 
not the converse), so long as the period taken is relatively 
1 Cf. Adam Smith, Bk. I., Ch. IX. 
2 Cf. Marshall 's Principles, Bk. VI., Ch. VI I I . , on this distinction. 
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so short that there is not time for the supply of the appli-
ance or factor to be influenced by expansion or contraction. 
My difference with Professor Marshall on this point was 
almost entirely as regards the economy of language. 
Technical terms ought not to be multiplied beyond neces-
sity, and the prefix quasi has, in general, served to gather 
rather than scatter the clouds of misunderstanding. 
As regards the substance, however, of the analogy be-
tween economic rent and profits it may, I think, be extended 
much further . 1 
W h e n once a society has passed from a natural to a 
money economy, the monetary valuation of capital (and 
thus also tha t of profits) is no longer a secondary, or acci-
dental, but a primary quali ty. 
W h a t Mill calls the incident of exchange becomes in 
fact an essential part of the substance of capital. This 
historical fact had been thoroughly grasped by Adam Smith 
in regard to circulating capital. Circulating capital is tha t 
which affords a revenue by changing hands. The revenue 
or profit arises solely from a continuous oscillation of ex-
changes between money and goods, goods and money. The 
capital continues its existence by retaining its money val-
uation ; anyth ing beyond is profit and may be lopped off 
as revenue; anything below so far shortens its life, unless 
the defect is made up from future profit. 
W i t h fixed capital, " which yields a revenue without 
changing masters " at first sight, this character of exchange 
seems excluded from Adam Smith's conception. Thus to 
take his example of seed corn : " Though it goes back-
ward and forward between the ground and the granary, 
it never changes masters, and therefore does not properly 
circulate. The farmer makes his profit not by its sale, but 
by its increase." 
I t is easy to show, however, tha t even in agriculture 
the money valuation is essential to fixed capital. Recently 
many English farmers went on growing wheat with fal l ing 
1 See above, Vol. II . , p. 81. 
PROGRESS A N D P R O F I T S . 143 
prices, but though the seed was returned sevenfold as before, 
the profit became less and the capital dwindled. 
Similarly as regards buildings, machinery, and the like : 
they may be kept in good repair and worn out parts may 
be continuously replaced; but whether or not this part of 
capital has suffered real depreciation, depends also on the 
competition of other agents of production affecting the 
prices and also on the sales of the product. Machinery 
that can only make unsaleable goods has logically lost its 
value as capital as effectually as if it had been corrupted 
by rust or destroyed by rioters.1 
§ 11. The Tendency of Profits to a Minimum. " T o 
popular apprehension," says Mill,2 " it seems as if the 
profits of business depended upon prices " ; and later on 
in dealing with the tendency of profits to a min imum 8 he 
controverts Adam Smith's a rgument on the interconnection 
of profits and prices. But as is so often the case with 
Mill 's paradoxes, Adam Smith and popular opinion express 
a great t ru th which Mill conceals with refinements of lan-
guage. Profit, argues Mill, arises not from the incident of 
exchange, but from the productive power of labour. 
But under a monetary economy all profits depend upon 
differences in relative prices, and the number of prices of 
sufficient magnitude to affect the margin of profits in any 
1 I t is worth noting that Adam Smith's position on fixed capital is still 
tha t which is applied in the Income Tax assessments and in the Companies 
Acts. The theory in both Company and Income Tax law seems to be that 
fixed capital has not to be replaced before profits are arrived at. The only 
notable exception is tha t an allowance may be made in Income Tax returns 
for the wear and tear of machinery and plant during the year ; none, 
however, may be made for depreciation of value. 
According to the Companies Acts profits are the excess of earnings 
over disbursements without any deduction for loss of capital. 
As regards economic theory, however, it may be pointed out tha t the 
Income Tax law is full of anomalies and inconsistencies, and in practice 
if a shareholder in a company receives larger dividends from " w a s t i n g " 
subjects, he must, to keep his capital intact, himself set aside a sum for 
depreciation. 
2 Principles, Bk. I I . , Ch. XVI. , § 6. 
a Ibid., Bk. IV., Ch. IV., § 1. 
1-144 ECONOMIC P R O G R E S S . 
particular business is very great. The price of the labour 
directly employed is not always of predominant importance. 
Since, moreover, all prices depend upon demand as well as 
on supply, any account of profit which refers only to the 
productive power of labour omits the principal and most 
difficult parts of the problem. Even from the point of 
view of production in the narrowest sense of the term the 
exposition is incomplete : capital in this sense has also pro-
ductive power ; machinery may be substituted for labour 
and may be auxiliary to labour, and if wages are ascribed 
to the productive power of labour, profits may with equal 
justice be assigned to the productive power of capital. 
Product ive power, however, with the widest interpreta-
tion, cannot extend beyond supply, and both wages and 
profits in societies rest ing on exchange must depend 
equally on demand. 
Money wages and profits are both cases of relative 
prices. Considered from this point of view, there is, in-
deed, one sense in which the tendency of profits to fall 
with the progress of society may be affirmed as a general 
proposition — and that is in the sense plainly indicated by 
Adam Smith. So far as profits depend on buying to sell 
again, the increase of competition tends to diminish the 
differences between the buying and selling prices. In gen-
eral competition prices are lower than monopoly prices. 
This a rgument applies also to the difference between the 
price of labour and the sale of its p roduc t ; the profits of 
interchange fall as the difference diminishes, and either 
the labourer or the consumer must reap the benefit. If, 
then, as is the case in modern industrial societies, the great 
body of labourers is the same as the great body of con-
sumers, we may say that real wages rise at the expense of 
profits. 
As already explained, however, profits is complex, and 
a large part is itself wages. I t is quite possible that the 
wages of management per uni t of time may rise continu-
ously compared with other kinds of time wages, whilst 
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profits 011 the turnover of capital are continuously dimin-
ished. Men more often become millionaires by handl ing 
large capitals with small differences, than by handling 
small capitals with large differences. 
The wages of management of large capitals is per unit 
of time by far the highest of all wages. So high, indeed, 
is the reward that the term "wages " seems altogether inap-
plicable in many cases, and quasi-vant is more suggestive 
of the fabulous riches involved. 
Similarly as regards the thi rd element in gross profits, 
namely, insurance against risk. In the course of progress 
the sphere of insurance extends, and so far the element of 
risk is extruded from gross profits. The mediaeval ship-
owner had to take the risk of all kinds of perils, the insur-
ance against which is now as much a part of cost as the 
safety valves in the boiler or the water-tight compartments. 
Bu t the maxim still holds good that the greater the risk 
to the individual the greater the profit. The organisation 
of modern markets affords the possibility of immense gains, 
provided the speculator risks everything. Risk, of this 
kind, however, is the risk of speculation, and obviously 
does not admit of insurance. 
Bu t speculation may mean anything from reckless, igno-
rant gambling, in which one man's gain is another man's 
loss, to far-seeing calculations of the course of progress in 
all its departments. Speculation of this second kind some-
times deserves to rank with the highest efforts of practical 
genius, for without it such efforts never gain an opportu-
nity for realisation. Occasionally, however, even bona-fide 
and well-founded speculation obtains an extravagant reward 
as the result of good fo r tune ; but such occasional rewards 
encourage the highest forms of enterprise. I t is, however, 
useless to a t tempt to strike an average in cases of this kind. 
On the whole, the conclusion is tha t if the expression, 
" general rate of profits," is still retained in its widest sig-
nificance, the effects of progress on this general rate must 
be said to be indeterminate. 
VOL. I I I . — L 
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NOTE ON PROFITS AND PRICES. 
I t may be admi t ted tha t Mill is perfect ly correct in deny-
ing tha t h igh prices make h igh profits if by high prices is 
mean t simply a high general level of prices, or a low ex-
change value of money, which is supposed to have been 
definitely and un i fo rmly established. B u t such an ele-
men ta ry exposure of a simple currency fallacy is imperti-
nen t to the subject in one sense of the te rm and to A d a m 
Smi th in the other . 
If Mill had seen the real connect ion of profits and prices, 
he could hard ly have fo rmula ted his proposit ion 011 the 
tendency of profits to a min imum. 
T h a t general profits t end to a min imum is, as a general 
s t a t emen t , as unmean ing as t h a t genera l prices tend to a 
min imum, the absurd i ty of which is obvious by expressing 
i t in the form t h a t the exchange value of money tends to 
a max imum. Unde r certain condit ions certain kinds of 
profits t end to fal l and some, indeed, may become negat ive ; 
but , on the other hand, other k inds of profit may increase 
" out rageously ." 
Al l these various profits, once a money economy is estab-
lished, may be t rea ted as cases of relative prices, and none 
are due s imply to the product ive power of labour. A 
stock-jobber buys and sells par t icular shares and makes a 
profit, i t may be, at the very same t ime and place ; in other 
forms of t rade the difference in price and the resu l tan t 
profit depends upon the lapse of t ime or change of place, 
the commodi ty itself being unaffected ; in other cases the 
owners of various k inds of fixed capital buy labour of vari-
ous k inds and sell the amalgam of their product , the profit 
depending on a series of prices besides the prices of the 
labour direct ly employed. 
P u r e in teres t may be regarded as the difference between 
present and f u t u r e price. A present sum of money is sold 
for a grea ter sum a t a f u t u r e t ime, and the difference is 
in teres t . " T h e essence of interest in shor t is d i scount , " 1 
1 Professor Smar t ' s condensation of Boehm-Bawerk. " I n t e r e s t and 
Capital " ( t ranslat ion) , p. xx. See also note Bk. I I I . , Ch. XXII . , p. 210. 
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This mode of regarding interest is in effect the practical 
method of business. Calculations are periodically made in 
the financial papers on the yield to various stocks, and any 
rise in value is added proportionately to the interest derived 
eo nomine from the stock. Consols, and the leading Eng-
lish railway debentures, are usually regarded as types of 
perfect security, especially for bankers. They are so in 
the sense tha t the interest they bear will be regularly paid 
during the period assigned; but the capital value of these 
annuities is liable to constant change, and the returns to the 
investment depend also on the price of purchase and sale. 
A bank may easily lose money in these perfect securities 
instead of gaining interest. Accordingly banks use such 
securities largely as providing reserves for cases of need, 
and they make their profits by discounts and loans in which 
the return of the principal is certain at a certain time. 
The element of indemnity for risk is also natural ly ex-
pressed in terms of prices. If the risk to principal or 
interest is great, the present value is proportionately low, 
or the fu tu re is discounted at a high rate. The yield in 
cases of ful l payment must compensate for the total and 
partial failures of other cases. The whole business of 
insurance is a calculation of average prices founded upon 
probabilities determined by experience. When in any form 
of business separate insurance is impossible, still if the busi-
ness is to continue, the prices of its products must suffice 
to ensure the capital involved. In other words, what can 
be set aside for depreciation of capital depends on the 
course of prices. 
As regards earnings of management, they are best 
regarded as the price paid for a certain kind of labour. 
Any business in a satisfactory state must pay salaries to 
its managers or directors, and whether or not they happen 
to be the owners of the capital is theoretically a mat ter of 
indifference. These salaries considered as part of gross 
profits are again dependent on prices. 
C H A P T E R VI I . 
PROGRESS AND WAGES. 
§ 1. Progress and the Price of Labour. I n considering 
the effects of progress on wages, wages may in the first 
place be regarded as the price of labour. The price of 
labour is of course only one element affecting real wages, 
just as real wages again is only one element in general 
well-being ; but the price of labour is a very important 
element, and changes in this price are associated with the 
greatest movements of economic progress. To get rid of 
other complicating circumstances, I have used the phrase 
price of labour. B u t the phrase without qualification is as 
vague as the price of animals or the price of produce. 
Labour embraces many forms of work (objective), and 
many kinds of feelings (subject ive) , and the price of any 
species may be quoted per uni t of work done, e.g., mowing 
an acre of grass, or per uni t of feeling endured, e.g., a 
day's labour in the fields. 
The two methods of measurement are no doubt closely 
connec t ed : 1 the time-worker must generally work up to a 
certain standard, and the piece-worker must take in general 
a certain average time. I t is found, however, that in some 
cases, both theoretical and practical, the one method and in 
others the other method is preferable, whilst in some cases 
it is a matter of indifference.2 
1 There are also certain intermediate and supplemental forms, e.g., 
task wages and progressive wages. See D. F. Soliloss, Methods of In-
dustrial Remuneration (3d edition), Ch. I. 
2 Cf. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Industrial Democracy, Vol. I., Ch. V. 
It is shown inter alia that of trade unions with more than 1000 members 
(omitting unskilled and transport workers) 49 unions with 573,000 members 
insist on piece-work, 34 unions with 140,000 recognise both piece-work 
and time-work, and 38 unions with 290,000 members insist on time-work. 
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In the tables of Rogers the prices of agricultural labour 
are sometimes given by the day, sometimes by the piece 
(ie.g., threshing various kinds of grain). . I t is to be regretted 
that in the latest official re tu rn 1 on the earnings of agricul-
tural labourers no figures are given of piece-work. A com-
parison of the nineteenth with the thirteenth century would 
be most interesting, and in many parts of England typical 
mediaeval methods survived until quite recent years, e.g., 
threshing with the flail, reaping with the sickle high on 
the stalk. In most works dealing with economic progress 
the price of labour has been considered almost exclusively 
with reference to estimates of variations in real wages. 
In making such estimates in general, ordinary unskilled 
labour has been taken as typical of all labour, and the price 
of wheat has been taken as typical of workmen's budgets, 
so that the progress or the reverse in real wages has been 
reckoned in terms of the pecks of wheat obtained. 
In the present chapter I propose to deal mainly with a 
different problem, which is perhaps of much greater impor-
tance in estimating economic progress, namely, the varia-
tions in the relative prices of various forms of labour. 
§ 2. The Differentiation of Labour as shown by Prices. 
The differentiation of labour is one of the most marked 
characteristics of economic progress, being indeed one aspect 
of division of labour. Two modern instances may be cited. 
The piece-work rates of the Lancashire cotton operatives 
are so complicated that both the employers and the work 
people maintain salaried professional experts who devote 
their whole time to the services respectively of the Employ-
ers' Association and the Trade Union. I t is worth noting 
that the union official is appointed after competitive exami-
nation. Another example is afforded by the engineers. 
" A century ago, the small, skilled class of millwrights 
executed every kind of engineering operation from making 
the wooden patterns to erecting in the mill the machines 
constructed by their own hands. The mechanics in a great 
1 Report of Mr. Wilson Fox (Cd-346), 1900, see p. 19. 
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engineering establishment are to-day divided into numerous 
distinct classes of workers, who are rarely able to do each 
other's work." 1 And this is but one detail of the increas-
ing specialisation of the engineering trade. These varia-
tions in work call for corresponding variations in wages, 
and the heterogeneity is best expressed in prices. Wha t 
a contrast to the village smithy to which people in the 
early mediaeval period brought their own iron or steel to 
work up into a plough-share or nails ! 2 
Even in agriculture in the latest report we are told that 
among ordinary labourers there are many grades, and that 
the men who undertake the more skilled work generally 
receive higher wages.3 
§ 3. Progress and the Occupations of the People. The 
increasing differentiation of labour may also be shown by 
direct evidence regarding the occupations of the people. 
In the fourteenth century Rogers4 calculates, on the basis 
of the agricultural production, that the population of Eng-
land and Wales could not exceed two and a half million 
at the highest estimate. The great bulk of this population 
was engaged in agriculture. Even the towns were largely 
agricultural, and the holidays of the Universities and law 
courts were ordered to suit the operations of the harvest. 
According to the census of 1891 the population of Eng-
land and Wales was 29,050,363. Of this number 1,050,464 
males were engaged in agriculture. It is plain that at the 
J S . and B. Webb, Industrial Democracy, Vol. I. , p. 197. See also 
p. 105 for differences of wages. 
2 Rogers, Vol. I. , p. 281. 
3 By Mr. Wilson Fox (1900). 
A good idea of the complexity of modern industry as indicated by the 
variety of rates of wages in the United Kingdom may be formed by referring 
to the census taken by the Board of Trade for October, 1886. A summary 
is given in the Abstract of Labour Statistics (1900, Cd-119), pp. 120-148. 
These returns, however, refer only to manual labour and are only repre-
sentative. See also the Report on Standard Piece Hates of Wages and 
Sliding Scales in the United Kingdom (1900, Cd-144) for a detailed pre-
sentment of the complexity of modern industry. 
4 Op. cit., Vol. I. , p. 57. 
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highest estimate the total number of occupied males in the 
fourteenth century could not exceed this figure, taking 
half the population as males and twenty per cent as under 
ten years of age. I t thus appears tha t the number of males 
at present employed in agriculture in England and Wales 
is probably greater than in the mediaeval period. 
In the mediaeval period, however, women were employed 
in agriculture almost as much as men, while at present 
they are employed hardly at all. But our census returns 
also show that of the total number of male workers in all 
industries the agriculturists constitute only 11.8 per cent. 
§ 4. Agrindtural and Non-agricidtural Wages. As 
shown in the preceding section, one of the most noticeable 
features of English economic progress is the proportionate 
decrease of the agricultural to the non-agricultural occu-
pied males.1 This proportionate diminution, especially 
when taken with the practical disappearance of women 
from agriculture, if we compare the mediaeval period with 
the nineteenth century, indicates very clearly two great 
factors of economic progress. In the first place, it indi-
cates the great expansion of other industries — not merely 
manufactures,2 in the ordinary sense, but all the occupa-
tions that go to make towns and cities. 
And, secondly, this absolute increase of occupied males in 
other pursuits indicates great improvements in agricultural 
production, and shows that there is a greater surplus for 
town consumption. Since the free-trade era this interde-
pendence of the commerce of the towns and the improve-
ment of the country has been overshadowed by foreign 
imports. But when we make a complete survey of Eng-
lish economic history from the middle of the thir teenth 
century to the middle of the nineteenth century, foreign 
agricultural products are of minor importance. 
1 The employment of women is considered below, §§ 9-13. 
2 In 1851 those engaged in manufactures in England were 32.7 of those 
earning independent incomes as against only 30.7 in 1881. Marshal l ' s 
Principles of Economics (4th edition), p. 355 n. 
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This proportionate diminution of males occupied in agri-
culture (or in the converse this growth in urban occupa-
tions) is closely connected with the rates of wages in 
agricultural and non-agricultural pursuits. The subject is 
extremely difficult and complex, even when treated on the 
large scale of Thorold Rogers and Vicomte D'Avenel, and 
compression is still more difficult. I t is necessary to select 
typical examples. As a representative of non-agricultural 
workers, Ave may take the carpenter. Relatively to other 
industries, e.g., spinning, weaving, mining, the work of the 
carpenter has remained comparatively similar throughout 
six centuries.1 W e have also continuous records from the 
middle of the thirteenth century of the carpenter's wages, 
and it is found that they correspond very closely to the 
wages of the mason, the tiler, the sawyer, the plumber.2 
The carpenter indeed not only represents his own trade but 
the building trade generally, and the building trade fairly 
represents ordinary skilled labour. 
Wi th regard to the history of agricultural wages there are 
several difficulties. Money wages, especially in the earlier 
centuries, are only part of earnings. The wages are often 
quoted by the unit of work done (e.g., threshing of various 
kinds of g r a i n i e r quarter, reaping, mowing, etc., per acre), 
and in comparing different occupations (e.g., the farm hand 
and the carpenter) it is obvious that time wages must be 
taken. Time wages when quoted as such, or estimated 
from piece-work, are generally estimated by the day, 
which is certainly the most general measure of labour; 
but earnings (on the basis of the standard of comfort) are 
1 Vicomte D'Avenel gives reasons for taking the labour of the mason 
as typical in dealing with similar variations (op. cit., Bk. I I I . , p. 120). 
The carpenter ' s occupation is, perhaps, more extensive and less variable. 
I t is noteworthy, however, tha t in general, f rom the mediaeval period to 
the present day, both in England and France there is on the average little 
difference between the wages of the carpenter and the mason. 
2 Mr. A. L. Bowley takes the bricklayer as representative of the skilled 
t radesman, and the br icklayer 's labourer of the unskilled ; the bricklayer 
is practically the same as the mason. Wages in the United Kingdom in 
the Nineteenth Century, § VII I . 
PROGRESS A N D W A G E S . 153 
more generally estimated by the year. The difficulty 
arises: how many working days are there in the year ? The 
usual modern estimate is 300, and Rogers usually takes 
that figure even in the Middle Ages. Vicomte D'Avenel 
thinks 250 a maximum, and that it should, on the average, 
be much less. In agriculture much of the labour is 
engaged by the year, and the holidays may be taken as a 
benefit; but if the work is by the day, unless the rate of 
pay is high irregularity of employment is considered a 
proportionate evil. 
§ 5. Summary of the English Evidence. 1st. From 
1259 to 1350 Rogers calculates the average earning of the 
regular farm hand of the higher class at £2 7s. 10d. per 
annum. This is made up partly from the money valuation 
of allowances and extra earnings, — obviously a necessary 
correct ion,—but partly also by the estimated earnings of 
the wife and one child. Deducting this latter amount (for 
which there is nothing corresponding in the carpenter's 
earnings), we have £1 15s. 4d. The annual earnings of 
the carpenter are taken at £ 3 18s. 1 ^ d., the estimate 
being made for 300 days at the ordinary day's wage. A t 
these rates the earnings of the carpenter are more than 
double those of the farm hand. I t seems probable, how-
ever, that Rogers has underestimated the value of the vari-
ous allowances of the agricultural and overestimated the 
regularity of the carpenter's work. In any case, however, 
it would appear that the carpenter earned at least 50 per 
cent more than the worker in agriculture. 
From 1351 to 1400, by Rogers's method, the first-class farm 
hand receives £3 15s. as against £5 15s. Id. for the car-
penter. Deducting from the former £1 5s. for the wife 
and boy, the carpenter again earns more than double, and 
in any case he probably earns half as much more.1 
1 If we might take the tha teher ' s " help " as typical of unskilled labour, 
the rates are before the Plague (1259-1350) Id., and af ter (1350-1400) 
2 \ d . per day as against 3 \ d . for the carpenter in the first period, and 4§d. 
in the second. In the former case the carpenter 's wages are more than 
1-154 ECONOMIC P R O G R E S S . 
2d. From 1401 to 1540 the wages of unskilled labour 
generally ( including ordinary agricultural labour) are 4d. 
per day as against for artisans ( the carpenter is 5 
average, and 6^d. the highest) ; the difference here is just 
50 per cent in favour of the lat ter . 
3d. From 1541 to 1583, af ter the great rise in prices, 
the same proportion is preserved, viz., average unskilled 
labour as against 9 | d . for the average artisan (car-
penter, lOd., average to highest l l | i 7 . ) . 
4th. From 1583 to 1642 the average carpenter receives 
per week 6s. 2 | d . as against 4s. 10d. for hedging and ditch-
ing. This proportion is less favourable to the carpenter. 
B u t the labourer to the artisan receives 4s. 2 | d . only, 
against 6s. 4d. to the average artisan (carpenter, mason, 
bricklayer, t i ler) , which gives almost exactly 50 per cent 
advantage to the lat ter . 
5th. The period 1642-1702 brings to l ight the begin-
ning of a str iking movement. The average carpenter 
receives per week 10s. 2 | d . (highest , 12s. 2|d.~) as against 
•6s. 4 | d . to the liedger and ditcher, i.e., more than 50 per 
c e n t ; and the labourer to the artisan has slightly higher 
wages (viz., 6s. 7 | d . ) than the hedger, whilst in the period 
immediately preceding the reverse was the case. 
I t should be observed tha t hedging and ditching were 
generally considered as exceptional accomplishments of 
the farm hand,1 and were paid for at slightly higher rates. 
I t follows then that ordinary agricultural labour obtained 
still less than ordinary unskilled labour. 
6th. From 1720 to 18002 the carpenter receives per week 
20s. to 23s. as against 8s. to 10s. of the agricultural labourer 
and l i s . to 14s. of the common labourer (non-agricul tural) . 
The relative rise of the carpenter 's wages and the depres-
sion of the agricultural labourer's is continuous. 
three times, and in the latter more than double those of the common man. 
The " h e l p , " however, was probably a woman. 
1 Rogers, Vol. I I I . , p. 476. 
2 These prices are taken f rom Palgrave's Dictionary of Political Econ-
omy (Article Wages) . 
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7th. From 1804 to 1836 the figures are carpenter, 20s. 
to 23s., agricultural labourer, 9s. to 10s., common labourer, 
13s. to 15s. The same movement of relative wages is 
observed in agriculture, whilst the advantage of the car-
penter over the common labourer returns to its former 50 
per cent. 
8th. From 1836 to 1898 there is an almost continuous 
advance in carpenter's wages from 24s. to 26s. up to 32s. to 
34s., the corresponding movements in agricultural wages 
being from 10s. to 12s. up to 12s. to 16s., i.e., carpenter's 
wages are more than double; and in common labour (non-
agricultural) from 15s. to 18s. up to 18s. to 22s., which 
preserves very nearly the 50 per cent.1 
§ 6. Wages in France. I t is interesting to compare the 
extraordinary permanence in the difference between the 
wages of the common labourer and the artisan in England, 
with the results obtained by Vicomte D'Avenel for France. 
" The wage of the common labourer ( journalier) stands 
at present (1897) in relation to that of the mason as 100 
to 136. In round numbers the mason gains a third more 
1 See Mr. Wilson Fox ' s Report , p. 49, for agricultural wages f rom 
1850 to 1899. For the nineteenth century generally, the reader should 
consult the work of Mr. A. L. Bowley on Wages in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury in the United Kingdom, and the more elaborate papers by the same 
writer in the Statistical Journal. 
The following is f rom Mr. Bowley's work on Wages, p. 70 : — 
T E N T A T I V E T A B L E OF A V E R A G E W E E K L Y W A G E S . 
1795 1807 1824 1833 1867 1897 Weights for average. 
s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. s. d. 
Lonrlon type of artisan . 25 0 30 0 30 0 28 0 36 0 40 0 1 
Provincial type of artisan 17 0 22 0 24 0 22 0 27 0 34 0 2 
Town labourers . . . . 12 0 14 0 16 0 14 0 20 0 25 0 3 
Agricultural labourers. . 9 0 13 0 9 6 10 6 14 0 16 0 3 
Weighted average . . . 13 6 17 0 18 0 16 0 21 4 25 6 
It will be observed tha t f rom 1795 to 1833 the average of the provincial arti-
san is 21s. 3d. against 14s. for the town labourer and 10s. 6d. for the agri-
cultural labourer. For 1807-1897 the figures are 30s. 6d., 22s. 6(7., and 15s. 
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than the labourer, or the labourer gains three-quarters of 
the wage of the mason. Well, this has been the identical 
proportion during six centuries. In spite of their respec-
tive variations, which sometimes raise one and sometimes 
the other, we may consider that they maintain the mean 
proportion of 3 to 4 . " 1 I t may be observed in passing 
that this is almost exactly the proportion of the wage of 
the town labourer to the provincial artisan in England, 
1867-1897, viz., 22s. Qd. to 30s. 6d. 
§ 7. Wages in the United States. The Massachusetts 
Bureau of Labour Statistics issued in 1885 a report on 
wages from 1760 to 1883.2 I t may be calculated from 
these figures that from 1780 to 1850 the average wages of 
the agricultural labourer are, in the proportion to those of 
the carpenter, as 100 to 147, whilst from 1860 to 1883 the 
proportion is 100 to 188. Since 1883 the movement has 
been in favour of the carpenter, his average wages being 
more than double those of the agricultural labourer. 
§ 8. Result of the Comparison of Agricidtural and Non-
agricultural Wages. The general result of this survey of 
agricultural and artisan wages is that the latter have 
always exceeded the former. In England up to the end 
of the eighteenth century the wages of the carpenter are 
in general 50 per cent higher, and during the nineteenth 
century 100 per cent higher than those of the agricultural 
labourer. And it is perhaps even more remarkable that 
about the middle of the seventeenth century the wages of 
common unskilled labour (non-agricultural) begin to exceed 
agricultural wages until after a more or less continuous rise 
they are in the latest period (1867-1897) about 50 per cent 
higher. I t is well known that, relatively, agricultural wages 
are higher in the manufacturing and mining districts than 
in the purely agricultural counties, and a reference to the 
figures of Rogers shows that in general wages in London are 
1 Op. tit., Vol. I I I . , p. 113. 
2 The tables are quoted in Mayo-Smith 's Statistics and Economics, 
p. 312. 
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higher than wages in the provincial towns in which the con-
nection with agriculture is much closer. If now we compare 
these records of wages with the movements in the occupa-
tions of the people, we find a natural explanation of the 
gradual diminution in the proportion of the rural to the 
urban population. Labour tends to flow where the reward 
is highest. But the astonishing thing is that in spite 
of the continuous migration from the country to the 
town, the balance of money wages is still largely in favour 
of the town. Nor can the difference be explained by 
reference to any or all of the so-called natural causes of 
difference in different employments. The town to the 
labourer is more attractive, and has probably always been 
more attractive than the country. I t is a commonplace of 
all l iteratures tha t the happy peasant has never fu l ly real-
ised his own happiness. Again the labour of the shep-
herd, and of the ploughman, and of any persons who deal 
with animals requires a high degree of skill and trust-
worthiness ; there is little or no chance of rising in the 
social scale — too often the workhouse is the last reward 
of the agricultural labourer. These facts have often been 
cited to show cause why country people move into the 
towns, but another deduction has been less noted. There 
can be no question that from the labourer's point of view 
the net advantages of the occupation are in favour of the 
town. I t follows, therefore, tha t wages in the country 
should naturally be higher unless they are depressed by 
some other powerful causes. The prices of consumable 
commodities in former times gave advantages in some 
respects, as also the perquisites in the shape of produce. 
But in recent years these advantages have been incon-
siderable, and are certainly not enough to account for the 
difference in money wages. W e are thus thrown back for 
an explanation on the fundamental law of supply and 
demand. Once a country is fairly well peopled, and most 
of its available lands cultivated, there is little room for the 
expansion of agriculture. Many of the improvements that 
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take place are such as essentially to demand less labour. 
And on the whole the demand for labour is non-expansive. 
On the other hand, the supply of agricultural labour natu-
rally increases, even when it is not directly encouraged 
by the laxi ty of an injudicious poor law. 
Thus there is a permanent flow of labour from the coun-
try to the towns. J u s t as with the great flow of the 
waters between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean the 
tide always sets the same way, and age after age the Bos-
phorus runs like a great river through the heart of Con-
stantinople, so the great stream of country folk passes 011 
through the great cities of the world and returns no 
more. 
I t was well observed by Adam Smith that wages are 
highest in new industries, and tha t they rise with the in-
crease of employment. Bu t agriculture is the oldest of 
all employments, and relatively to other employments very 
soon becomes stat ionary or declining. The depopulation 
of the country has been the theme of all ages. 
I t is doubtful even if protective duties would do much 
to raise agr icul tural wages. I t is far more probable that, 
as in the past, they would for the most part raise rents. 
The observation of Adam Smith has been confirmed by 
subsequent experience and may almost take rank as an 
empirical law. Wi th reference to the nineteenth century 
Mr. Hooker 1 has shown that there is a fairly close relation 
between the wages and the numbers of those employed in 
coal mines in recent years. Mr. Bowley 2 has stated gen-
erally, that if a list is wri t ten down of the trades whose 
numbers have increased more than the average, and of those 
trades whose numbers have decreased, or increased less 
than the average, it will be found that in general the wages 
of the former are precisely those wages which have in-
creased more than the average wage and vice versa. 
§ 9. The Relative Wages of Women and Men. In the 
1 Statistical Journal, 1894. 
2 Wages in the Nineteenth Century, p. 20. 
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mediaeval period women were employed in agriculture 
nearly to as great an extent as men. They not only assisted 
in outdoor work generally, but did work now always asso-
ciated with men. The " homo " or help of the thatclier of 
mediaeval records was generally a woman, and women also 
washed and dipped the sheep, which for tunate ly were of a 
small size. 
The records of Thorold Rogers tend to prove that from 
1260 to 17021 the wages paid to women engaged in agricul-
tural work were on the average about half the wages paid 
to men. I t appears, however, from one s ta tement 2 that if 
women do men's work, they receive the same pay. 
I t is worth noting also that in 1601 the rates of 
domestic servants in good households do not show such an 
excess in favour of males. Lord Spenser has 31 male and 
9 female servants. The highest male and female receive 
the same rate, £ 1 0 per annum, whilst 27 males receive 40s. 
as against 3-3s. 4d. paid to 6 females. 
From 1720 to 1787 3 woollen and worsted spinners, women, 
(single wheel by hand) earned from 8s. to 10s. per week, 
whilst worsted stuff weavers (hand loom), men, earned from 
l i s . to 15s., and woollen cloth weavers 13s. to 21s. Dur-
ing the same time, however, common agricultural labourers, 
men, only earned 8s. to 10s. 
In 18334 the average weekly earnings in 43 cotton 
mills in Manchester of males above 21 years of age 22s. 
5 | d . ; of females 9s. 6^d. 
1 Before the Plague (1350) the average woman's wage in agriculture was 
1(7. per day and af ter the Plague 2d. per day, the corresponding pay of 
the thatcher (who receives a little more than the ordinary labourer) being 
2f{7. and 3|<7. Roughly f rom 1200 to 1400 women received half the wages 
of men. F rom 1400 to 1540 the rates are men 6(7., women 3r7. From 1583 
to 1642 the rates are 2s. 3d. per week to women, against 4s. 10(7. to the 
hedger and ditcher and 4s. 2 \ d . to the labourer to the artisan. From 1642 
to 1702 the rates are respectively 2s. 6§c7. against 6s. 4f(7. and 6s. 7 |d. 
These figures are taken f rom Rogers. 
2 Rogers's Agriculture and Prices, Vol. IV., p. 495. 
' Pa lg rave ' s Dictionary of Political Economy, Article Wages. 
4 Ibid., Article Female Labour. 
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In 1883 an enqu i ry 1 made into the relative wages paid 
to men and women in twenty-four manufactur ing industries 
in Great Britain and Massachusetts show tha t in Great 
Britain the average weekly wage of women was 41 per 
cent of men's, and in Massachusetts 51 per cent. A nota-
ble apparent exception occurs in the Lancashire cotton 
weaving. The piece-work rates are the same for men and 
women, and sometimes clever women get through more 
work, and thus earn higher weekly wages than men. A 
similar equali ty of task wages is also said to prevail in 
cotton weaving in France. 
A calculation based on the average rates of wages 2 in 
all the textile trades obtained by the board of t rade in 
the census of 1886 shows tha t the average wages of men 
were 23s. 2d. as against l i s . Id. for women. In the cotton 
manufacture men's wages were 25s. 3d. as against 15s. 3d. 
for women, whilst in "ha i r , elastic web, and lamp and 
candle-wick manufactures " the rates were 25s. men to 9s. 
10c?. women. In some of the other industries quoted, e.g., 
tin-plate workers, the wages of men are more than three 
times those of women (33s. 5d . against 10s. 4c?.). On the 
whole, however, it would appear tha t roughly the propor-
tion is in general about two to one in favour of men in all 
the industries. Wi th regard to agriculture, the latest offi-
c ial 3 report is silent. From private inquiries I find tha t 
in districts around Edinburgh the average wages of men 
are about double those of women — the work, however, 
being different in the two cases. When , as in some districts, 
1 The inquiry was made by the Massachusetts Bureau of Statistics of 
Labour in 1884. The results are quoted by Mr. Sidney Webb in his 
article on the " Differences of Wages paid to Men and Women , " Economic 
Journal, December, 1891. This article contains much useful information 
on modern conditions. See also Industrial Democracy, Vol. II., pp. 495-
507. The question is also discussed by Professor Smart in Economic 
Studies, pp. 107-141. 
2 Abstract of Labour Statistics (1900). In making the calculation I 
have taken a simple average in both cases. 
8 By Mr. Wilson Fox (1900), see p. 8. 
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women do the same work as men, the payments are the 
same. The noteworthy circumstance, however, about the 
employment of women in agriculture is tha t in England, 
except in some of the northern counties, it has ceased, and 
in Scotland it has greatly diminished. 
§ 10. Wages of Women and Men in France. The re-
searches of Vicomte D'Avenel have made available still 
more ample materials for the history of wages in France, 
and he has treated with great fulness and acumen the com-
parison of the relative wages of men and women. In this 
place only a few of the main results can be noted. Tak-
ing ordinary day labour, such as work in the fields, as the 
basis, it is calculated 1 tha t in the last quarter of the four-
teenth century the usual earnings of women were 75 per 
cent those of men. In the last quarter of the fifteenth 
century the percentage fell to 55. From that time onwards 2 
there are oscillations between 71 and 5-3. For 1897 it is 
calculated that for common day labour the average wage 
of women is 60 per cent that of men. The writer points 
out as regards other industrial occupations tha t the propor-
tion is less in favour of women ; in la grande Industrie 
their wages being less than half those of men, and in la 
petite industrie about one-half. Thus on the whole the 
result is to confirm the English evidence and to s t rengthen 
the popular opinion that in most cases women earn only 
half as much as men. The chief difference is that the 
French evidence (perhaps because it is more abundant ) 
shows greater variations in the details. 
§ 11. The Relative Wages of Women in Different Employ-
ments. The French evidence is also more abundant and 
continuous on another point of great interest at the present 
time. In recent years there has been a great rise in the 
wages of women in domestic service relatively to other 
employments. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries 
Vicomte D'Avenel records that the wages of women em-
ployed in ordinary day labour ( j ourna l i e re ) were much 
1 Op. cit., Tome I I I . , p. 36. 2 Op. eft., Tome III. , p. 100. 
VOL. I I I . •— M 
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higher than those obtained by domestic servants. When 
both received food, the money wages were about double in 
the former case, and this difference was far more than could 
be accounted for by the saving effected by the domestic in 
having provided light, fire, and shelter. From 1600 to 1800 
compared with 1300-1600 it is calculated that in the gen-
eral fall of money 1 wages that occurred, whilst the jour-
nalieres lost one-half the domestics only lost one-quarter 
of their wages. When we compare 1790 with the present 
time (1897) the relative rise of the wages of domestic ser-
vants is still more marked. Even taking the case of rural 
domestic servants only, their wages have risen two and a 
half times, whilst those of the journalieres have risen only 
about 80 per cent. 
The relative rise of wages of domestic servants in Eng-
land dur ing the last fifty years is too well known to require 
special evidence. If, however, we take the average wages 
of women in the textiles as l i s . Id. per week, it is easily 
seen what an advantage is obtained by the domestic ser-
vant. Many classes of superior servants 2 obtain as much 
in money wages, besides receiving in addition board which 
probably costs at least as much more ; and even if the 
money wages of domestic servants be taken on the average 
as low as 6s. per week (or £ 1 6 a year) , the other elements 
in real wages give them a considerable advantage. The 
conditions of service dur ing the last half century have 
probably improved still more than the money wages. 
§ 12. The Occupations of Women. I t has been observed 
tha t in the medifeval period women were employed in 
agriculture nearly as much as men. I t may be added that 
even in the case of domestic servants, whether in the towns 
(which were for the most part villages) or in the country 
1 Op. cit., pp. 34, 35. 
2 The Official Report, by Miss Collet, IVar/es of Domestic Servants 
(C-9346) (1899) gives an adequate idea of present wages. In London 
the average wage of servants under 15 is £7 3s. ; of those between 35 and 
45, £27 9s.; and the average of all ages, .£18 Is. The estimated average 
for all England and Wales for all ages is £10 a year. 
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proper, much of their work was of an agricultural k ind 
according to our standards. The latest census returns 
available (1891) for England and Wales show that the 
total number of females engaged in agriculture in England 
and Wales in 1891 was 51,696, whilst the aggregate of 
occupied females was 3,945,580. 
Even of this relatively small number employed in agri-
culture, less than half were engaged in outdoor opera-
tions. By way of contrast it may be pointed out tha t the 
number of females engaged in domestic offices or services 
was 1,759,555, in the textile fabrics 628,001, and in dress 
691,441, that is, nearly 80 per cent of the occupied females 
are in these three employments.1 Of a total of females of 
14,949,624, it is found that 11,004,041 are unoccupied. 
The significance of the change hardly requires comment. 
Any one who has seen women spreading manure over the 
fields in winter, as is still the practice in the fields tha t 
touch the suburbs of Edinburgh, will appreciate the prog-
ress from mediaeval conditions. Agricul ture is not all 
hay-making. 
§ 13. Causes of the relatively Low Wages of Women and 
of their Improvement. There has been much discussion of 
the causes of the relatively low wages of women. A mere 
reference to custom is as unsatisfactory as in other cases of 
customary prices. A custom that has survived six centuries 
of competition must be firmly based on deep-rooted causes. 
The causes — being causes tha t affect relative prices — 
must be capable of being grouped under supply and de-
mand. Compared with men, the field of employment for 
women or the demand has always been relatively restricted. 
Women have never found much employment in war, in 
transport by sea and land, and in min ing ; nor as smiths, 
or masons, or carpenters, or generally in occupations asso-
ciated with the building t rades ; and they have in general 
1 Abstract of Labour Statistics, 1900. For fu r the r details, see Miss 
Collet's valuable Report to the Board of Trade (1894) of the Statistics of 
the Employment of Women and Girls. 
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been excluded from wholesale trade and the learned pro-
fessions. A glance over the records of six centuries of 
wages is sufficient to show that the field for the employ-
ment of women has been contracted in many directions. 
Even in agriculture, certain operations have always been 
confined to men. And on the other hand, unti l recent 
times, there was very little specialisation of employment in 
favour of women. Men have been also employed in domes-
tic service: in the great households there were often more 
men than women; men were also employed in weaving and 
in the decorative arts. W h e n certain kinds of employment 
came to be considered as specially adapted for women, very 
often the determining cause was the cheapness of the labour. 
As regards the supply on the other hand, it is well 
known tha t the distribution of the sexes is about equal, 
and the poorer the great mass of the people, so much the 
more necessary is it for women to seek gainful employ-
ments. On this point there is an instructive commentary 
by Vicomte D'Avenel . He accounts for the relative fall in 
the wages of women from 75 to 50 per cent of those of 
men in the lapse of four centuries (1400-1800) by the 
general impoverishment of the labouring classes, which 
made it necessary for more and more women to seek 
employment. 
When men competed with women, the advantage in 
s t rength of position was usually with the former. As a 
rule, men had some superiority in physical s trength and 
still more in moral coercion. Thus women were gradually 
excluded from the more'-gainful employments, and then 
the oversupply of their labour for other employments 
lowered their wages still more. Thus the custom grew 
up of considering women only capable of inferior employ-
ments, and also of considering the most gainful occupations 
as unfeminine. A t present, al though half the people in the 
world are females, there is still a prejudice against lady 
doctors; and though women are considerably engaged as 
litigants, they are practically never employed as lawyers. 
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In recent years, however, the great natural economic 
forces have been working in favour of women. The de-
mand for domestic servants is increasing with the growth 
of wealth, and relatively to the increase in population the 
supply is diminishing. The growth of wealth of the great 
masses of the people also makes it less necessary for women 
to seek gainful employments — witness the large number 
of the unoccupied. The adoption of piece-work in many 
industries is also in favour of the equalisation of women 
with men. " If we exclude from the calculation persons 
employed in agriculture and domestic service ( in which 
time-work is practically universal) , we find tha t 39 per 
cent of the persons occupied are engaged in trades which 
are chiefly piece-work compared with 61 per cent in trades 
chiefly time-work. The corresponding percentages for 
males only are 33 (piece) and 67 ( t ime) , and for females 
61 (piece) and 39 ( t i m e ) . " 1 I t stands to reason tha t 
when women are paid by the piece, the fact of sex must 
become of less importance.2 
The increase of education has also given new openings 
for women not only in teaching but in wri t ing (both books 
and journalism), the contraction of prejudice has thrown 
open many public employments, and even the gates of the 
learned professions are being unclosed. 
The question remains whether the gain of the women 
must be the loss of the men. Two cases are to be con-
sidered : in the first case there are certain employments 
where only a certain amount of work 3 is required, as in 
law and medicine. If as many women as men became 
qualified as lawyers and doctors, it is not at all likely tha t 
there would be a corresponding increase in disease or liti-
gation. If fees remained the same, it is clear that some of 
1 Report on Standard Piece Rates (1900) (Cd-144). 
2 Mr. Schloss, in his Methods of Industrial Remuneration, p. 188, gives 
instances of relatively high wages being earned by women at piece-work, 
e.g., 4s. per day at button-holing. 
3 In this case the " lump of labour " theory seems to hold good. 
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the men would suffer, and it is equally clear that it would 
be the third-rate men — the men on the margin. Thus the 
public would gain through the increase of efficiency. I t 
is possible also tha t the fees would fall, in which case the 
public would gain still more and the marginal men suffer 
still more. I t is doubt fu l if any fall in average fees would 
affect the highest classes of professional skill. 
In the second case, however, the result of the work, to 
recall a venerable phrase, is embodied in vendible objects. 
If we apply the principle of the reciprocity of demand 
and supply, in general after equilibrium is restored the 
additional supply of saleable goods ought to create the 
additional demand for labour. There would no doubt in 
this case also be a certain amount of marginal substitution 
with a corresponding increase of efficiency and gain to the 
public as consumers. In certain cases the admission of 
women might lower the fighting or bargaining capacity of 
the group concerned; but the difficulty does not seem 
formidable even to the authors of Industrial Democracy, 
who make the s tandard rate and the common rule the 
foundation of industrial well-being.1 
The increase in the economic independence of women 
would again s t rengthen their position in what to most of 
them seems the principal bargain in life, and again it may 
be said tha t only the third-rate men would suffer. 
On the whole, in economic as in other departments of 
social life, the elevation of women has proved to be one of 
the chief factors and also one of the best signs of progress. 
§ 14. The Employment of Children. If there are still 
doubts as regards the proper employment of women, there 
are for tunately no doubts as regards that of young chil-
dren. Since 1891 the employment of children under ten 
in most ga infu l pursuits in the Uni ted Kingdom has been 
prohibited. The employment of children of less tender 
years has also been placed under s t r ingent regulations, 
and in many cases prevented. Of children between ten 
i Cf. Vol. I I . , pp. 506, 507. 
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and fifteen the grand total of the United Kingdom (1891) 
was 4,225,729, of whom only 817,912 were occupied. The 
" u n o c c u p i e d " children — nearly three and a half millions 
of them — are for the most part being educated to a higher 
degree. The records of the employments of children in 
the first half of the nineteenth century reveal some of the 
worst of the lawful crimes of history.1 They are so black 
that even the modern mania for contradict ing the traditional 
has failed in this case to substi tute the dull gray of com-
promise. " Cruel ty to children : horrible, incredible, un-
paralleled even in the history of pagan slavery, and not 
exceptional such as in all social organisations must be 
expected as the occasional outbursts of corrupted na tu re ; 
but general normal a matter of business and calculation. 
All of which can be duly seen in the sober pages of Parlia-
mentary Reports, notably in the two celebrated Reports in 
1842 and 1843 of the Children's Employment Commission 
that aroused the tardy horror of England and Europe." 2 
Even under present conditions it may be contended that 
regula t ion 3 has not yet reached its rational limits whether 
as regards age or the conditions of employment,4 but the 
principle has been ful ty accepted by all parties. And it 
ought to be remembered that if the nineteenth century saw 
the climax of the evil, it was also the first century to apply 
the remedy. U p to tha t time the r ight to the labour of 
their children seemed a natural r ight of the parents. " At 
the lowest stage were the children who were paid six or 
seven francs a year, sometimes only two or three francs in 
the case of babies, who hardly earned their keep. Under 
the influence of la misere at the end of the four teenth 
1 See Effects of Machinery on Wages, p. 46. Mrs. Browning's Cry of 
the Children is perhaps the most pathetic lyric ever written, and it was 
once the most true. 
2 C. S. Devas, Political Economy (2d edition), p. 533. 
3 On the evils that prevail in the unregulated industries see Industrial 
Remuneration by D. F. Schloss (1898), p. 211, and Industrial Democracy, 
pp. 721, 722. ' 
4 Cf. Industrial Democracy, Vol. II. , p. 766. 
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and the beginning of the fifteenth centuries more and more 
were employed of these little beings whom toil lay hold 
on at incredibly early ages. In 1403, for example, a father 
hires out for nine years to a neighbouring farmer his little 
daughter aged four years." 1 The present sweating of 
children in domestic industries may in a sense be regarded 
as a mediaeval survival. 
§ 15. The Higher Forms of Labour. Space will not admit 
of the survey of the interest ing topic of the development 
of the rent of ability. If, however, we refer to the medi-
aeval records, we are struck by the comparatively small 
prices paid for the highest professional skill. Treasures of 
ar t which we regard as priceless were bought for sums that 
appear ridiculous. Even down to the end of the eighteenth 
cen tury the greatest writers failed to earn a fair compe-
tence. The gains of Pope were considered fabulous; but 
if he received £5000 for his translation of the Iliad, 
George Eliot received £10,000 for Romola. One of the 
greates t portrai t painters at the close of the eighteenth 
century, Raeburn, received for one of his pictures thir ty 
guineas, and the price of the frame was seven guineas. 
The incomes at present earned by successful lawyers, 
doctors, architects, writers, and professional men of all 
kinds are to a large extent ren t of ability, and the highest 
of their incomes are relatively small compared with the 
earnings of the most successful men of business. The 
merchant princes of mediaeval times were poor compared 
with their modern counterparts. In this case, however, 
the incomes af ter a certain point is reached can hardly be 
associated with a b i l i t y — t h e y depend rather on a complex-
ity of causes tha t may be regarded as examples of what 
Cournot calls the principle of fortuity. The annual earn-
ings of the most successful race horses are also higher than 
those of the most successful professional men. 
§ 1 6 . Progress and Real Wages. Another topic of great 
importance may be dismissed in a few words, for the suffi-
1 Vicomte D'Avenel, op. cit., Vol. III. , p. 26. 
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cient reason that it has been treated with great fulness by 
a mult i tude of enquirers,1 the progress, namely, of real 
wages. The works of Thorolcl Rogers and Vicomte 
D 'Avene l 2 again offer abundant materials. I t will be 
found that from this point of view progress has by no 
means been continuous, and the pecks of wheat have 
varied considerably. In making comparisons, however, of 
this kind, several precautions must be taken which are too 
often neglected. The whole trend of the argument in the 
preceding sections is to show tha t one of the principal 
characteristics of progress as regards wages is the increas-
ing differentiation. Accordingly, nothing could be more 
erroneous than to take the villein of the mediaeval period 
as typical of mediaeval labour, and the agricultural labourer 
as typical of modern labour. To begin with, the villein 
with a normal virgate was himself well up in the social 
sca le—benea th him were bordars, cottars, landless men, 
and slaves; and in modern industry the agricul tural la-
bourer as regards wages is very low down. Again, the con-
sti tuent elements of real wages must be considered. The 
mediaeval " b r e a d " was of many kinds, and the workers did 
not get the best. W h a t meat they got was either diseased 
(like the " b r a x y " still given to shepherds in Scotland) or 
intolerably salt. The houses were hovels, the light was 
firelight, the clothing was part ly leather and part ly the 
coarsest cloth, the drink was beer that would now be con-
sidered undrinkable. In a word, the "necessar ies" of life 
were all of a totally inferior quality, the margin for lux-
uries was small, and the real command of luxuries was 
still less. The nearest resemblance to a mediaeval village 
in external appearance is to be found at present in some 
of the most remote and congested districts of Ireland. 
There were no doubt compensations, but they were com-
1 See essay by the present writer on the Reality of Industrial Progress 
in Strikes and Social Problems, p. 70. 
2 See op. cit., Tome III., p. 173, for a brief summary of the history of 
wages in France from 1500 to 1897. 
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paratively small. The remarkable thing, however, about 
mediaeval society is tha t when the greater part of the 
people were sunk in what our working-classes would call 
misery, there was such a wealth of thought and such an 
intensi ty of spiritual life as to give countenance to the 
ancient idea tha t the growth of material wealth checks 
the manifestation of higher thought and feelings. 
One of the most popular works in the mediaeval period 
was Boethius on the Consolation of Philosophy. Here is 
the essence in Chaucer's translation : " Is it thanne so, that 
ye men ne han no proper good y-set in you, for which ye 
moten seken outward your goodes in foreine and subgit 
th ings? So is thanne the condicioun of thinges torned 
up-so-down, tha t a man, that is a devyne beest by merite of 
his resoun, th inke th that himself nis neither faire ne noble 
but-yif it be through possessioun of ostelments \i.e. house-
hold goods] that ne han no sowles." 1 
All the eloquence of John Ruskin cannot describe with 
greater vigour the " devyne bee s t " bowing down to " ostel-
ments that ne han no sowles." 
§ 17. J. S. Mill's Forecast of the Probable Future of the 
Labouring Classes. J . S. Mill's celebrated chapter on the 
Probable Fu tu re of the Labouring Classes is now only of 
interest as a str iking example of the dangers of prophecy 
in economics. " There can be li t t le doubt ," wrote Mill, 
" tha t the status of hired labourers will gradually tend to 
confine itself to the description of work-people whose low 
moral qualities render them unfit for anything more inde-
pendent , and tha t relations of masters and work-people 
will be gradually superseded by partnership in one of two 
forms; in some cases association of the labourer with the 
capital ist ; in others, and perhaps finally in all, association 
of labourers amongst themselves." 2 
In brief, profit sharing and productive cooperation were 
to displace the system of entrepreneur and hired labour. 
1 Skeat's Chaucer, Vol. II. , p. 39. 
2 Principles of Political Economy, Bk. IV., Ch. VII. , § 4. 
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Let the facts suffice for commentary on the theory. On 
the 30th of June, 1899, there were throughout the British 
Empire1 eighty-five businesses in which profit sharing was 
known to exist, and the number of persons employed in 
them was 51,829. A t the end of 1899 there were in the 
United Kingdom 1,802,518 members of trade unions,2 an 
increase in eight years of about 300,000, such increase 
being sixfold the total number of profit sharers in the 
Empire. 
The figures for cooperative production 8 are still more 
striking. In the Uni ted Kingdom in 1898 there were 
865 of such societies with a total membership of 30,104. 
The value of the goods produced was £10,200,598. For 
the same year the total number of persons employed 4 
in factories and workshops in the Uni ted Kingdom was 
3,807,024, and the aggregate value of the foreign t rade 
only was £764,392,571. 
In conclusion I may perhaps be allowed to quote from 
my essay on Profit Sharing writ ten in 1890.5 
" Compared with the great mass of industry conducted 
on the ordinary system of payment by wages, the amount 
of profit sharing is practically infinitesimal. . . . The 
greatest industr ial success achieved by labour in this 
century, judged by the ordinary standards of numbers, 
funds, results, is undoubtedly trade unionism. . . . Trade 
unionism has, in fact, been so successful that it has now 
reached the point of development at which the danger to 
be feared on the analogy of corresponding forms in indus-
trial history is the danger of excessive power." 
The most important result, however, of the application 
of the historical method is that general estimates of the 
fu ture are extremely hazardous. Even as regards the 
1 Abstract of Labour Returns for 1900, p. 104. 
2 Report on Trade Unions for 1889, p. xiii. 
8 Abstract of Labour Returns for 1900, p. 31. 
4 Ibid., p. 188. 
6 Republished in Strikes and Social Problems, p. 45. 
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much easier problem of the interpretation of the past, 
there are still great differences of opinion. The following 
passage from Vicomte D 'Avenel is so much opposed to 
present popular views as to demand careful consideration: 
" W e have seen tha t this poor law of supply and demand 
against which the civil and religious powers are so prej-
udiced, and which both expect to overcome by decrees 
and homilies, has governed en souverain from 1200 to the 
present day the rate of wages of the day labourer ( j our -
nalier), of all those pairs of arms that the English call 
unskilled, tha t is, wi thout any special capacity or know-
ledge. But , it may be objected, that these were easy-
going kinds of labour who did not know how to resist 
the current of things, and formed no associations nor 
brotherhoods (confrer ies ) . Well , it results from the fig-
ures collected by us that these corporations, more or less 
closed, with all the assembly of rules and privileges with 
which they had been invested, have exercised no influence 
on the price of labour neither in feudal times nor in later 
centuries. The skilled workers (ouvriers de metier) have 
in vain grouped and fixed themselves in their companies 
(tjurandes), they have undergone the same vicissitudes as 
the malleable poor men, isolated and disarmed before the 
movements of a rise and fall of wages, which were due to 
the scarcity or abundance of pairs of arms." 1 
The argument here refers to the determination of rela-
tive wages, but the writer also maintains that the aggregate 
effect of the corporations was injurious to the working-
classes, because on the whole they decreased the efficiency 
and productive power of labour. 
1 Op. cit., Vol. III. , p. 109. 
BOOK Y. 
T H E E C O N O M I C F U N C T I O N S 
G O V E R N M E N T . 

C H A P T E R I. 
ECONOMIC IDEALS. 
§ 1. Economic and Other Functions of Government dis-
tinguished. When we take a broad survey of the past 
and present social conditions of various nations, we dis-
cover immediately that the functions of government are so 
varied and complex as to elude any simple classification. 
We cannot even draw a sharp distinction between the 
necessary and the optional func t ions ; the necessaries of 
governments are as variable as the necessaries of individuals. 
Take, for example, the duty which is generally placed 
first — the protection, namely, of the State against foreign 
enemies. We may indeed say that logically the very ex-
istence of a sovereign State involves political independence, 
but in saying so we are only beginning the definition or 
analysis of sovereignty. History is ful l of examples of the 
sacrifice of political independence to other political objects, 
and States have submit ted under varying degrees of per-
suasion or compulsion to foreign enemies. And even tak-
ing existing conditions, who can lay down any practical 
rule by which governments may decide how much of their 
resources are to be devoted to defence ? Are the immense 
armies and armaments of the nations of Europe "necessa-
ries " ? Or at what point does the necessity of defence 
pass into the luxury of attack or the extravagance of dis-
play? How much of the expenditure on preparations for 
war is necessary and how much optional? This is the 
question in the concrete which the Czar invited all the 
wisdom of the nations to answer, and no answer was 
forthcoming. 
The provision of internal security — the protection of the 
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liberty and property of its sub j ec t s—may also be regarded 
as a primary function of government, but again there is a 
wide debatable land between the necessary and the op-
tional. Consider personal liberty — Is the State to protect 
the liberty of the individual against moral as well as phys-
ical coercion ? W h a t exactly constitutes moral coercion ? 
Is the State to aim at perfect toleration in religion and in 
the expression of opinion? The Roman Empire tolerated 
every kind of religion except primitive Chris t iani ty; the 
British Empire tolerates every kind of religion, except the 
sensualism and cruelties of paganism. The exceptions in 
each case depend on the political and moral ideas of the 
time. The Romans looked on Christianity as anarchis t ; 
we consider paganism indecent and inhuman. 
Consider the protection of property — even the defini-
tion of property is subject to endless variations, and the 
degree of protection considered requisite is still more vari-
able. W e have already seen tha t immaterial wealth — 
even in terms of money — is often of more value than 
material wealth. A new idea may produce more wealth 
than all the mines of Klondike — but property in creative 
ideas is generally either unrecognised or unattainable in 
spite of copyrights and patents. In the modern State the 
security of property rests on the security of contract, but 
every State actually restrains freedom of contract, and re-
fuses its sanction to agreements in different cases on vari-
ous grounds. I t is vain to say tha t the enforcement of 
contracts is a necessary function of the State when the 
positive laws relating to contracts reveal such wide dis-
crepancies as regards enforcement. 
In the same way through the whole range of govern-
mental functions the line of demarcation between the nec-
essary and the optional is equally variable and uncertain. 
And fur ther the determination of what are "necessary " 
functions and what the best modes of fulfilment, having 
regard to the circumstances of different times and places, 
does not depend on economic considerations alone. To 
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take a particular case, the hire of soldiers is one thing, 
their discipline another ; and, more generally, the provision 
of various public works and institutions, the adminis-
tration of justice, the extension of education, however 
necessary they may be deemed, are not therefore placed 
exclusively within the economist's sphere of influence; 
the quanti ty and quality, for example, of the justice or 
education provided by the State will depend only part ly 
on the market price of the services required or the money 
value of the services rendered. 
A n d when we pass to the optional funct ions of govern-
ment, the statesman may appeal still less to the economist. 
The government of every State is actually dominated by 
a complex growth of ideas, and the widest interpretation 
of the term " e c o n o m i c " will not embrace the whole of 
them, even in the most advanced community.1 How much 
of the actual positive law of England can be deduced 
from economic principles, and how much of its interna-
tional policy is determined by purely economic considera-
tions? The positive laws of England and the present 
policy of England still bear the impress of ancient reli-
gions and remote ideals of justice, and the impress also of 
the beginnings of new moral conceptions. I t is a mat ter 
of history that , in the development of the English people, 
ideals of justice and of religion have exercised great influ-
ence, just as also have commercial, mercantile, and eco-
nomic customs and theories. A n d it is not necessary to 
a t tempt an accurate and adequate presentment of these 
different influences before admit t ing their reality. The 
1 Cf. Dr. Bonar's " O l d Lights and New in Economic Study," Eco-
nomic Journal, December, 1898 — an excellent criticism of the ultra-
economic interpretation of history. " Marx and Loria allow that the 
automatic establishment of better conditions of life is slow and irregular. 
They say that the laws of all civilised countries are obsolete and yet per-
sist in being. Surely, then, we might argue that there is a strong force 
acting against these economic causes" (p. 446). " W e a l t h is rather the 
controlled than the controlling element in a healthy national polity " 
(p. 451). See also above, Book IV., Ch. II., § 1. 
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real is not l imited by our powers of expression or compre-
hension. Many changes in our civilisation have been ef-
fected by an appeal to justice and many by an appeal to 
Christianity. I t is t rue tha t the ideas of justice and of 
Christ ianity — considered as political forces — have varied 
from generation to generation just as at the present day 
they vary from nation to nation and from class to class; 
but it would be absurd to deny the reality of these forces 
on the cheap pretence tha t the words do not always convey 
to all minds precisely the same meaning. 
And in the same way economic principles play their part 
in moulding laws and policj', a l though from generation to 
generation and from place to place they vary in form and 
substance. 
On the view taken in this treatise the production, dis-
tribution, and exchange of wealth — the three great de-
partments of economic investigation — depend upon a 
great variety of factors, and every one of these factors is 
more or less subject to modification by the general and 
special influence of government. To at tempt to summa-
rise under one heading or to bring under one principle these 
various modes of action seems a false procedure if we are 
dealing with positive facts, and illusory if we are set t ing 
up an ideal. A brief examination of the opposing princi-
ples of what may be termed "min imum in ter fe rence" and 
" m a x i m u m utili ty " will, I think, justify the position here 
laid down. 
§ 2. The Principle of Natural Liberty, Laisser-Faire, or 
"Minimum Interference." The popular blunders regard-
ing the system of natural liberty are as numerous as the 
crimes committed in its name. No account of the system 
ought to pass over Adam Smith, and yet the broadest sur-
vey of Adam Smith is sufficient to prove that he did not 
set up the system of minimum interference even as an eco-
nomic ideal, and still less as the most general political ideal.1 
1 The following quotation from the Preface to the last revised edition 
(1790) of the Theory of Moral Sentiments (first published 1759), shows 
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At the very outset of his preliminary presentment 1 of the 
"obvious and simple system of natural l iber ty" he intro-
duces a most important qualifying clause. Every man 
is, indeed, on this system left perfectly free to pursue his 
own interest in his own way, but — mark the qualification 
— only " a s long as he does not violate the laws of justice." 
Thus the freedom of competition of the industry and capi-
tal of individuals is always subject to the limitations of 
these avowedly higher laws of natural justice. And again, 
according to the system of natural liberty, the sovereign 
h a s — i t is true — oyily three duties to at tend to, but they 
are duties of the greatest importance, viz., protection 
against other States, the protection of every member of 
the society from the injustice or oppression of every other 
member of it, and, finalljr, the duty of erecting and main-
taining certain public works and institutions which it can 
never be the interest of any individual or small number of 
individuals to erect and maintain. Thus, according to the 
actual teaching of Adam Smith, if competition leads to in-
justice or oppression, the State ought to intervene, and if 
the breadth of view of Adam Smith, and that the Wealth of Nations was 
not designed simply to advocate laisser-faire. 
" In the last paragraph of the First Edition of the present work I said 
that I should, in another discourse, endeavour to give an account of the 
general principles of law and government, and of the different revolutions 
which they had undergone in the different ages and periods of society, 
not only in what concerns justice, but in what concerns police, revenue, 
and arms, and whatever else is the object of law. In the Enquiry concern-
ing the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations I have partly exe-
cuted this promise at least so far as concerns police, revenue, and arms. 
AVhat remains, the theory of jurisprudence, I have hitherto been hindered 
from executing by the same occupations which have till now prevented 
me from revising the present work. Though my very advanced age 
leaves me very little expectation of ever being able to execute this great 
work to my own satisfaction, yet as I have not altogether abandoned the 
design, and as I wish still to continue under the obligation of doing what 
I can, I have allowed this paragraph to remain as it was published more 
than thirty years ago, when I entertained no doubt of being able to exe-
cute everything which it announced." He died the same year. 
1 Wealth of Nations, Book IV., Ch. IX. 
1 8 0 ECONOMIC. FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT. 
self-interest is inadequate to provide various institutions 
for the satisfaction of social needs, the State ought to pro-
vide for their erection and maintenance. I t would be im-
possible to state more precisely the general position that 
the State may be called on to interfere—on various grounds 
— with the liberty of individuals in the production and 
distribution of weal th; and it would be easy to show by 
particular references that Adam Smith was himself pre-
pared to advocate such interference in many cases, and 
that in the natural course of progress this list of cases for 
interference has been largely extended. Professor Sidg-
wick is only put t ing Adam Smith's argument in modern 
form when he shows that even in a society composed solely 
of " economic men " the system of natural liberty in certain 
respects and under certain conditions would have no ten-
dency to realise the beneficent results claimed for it. And 
when we consider in how many ways human nature differs 
from this hypothetical economic abstraction,1 and further 
take into account the various causes of friction in produc-
tion and distribution, and the imperfections generally of 
the mechanism of exchange, the prima facie case for gov-
ernmental interference, or rather deliberation, is still fur-
ther strengthened. Thus all that seems to be left of the 
system of natural liberty, considered as the most general 
rule of political action, is simply the presumption that the 
burden of proof lies on those who advocate State interfer-
ence or control. We are not entitled to say that minimum 
interference is an ideal, and that every restriction abolished 
is a step nearer this ideal. 
And even this presumption in favour of natural liberty 
may be theoretically at tenuated into the barren statement 
that the State ought not to interfere except in case of 
need, and then we have only to show that the cases of 
need are in the majority to turn the presumption in favour 
of interference and to arrive logically at some form of 
socialism. 
1 Of. Pantaleoni, Pure Economics, passim. 
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On Adam Smith's view, however, such an inversion of 
natural liberty was impossible 011 two general grounds, 
one positive, the other negative. In the first place, he 
maintained that in general natural justice was promoted 
by natural liberty, and the successors of Adam Smith only 
differ from him in the breadth of the meaning to be given 
to these doubtful expressions.1 They believe, with him, 
that the cases of need for interference, according to the 
ideas of justice prevailing alike in the practice and in the 
philosophy of modern States, are exceptional, and that 
the positive law of the most advanced communities rarely 
(i.e., in comparison) interferes except to punish the vio-
lation of good faith. And, as Sir Henry Maine well 
observed, the very character of modern frauds —- which 
at first from their novelty seem proof of retrogression — 
shows clearly that the moral obligations, of which they 
are the breach, must have been more than proportionately ' 
developed. It is the confidence reposed and deserved by 
the many which affords facilities for the bad faith of the 
few.2 
And secondly, Adam Smith showed by a wide historical 
survey that even the theoretically beneficial action of gov-
ernments is subject to practical limitations imposed by 
want of wisdom or want of power or want of money, and 
the history recorded since Adam Smith's time affords 
abundant illustration of these three great wants. 
The examination, however, more in detail of the benefits 
and failures of freedom on the one hand, and on the other 
of the limitations on the remedial and supplementary ac-
tions of governments, will be taken up in the following 
chapters. 
I propose now to consider how far the system of maxi-
mum utility can be held to be the foundation of all the 
media axiomata of economic action, or to constitute the 
ideal of economic conduct. 
1 Cf. Bosanquet's Philosophical Theory of the State, Chap. VI. 
2 Ancient Law, p. 307. 
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§ 3. The Principle of Maximum Utility. The system 
of maximum utility must be stated in the first place so as 
to bring out its essential characteristics, and for the pres-
ent the very important practical qualifications with which 
it is presented by its ablest exponent 1 may be omitted. 
The economic principle is a deduction from, or a part of, 
the general system of utilitarianism. On this view the 
art of political economy has for its object, briefly stated, 
the at tainment of the maximum utility of which the so-
ciety is capable by means of wealth. Accordingly, the 
government may advantageously interfere with the free-
dom of individuals in production if it can thereby increase 
the aggregate of wealth or make the proportion of produce 
to population a maximum, and it may interfere with their 
freedom in distribution if thereby the apportionment of 
wealth secures on the whole a greater amount of utility 
* to the members of the society. 
If we were entitled to assume that all injustice involves 
disutility, and that perfect justice is that which secures 
maximum utility, the difference between this system and 
that of natural liberty would appear to be only formal, 
for the practical object of the system of natural liberty is 
also to secure justice, partly by allowing freedom and 
partly by recourse to law and government. 
And especially as regards the erection and maintenance 
of public works and institutions, it may be thought that 
the only test of justice or advantage is the consequent 
utility compared with the expense (or other disutility) 
directly or indirectly involved. But when we pass from 
indefinite generalities to particular applications, this iden-
tification of the two systems cannot be accepted. The 
prima facie ground, says Professor Sidgwick,2 on which 
the interference of government with the distribution of 
produce that results from the individualistic organisation 
of industry appears economically desirable is the great and 
1 Cf. Sidgwick's Principles of Political Economy, Book III. 
2 Op. cit., p. 518. 
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ever increasing inequalities in income to which this organi-
sation leads. The common sense of mankind, he asserts, 
holds these inequalities to be objectionable; implicitly 
adopting, as he conceives, a certain view of the relation of 
wealth to happiness which is stated explicitly in two 
propositions laid down by Bentham. Before requoting 
these two propositions we may pause at the assertion 
regarding inequalities. In the first place, it is extremely 
doubtful, as a matter of fact, whether the individualistic 
organisation can be said to lead to ever increasing in-
equalities in income.1 How are the inequalities to be 
measured? Are we to take an average of all incomes, 
and to say that the two extremes of poverty and affluence 
in certain cases go farther and far ther away, that the rich 
become richer and the poor poorer? Or are we to suppose 
that the submerged tenth are lower beneath the surface, 
and the upraised millionth, like active volcanoes, make 
their displays at a greater he ight? Still it may happen 
that the nine-tenths, the mass of the people, are grouped 
nearer the average, — the sea level of the favourite eco-
nomic metaphor. 
Even, however, if it is granted that individualism 
causes a considerable and an increasing inequali ty in 
the incomes of members of the society, it i s .no t so easy 
to assent to the assertion that the common sense of man-
kind holds such inequalities to be objectionable.2 The 
1 Cf. Leroy-Beaulieu, Repartition des Richesses, and Pareto, Cours 
d'Economic politique, Vol. II . , Bk. III . , Ch. III. , p. 318. 
2 Cf. Bentham's "Essay on the Levelling System," Works, Vol. I., 
p. 361. 
" The love, the passion, for equality has its root, not in virtue, but in 
vice, not in benevolence, but in malevolence. . . . The passion for 
equality has no root in the benevolent affections ; its root is either simply 
in the selfish affections or in the selfish combined with the malevolent. . . . 
The lover of equality in its most refined form is the man to whose eyes the 
spectacle of another's prosperity is intolerable. What, then, is this so 
much boasted passion for equality ? It is a propensity which begins in 
vice and leads to ruin. In the scale of merit it is as much below selfishness 
as selfishness is below the virtue of benevolence." 
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"common sense of m a n k i n d " is a very respectable but 
very empty expression; it is of the tribe of innate ideas 
which John Locke killed and buried. If for the vague 
appeal to the common sense of mankind we substi tute 
the opinion of twelve, or twelve thousand, ordinary men 
taken at random, their opinion would, in all probability, 
not be favourable to equality of income as an ideal, and 
certainly not favourable to pu t t ing their own incomes into 
hotchpot and dividing the aggregate. Equali ty before the 
law, for example, as regards the enjoyment of personal 
l iberty or the punishment of crimes, has obtained recog-
nition with difficulty in the most advanced nations ; but 
even the most enthusiastic Christians and philosophers 
rarely aim at the actual fur therance of equali ty of in-
comes, and still less is equalisation of incomes an active 
principle in any modern State. 
W e may now examine the two propositions of Bentham 
on which the alleged objection of the common sense of 
mankind to inequality of incomes is supposed to rest. 
These propositions are (1 ) that an increase of wealth is, 
speaking broadly and generally, productive of an increase 
of happiness to its possessor; and (2 ) that the resulting 
increase of happiness is not simply proportional to the 
increase of wealth, but stands in a continually decreasing 
ratio to it. 
The first of these propositions may easily be reduced 
to a truism by those who identify util i ty with happiness. 
The essential characteristic of all wealth is to possess util-
ity, and the meaning of util i ty is the capacity to satisfy 
desire, and if the satisfaction of desire constitutes happi-
ness, the increase of wealth means an increase of happiness. 
I t may, at any rate, be admitted that most people prac-
tically act as if they regarded the acquisition of wealth 
as affording an increase of happiness and the loss of it 
as a source of pain. 
The second proposition is simply a s tatement of the law 
of diminishing ut i l i ty which has already been so fully 
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i l lustrated; a shilling to the man tha t is fast ing would 
mean more happiness than to the man tha t is ful l . 
The conclusion that is drawn from these innocent propo-
sitions is said to be obvious. " From the two proposi-
tions taken together the obvious conclusion is, tha t the 
more any society approximates to equality in the distri-
bution of wealth amongst its members, the greater, on the 
whole, is the aggregate of satisfaction which the society in 
question derives from the wealth that it possesses." 1 
If the wealth of the society were equally distributed 
amongst the members, and if they were all assumed equally 
capable of deriving satisfaction from it, this equal distri-
bution amongst those equalty sensitive and equally sen-
sible people might make the util i ty of the wealth a 
maximum. But between this ideal and the real there 
is a great gulf fixed. A n d until human nature has become 
so reasonable, tha t every one looks on himself as a uni t like 
other units, and regards the happiness of any two as greater 
than that of any one, even if tha t one is himself, the volun-
tary adoption of equality of distribution is impossible. 
I t may, however, be replied that a democratic govern-
ment is not a personal tyrant , but the embodiment of the 
will of the people, and it ought to use its power to correct 
the inequalities that spring from the selfishness of individ-
uals, and that the State at any rate ought to look to the 
maximum happiness of the whole society. A n d this in-
deed is the reply of those who advocate communism or 
socialism. But this simple solution fails even on utilita-
rian grounds. If the food and other produce to be distrib-
uted fell like manna from heaven, equali ty or inequality 
of distribution would not affect the supply of the food or 
of the mouths to eat it. I t is not so, however, with eco-
nomic utilities. Economic utilities are in general the re-
sult of labour and sacrifice, and in their case equality of 
distribution would, as Professor Sidgwick shows, at the 
same time diminish the dividend and increase the divisor, 
1 Op. cit., p. 519. 
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and in the end the diminished quotient might give less than 
the aggregate happiness ensured by the present system. 
Reflection, he says, shows tha t the inference drawn 
from the two Benthamite propositions is only legitimate 
under certain conditions, viz., " tha t the total amount of 
produce to be divided, and the number of persons among 
whom it is to be divided, remains unaffected by the 
change in distr ibution." A n d a fu r the r qualification is 
added to the effect tha t the change has no tendency to 
diminish the happiness of the community so far as it is 
derived from other sources than the increase of wealth, such, 
for example, as " cul ture ," and the virtues which are fostered 
by the strivings of individuals under unequal conditions. 
In conclusion the opinion may be hazarded that no sys-
tem of ethical philosophy ever propounded lends itself so 
readily to casuistry as utili tarianism. All the virtues can 
be caught in its net, so large is its sweep, and every one of 
them can escape again, so wide are its meshes. Every 
virtue, on the whole, promotes happiness; but there are 
exceptions to every virtue, which if reasonably calculated 
according to the Hedonist ic calculus, will give a little 
more happiness. Thus t ru th produces happiness, but t ru th 
properly economised produces a li t t le more happiness, 
and in these days of marginal increments the little more is 
of ten the decisive consideration.1 
1 The casuistry of utilitarianism may be illustrated indefinitely from 
the works of Bentham. Take, for example, his treatment of Marriage 
and Divorce, Works, Vol. I., p. 349 sq. 
" T h e reign of liberty produces less wandering fancies than that of 
conjugal captivity. Render marriages dissoluble, there will be more ap-
parent, but there will be fewer real, separations." 
" To believe in the perfection of the beloved object, to believe in the 
eternity of the passion which is felt, and which is inspired, such are the 
illusions which may be produced to two children in the blindness of love. 
But aged lawyers, legislators, whose heads are whitened by years, ought 
not to give place to this chimera." 
" Upon whom shall the choice of a husband or a wife depend ? The 
laws ought never to intrust the power to the parents. The manner in 
which parents see and feel is not the same. Love is the moving principle 
of youth ; the old scarcely feel i t . " 
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§ 4. The Christian Principle in Relation to Liberty and 
Utility. A t different times the economic principles just 
examined have been controlled or set aside by moral or 
religious ideas. To take one most important and interest-
ing case, throughout the Middle Ages there was a contin-
uous endeavour to make economic activities conform to, or 
rather make way for, the great ideas of Christianity. The 
pure and austere idea of the Franciscans forms a s tr iking 
contrast with the economic principles which prevail at the 
present time. Material luxuries were scorned; sloth was 
a sin, and labour a duty — not for the material results, bu t 
for the spiritual discipline; property was limited to the 
passing use of necessaries ; humili ty and renunciation occu-
pied the place of self-interest. Between the pure theory of 
Christianity as thus conceived, and individualism, a recon-
ciliation seems possible if self-realisation is found in the 
voluntary imitation of Christ "whose service is perfect 
f r e e d o m " ; 1 but no reconciliation seems possible with a 
system which asserts that increase of wealth involves in-
crease of happiness, unless a wider interpretat ion is given 
both to Christianity and to wealth. Such an interpretation 
is suggested in the last chapter of the present book; it 
can, however, lay no claim to general acceptance and the 
more austere view still prevails to a large extent . In our 
own times we find socialism strongly condemned by the 
Catholic Church on the very grounds on which it is ap-
The table of alliances to be prohibited with the inconveniences noted 
is full of curiosities. We find, for example, marriage with the mother-in-
law forbidden, the only reason given being Inconvenience (I) . On refer-
ence this proves to be " Evil of Sivah~y. Danger resulting from a real or 
suspected rivalry between a bridegroom and certain persons of the num-
ber of his relations or connexions." 
1 Cf. Thomas a Kempis : " An eternal man prefers the care of himself 
before all other cares. Where art thou when thou art not present to thy-
self ? Or when thou hast risen over all things, what profit will it be to 
thee if thou hast neglected thyself ? If thou desirest to have peace and 
true vision, thou must set all the rest aside and turn thy eyes upon thy_ 
self alone. Thou wilt then note great progress if thou keep thyself free 
from all temporal care." — Imi tat ion of Christ, Book II., Ch. V. 
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proved by the system of util i ty ; in the words of Leo X I I I . 
in his Encyclical against the socialists: " The desire of 
present good is the root of all evil, and the Church ac-
knowledges that the inequality amongst men which is seen 
in the natural distribution of mental and bodily gif ts exists 
also in the possession of property, and she enjoins the in-
violability of the r ight of property and ownership." 1 
1 For the modern treatment of economics from the Christian (Catholic) 
standpoint, see Political Economy, by C. S. Devas — one of the manuals 
of Catholic Philosophy (Stonyhurst Series). This work is interesting, 
both by way of contrast and supplement to that of the orthodox English 
school. Throughout, two principles are held f a s t : (1) " T h e family is 
the prerequisite of production, the ordinary unit of enjoyment, the foun-
dation of national welfare and greatness, the principal source, in the 
natural order, both of virtues and happiness" (p. 100). 
(2) " I n every State the lawful authority, called the Government, or 
Civil Power, has, like parental authority, all its rights from God " (p. 470). 
The motto of the book is : "F in i s autem ultimus ceconomicse est totum 
bene vivere secundum domesticam conversationem." 
The relations of Christian doctrines to economics, both from the his-
torical and the practical side, have been admirably treated by Dr. W. 
Cunningham: see especially " Use and Abuse of Money'''; " Usury" ; 
" Economics and Politics "; " Modern Civilisation in its Economic 
Aspects." Compare the last chapter in the present book. 
C H A P T E R I I . 
BENEFITS OF INDIVIDUALISM. 
§ 1. Relation of Present Subject to General Argument. 
As is shown in the last chapter, there no simple test of 
advantage and disadvantage, or benefit and injury, by which 
it can be decided whether individual freedom or State con-
trol is preferable. I t is difficult to strike the balance in 
any particular case of profit and loss, and the indirect and 
obscure effects of interference (or non-interference) are 
often of more consequence than those which are direct and 
obvious. 
A t the same time, however, the government of any 
civilised State would be rendered impossible if the only 
recognised rule of action were tha t every case must be 
decided on its own merits. On the contrary, every case 
ought to be regarded as a possible precedent for all cases 
essentially similar, whether in the direction of fu r ther 
freedom or closer restraint. The idea tha t particular 
abuses can be remedied or particular advantages conferred 
by the State, without reference to general principles, sim-
ply involves the substitution of the prejudices and impres-
sions of the moment for the deliberate recognition of 
general principles of public policy. And it does not fol-
low that because all these principles cannot be deduced 
from one great first principle — whether liberty, utility, or 
religion — they are therefore to be held of no account. 
Even in the physical sciences such a comprehensive gen-
eralisation of particular inductions has hi therto proved 
impossible. The ul t imate laws of matter and motion may 
perhaps not be even intelligible to human reason, but this 
recognition of final ignorance throws no doubt on the 
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predictions or records of astronomy or geology. And in 
the same way, al though the final principles of government 
are still a mat ter of dispute, and al though it is possible 
that the human race may be under the sway of ultimate 
principles tha t are not even intelligible to the particular 
reason (according to the fundamental assumption of many 
systems of theology and philosophy),1 there are media axi-
omata of government , as of phj'sics, and there are empiri-
cal laws in politics and economics as well founded as the 
empirical laws of the physical sciences. 
In the present chapter I propose to examine only the 
advantages and benefits of individualism. Al though inci-
dentally, for the l ight of contrast, occasional references 
may be made to the opposite, for the purpose of scientific 
analysis it is found convenient to defer the consideration 
of the evils and disadvantages to the next chapter. The 
t reatment of the evils of non-interference will then nat-
urally lead up to the consideration of the benefits and 
methods, the limitations and the disadvantages, of govern-
mental action. Finally, since all government in general 
involves "expense ," and expense involves revenue, it will 
be necessary to examine the principles of Public Finance, 
including Taxat ion and Expendi ture . 
In considering the benefits of individualism, I shall take 
in oi'der the leading principles of Consumption, Produc-
tion ( including Exchange) , and Distribution. 
§ 2. Benefits of Freedom as regards Consumption and 
Demand. Consumption is the final cause of production, 
and the wants of consumers are indicated by demand. 
Men and women, as well as children, may demand what 
they like or what they are told by their superiors they 
ought to like. 
In considering the benefits of leaving their choice unfet-
tered we may, first of all, refer back to the general princi-
ples of uti l i ty or the satisfaction of wants. Both as regards 
their material wants and as regards the means of satisfac-
1 Compare the Introduction to Book I. § 4. 
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tion, people are confronted with endless varieties of choice ; 
and, on the whole, in modern industrial societies, it is now 
recognised that consumers are the best judges of what they 
require and of the things that will satisfy their require-
ments. I t must always be remembered that all incomes are 
limited, and that the vast majority relatively to the large 
choice of expenditure are extremely narrow. The poor-
est may spend the whole of their incomes upon " necessa-
ries," but even as regards necessaries there is relatively a 
considerable choice. In any case, however, the limitation 
of incomes means that expenditure in one direction leaves 
less to spend in others. Thus , if people find a certain mode 
of expenditure unsatisfactory, they will try something else, 
and the final results of these experiments will be the 
maximum satisfaction under the circumstances. The con-
sumers may, of course, make mistakes. 1 They may choose 
pleasures that do not answer to Bentham's, or even to less 
exacting, requirements, and they may fail to realise the 
pleasures which they choose. But the general rule of 
individualism is to allow freedom of choice to the consu-
mer of all forms of material wealth, and the general result 
is held to be beneficial to society at large. Give two boys 
a shilling each to spend, more happiness will ensue if each 
chooses for himself and not each for the other. T h a t is 
the germ of laisser-faire in consumption. 
The presumption in favour of this rule is supported by 
an appeal to history.2 In progressive societies the eman-
cipation of the consumer of material wealth had been 
effected whilst the producers and traders were still in fet-
ters ; and the freedom of production and of trade was 
largely consequent on the extension of freedom of con-
sumption and demand. 
History also shows on the reverse side that when castes, 
customs, and laws succeed in imposing uniformity and 
rigidity on the choice of consumers, they succeed also in 
checking material progress. I t has long been recognised 
1 See next chapter. 2 See above, Book IV. 
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tha t the first step toward the civilisation of undeveloped 
nations is the creation of new wants and desires; the sub-
st i tut ion of an effective freedom of choice for a blind 
adherence to habit or custom. There is the less need to 
labour the argument , as this part of individualism seems to 
be generally approved (exceptis excipiendis) by economists 
who in other respects advocate some form of socialism or 
collectivism, at any rate as a regulat ive idea. The authors 
of Industrial Democracy, for example, state explicitly, 
" To obtain for the community the maximum satisfaction 
i t is essential tha t the needs and desires of consumers 
should be the main factor in determining' the commodities 
and services to be produced." 1 And again, in defending 
their Common Rule ( the new name for the minimum 
standard of comfort) , they say : " I t would in no way pre-
vent competition between trades or lessen its intensity. 
The consumer would be free to select whatever produce 
he preferred, whether it was made by men or women, by 
hand or by machinery, by his own countrymen or by for-
eigners." Even pronounced state socialists would appar-
ently leave the demand of consumers free as the general 
rule, the business of government being to guide production 
according to the statistics of consumption. 2 
The ready acceptance of the rule of freedom of material 
consumption at the present time is part ly due to the recog-
nition of the fact that , with a few comparatively unim-
por tant exceptions, no government can enforce sumptuary 
laws, and partly to the wide acceptance of the theory of 
evolution in so far as it asserts the tendency to variation 
to be a necessary condition of progress. 
Similar reasoning applies in the case of immaterial 
wealth, though here in most cases the recognition of free-
dom has been much more tardy and in most countries is 
less complete. Still, in modern industrial societies the 
general rule is, as regards education, religion, and amuse-
1 Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Vol. II., p. 818. 
2 Cf. Schaffle, Quintessence of Socialism (translation), p. 42. 
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ments, that those who are supposed to have the capacity 
are allowed freedom of choice. In Britain a certain 
amount of elementary education is compulsory upon chil-
dren, but the principal argument in support of the compul-
sion rests, as in similar regulations restricting the freedom 
of consumers, upon their incapacity or that of their parents 
to make a reasonable choice. Wi th this exception the 
people of this country are free to remain as ignorant as 
they please, even of the elements of religion. In the 
United Kingdom, although the State provides or assists in 
providing schools, the children or their parents are free to 
obtain the necessary education elsewhere; and beyond lay-
ing down the official requirements as regards attendance, 
standards, and age, the State makes no fu r the r interference. 
The principal practical difficulty at present is with refer-
ence to the pecuniary aid to be afforded to voluntary 
schools. 
The State still, however, interferes directly or indirectly 
as regards the education of the professional classes. The 
candidates, for example, for the medical profession are not 
allowed to demand the quant i ty and quality of education 
which they (or their natural advisers) think best. If a 
man wishes to practise as a doctor, he must obtain a quali-
fication, and this qualification involves a specified kind 
of education. The theoretical justification for medical 
licenses is again the assumption that the consumer is not 
fitted to judge, and a legal qualification is a kind of guar, 
antee of the goodness of the services. Adam Smith,1 
indeed, strongly advocated perfect freedom of t rade in 
medicine and the abolition of licenses, but his opinion 
was no doubt coloured by the abuses of his time. I t is 
certainly at present the reverse of the t ru th to say that " a 
degree can pretend to give security for nothing but the 
/science of the graduate, and even for that it can give but 
a very slender security ; . . . and that a degree always has 
1 See Letter to Dr. Cullen. Appendix to McCulloch's edition, note 
xxii., p. 583. 
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been and always must be a mere piece of quackery, in spite 
of all the regulations tha t can be made." 
A t the same time, however, it must be admitted that as 
regards the provision of medical science, there has been, as 
in other industries, a great extension of freedom of demand, 
and the demands of the consumers practically govern the 
production of prescriptions. On the whole, the public 
judges by practical success, and the competition of medical 
schools is so severe tha t the teachers must provide the 
kind of education that leads to the most successful results 
or best satisfies the public demand. 
The restraints upon entrance to the various branches of 
the legal profession, though originating in monopoly, are 
now defended in the interests of the public. The univer-
sities and law schools provide a general training and a 
preliminary professional t raining tha t tend to raise the 
s tandard of the profession, and the consumers of legal 
advice also have a kind of guarantee for its respectability. 
From the point of view of the public what is most re-
quired, next to the puri ty and efficiency of justice, is speedy 
administrat ion. The law's delay is still proverbial; though, 
in this country, there is 110 question as to the puri ty or ef-
ficiency of the interpretation. One of the principal eco-
nomic justifications of restraints on the legal profession is 
tha t certain forms and technical modes of procedure are 
necessary to save the time of the courts. Probably the 
greatest improvements in the administration of law in this 
country would be found in giving to a greater extent con-
scious effect to this principle. 
As matters stand, the time of the courts is often dis-
t r ibuted according to the amount of money there is to be 
spent on the case; and in this respect the consumers are 
not the best judges of their own interests, and still less of 
the interests of the public. In this case the freedom of a 
few limits the freedom of many. 
On the whole, however, taking a broad survey, the 
administration of justice has followed the laws of general 
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industrial progress in being brought more and more under 
the influence of freedom of demand. And if the law does 
not satisfy the demand, people make tribunals and courts 
of arbitration of their own, —munic ip ia in municipio. The 
great business of the law is to guarantee freedom, to 
enforce contracts, and to provide for the liberties of the 
subject and the security of p roper ty ; and the law of pro-
gressive societies has been adapted to meet these require-
ments. The greatest security to the individual is afforded 
by the separation in the State of the judicial from the 
executive power. The general argument of Adam Smith 
may be pointed and modernised by reference to the Drey-
fus case. " When the judicial is uni ted to the executive 
power it is scarce possible that justice should not fre-
queritly be sacrificed to what is vulgarly called politics. 
The persons intrusted with the great interests of the State 
may, even without any corrupt views, sometimes imagine 
it necessary to sacrifice to those interests the rights of a 
private man. Bu t upon the impartial administration of 
justice depends the liberty of every individual, the sense 
which he has of his own security. In order to make every 
individual feel himself perfectly secure in the possession 
of every right which belongs to him, it is not only neces-
sary that the judicial should be separated from the execu-
tive power, but that it should be rendered as much as 
possible independent of tha t power." The demand for 
justice is also the demand for liberty. 
Of all the branches of progress, however, in the provi-
sion of the forms of immaterial wealth, the progress in 
religious liberty is the most remarkable. In Britain itself 
the large toleration at present prevailing has only been 
obtained by a long series of constitutional struggles. The 
benefits of religious liberty can only be measured and 
realised by reference to history,1 and realisation by his-
tory requires, unfortunately, not only the labour of read-
ing, but a certain effort of imagination. W e are apt to 
1 Cf. passim, the works of Hallam, Erskine May, Lecky. 
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consider religious persecution as simply barbarous, forget-
fu l of the fact that some of the most glorious periods in 
our annals pushed intolerance to torture and death. The 
horrors perpetrated in the name of Christianity in this 
land of freedom are, by the very contrast, the most sicken-
ing of all the cruelties ever inflicted by man on man. Even 
in the reign of Queen Elizabeth and the lifetime of Shake-
speare " Englishmen were liable to be burnt for what 
perhaps they did not unders tand to be heresy, till the 
ecclesiastical judge so interpreted the words of the canon-
ical scripture." 1 Under such an interpretat ion of Scrip-
ture by the Bishop of Norwich of the day, five anabaptists 
were subjected to the wri t de heretico comburendo and 
burn t accordingly.2 The execution of some two hun-
dred papists was justified by converting their religion 
into high treason, though not legally shown by any overt 
act. The record of the burnings of heretics, however, 
Catholic and Protes tant , seems to us — through f requent 
repetition — stale and unprofi table; a less notorious in-
stance of intolerance is afforded by the t rea tment of the 
Book of Common Prayer . In the reign of Elizabeth " a n y 
person whatever who in plays, songs, or other open words 
speaks anything in derogation of the said book," was liable 
to heavy fines for two offences, and for the third to im-
prisonment for life. Dur ing the Commonwealth, in the 
lifetime of Milton, when Pur i tanism had its day of power 
in England, any person who used the Book of Common 
Prayer, not only in a place of public worship, but even in 
any private family, was liable on the third offence to a 
year's imprisonment.3 
I t may be interesting to non-churchgoing people to be 
reminded tha t the s ta tutes imposing penalties on the 
" total irreligion " thereby displayed were only repealed 
1 Blackstone, Book IV., Ch. 4. The whole of this chapter gives an 
excellent historical account of the offences against God and religion. 
2 Hallam, Constitutional History, Vol. II., p. 20 (note). 
3 Ordinance of August. 1054. 
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in the reign of Victoria.1 In the time of Elizabeth non-
attendance at church was for an occasional Sunday very 
cheap, being only one shilling to be given to the poor; a 
month, however, of such relaxation involved a fine of 
to the crown. I t may be said that s tatutes of this kind 
had long become obsolete, and tha t the abolition was only 
formal. Bu t many statutes involving very serious disa-
bilities were enforced dur ing the reign of Victoria against 
those who did not conform to the Church of England. I t 
was not till 1871 tha t the offices and degrees of the English 
universities were opened without theological restriction.2 
I t is worth noting that England has been much behind 
some other nations in the ful l concession of political r ights 
to non-conformists.3 The United States led the way by 
declaring in one of the articles of the Consti tution that 
" no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification 
to any office or public t rus t under the Uni ted States." 
The tardiness of England is part ly explained by the large 
comprehensiveness of the Established Church on matters 
of doctrine, and part ly by its great political influence. 
I t may perhaps be thought tha t the economic concep-
tion of freedom of demand is as much out of place in the 
spiritual heaven of theologians as in the material heaven 
of astronomers, — that we might as well speak of a demand 
for comets or small planets as of a demand for religious 
creeds and confessions. There is, however, undoubtedly 
an economic side to all religion, as Adam Smith showed in 
one of the most vigorous chapters of the Wealth of Nations 4 
and as is shown by every religious persuasion at the pres-
ent time f rom the Salvation Army up to the highest 
developments — the particularisation of which would be 
invidious. A demand for any kind of religious services 
1 1844 and 1846. 
2 In 1869 Henry Sidgwick resigned his Fellowship in Trinity College, 
Cambridge, as a protest against the religious tests then in force. 
3 Lecky, Democracy and Liberty, Vol. I., p. 427. 
* Book V., Ch. I., Ft . 3. See above Book I., Ch. II. , § 3, p. 42. 
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must be an effectual demand, or the supply will not be 
forthcoming. I t is no doubt t rue tha t in the past great re-
ligious orders have been inst i tuted under vows of poverty, 
and the founders, and those who imitated their example in 
their lives and conduct, were guided by spiritual and not 
by economic considerations. Bu t as these orders decayed 
in spiri tual austeri ty they grew in economic power, and as 
they relaxed their rules they extended their wealth. The 
Church established a gigantic religious monopoly on an 
economic basis. This monopoly of religion by the Roman 
Catholic Church, like other great mediaeval monopolies 
of t rade and feudalism, broke down because it ceased 
to consider the interests of the great body of con-
sumers.1 
J u s t as a monopoly of religion is apt to engender intol-
1 I am much indebted for the following critical note to Mr. C. S. Devas: 
" It seems to me that Adam Smith, in the passages you refer to, appeal's 
not as the shrewd observer of his own times but as eighteenth-century 
philosopher with no means of understanding the Middle Ages — no more 
than Hume or Voltaire. His notion that the clergy had an absolute com-
mand over the great body of the people is never true of any time or place, 
certainly not true of the days of the Emperor Frederic II. and of the 
prevalence of Arabian philosophy before St. Thomas Aquinas ; not true 
of the anti-clerical time of Philip the Fair, nor again of Italy and Germany 
in the fifteenth century. Then, as regards the riches of the Church 
breeding corruption, there was no doubt a constant danger of i t ; especially 
of the higher posts of abbot or bishop being occupied by royal favourites 
or younger sons of the nobility without regard to spiritual fitness. How 
far this actually happened needs for each period and country an exami-
nation of the contemporary evidence ; and to make any general proposi-
tion seem very hazardous. I am not denying that there may have been 
great misapplication of Church property by the clergy ; but at any rate as 
regards England in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the detailed evi-
dence collected by Dr. Jessop (Protestant) and Dr. Gasquet (Catholic) 
shows Adam Smith's view of the inferior ranks of the people being dis-
gusted by the vanity, etc., of the richer clergy to be a complete misrepre-
sentation. The destruction of the monasteries and the confiscation of 
ecclesiastical property was most unpopular with the poorer classes, who 
(apart from any spiritual loss or gain) suffered appallingly in their fortunes 
by the change — a change that Jessop calls the Spoliation or the Great 
Pillage." 
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erance of opinion and laxity of morals, so free trade in re-
ligion on Adam Smith's view tends to promote toleration 
and variety in doctrine and austerity in conduct. " In lit-
tle religious sects," says Adam Smith, " the morals of the 
common people have been almost always remarkably 
regular and order ly ; generally much more so than in 
the Established Church. The morals of these little sects, 
indeed, have frequently been rather disagreeable and 
unsocial." 1 
1 Adam Smith's remedies for the peculiar defects and excesses which 
are likely to arise under a system of free trade in religion are still worthy 
of consideration. 
" T h e first of these remedies is the study of science and philosophy, 
which the State might render almost universal among all people of mid-
dling, or more than middling rank and fortune, not by giving salaries to 
teachers in order to make them negligent and idle, but by instituting some 
sort of probation, even in the higher and more difficult sciences, to be 
undergone before he was permitted to exercise any liberal profession, or 
before he could be received as a candidate for any honourable office of 
trust or profit. If the State imposed upon the order of men the necessity 
of learning, it would have no occasion to give itself any trouble about 
providing them with proper teachers. They would soon find better 
teachers for themselves than any whom the State could provide for them. 
Science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and superstition ; 
and where all the superior ranks of people were secured from it, the 
inferior ranks could not be much exposed to i t ." 
The second of these remedies, which still needs advertising throughout 
Britain, especially in the northern parts, is the frequency and gaiety of 
public diversions. " T h e State, by encouraging, that is, by giving entire 
liberty to all those who, for their own interest, would attempt, without 
scandal or indecency, to amuse and divert the people by painting, poetry, 
music, dancing, by all sorts of dramatic representations and exhibitions, 
would easily dissipate in the greater part of them that melancholy and 
gloomy humour which is almost always the source of popular superstition 
and enthusiasm. Public diversions have always been the objects of dread 
and hatred to all the fanatical promoters of those popular frenzies. The 
gaiety and good humour which these diversions inspire were altogether 
inconsistent with that temper of mind which was fittest for their purpose, 
or which they could best work upon. Dramatic representations, besides 
frequently exposing their artifices to public ridicule, and sometimes even 
to public execration, were upon that account, more than all other diver-
sions, the objects of their peculiar abhorrence." — Wealth of Nations, 
Book V., Ch. I., Pt. III . , p. 333 (Nicholson's edition). 
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The general conclusion is tha t as regards demand — 
whether of material or immaterial utilities — freedom of 
choice should be allowed to the consumers. There are ex-
ceptions ( to be noted in the next chapter) , but the pre-
sumption is in favour of the rule both on historical and 
theoretical grounds. The rule is capable of very extensive 
application, not only to material, but to immaterial, forms 
of wealth as manifested in religion, art, l i terature, and 
science. 
§ 3. Benefits of Freedom of Production. The object of 
production is to satisfy the demands of consumers. In 
modern societies a relatively small amount is intended by 
the producers for their own personal consumption. A t 
the same time, however, all producers are consumers, and 
if we take as our consuming uni t the family, and regard 
the non-working women and children, the aged and the 
infirm, as dependants on the working members, nearly all 
consuming units are also producers. Accordingly we have 
to regard production in a twofold aspect: (1 ) as affecting 
the means of enjoyment or the satisfaction of wants of 
o the rs ; ( 2 ) as affecting the enjoyment or the satisfaction 
of the workers directly through the conditions of produc-
tion. This twofold aspect has already been noticed in 
the analysis of production and distribution in the first two 
books, and in tha t of progress in the fourth. We have now 
to consider generally the benefits of freedom of production 
as against the management of the State. 
The interests of consumers of material wealth may be 
promoted by producers in several different ways, viz., as 
regards abundance, convenience of acquisition, cheapness, 
quali ty, and variety ; and in each and all of these ways it 
is held that , on the whole, the maximum satisfaction of 
consumers is obtained by the free competition of producers. 
In some cases competition may fail in one direction, but 
the failure may be more than compensated by success in 
another. Competition in modern societies works in dif-
ferent ways and assumes different forms. Abundance, 
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convenience of acquisition, and cheapness are closely cor-
related, and may be taken together. Ju s t as production 
is not complete till the commodity is in the hands of the 
consumer, so the most abundant supply is of no avail unless 
the means of acquisition are relatively easy and the price 
relatively cheap. W e may have over-production with 
bankrupt prices, and at the same time the consuming 
power of the nation may be lessened through disorganisa-
tion of the means of distribution and acquisition. 
On the other hand, in the excessive competition of the 
retail trades, cheapness is sometimes sacrificed to conven-
ience. In the normal case, however, the competition 
which causes abundance causes also cheapness and con-
venience. The competition of producers in most cases not 
only answers the variety of wants, but actually promotes 
variety — the t rader who cannot offer novelties is le f t 
hopelessly behind. In some cases the stress of competition 
is in the quality of wares or services •— the prices being 
fixed by custom or arrangement. Thus competing railways 
and newspapers may make the same charge of a penny a 
mile or a penny a number, whilst the effective competition 
is to suit the tastes of the respective passengers and readers, 
whose gain as consumers is probably much greater than 
would result from cut t ing down prices. 
Tha t the free competition of producers on the whole 
benefits consumers is so patent and so generally admit ted 
that fu r ther explanation and even illustration seem hardly 
necessary. The objections raised by the socialists and 
collectivists to the present system of production are not 
based on the inefficiency of processes but on the injustice 
of the distribution of products. Modern large production 
is throughout ruled by the spirit of economy in expenses 
and the survival of the fittest in methods, and the benefit 
of every economy and every improvement in the course of 
time, through the levelling power of competition, is trans-
ferred to the consumer. Alike in mechanical appliances, 
raw materials, commercial methods, and human skill, there 
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is a constant str iving to obtain better resul ts ; and in gen-
eral the bet terment means the bet terment of consumption. 
Par t icular kinds of capital and skill may become old-fash-
ioned and their earnings may fall, but this is simply evi-
dence that more effective methods of production have been 
invented and adopted. Vested interests of all kinds that 
are open to the influences of competition are bound to give 
way to the interests of consumers. A n d the curious 
th ing is that in general the consumers are quite uncon-
scious of any egoism, just as the producers are equally un-
conscious of any al t ruism; 1 the consumer has no more 
affectation of guiding the wheels of indust ry for the public 
good than the merchant has of t rading for it. 
Now that , for a brief space, biology has taken the place 
of na tura l theology, we no longer refer to the invisible 
hand, but we mean the same th ing when we say tha t the 
consumer is of all animals the most for tunate in the ever-
last ing struggle of nature, for in his case the environment 
is adapted to the animal, and not the animal to the 
environment. The history of industry dur ing the last hun-
dred years shows in every branch and method of produc-
tion a great development of competition — trade competes 
with t rade and nation with nation for the markets of the 
world. Perhaps the most s t r iking illustration of the prog-
ress of competition is found where it might be least 
expected, namely, in the development of t rade unionism 
according to its latest and most sympathetic historians.2 
When the industr ial revolution broke down the laws and 
customs that had previously protected the workers, they 
combined to petition for governmental regulat ion; they 
prayed the government to enforce the regulations on 
apprenticeship and other restraints on free competition. 
W h e n they failed in their appeals to law, they themselves 
tried to mitigate competition by imposing barriers to the 
entrance to a trade and to the adoption of new processes. 
1 Industrial Democracy, Vol. II., op. cit., p. 671. 
2 Sidney and Beatrice Webb. 
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But speaking generally these methods of restriction have 
been abandoned. A t present the unions in most cases 1 
impose no restrictions on entrance — except the capacity 
to earn the standard rate, and they make no objection to 
new processes, provided — a rather large and elastic pro-
vision, it is t rue — that the condition of the worker is not 
deteriorated thereby. " I t is interest ing to observe," says 
Mr. Webb,2 " that with the acceptance of this new policy 
by the employers and its complete apprehension by the 
workmen, it is not the individual capitalist, but the trade 
union which most strenuously insists on the very latest 
improvements in machinery." In the same way the unions 
object to the small masters and their old-fashioned methods. 
On the whole, also, they are content to leave the manage-
ment to the entrepreneurs, and to accept the results of 
competition as regards processes and commercial methods. 
In brief, to adopt Mr. Webb 's phraseology, they have 
abandoned the doctrine of vested interests in their trades 
for the doctrine of demand and supply. " Even trade 
unionists feel the doctrine of vested interests to be out 
of date ." 3 The modification of demand and supply by 
the insistence, as in many other markets, on a reserve 
price (or the adoption of a common rule) 4 is held on the 
whole to increase competition. " I t in no way abolishes 
competition or lessons its intensity. W h a t it does is per-
petually to st imulate the selection of the most efficient 
workmen, the best equipped employers, and the most 
advantageous forms of industry. I t in no way deteriorates 
any of the factors of production ; on the contrary, its in-
fluence acts as a constant incentive to the fu r the r improve-
ment of the manual labourers, the machinery, and the 
organising ability and indus t ry . " T h a t cheap labour 
is dear labour has long been a commonplace, and if the 
maintenance of a reserve price on labour is accompanied 
1 There are exceptions, e.g., flint glass and hand-made paper. 
2 Webb's Industrial Democracy, Vol. I., p. 413. 
3 Ibid., p. 571. 4 Ibid., II., pp. 732, 733. 
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by a development of competition as regards the other 
factors of production, the consumer gains — and gains 
through the competition of producers. 
The extension of freedom of trade in the interchange of 
commodities has been as remarkable as in their manufac-
ture, especially in the case of Britain. Tak ing the modern 
commercial world as a whole, and considering the condi-
tions affecting the internal trade of the great nations, the 
progress in the direction of free trade dur ing the present 
century has been astonishing. W e are apt to lay too much 
stress on part icular tariffs and international fiscal arrange-
ments, and thus to overlook the great fact of approximately 
perfect free t rade within immense areas, e.g., the United 
States and the German Empire. Even as regards Britain 
the foreign t rade is relatively small to the whole trade of 
the country, and of this foreign trade only a relatively 
small par t is subject to foreign restrictions. 
T h a t on the whole the result of this extension of free-
dom of competition in production and trade has conferred 
benefits on the consumer in the modes indicated at the out-
s e t — abundance, convenience of acquisition, cheapness, 
variety, and quali ty — is so palpable tha t it is not seriously 
disputed by the keenest lovers of paradox or original 
research. 
A more just and more common objection, however, to the 
present system of competition is that the interests of pro-
ducers are sacrificed to the interests of consumers. This 
objection natural ly leads to a consideration of the second 
aspect of product ion; namely, as affecting the conditions 
of labour, or more generally the disutil i ty of labour. 
In the present chapter, however, I am dealing with the 
benefits of f reedom of competition, the failures or defects 
being taken later and separately, for the sake of clearness.1 
Competition tends to benefit the producers qua the condi-
tions of production in several ways. In the first place, the 
more effective the competition, the more readily do all 
1 See next chapter. 
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workers find the work best adapted to their capacity—-
one of the greatest advantages of division of labour. The 
three great classes of men, women, and children are em-
ployed in the order of their strength and abilities ; men ex-
clusively are employed, for example, in mines, foundries, 
building, railways, and the military and police services, 
whilst in the industries in which men and women are em-
ployed, e.g., the textile, we have also the propria quce 
maribus, the men taking the heavier, and the women the 
lighter tasks. Similarly as regards the two most numerous 
employments of this countrj r , viz., agriculture and domes-
tic service, in the former men, in the lat ter women, do most 
of the work. Within particular employments competition 
leads to fur ther selection, and differentiation and promo-
tion are by merit and not by seniority. The ideal of perfect 
competition is perfect adjustment of ability, natural and 
acquired. Secondly, the better the conditions of employ-
ment, so much the better are the workers from whom the 
employer may choose. This is perhaps best illustrated in 
the case of domestic servants. The competition of em-
ployers acts more by offering better conditions than higher 
money wages, and the short term of engagement now usual 
( the month instead of the year) secures the continuance of 
the benefits offered. Similarly, though not perhaps to such a 
marked extent, the best masters — qua conditions — obtain 
the best workmen. Thirdly, corresponding to the economy 
of high wages, there is the economy of good conditions. 
Improvements in the conditions of work promote the effi-
ciency of labour. The " law of substitution " may act 
through sanitation and shorter hours of labour. 
There can be no doubt tha t freedom of competition in 
the large sense of the term does tend to improve the con-
ditions of employment in the modes indicated. I t is, how-
ever, in this direction also that freedom of competition is 
most liable to failures, both as regards defects of adjust-
ment and positive abuses. " For fifty years after the intro-
duction of the improved processes of production which 
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mark the commencement of the era, the working-classes, in-
stead of benefit, undoubtedly received injury. The civil-
ised nations, England in particular, had developed forces 
they could not control ; the established laws and usages 
fell into desuetude, and there followed a general disorgani-
sation of industr ial society. . . . The process of adapta-
tion to the new environment has been rendered less speedy 
than it might have been by the absurd extremes to which 
the doctrine of laisser-faire has been carried." 1 
§ 4. Benefits of Freedom of Distribution : ( a ) Competition 
of Individuals. The abuses under actual conditions of 
imperfect competition on the one side, and of excessive 
or rather specialised competition on the other, have been of 
late so abundant ly i l lustrated that the distribution by the 
competition of individuals of the national wealth and the 
annual dividend may be likened to the principle of an Act 
of Par l iament that has disappeared under a cloud of 
amendments. " A n y discussion," it is asserted in Indus-
trial Democracy,2 " of the relation of consumer and pro-
ducer, or between capitalist, brain worker, and manual 
labourer, which is based on the assumption of a mutual 
exchange of services among freely competing individual 
bargainers, is from a practical point of view entirely obso-
lete. W e have in fact to work out a new scientific analy-
sis, not of any ideal state of natural liberty, but of the 
actual facts of a world of more or less complete economic 
monopolies — legal monopolies, natural monopolies, mo-
nopolies arising out of the prejudices of the consumers, and 
last but not least, monopolies deliberately constructed by 
the tacit or formal combination or amalgamation of all the 
competing interests." Tha t " monopolies " of the kinds 
indicated are still important elements in the industrial 
system may be readily g ran ted ; but it would be a grave 
historical error to suppose that at present, even in the 
Uni ted States, the proportion of " monopoly " to " competi-
1 Cf. Effects of Machinery on Wages, new edition, p. 132. See next 
chapter. 2 Vol. II., p. 688. 
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tion " is greater than at an}' former period, or that monop-
oly is a modern reaction against the excesses of modern 
competition. The destructive part of Adam Smith's work 
was directed mainly against the interferences with natural 
libertjr in all directions by the survivals of the mediaeval 
economic system. Mediaeval economy was pervaded to a 
far greater extent with the spirit of monopoly than is the 
most advanced modern economy. But perhaps the best 
example of the ascendancy of the " monopolistic " spirit 
and of industrial paternalism is found in the records of 
the Byzantine Empire. 
Constantinople, after the completion of the sett lements 
of the barbarians, thanks to its unrivalled situation and its 
concentration of the inherited powers of civilisation, had 
retained the commercial supremacy of the wor ld . 1 But 
the ruin which the assaults of the barbarians had failed to 
accomplish was achieved by the weakening effects of 
cumulative economic causes. In every depar tment of 
economic activity officialism and bureaucracy checked en-
terprise ; enormous sums were spent in " public w o r k s " 
and " d o l e s " to the poor; the navy and army exhausted 
the treasury and the populat ion; and all the abuses of 
overgovernment and overexpenditure and overtaxation 
were heaped up. These general causes of economic ruin 
have indeed become commonplaces of history and of polit-
ical philosophy ; but for the present purpose the particular 
development of " monopolies " deserves special at tent ion. 
A graphic account of the series of monopolies into which 
industry had been converted survives in the edict of the 
Emperor Leo VI., the Philosopher (misnamed according 
to Gibbon), dating from the first years of the t en th cen-
tu ry . 2 "Nowhere has the organisation of corporations 
1 " T h e physical strength of Constantinople is demonstrated by the 
magnificent manner in which it held its own in the protection of all that 
was left of ancient civilisation for more than a thousand years ." — 
Cunningham, Western Civilisation, p. 197. 
2 Le Livre du Prefet ou Vedit de I'empereur Leon le Sage sur les Cor-
porations de Constantinople, translated into French from the Greek by 
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been developed as at Constantinople ; professional colleges, 
unions of artisans, of trades, of artists were so many wheels 
in the administration. Public authority was the absolute 
mistress; it fixed the purchases of raw material; it 
directed the methods of manufacture, it excluded indus-
trial products of which it disapproved; it fixed the profit 
of the master and the wages of the workers: to fulfil 
these multiple missions it had its agents, its spies, its 
informers ; it went so far as to impose the duty of inform-
ing on all the members of the trading bodies. Enormous 
fines, banishment, flagellation, removal of the beard and 
the hair, these were ordinary punishments. But above all 
was the '••peine fort dure,' the erasure of the name from the 
corporation, in other words, the forfeiture of the right to 
practise the art or trade." 1 
And be it observed that the government in question 
was a government imperial in form, it is true, but based 
upon Christianity and Roman law. The power of the 
spirit of monopoly at the present time is only a shadow 
compared with the pas t ; and tha t it is so is due to the 
growth of the power of the opposing system of natural 
liberty. 
I t is then still worth while examining the natural results 
of distribution according to this system; and to bring out 
the leading ideas we may take the system in the extreme 
form of an ideal not yet attained — the other extreme to 
the wornout " obsolete." 
Let it be supposed, first of all, — though this is only one 
part of the system, — t h a t there is perfect freedom of com-
petition between individuals. This implies mobility of 
labour and capital, and ful ly organised markets both for 
services and products. No one, I suppose, is inclined to 
regard such mobility and organisation as anything but 
preventives of economic waste to the public at large. 
Jules Nicole. (Geneva text, 1893, translation, 1894.) This work is well 
worthy of the attention of English students. Cf. Pareto, op. cit., Vol. II., 
805-894. See also Gibbon's Decline and Fall, Chs. XL. and LXIV. 
1 liecherches sur Vhistoire d'economies politique, par E. Nys, p. 4. 
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Let the terms " l a b o u r " and " se rv i ce" be taken in the 
widest sense, and let the conditions of perfectly organised 
markets be applicable to all sorts and conditions of services. 
Under such conditions what would be the general results 
of the free play of supply and demand? 
The first result is, that for equal efficiency there will be 
equal reward, and no scheme of socialism founded upon 
reward according to deserts ever aimed at more perfect 
equality. The units of " labour time," or of " labour stress 
and strain," or of " vital force " will fetch the same price 
per unit, and the individual whose personality comprises 
most units will obtain the highest aggregate reward. 
Secondly, at the equilibrium price the supply will be 
just equal to the demand. If any are left over their com-
petition will lower prices until the quantity demanded at 
the price equals the supply. As the price falls, some of 
the sellers will withdraw, but the withdrawal is voluntary, 
because it is not worth while to accept the market price. 
But the point is that every one willing to sell at the price 
has the opportunity. 
There is with perfect competition no chance for some to 
get overwork with overpay, and others no work with no 
pay; and so far perfect competition means " f r a t e rn i ty . " 
In the third place this equality of wages (per unit as 
before) is not brought about by authority — by prefects, 
town councillors, or policemen; the moving force of the 
whole system is liberty. No man is forced to sell or to 
buy his labour, his capital, his ideas, or his time. And 
thus the ideal of perfect competition is liberty, equality, and 
fraternity, that is to say, in the practical legitimate sense 
of liberty of exchange, equal prices, and mutual services. 
And further it may be observed that not oidy does such 
a system of distribution conform to the common interpreta-
tion of natural justice, but the effect of such a scheme on 
production is that the maximum of utility is produced at 
the minimum cost of disutility. It is not necessary again 
to introduce the technical niceties of the utilitarian calcu-
Y O L . I I I . P 
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lus. The language of Adam Smith is still sufficiently in. 
telligible and forcible. " T h e proper performance of every 
service seems to require that its pay or recompense should 
be as exactly as possible proportioned to the nature of the 
service. If any service is very much underpaid, it is very 
apt to suffer by the meanness and incapacity of the greater 
part of those who are employed in it. If it is very much 
overpaid it is apt to suffer perhaps still more by their 
negligence and idleness." Adam Smith was referring in 
his context to the wages of clergymen, but the general state-
ment admits of a general application. The proper per-
formance of every service is secured by giving the true 
competition rate, or what is only in question at present: 
the maximum national production is thereby secured. 
I t cannot then be said that competition of individuals 
fails as an ideal, though it may be that, as in the case of 
other ideals, it breaks down in practice. Actual competi-
tion, indeed, falls short in all the conditions assumed — in 
mobility, in the organisation of markets, and in the adjust-
ment of supply to demand. Some of these failures, how-
ever, of competition of individuals are met by voluntary 
associations, which are also part of the system of natural 
liberty.1 
§ 5. (b ) Benefits of Freedom of Association. Up to this 
point in the survey of the benefits of individual freedom 
it has been assumed that the individuals in question attain 
their ends by independent action. If they act in combina-
tion, as in the complex processes of division of labour, these 
combinations are managed by an entrepreneur, who is sup-
posed to make separate bargains with each contr ibutor; 
and, in short, the whole industry of the country is carried 
011 by an endless number of contracts of truly competing 
individuals. The case of domestic servants (almost the 
largest class of labour in the United Kingdom) is an 
example of such a method of independent bargaining on a 
1 For further development of the argument of this section, see " Essay 
on Combination and Competi t ion" in Strikes and Social Problems. 
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large scale; and in agriculture, the most important pro-
ductive industry, the large farmer may be taken as a type 
of an employer who still bargains with his men separately.1 
But we have also seen that competition is complex, and 
that free competition of individuals may' exist in some 
forms, whilst in other respects they are fettered by law 
and custom. And apart altogether from the compulsion 
of law and custom —• considered as forces external to the 
individual — individuals may make a complete or partial 
sacrifice of their independence by enter ing into voluntary 
associations. Occasionally, as in certain monastic orders, 
there is an absolute surrender of personal l iber ty; in other 
cases the surrender is only partial, and is limited to certain 
definite purposes. 
In general, it is t rue tha t the idea of competition ex-
cludes the idea of combination or association, even if the 
combination is in origin and intention purely voluntary. 
Bu t industrial freedom is wider than competition, and 
may be held to cover voluntary associations as contrasted 
with legal compulsion. Associations of this kind, though 
in respect of their regulations they limit the independence 
of their members, by increasing their power may add to 
their personal freedom on the whole. In these voluntary 
associations the individual limits his freedom of action by 
consenting to obey certain rules, or it may be the will of a 
majority or of an arbiter, or even of a dictator. In vol-
untary associations we have real examples of " social con-
tracts," very different f rom the hypothetical quasi-social 
contract of political theory. These associations may be for 
all kinds of objects, — moral, religious, aesthetic, as well as 
economic, — but most of them have an economic founda-
tion in the sense tha t they incur expenses and must 
1 In 1891 there were employed in "domest ic offices or services" 
2,341,696 persons, and in " ag r i cu l t u r e " 2,461,048 persons. How many 
would fall under the term " l a b o u r " is doubtful, but obviously the great 
majority. The number of Trade Unions in 1892 was 1208, and the total 
membership 1,501,083. — Abstract of Labour Statistics for the United 
Kingdom, 1900. 
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furnish capital or revenue; and so far they enter into 
economic inquiry. 
There are, moreover, throughout the modern industrial 
state (as in former ages) numberless examples of volun-
tary associations for purposes mainly economic. Under 
certain conditions these associations, which are voluntary 
to begin with, become, by the aid of the law or in spite of 
it, compulsory; that is to say, those who wish to attain 
the objects promoted by these associations are legally or 
practically obliged to submit to their rules. Such, for 
example, was the case in the development and degenera-
tion of many forms of guilds.1 
For the present, however, attention may.be confined to 
associations to which the entrance is essentially as well as 
nominally free. 
In an examination of principles it is necessary to be 
influenced as little as possible by the peculiar character-
istics of certain forms of association that happen at the 
time to bulk largely in the public view. A t present there 
is a tendency to consider manual labour as typical of all 
labour, and material production of all product ion; and 
similarly there is a tendency to look on trade unions as 
typical of all associations of labour, and trusts as typi-
cal of all associations of capital. I t is desirable, then, to 
indicate the wide extension of the principle of voluntary 
association in cases in which the voluntary characteristic is 
still predominant. 
There are, for example, the many forms of partnership, 
so important and varied that the law of partnership occu-
pies a large part of the field of mercantile law. 
The first characteristic of partnership is the voluntary 
character of the agreement: In English law there must be 
consent of every individual member of the firm to author-
ise the introduction of a new one, and so necessary is this 
consent, that the executors of a deceased partner are not 
allowed to occupy his place unless there be a stipulation 
1 See above, Books II. and III. 
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in the contract of partnership, in which case modus et con-
ventio vincunt legem.1 
Next to the voluntary character of the association we may 
notice, secondly, the risk involved. As Professor Ashley 
observes in his admirable account of the development of 
the canonical doctrine in the Middle Ages : " The essen-
tial element in partnership was that the investor shared 
in the risk of the venture or business, and the canonists 
were ready to invert the definition and say, ' Where risk, 
there partnership.' Accordingly the popular definition of 
usury among business men came to be gain 'wi thout r isk. ' " 
This element of risk in ordinary partnership is so essen-
tial that the principle of unlimited liability prevails, and 
thus it often becomes a question of great legal difficulty 
and practical importance as to what does or does not con-
stitute partnership, especially as regards third parties and 
the public. 
The third characteristic of partnership is the power of 
any member to bind the firm in all matters within the 
scope of the partnership, either according to the agreement 
of the partners, or according to the usual interpretation of 
the business in the mercantile world. Each partner is, so 
to speak, the recognised agent of the firm, and the ordinary 
rule applies, that qui facit per alium facit per se. There 
is an unlimited mandate or power to each person to bind 
the association in the line of its business. 
Finally, the object of the association of partnership is 
gain or profi t ; it is not the attainment of various social 
and moral aims for the general welfare of the partners or 
of other persons. 
Whether a share in the profit is sufficient to constitute 
partnership as to personal liability and power of binding 
the firm, is a question of law. 
Similarly the nature and extent of the contribution in 
" property or labour," goods, money, skill, or industry, may 
or may not be held to constitute partnership according to 
1 Smith's Mercantile Law, Vol. I. , p. 9. 
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law. For the present purpose, however, it is necessary to 
separate carefully the constituent economic elements from 
the purely legal principles and legal divisions. 
And thus regarded, the essential characteristics of part-
nership are the voluntary nature of the agreement, the 
unlimited liability of the members, the unlimited power of 
binding the firm in the line of the business, and the object 
of gain or profit. 
Thus regarded, it is plain that the idea of industrial 
partnership as commonly conceived is based rather on acci-
dental, than essential, qualities of ordinary partnership. 
I t does not conform to such an association as regards the 
nature of the agreement, the liability of the members or 
the power of mandate, and in general even the share in the 
profit is associated with various social aims. 
Wi th the development of industry, however, partnership 
has given rise to joint-stock companies, in which both the 
liability of members and their share in the management 
are limited and curtailed. The tendency (since 1855 in 
the United Kingdom) has been for shareholders to be lia-
ble for the extent of their shares only, and to delegate the 
power of management entirely to the directors. 
With these privileges it is only natural that the rights 
of the public should be specially protected, and such pro-
tection has been partially obtained in the long series of 
Companies Acts. 
The benefits of such companies (and their enormous 
range) have already been considered. I t is sufficient here 
to point out that the voluntary character is carried to an 
extreme. In general, the shares can be disposed of in the 
open market and sold to the highest bidder, the company 
exercising no power of refusing admission. The same 
person may hold shares in numbers of very different 
undertakings in which he only risks his original purchase 
money (assuming that the shares have been fully paid 
up) , and takes practically no share whatever in the man-
agement. 
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Joint-stock companies are essentially voluntary associa-
tions, and they compete with one another and with private 
firms in the conduct of various kinds of business. They 
have, however, always shown a tendency to act in the 
spirit of monopoly, and as far as possible to have their 
monopoly rendered effective by law. Thus railways com-
pete, it is true, with other railways and with other means 
of communication by land or sea, but under many condi-
tions they acquire a practical monopoly in the districts 
which they serve, or the great trade routes they occupy. 
Monopolies that arise in this way from the natural devel-
opment of certain kinds of companies, may have certain 
advantages both from the point of view of the consumer 
and of the general public. In general, however, as mo-
nopoly increases, the benefits of freedom are curtailed, and 
a c c o r d i n g ^ a case for governmental control is generally 
recognised in order to restore those benefits. 
Recently the tendency to monopoly has been fu r the r 
developed (especially in America) by the creation of 
trusts. These trusts in their beginnings assume the vol-
untary character ; the shareholders of the consti tuent com-
panies surrender their rights, and rules are adopted for 
the regulation of the whole industry.1 But the essential 
idea is to destroy all outside competition, and to compel 
all engaged in the under taking to submit to the t rust . 
The immediate effect of this a t tempt to destroy competi-
tion may be to cheapen the commodities or services even 
below cost, but the ul t imate object is to make the gain of 
the t rust the only consideration. A t rus t may acciden-
tally, by preventing the waste of competition and by other 
economies of larger production, benefit the consumers even 
ultimately, but such a result is not intended and is not 
probable. 
Similarly a t rust may, to begin with, pay higher rates of 
wages and even ult imately through the greater efficiency 
of production keep up wages, but again such a result is 
1 Cf. Ashley, Economic Journal, June , 1899. 
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not intended and is not probable. The object being profit, 
as a rule, once competition has been destroyed, the leaders 
of the t rust will resort to the simple methods of high 
prices and low wages. 
As regards wages, Adam Smith called attention to the 
tacit associations of masters, and as regards high prices 
the tacit associations of retail traders are notorious. The 
trust , simply because it is open and avowed in its mo-
nopoly, is not likely either to raise wages or to depress 
prices.1 
W e arrive now at trade unions as voluntary associa-
tions in the interests of labour. Af ter the examination 
previously given, I shall at this point only call attention 
to one general result of the admirable survey (on its posi-
tive side) of the authors of Industrial Democracy, namely, 
tha t the unions must rely mainly in the fu ture on the 
method of legal enactment. That the unions should care-
fully consider all legislation affecting industry, and should 
endeavour to promote the interests of their members (and 
of the working-classes generally) by the aid of law and 
government, may be considered as part of their primary 
duty. And that law and government can improve the 
conditions of labour and the standard of life, and that in 
many ways unregulated laisser-faire leads to the degrada-
tion of labour, has been abundantly proved. But that the 
method of legal enactment can be beneficially extended to 
the regulation of wages and more generally of the prices 
of services and commodities, seems to me altogether im-
probable both on historical and theoretical grounds. The 
" method of legal enac tmen t" is a very elastic phrase, 
which proves, on examination, to be no more simple and 
obvious than the system of natural liberty.2 
The voluntary character is fully retained in cooperation, 
and on that account this form of association has always 
been highly esteemed. Unfortunately, however, as re-
1 Ashley, Economic Journal, June, 1899. 
2 See Ch. IV. 
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gards production (as distinct from amalgamations of retail 
trade), it has had no more than a succis d'estime. All the 
cooperative production of the United Kingdom is hut a 
fragment of its whole industry, and the rate of progress 
since Mill wrote his prophetic eulogies has been remark-
ably slow. To expect that the productive industry of 
Great Britain will ever be carried on mainly by cooper-
'ative societies is about as reasonable as to expect that 
cash payments will altogether replace credit transactions. 
Similarly, " industr ia l partnership," though successful 
to a limited extent, does not appear likely to displace 
the ordinary methods of industry. I t is indeed a mis-
named partnership, lacking, as already shown, most of 
the characteristics, e.g., liability to loss, share in manage-
ment. " Profit-sharing " — the better name — is, in effect, 
not a method of partnership, but a method of payment 
by results. 
The element of t ru th that is of importance in these 
latter schemes is not dependent on their peculiar charac-
terisation. Altogether apart from cooperation and profit-
sharing, voluntary agreement and good faith, however 
manifested, are better for capital and labour than com-
pulsion and trickery. I t is good business to have workers 
interested in their work, for masters and men to recognise 
the " cooperation " of labour and capital, and to substi tute 
the uberrima fides of " partnership " for mutual distrust. 
But the words must not be made to carry more than they 
can bear. 
Before leaving the benefits of freedom of association, 
special attention may be directed to one of those benefits 
that is too often overlooked — namely, the freedom to de-
cay. Voluntary associations that cease to fulfil their func-
tions soon wither away, and are replaced by other men and 
other minds. Bu t once an association has gained the 
protection of the law and has learned to rely on the 
law, it attains the artificial immortality of legal corpo-
rations. What may have begun as a voluntary association 
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and has passed into the extreme form of a department 
of government with a monopoly against all interlopers, 
long after it has become worse than useless, at the best 
dies hard. A government department may easily become 
insolvent, but never bankrupt until it shares in the final 
ruin of the State, and a legal enactment is seldom repealed 
until its accumulated abuses become intolerable. 
§ 6. Summary. I t is universally recognised that in 
consumption freedom is a beneficial rule, and must at 
any rate be the general rule. I t is true, to take promi-
nent examples, that there are laws against adulteration 
and laws regulat ing the consumption of liquor, but the 
whole of these laws affect the aggregate mass of con-
sumption to a relatively small extent. The consumers 
of this country were never so well provided with neces-
saries and luxuries, but laws against adulteration have 
had a small share in this result compared with the com-
petition of t raders; and the diminution of drunkenness 
during the present century has been astonishing, espe-
cially considering the growth of wealth, but the regu-
lation of the drink trade has had little effect compared 
with the revolution in public opinion. Still, even in 
consumption, there is room for governmental control in 
certain cases. 
As regards production, freedom of enterprise and free-
dom in the selection of processes is still the rule, and 
qua production is recognised as beneficial. Every indus-
t ry is constantly changing and the initiative is taken by 
individuals. 
No admirer of bureaucracy pretends that it is the duty 
of government to appoint official inventors and discov-
erers for various industries, and the survival of the fittest 
in productive processes is achieved by competition. Even 
when commercial competition is restrained by a trust, in-
dustrial competition survives within the ring. But when 
production is regarded, not from the point of view of the 
products, but from that of the personality of the producers, 
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the case is by 110 means so simple. I t is true that effective 
competition tends to increase the efficiency of labour, and 
one of the factors in efficiency is improvement in the con-
ditions of work. To take a practical case, the best em-
ployers qua conditions get the pick of labour, but per 
contra the worst employers have relatively the more power 
over the weakest labourers. On the whole, competition acts 
very imperfectly in securing the best conditions of pro-
duction as affecting the health and morals of the workers, 
and regulation by the State has been extensively adopted 
with success. Such regulations, however, have not so 
much checked competition as provided rules according to 
which it must be conducted — like the game of golf, or 
the game of speculation. There is no lack of competition 
when the rules are reasonable; every one is compelled 
to play the game, and the entrepreneur might take a 
worse model than the good sportsman. 
As regards the distribution of the national wealth, the 
tendency of competition — if effective as regards the mo-
bility of the productive agents and the organisation of 
markets — is to proportion reward to the net value of the 
service rendered to the society. And in many cases in-
equalities of reward in this sense would be remedied by 
more effective competition. In fact, as already shown, 
the main factor in the progress of distribution has been 
the substitution of freedom of contract for privilege and 
delegated or permitted authority. There are, however, 
many cases in which the conditions essential to freedom 
of contract do not prevail, and there are others in which 
freedom of contract passes into freedom of coercion. 
Such is especially the case with associations which are 
instituted on a voluntary or contractual basis. Such 
associations easily attain powers which, relatively to in-
dividuals, give them an overpowering position ; and a com-
bination of associations may have similar power compared 
to any one. There are fur ther relations assumed by 
associations toward the public which could never arise 
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with individuals. One man is as nothing against the 
whole people; but one company, still more one gigantic 
t rust , may revive in a new form the old r ight of private 
taxation. The predatory and parasitic tendencies of 
combinations are far s tronger than those of individuals, 
just as a mob is more cruel than the average of its mem-
bers. And altogether apart from abuses, the civil relations 
of associations to third parties are extremely complex. 
Accordingly a large part of mercantile law is occupied with 
various economic combinations, — e.g., partnerships, com-
panies, unions, and associations, — and with fur ther devel-
opment, fu r the r extension of the law may be necessary. 
In conclusion, it may be observed tha t it is still a 
fundamenta l principle of the law of England that all 
contracts in general restraint of trade are void, al though 
the interpretat ion of the term has varied in the courts, 
and in particular cases has been definitely declared by 
statute. 
A n d in the United States of America any infr ingement 
by law of the principle of freedom of contract is contrary 
to the Const i tut ion. 
On the whole, whether we like it or not, there is no 
gainsaying the fact that th roughout the whole field of 
economic activities in the modern State, alike as re-
gards consumption, production, exchange, distribution, and 
association, the system of natural liberty prevails over the 
system of regulation. 
B u t natural l iberty also has the defects of its qualities, 
and may require restraint or supplement on the par t of 
the State.1 
1 See next chapter. 
C H A P T E R I I I . 
F A I L U R E S AND DEFECTS OF INDIVIDUALISM. 
§ 1. General Possibilities of Failure of Individualism. 
The system of natural liberty rests upon two fundamental 
and closely allied assumptions, and unless these assump-
tions are realised in practice, the benefits which have been 
examined in the last chapter will not be forthcoming. I t 
is assumed, namely, in the first place, that the individuals 
concerned are in a state of freedom, and secondly, that they 
are guided only by self-interest. A state of freedom, how-
ever, is an expression almost as doubtful in meaning as a 
state of nature. Man with the progress of society comes 
more and more under social influences; he is more and 
more a political animal in the original significance of the 
term. Liberty itself is unmeaning without society; the 
man on the desert island is not free, he is a prisoner shut 
in by the ocean. Rational freedom is freedom under the 
law, freedom in communion ; absolute freedom is as un-
meaning as the absolute velocity of a particle in space. 
This doctrine is as old as Aristotle, and as fresh as the 
latest presentation of Hegel. 
" I t is possible for us to acquiesce as rational beings in a 
law and order which on the whole makes for the possibility 
of asserting our t rue and universal selves at the very 
moment when this law and order is constraining our par-
ticular private wills in a way which we resent or even 
condemn. Such a law and order, maintained by force 
which we recognise as on the whole the instrument of our 
greatest self-affirmation, is a system of r igh t s ; and our 
liberty — or to use a good old expression, our liberties — 
may be identified with such a system considered as the 
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condition and guarantee of our becoming the best that we 
have it in us to be, tha t is, of becoming ourselves." 1 
Freedom under the law means more than passive obedi-
ence. Mere torpid submission to inherited laws and cus-
toms may check all freedom of movement and tendency to 
variation, and al though the people do not feel the pressure 
of these social sanctions or restraints on their individual 
liberty, there is no scope for the benefits of individualism. 
A n d it will not suffice simply to sweep away the old regula-
tions and t rus t to natural liberty at once to assert itself. 
The history, for example, of the British Empire shows 
tha t the fair field for individual enterprise can only be 
gradual ly prepared. The great French Revolution appar-
ent ly uprooted all the evil laws and customs of the old 
regime, but it did not establish industrial liberty. 
Again, apart from law and custom, the reality of freedom 
may be restricted by inequalities of position. There may 
be nominal freedom of contract with the power of dictat ing 
terms on one side. There may be nominal personal free-
dom in various home industries with less than the real 
l iberty of serfs and slaves. " W h e n the rate of pay is so 
small tha t even sixteen hours' work does not earn more 
than the bare clay's subsistence, all free time disappears, 
and to quote the House of Lords Committee, the lives of 
the workers become periods of almost ceaseless toil." 2 
Accordingly, so far as the first assumption is concerned, 
namely, tha t the individuals are in a state of freedom, it 
is easy to see that the system of natural liberty is by no 
means simple and obvious. The benefits of individualism 
may be lost or diminished, not because people have too 
much freedom, but because their freedom is curtailed by 
1 The Philosophical Theory of the State, by Bernard Bosanquet, p. 127. 
Cf. Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act I., So. 1, 1. 78 : — 
" T h i s above all: to thine own self be true, 
And it must follow as the night the day, 
Thou canst not then be false to any man . " 
2 "Webb, Vol. II., p. 545, and cf. Mill on Communism, Bk. II., 
Ch. I., § 3. 
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their own inertia or poverty. The crofter sees the great 
ships sailing by, but he clings to his croft of his own free 
will. 
Again, as regards the second assumption, that people are 
guided by self-interest and only consider the interests of 
others so far as they affect their own, it must be observed 
that self-interest is, like freedom, a variable conception. 
I t may be rudimentary and animal, and only impel to the 
satisfaction of animal desires; on the other hand, it may 
be highly developed and spiritual, and an individual may 
spend the greater part of his wealth in promoting various 
objects — social, religious or aesthetic — in which, to ex-
press common thought in common language, he is inter-
ested.1 
Between these two ex t remes—the satisfaction of animal 
desires and that of spiritual aspirations — the guidance of 
self-interest will steer a course, or zig-zag from side to side, 
according to the nature and education of the individual. 
Thus it follows also that the social benefits of individu-
alism may be lost or diminished, not because people are 
guided by self-interest, but because they are themselves 
brutish and ignorant—- their self-interest is of a low type. 
These general reflections lead to the conclusion that 
individualism, considered as a .working economic system, 
can only succeed under conditions favourable to its posi-
tive elements; the negative absence of restraint is not 
enough. Success or failure will depend largely on the 
kind of individuals by whom the system is adopted.2 
Even egoism pure and simple requires for the attain-
ment of its ends more than negative freedom and keen 
1 Cf. Pope's Essay on Man, Epistle IV., 1. 363. 
" Self-love but serves the virtuous mind to wake, 
As the small pebble stirs the peaceful lake ; 
The centre moved, a circle straight succeeds ; 
Another still, and still another spreads ; 
Friend, parent, neighbour, first it will embrace, 
His country next, and next all human race." 
2 Cf. Mill, Bk. V., Ch. XI., 16, p. 591. 
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selfishness. To take the simplest case, a man may he a 
perfervid egoist and lover of pleasure, and respect neither 
God nor man in realising his pleasures and his freedom. 
But he may fail in his endeavours; in his zeal he may 
transgress the rules of common morality or offend reli-
gious sensibilities ; he means to be independent and happy, 
but he only succeeds in being eccentric and uncom-
fortable. 
If, however, individuals in a state of egoistic freedom 
may fail to attain their own interests (in the narrow sense), 
it is hardly likely that they will unconsciously promote 
the interests of the community in which they live. Pri-
vate vices may sometimes be public benefits; but beyond 
that admission the paradox would not now find a defender. 
Tha t the extravagance of the rich is necessary for the em-
ployment of the poor is an economic fallacy typical of 
many others long since destroyed. 
Moreover, even if we allow for the abundance of practi-
cal difficulties of all kinds, and suppose that the self-inter-
est of individuals is highly developed and adequately 
enlightened, there are numerous exceptions to the propo-
sition that the common good is best secured by giving free 
play to the individual. I proceed to enforce and illustrate 
this position by reference to the different departments of 
economic life in a modern industrial society. 
§ 2. Failures in Consumption and I)emand. In con-
sidering the economic effects of individualism on the com-
munity as a whole, we must certainly take for granted 
inequality of property and income. In the modern State 
individual possessions range in value from zero and hope-
less indebtedness up to millions and unlimited credit. 
And if we combine these inequalities of revenues with the 
various species of diminishing utility from expenditure, it 
is only too easy to prove that expenditure determined by 
the self-interest of each will not secure the interest of all. 
The practical difficulty, indeed, is to justify these in-
equalities as unavoidable or as conducive to aggregate 
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production, or on other grounds, to be endured or ap-
plauded. 
Taking inequality of wealth as a positive fact, it is clear 
that the relatively rich will demand all kinds of luxuries 
and their demand being effectual these luxuries will be 
produced ; whilst the relatively poor may have insufficient 
necessaries and the extremity of their want exercise no 
influence on production: there may be an effectual de-
mand for cakes, but only an empty desire for bread, there 
being an obvious loss in total utility to the two classes 
together. 
I t is not necessary, however, to resort to extremes, which 
are always suspected. If we take any two unequal in-
comes, and make the usual assumptions regarding our 
own flesh and blood, the possessor of the larger income 
will guide the larger part of production for his own benefit, 
and not for that of himself and his neighbour combined. 
There are no doubt compensations, but, granted unequal 
incomes — and disregarding for the present the more 
remote influences on production and accumulation — free-
dom of demand and consumption, may from the social 
point of view, lead to a loss of social utility in many 
ways. 
In the first place, if the things which are the objects 
of demand are limited by nature, it is possible that the 
demands of the rich for extravagant luxury may stint the 
necessaries of the poor. Such has often been the case in 
the past as regards land (and other gifts of na ture) , and 
is so still in several respects in the most advanced com-
munities. If a large rural population is evicted to make 
room for cattle, sheep, or deer, the immediate loss to the 
inhabitants of the districts affected in general altogether 
outweighs the immediate gain. I t may happen that 
ultimately the loss to the nation will be more than com-
pensated by the greater efficiency of the deported labour, 
but the immediate object of the depopulation is in general 
simply a rise in rent or promotion of sport, and it is quite 
v o l . i i i . — q 
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possible tha t the compensation to the community may 
never be forthcoming. 
And passing from the limited gif ts of nature, where 
the expansion of possessions in one class means of neces-
sity the contraction of other classes, a similar failure of 
social uti l i ty may be observed in all things, tha t can only 
be increased with a rapidly diminishing return. The 
productive powers of society as a whole are wasted as 
regards the interests of the whole community. Nearly 
all expensive luxuries, e.g., the delicacies of the table, 
dress, houses and their decorations, fantastically t rained 
servants, curiously bred dogs, exemplify this form of 
economic waste. In some cases, it is t rue, the extrava-
gance of the rich is concentrated on works of art or 
encourages various forms of culture, but no one would 
contend that millionaires and lesser plutocrats justify their 
social existence as such by their control of expenditure. 
Such justification as their existence finds is from the side 
of production. For tunate ly the art of selfish expenditure 
— as exemplified in the concentrated waste of labour — 
has much degenerated since the t ime of the Roman Em-
pire, and many forms of ext ravagant waste are now either 
unknown or impossible through legal or moral impedi-
ments. A n d this leads to the still wider consideration 
tha t freedom of demand may result in a demand for evil 
things, and in this case the poor — relatively to their means 
•—often show worse choice than the rich. The problem 
of overcrowding in cities is only partly due to the limited 
supply of houses; in many cases the people prefer over-
crowding, and in still more they object to the trouble of 
living at a distance from their work. A more judicious 
expendi ture would vastly improve the condition of the 
working-classes above the lowest ranks, and a rise in wages 
without an improvement in expenditure often has no effect 
in raising their condition. 
Consumers in general are apt to be too much influenced 
by immediate cheapness. The demand for cheapness 
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naturally leads to adulteration and deterioration of quality, 
just as the demand by the wealthy for expensive goods 
that will show off their wealth leads also to deterioration 
of art. 
The element of time must also be considered. I t is to 
the interest of the individual taking interest to mean the 
acquisition of pleasure to enjoy the day and discount the 
future heavily. Even one generation, guided in this way, 
may from the point of view of the nation as an enduring 
society lay too much stress on the present, to the serious 
danger of fu ture prosperity. Thus, for example, the 
treatment of forests in new countries, and not infrequently 
in old, is ill managed in the interests of fu ture generations. 
And speaking generally, one of the most vital distinctions 
is that between the satisfaction of present and fu ture 
needs, the distinction between capital and non-capital, 
the balance of production over consumption. 
On the whole it is evident tha t freedom of consumption 
is liable to many chances of failure, whether we consider 
the direct immediate consumption of individuals or the in-
direct consequences as regards the future. Such failures 
are still more likely to occur when the interests of others 
(present or fu ture ) are indirectly affected. And finally, 
the chances of failure are fur ther increased when we bring 
in the various forms of immaterial wealth—-education, 
arts, letters, and religion. 
Thus ,primd facie, there is room for interference or guid-
ance on the part of the State as regards what at first sight 
seems the best established position of the system of natural 
liberty, viz., freedom of demand. Freedom of demand may 
be either injurious or insufficient; and the State may be 
called on to control private expenditure or to increase 
public expenditure, on various social and moral grounds, 
as well as on more purely economic considerations. 
Whether, on the whole, State interference is desirable, de-
pends on the methods and limitations of governmental 
action.1 
1 See next chapter. 
228 ECONOMIC. FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT. 
§ 3. vis regards Production. In the last section produc-
tion has only been considered indirectly as affected or 
guided by consumption or demand. I t has been implicitly 
assumed that the producers carry out the orders of the 
consumers; that they are, so to speak, simply agents for 
the consumers, and like other agents under a perfect system 
of law can never benefit at the expense of their principals. 
Practically, however, the interests of producers are found 
to conflict with the interests of consumers in several ways: 
they may conflict as regards cheapness, abundance, and 
quality. I t is to the interest of the producers or dealers 
to sell as dear as possible after taking into account the 
possible competition of others and the possible effect on 
demand. To neutralise competition they may resort to 
combination and monopoly, and if they do so there will in 
general be a rise of price against the consumer. If they 
can fix prices arbitrarily, monopolists generally err on the 
side of excess, even in their own interests, and still more 
from the point of view of the consumer. The association 
of cheapness and plenty is so evident that it is hardly 
necessary to repeat that artificial dearness involves artifi-
cial restriction of supply. 
Again, there may be, as in retail trades, a tacit combina-
tion to fix prices, the competition of the retailers being 
confined to competition for customers. As regards legal, 
medical, and ecclesiastical fees, and payments for various 
kinds of services, we are also as in other things a nation of 
shopkeepers.1 
I t is to the interest of any one producer or dealer to 
displace his rivals by advertisements and other costly 
expedients, and, taking a broad survey of production and 
consumption, a general waste is thereby incurred. 
1 This expression is found in Adam Smith, though generally ascribed 
to Napoleon Bonaparte. " To found a great empire for the sole purpose 
of raising up a people of customers may, at first sight, appear a project fit 
only for a nation of shopkeepers. I t is, however, a project altogether 
unfit for a nation of shopkeepers, but extremely fit for a nation whose 
government is influenced by shopkeepers." — Wealth of Nations, Bk. IV., 
Ch. VII., p. 253 (Nicholson's edition). 
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As regards the quality of wares, the profits of adultera-
tion and of the substitution of inferior kinds are attrac-
tive to the self-interest of producers. A little water in 
heavily taxed spirits or tobacco is very profitable, as is also 
the promotion (to adopt a simile of Mr. Gladstone) of 
Cape and Australian wines to the style and titles of 
French vineyards. A slight change of language will 
adapt the same ideas to the case of immaterial wealth. 
Legal documents and counsels' speeches are copiously 
diluted with words. 
Production for the present purpose includes exchange 
as already implied in some of the examples, and most 
commodities bear large surtaxes imposed by useless ex-
changes before they reach the hands of the consumers. 
Even ideas cannot be distributed without considerable cost 
in respect of intermediaries. 
The waste involved in unregulated freedom of produc-
tion and transmission is especially observable in the ad-
vancement of learning of all kinds, although it must also 
be remembered that it is precisely in this field that regu-
lation by authority has met with the most signal failure. 
On the whole, there can be no question tha t in certain 
cases freedom of production, like freedom of demand, may 
involve economic waste and social disorder. The failures 
of production, moreover, as already explained, are greatest 
as regards the conditions of employment or the disabilities 
involved in labour. On this matter the history of factory 
and other working-class legislation affords evidence that 
is only too abundant. The difficulty is not to discover 
examples of failure, but practicable remedies. 
§ 4. Failures of Distribution. I t is, however, as re-
gards distribution, tha t the failures or defects of unfet-
tered individualism seem greatest ; and it is also in this 
department that there is the greatest difficulty in deciding 
on the tests by which failures and defects are to be meas-
ured. W e cannot in this case, consistently with the view 
taken in this work, adopt as our standard maximum utility, 
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and simply consider how far individual freedom fails to 
realise this ideal; nor can we take for our standard some 
particular meaning of justice as determined by ethics, or 
by natural or revealed religion. 
Whatever view, however, is taken of the ultimate ideal 
of distribution, the principal question to determine is this: 
How far does perfect freedom of competition, or more 
generally the individualistic system, as regards labour and 
property, secure for each the net value 1 of his contribution 
to the national dividend ? To what extent failure in this 
respect amounts to a failure in justice or a loss of utility 
or of liberty involves a wider philosophical inquiry. 
In previous portions of this work I have noticed the 
failures of distribution due to practical difficulties in se-
curing full play to freedom, — the failures due to want 
of mobility of labour and capital, and to the friction of use 
and wont and other social influences. I propose now to 
examine the individualistic system of distribution apart 
from these so-called disturbing causes. 
Taking as the standard or test of success how far each 
person receives the net value of his contribution to the 
national dividend, there may be failures on the side of 
excess or of deficiency; and, indeed, the one involves the 
other, as in the converse case of taxation when relief to one 
class involves additional burdens on others. 
The economic test may be applied to the three great 
species of income in order. 
(1 ) And first, as regards the economic rent of land and 
other gifts of nature, — i.e., apart from the capital sunk in 
them,—-this species of income is derived from appropria-
tion and inheritance. The economic rent, pure and simple, 
is unearned by the individual possessor; and if reward is 
to be proportioned to the value of the contribution of each, 
we may say of the owners of the gifts of nature with St. 
Jerome : " Omnis dives iniquus aut heres iniqui." I t is easy, 
of course, to mitigate the " ferocity " of this doctrine, and 
1 See note at the end of the chapter. 
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the modern economist has a less difficult task than the 
mediaeval casuist. The original sins of acquisition have 
been blotted out by contracts of sale, and even Karl Marx 
admits the validity of this method of purification. Pri-
vate ownership of land and natural sources has many com-
pensating advantages; and, as already shown, if the State 
were to expropriate without compensation the direct gain 
would probaMy be less than the indirect loss, and even 
with compensation the immediate loss would be greater 
than the future gain. Again, much of what at first sight 
seems unearned by the unjust owner has been more than 
earned by his laborious and so far just predecessors. In 
other cases labour has been devoted to the environment, 
and the betterment of the property is due to indirect influ-
ences of the owners. 
But after making all allowances, the central fact remains 
that we cannot apply to the owners of the gifts of nature, 
qua nature, the economic principle that the producer ought 
to receive the value of his product, on the ground that 
otherwise the product will not be forthcoming. The land 
itself, i.e., its natural and indestructible qualities and the 
other unexploited resources of a country, remain unaffected 
by the mode of distribution. 
I t must be noted, also, that apart from rent considered 
as unearned, there are other privileges connected with 
landed and similar property which may lead to a failure 
of individualism. Appropriation implies exclusiveness, 
and in this case limitation cannot be overcome by substi-
tution. And in respect of many of the abuses of private 
ownership the modern socialist may again quote the medi-
aeval saint : u Dulcissima rerum possessio communis est." 
How far the unearned increment of land can be benefi-
cially absorbed'by taxation for the common good, and 
how far the abuses of private ownership can be remedied by 
legal regulations or abolition, are questions that depend for 
their answer on the general principles of taxation and of 
legislation. 
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(2 ) Profits on capital also fail in many cases to corre-
spond to the assumed simple proportion of reward to effort.1 
The history of the controversies on interest and the cor-
responding changes in law and public opinion offer the full-
est evidence on this point. The first application of the 
pure theory in the case of loans of money converts all in-
terest into extortion. The arguments 110 doubt are at first 
mainly derived from authority, philosophy, or religion, but 
in the course of time economic considerations come more 
and more to the front . A distinction is drawn between 
those forms of interest which may be considered as the fair 
reward for certain economic services, and those forms 
which correspond to unfair advantage taken of the neces-
sities of others, or to the accumulations of passive idleness.2 
The result of the series of controversies was to bring more 
and more cases under the class of just reward; the mere ac-
cumulat ion of capital in the sacrifice of the present, in the 
trouble of taking thought for the morrow, and in the risk 
of fu ture loss was seen to involve a species of economic 
effort analogous to the effort of labour. In the end pure 
interes t came to be regarded as the price necessary to call 
f o r th an adequate amount of capital, whether we consider 
the case of individual producers, or the productive powers of 
the whole society. The analysis, however, already g iven 3 
shows that such a simple harmony is not always forthcom-
ing. I t is easy to see that in many cases individuals obtain 
for their capital more than is necessary to make it forth-
coming or available. A fall in the rate of interest may 
occur without any check on accumulation. The interest 
received from capital may indeed be considered as the 
price paid for its use ( including the original provision and 
maintenance) , but all prices depend on demand as well as 
supply. And it is quite clear that an increase in demand 
due to a variety of causes may raise the rate of interest 
(considered as a price), whilst for the time the conditions 
1 Cf. Webb, II. , pp. 679, 680, 688, 689, on " Monopolies." 
2 Cf. Ashley on the Canon Law and Interest. 
3 Cf. Bk. II.. Ch. XIII ; Bk. III . , Ch. XXII. ; Bk. IV., Ch. VI. 
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of supply are/actual ly more favourable to accumulation. 
Thus we reach the conclusion tha t in interest, as in eco-
nomic rent, there is an " u n e a r n e d " element. This con-
clusion is s t rengthened when we take account fu r ther of 
the fact that the interest resembles economic rent in the 
differences of yield to different kinds of capital. If some 
kinds obtain a bare minimum or a marginal re turn, others 
obtain much more. This "quasi-rent" may be unstable in 
any particular case, but a large amount is, on the average, 
always present in any progressive society.1 
When we consider the element in profits ranked as 
wages of superintendence or reward for management, the 
exceptions to the rule founded on the ne t value of the 
contribution of each to the national dividend become more 
numerous and glaring. And, generally, we may say that 
the mere possession of material capital gives to the man-
agers, on the whole, an advantage in the distribution of 
the national dividend, over those who have only labour to 
offer. Thus, relatively, there is an unearned element in 
the profits of management. Similarly, in many under-
takings, the reward for risk is far more than is necessary 
for insurance. 
(3 ) The consideration of this particular element — 
profits — leads up to the thi rd great species of income, 
namely, wages of labour. And here the results of the 
analysis in the earlier portions of this inquiry make ab-
breviation not only possible, but conducive to clearness. 
Capital, as we saw, is immaterial as well as material, and 
immaterial capital is lodged in human beings, and when 
they use this capital they call it work or labour. But , as 
we also saw, the greater part of this immaterial capital is 
an inheritance from the past — and the greater the degree 
of skill and the complexity of the education required, so 
much the more is the possessor indebted to the spirits of 
the departed. Any man of ordinary intelligence can be 
trained to acquire ordinary professional skill in any of the 
1 Cf. Webb, Industrial Democracy, I I . , p. 680. 
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arts and sciences, but not one in a thousand has made for 
himself an addition to the knowledge derived from the 
past. A n d thus, taking all the branches of skilled labour, 
f rom the lowest to the highest, the larger part of their 
earnings is an annui ty from the dead. The temporary 
possessors of this great inheritance have no more created 
it than the landlords have created the l and ; they cannot 
even plead that their direct ancestors in blood have given 
them a t i t l e ; they have simply taken that part of the 
knowledge of the race which lay nearest to hand and 
seemed most profitable ; and they have used it for their 
own ends, without a thought of the givers — as thought-
less as seeds that have fallen on good ground of the labours 
of the husbandman.1 
But, passing from this general survey, which reveals a 
large unearned increment in the wages of every form of 
labour, we easily see that wages under a system of compe-
tition are subject to various inequalities, and that reward 
fails to be proportioned to effort or desert. Perfect dis-
tr ibution as contemplated under perfect competition could 
only be realised in a stationary society. As soon as we 
introduce change, or progress, time is required for re-
adjus tment , and unti l the readjus tment is made, some gain 
and others lose without merit and without fault . If we are 
heirs of the dead in knowledge, we are heirs also in igno-
rance ; and in the economic world also there are survivals 
and even reversions. 
§ 5. ResumS. Thus when we take a dispassionate sur-
vey of individualism, considered as the basis of modern 
industrial societies, we find it is open to criticism both in 
principle and in detail. 
The two supports of the system are freedom and self-
interest. Bu t freedom is freedom under the law, and 
self-interest includes interest in others and in the State. 
Thus freedom is not merely absence of restraint or the 
negation of government . On the contrary it may be said 
1 Cf. Webb, II . , op. cit., p. 831. 
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that the highest form of government is that which secures 
the highest form of liberty. 
And self-interest may be so interpreted as to mean that 
higher self, which in every man is supposed to sit in judg-
ment on the doings of his imperfect and misguided self. 
And again reason may counsel the suppression, by the 
power of law, of various forms of lower self-interest. 
And in each of the great economic departments we find 
that abuses and failures may arise from unregulated indi-
vidualism. In consumption, in production, and in distri-
bution, there are cases which seem primd facie to call for 
remedies on the part of the State. To some extent it is 
true, the defects and failures of unregulated individualism 
may be met by voluntary associations, the diversities and 
benefits of which have been already examined. But those 
associations, as already indicated, are again liable to lead 
to fur ther abuses, and to call for further regulations on the 
part of the State.1 
Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the methods and 
limitations of governmental action. 
1 The general relations of voluntary associations to the State have been 
well treated by Professor Sidgwick, Elements of Politics, Ch. X X V I I I . 
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T h e s t a n d a r d of t he ne t va lue of t he con t r ibu t ion of each is by no 
means so s imple as m a y a t first s igh t appear . As so o f ten happens in 
economics, t he difficulties m a y be evaded by verbal t ru isms, e.g., by 
the s t a t emen t t h a t t he ne t value of t h e con t r ibu t ion of each can only 
mean the compet i t ion price t h a t is given for it. 
E v e n u n d e r t h e assumpt ion , however , of s ta t ical condi t ions a n d 
perfec t competi t ion, t he re are the inequal i t ies crea ted by beques t a n d 
inher i tance , a n d b y t he t h r e e g rea t facts , t h a t l and (qua n a t u r e ) re-
quires no economic " con t r ibu t ion " for its main tenance , t h a t t h e sup-
ply of labour depends only pa r t ly on t he price ob ta ined for it , and t h a t 
even as regards capi ta l t he price ob ta ined for its use is only one ele-
men t in its product ion . 
Again , value in every case depends as necessari ly on demand as 
on supply, and the value of t h e con t r ibu t ion of each depends as 
m u c h on the d e m a n d for i t as on the " effor ts a n d abs t inences " of t he 
cont r ibutor . 
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Moreover, under condi t ions t h a t are s ta t ical by cer ta in tests (e.g., 
n u m b e r of popula t ion , wea l th pe r head, etc.) , there are always inces-
san t changes of the cons t i tuen t e lements in d e m a n d and supply, and 
every so-called s ta t ical condi t ion (when we leave t he cover of hypoth-
esis) is only a t empora ry equi l ib r ium of complex var iable forces. 
W h e n we pass def ini te ly to so-called dynamica l condit ions, the fail-
ures in equ i tab le d i s t r ibu t ion are mul t ip l ied a n d magnif ied . 
M a r k e t values of every descr ip t ion oscillate abou t normal values, 
wh ich themselves are c h a n g i n g w i th d i f fe ren t degrees of rap id i ty . 
C H A P T E R IV. 
METHODS AND LIMITATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL INTER-
FERENCE. 
§ 1. The General Question. The failures and defects 
of individualism may, as indicated, sometimes be met by 
increasing the reality of freedom, and sometimes by enlarg-
ing and extending the ideas of self-interest. And in both 
of these objects, to some extent, government may assist. 
The professed object of England, for example, in dealing 
with inferior and subject races is to render them lit for 
self-government and awake in them the wants and desires 
of civilisation. And, as often shown in the course of this 
work, the most advanced nation has within itself classes 
which represent the barbarism and stagnation of older 
types; and here, also, the primary object of government 
is to raise these classes to a higher level. In either case 
government can do little if not assisted directly and indi-
rectly by public opinion and private effort. For a long 
time the effective public opinion of England looked upon 
India simply as a field for exploitation, and at home the 
education of the masses was considered as out of place and 
unfitting the people for their proper station in life. In 
both cases the change in public opinion has revolutionised 
our economic policy. 
There are, however, other failures of individualism 
which call for the repression or curtailment of the freedom 
of individuals, and other defects which the unaided self-
interest of individuals is unable to remedy. To meet these 
defects and failures a primd facie case is presented for 
governmental interference. Whether or not the case for 
interference proves to be on the whole advantageous will 
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depend part ly ou the kind of interference required, and 
partly on the limitations, general and particular, imposed 
on governmental action. 
The methods of governmental interference may be 
divided into two great groups.1 First, the government 
may regulate the actions of individuals by providing and 
enforcing a system of positive l aw; and secondly, the gov-
ernment may itself perform certain economic functions. 
I proceed to notice some of the principal cases of these 
methods, t ak ing them as far as possible according to the 
degree of compulsion involved. 
The object in view is not the vain a t tempt to summarise 
all the principles of modern systems of law and govern-
ment, but by the examination of important typical cases 
to discover some of the principal practical limitations to 
beneficial governmental action. I t is impossible to assign 
theoretical limits to the action of the State if once the 
assumption is made of an all-wise and all-powerful gov-
ernment.2 
§ 2. I. The Methods of Legal Enactment: ( a ) The Crimi-
nal Law. The government may bring .certain kinds of 
economic abuses — whether of omission or commission — 
under the penal law, and inflict punishments of various 
degrees of intensity upon the offender. This method of 
interference is found to vary with different ideas of moral-
* 
1 Cf. Wagner (Finanzwissenschci f t , I., 64-68). He divides tlie func-
tions of government into two classes : (1) Reclits- und Machtzweck ; 
(2) Cultur- und Wolilfahrtzweck. 
2 The present German Emperor may be quoted as an extreme believer 
in State regulation : " When I came to the throne I stepped out of the 
school of idealism in which my fa ther had brought me up. I was of 
opinion that it was the duty of the Royal Theatre , above all things, to 
cultivate idealism in the people ; the theatre should be an instrument of 
the monarch, and, like the school or the university, work for the preser-
vation of the highest spiritual qualities of our noble German Fatherland. 
The theatre should contribute to the formation of the mind and charac-
ter, and to the ennobling of our moral perceptions. The theatre is also 
one of my weapons ." — Speech of the Herman Emperor on June 16, 
1898. 
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ity, religion, and civilisation. Examples may be taken 
from eacli of the great departments of political economy. 
In production the employment of persons, and even of 
animals, under conditions formerly considered natural , or 
at any rate lawful, is now no longer tolerated in civilised 
states. The clothier who keeps too many tailors in a room, 
and the farmer who keeps too many sheep in a field, are 
both brought under the penal law. Nearly every great 
industry in modern industrial societies is subject to legal 
regulations, the offence against which is cr iminal; and 
one of the crying demands of the times is to apply similar 
legislation to home industries.1 On the other hand, also, 
methods of production are now permitted which with other 
times and manners were 'forbidden. The use of the term 
" b r o a d c l o t h " recalls the regulation of Richard I. (1197), 
which provided that all cloth must be two ells in width. 
Mediaeval authority, as displayed directly byr the State or 
indirectly by corporations and guilds permit ted by the 
State, enforced with penalties minute regulations regard-
ing the quality, weights, and measures of all kinds of 
wares.2 
The criminal law of former times was part icularly vigor-
ous and rigorous in the various departments of exchange. 
The mediaeval t rader spent his life in paying or in evading 
the penalties of the criminal law. In England, even af ter 
the mediaeval period, the laws regulat ing trade in sheep and 
wool were, as Adam Smith says, writ ten in blood, and what 
strikes us perhaps even more, they were curiously refined 
in their cruelty — the penalties ascending from fines 
through dismemberment 3 up to death itself. 
The consumer was not only the object, but sometimes 
also the subject, of criminal law. People were not allowed 
to eat, drink, or wear what they liked, but what the law 
1 Cf. Webb, Industrial Democracy, II., pp. 112, 539. 
2 Cf. Schanz, op. cit., Vol. I., p. 586. 
3 E.g., the left hand to be cut off and nailed up in the market-place on 
a market-day. 
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liked. Sumptuary laws were numerous and minute. In 
modern times sumptuary regulations are mainly enforced 
by custom, fashion, and public opinion, but the criminal 
law still finds a few victims, especially as regards the con-
sumption of drink and poisons. Sumptuary laws of the 
mediaeval type still prevail as regards certain forms of 
immaterial wealth and services. The modern State now 
determines the quality and quant i ty of primary education, 
though generally no longer of religion. 
Again, as regards the distribution of wealth, we find 
similar variations in the use of the criminal law. Various 
modes of acquisition of property, formerly considered nat-
ural , have now found a place in the criminal law, whilst 
others formerly included have been emancipated. A man 
cannot now lawfully sell his wife or children. Wrecked 
ships and their cargoes are no longer the natural prey of 
the wreckers. In the Middle Ages usury was criminal, 
but the creditor could lawful ly make a slave of the debtor 
— so different was the at t i tude toward the principal sum 
and usance of it. 
In former times a t tempts have been made to regulate the 
rates of wages, penalties being imposed on those who gave 
or received higher rates. Sometimes minimum rates have 
also been enforced. A t present the efforts of some social-
istic reformers are directed toward a vast extension of this 
pr inciple: they would make it criminal to do certain work 
at less than certain ra tes ; they contend they are only giv-
ing its logical development to the practice of labour combina-
tions. Custom with the force of law as regards those who 
submit to it, as shown by trade unions (or conversely by 
associations of masters) , is held to furnish a model for the 
State. 
The simplicity of the method of regulation through the 
criminal law has always made it attractive to legislators and 
reformers. This method, however, is subject in practice to 
very effective limitations. J u s t as the letter of the law 
varies with the ideas of its framers so also does the enforce-
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ment vary with the ideas of its administrators. The great-
est agency in the mitigation of criminal statutes in England 
has undoubtedly been the refusal of juries to convict, and 
of judges to inflict the penalt ies; the juries have turned a 
blind eye to the evidence, and the judges have given them 
the appearance of reason by legal fictions. I t follows that 
the limits to the power of governmental action by the 
method of criminal legislation are found in the actual 
moral sense of the community ; the ultimate sanction of 
the criminal law as regulating economic actions is found 
in public opinion. Thus, even as regards the obvious and 
simple system of coercion, the tendencies of the opposing 
system of natural liberty have to be considered. 
(b ) Contracts, Parties to. The government, without 
going the length of prohibiting or penalising certain ac-
tions, may refuse to enforce the corresponding agreements 
or promises of performance. In some cases this refusal 
rests on the legal incapacity of the persons to make the 
agreement binding.1 Thus as exceptions to the capacity 
of natural persons to bind themselves by cont rac t—recog-
nised to a greater or less extent in different systems of 
law — we have infancy, coverture, and insanity. Some-
times the contracts are void, sometimes only voidable. 
The positive law of a State also defines the capacity of 
artificial persons of various kinds, e.g., corporations, part-
ners, companies. 
The development of mercantile law is a good illustra-
tion of differences in legal capacity. A t first merchants 
were a special class having special privileges and subject 
to special duties, and the mercantile law so far as it existed 
was administered in special courts (e.g., the Staple and 
Piepoudre) ; in the second period the mercantile law con-
sisted of a body of customs which must be proved as facts, 
and binding only upon the special class of merchants ; in 
the third period these customs were incorporated in the 
1 Cf. Pollock on Contract, Ch. I I . 
VOL. I I I . — R 
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general law and made binding on all, whether merchants 
or not.1 
To take a particular case: " Bills of Exchange at first 
were extended only to merchant strangers trafficking with 
English merchants, and af terward to inland bills between 
merchants trafficking with one another here in England; 
and then to all persons trafficking, and subsequently to all 
persons trafficking or not ." 
I t may be observed tha t the tendency of legislation in 
progressive societies has been to abolish the special rights 
and duties of special classes as regards making and enforc-
ing contracts. For example, a gentleman may now be a 
t r ade r ; so may his wife ; and either may become bankrupt 
separately. On the whole, the law of contract has become 
less and less a law of classes. 
( c ) Contracts, Forms of. The government maj ' make 
certain requirements of form essential to the enforcement 
of certain contracts. The contrast between ancient and 
modern conceptions of contracts as giving rights of action 
is remarkable and instructive. " According to the modern 
conception of contract, all agreements which satisfy certain 
conditions of a general kind are valid contracts and may 
be sued upon in the absence of any special legislation 
forbidding particular contracts to be made, or denying 
validity to them unless made with particular forms ." 2 
Ancient law, on the other hand, regards only formal con-
tracts. " The fundamenta l assumption of ancient law 
(when it has got so far as to recognise contract at al l) is 
tha t the validity of a contract depends, not upon the sub-
stance of the transaction, but upon its form. The rule is 
tha t formal contracts only can be sued upon ; the want of 
any part of the formalities is f a t a l ; the fulf i lment of them 
is conclusive." 3 
No better instance could be given of the extension of 
1 Smith 's Mercantile Law, Vol. I., p. lxxxii. 
a Pollock, op. tit., p. 119. 
3 Maine's Ancient Law, Ch. IX. 
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•the liberty of individuals or the diminution of the sphere 
of State control. In modern times the enforcement of 
particular forms is generally either -for the purposes of 
revenue, as in the stamp duties, or of registration — the 
ultimate object being not restriction, but publicity. The 
form as such is of no importance; the decisive considera-
tion is the intention of the parties, or the intention of the 
State. 
( d ) Contracts, Substance of. — The government may, 
however, make compulsory in contracts certain require-
ments, not only of form but of substance. In no contract, 
whether dealing with land or any other subject-matter, do 
the parties express in extenso all the rights and obliga-
tions involved. Certain provisions are held to be applied 
by the law, general or special. I t may be observed, how-
ever, tha t save in specially excepted cases persons are at 
liberty to contract themselves out of the particular obli-
gations imposed (otherwise) by statute. And a law 
which admits of "cont rac t ing o u t " generally remains a 
counsel of perfection, or at best provides a legal interpre-
tation in case of need. 
The cases, however, in which evasion of this kind is not 
permitted, are in modern states both numerous and im-
portant. In the contracts in use in most great industries 
— in agriculture, mining, manufactures, fisheries, railways, 
navigation — the legislature has made certain clauses com-
pulsory, and has prohibited the insertion of others. 
This method of interference also has its limitations. 
If the government at tempts too much, having regard to 
the ideas, customs, or prejudices of the times, either by 
way of compulsion or prohibition, the law is either evaded 
by the parties affected or nullified by its administrators. 
The att i tude of the public to lawbreakers of this kind is 
the at t i tude of Adam Smith to smugglers. " T o pretend 
to have any scruples about buying smuggled goods would 
in most countries be regarded as one of those pedantic 
pieces of hypocrisy, which, instead of gaining credit with 
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anybody, serve only to expose the person who affects to 
practise them, to the suspicion of being a greater knave 
than most of his neighbours ." As duties became more 
reasonable smuggling diminished, not only because less 
profitable, but because less connived at by public opinion. 
A law may be nullified, not only by laxity on the part 
of the executive, but by elasticity of interpretation. Such 
elasticity is well i l lustrated by the doctrine of considera-
tion, supposed to be peculiar to the English law of con-
tract.1 According to the theory of English law, a naked 
promise ( n u d u m pactum), so called because there is noth-
ing assigned why it should be made, is not b inding; every 
contract is supposed to imply a quid pro quo, or to be made 
on account of some valuable consideration. Such is the 
general principle, and the elasticity may be measured by 
the practical qualification tha t the adequacy of the consid-
eration is not material. " T h e value of all things," said 
Hobbes, " is measured by the appetite of the contractors, 
and therefore the just value is that which they be con-
tented to g ive . " 2 The terms " r e a s o n " and "conscience," 
with their derivative adjectives, have been found equally 
variable and elastic when interpreted in the law courts. 
" Customs," says Blackstone, " must be reasonable ; or 
rather, taken negatively, they must not be unreasonable, 
which is not always to be understood of every unlearned 
man's reason, but of artificial and legal reason warranted 
by authority of l a w . " 3 
§ 3. I I . The Methods of Governmental Action ( a ) The 
government may itself assume the position of a monopolist 
as regards certain industries or economic services. This 
case differs f rom that first noticed, namely, regulation by 
penalties, in tha t government not only prohibits others, 
but itself performs. The freedom of the individual is 
1 The analogies of the Roman causa and the French cause are partial 
only. Cf. Pollock's Contract, Ch. IV. 
2 Leviathan, P t . I . , Ch. XV. 
3 Commentaries, Introd. Section I I I . , § 1, 1. 
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equally restricted, but the government takes away the 
real burden of restriction by itself satisfying the economic 
want. Thus the post-office has a monopoly of letter-carry-
ing, but most people look on this monopoly as advanta-
geous. Again, the government prohibits private coinage, 
and again also confers a benefit by the prohibition. The 
penalties imposed on the infr ingement of governmental 
monopolies or patents may range from the most severe of 
the criminal law to a nominal fine by way of warning to 
desist. 
The assumption of monopolies by governments (with 
the exceptions noted) , and still more the delegation of 
such powers by patents to individuals, has in the course of 
time been greatly diminished. In England the constitu-
tional s truggle was practically settled under Elizabeth, 
and the victory was confirmed by the unsuccessful rever-
sion of the Stuarts. An important function of govern-
ment is the provision of weights and measures. Sometimes 
the use is compulsory and besides official stamping is 
necessary; sometimes the use is only optional, and side by 
side various local and customary standards are in vogue. 
( i ) The government may undertake certain kinds of 
business, but at the same time allow private enterprise to 
compete, as, for example, in providing for religious services, 
or for the conveyance of parcels. In this case — that of 
governmental management side by side with private enter-
prise — the only element of competition consists in the co-
ercive levying by taxation (as in Church t i thes) of the funds 
required for carrying on the business, and when the busi-
ness can be made to pay its own expenses (as with the 
parcel post) even this element of coercion vanishes.1 In 
forming an estimate of cost, however, it is important to 
take into account all the indirect expenses and supplement-
ary charges. 
(c) The government may intervene simply to carry out 
the wishes of the parties concerned (as, for example, in 
1 Sidgwiek's Political Economy, p. 427. 
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providing official arbi t rat ion) . A great part of the law of 
every State is intended simply to provide, or enforce, set-
tled rules, e.g., the rule of the road on land or sea. W h a t 
the rule is, is often a matter of indifference, provided only 
it is fixed and known. 
The principle of the law of inheritance (when freedom 
of bequest is al lowed) is in case of intestacy to carry out 
the supposed wishes of the deceased. 
And even when the law of inheritance lays down cer-
tain compulsory rules for the division of property after 
the death of the owner, it may be maintained that the 
owner, being dead, does not feel the compulsion. Practi-
cally, however, the knowledge of the law will, if it is not 
approved, lead to evasion by gif t , inter vivos, or the crea-
tion of secret trusts . 
The laws of bankruptcy are in some respects similar 
to the laws of compulsory inheritance. The bankrupt 
is so far civilly dead, and the State lays down the rules 
for distribution of his estate amongst the creditors. If it 
be supposed that the creditors wish for a just distribution, 
the State only carries out their wishes. The laws of 
bankruptcy also resemble the laws of inheritance in liabil-
ity to evasion by similar devices. 
Special at tention may be called to the illustration given 
by Mi l l 1 of the method under consideration. There are 
matters, he says, in which the interference of law is re-
quired, not to overrule the judgment of individuals 
respecting their own interest, but to give effect to that 
j u d g m e n t ; they being unable to give effect to it except 
by concert, which concert again cannot be effectual un-
less it receives validity and sanction from the law. As a 
particular case, he supposes that a general reduction of 
the hours of factory labour, from ten to nine, would be 
for the advantage of the work-people in the sense that 
they would receive practically the same wages for an 
hour 's less work. W e are not concerned now with the 
1 Political Economy, Bk. V., Ch. XI. , p. 12. 
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possibilities of the case ; increased efficiency might make 
even eight hours equal to ten, and, on the other hand, in 
some cases the greater intensity of labour might more 
than neutralise the benefit to the labourers of the short-
ening of hours. The only point in question is, tha t al-
though every individual worker might think that it would 
be for his interest and for the interests of the whole class 
to work the shorter time, the plan will not be adopted 
unless the operatives bind themselves together to abide 
by it. Agreement alone will not be sufficient unless 
enforced by opinion with a rigour practically equal to tha t 
of the law. Mill's position is, that the immediate interest 
of every individual would be found in violating the agree-
ment. His argument, in effect, supposes tha t the work-
ers are in the position of a combination of sellers with a 
seller's monopoly, and as such the case reduces to that 
already considered. I t is noteworthy that Mill himself 
does not recommend the proposal; he only uses it as an 
example of the manner in which classes of persons may 
need the assistance of the law to give effect to their delib-
erate collective opinion of their own interests. Up to the 
present, combinations of men and of masters have received 
very little legal recognition of this kind. Agreements 
that are intended to establish monopolies are still consid-
ered as in restraint of t rade. 1 
( d ) The government may provide for the erection and 
maintenance of various public works and institutions, for 
the provision of which private enterprise is unequal. This 
is the case which was dealt with very ful ly by Adam 
Smith, and in our own time is being pushed to an extreme 
by socialists. I t is a very large case, especially in the 
guise of municipal t rading and poor relief. Considered 
as a method of governmental interference, here again the 
only compulsion is in providing the revenue to meet the 
expenses, a kind of compulsion, however, it may be ob-
served, that becomes intensely disagreeable after a certain 
1 Cf. Webb, Vol. II . , pp. 713, 714, 531, 633, 853, Appendix. 
248 250 ECONOMIC. F U N C T I O N S O F G O V E R N M E N T . 
point has been reached in taxation or other compulsory 
contributions. The limitations to governmental and mu-
nicipal work of this kind are found part ly in the limits to 
taxat ion or other sources of revenue, — if the works and 
inst i tut ions are not se l f -support ing,—and part ly in the 
limits to public expenditure which must conform to cer-
tain general principles.1 
Before considering the degree and nature of the limits 
imposed by public finance, it is necessary to notice briefly 
certain limitations of a general character, which are appli-
cable to all kinds of governmental control. A brief state-
ment ought to suffice, because they are either obvious in 
themselves, or abundant ly proved by the experience of 
different progressive nations under various conditions. 
Their importance must not be measured by the paucity of 
words required to set them f o r t h ; the greater the t ru th 
the greater the brevity. 
§ 4. General Limitations to Governmental Interference. 
The assumption tha t government is all-wise and all-power-
fu l is so far removed from the t ru th as to be of little use 
even for the purposes of abstract reasoning. W i t h the 
best intentions, governments may ruin their legislation by 
ignorance and their administration by feebleness. And 
very f requent ly the intentions are not the best, if by best 
we mean tha t the public interests, with due regard to the 
fu tu re as well as the present, are always dominant. The 
government, even of the most democratic states, must be 
formed of persons who are themselves liable to errors of 
judgment and errors of passion. And to a considerable 
extent they are supposed to carry out the mandate of 
their electors. The electors are open to all kinds of per-
suasion, as well as to the persuasion of justice and reason. 
Ari thmetic, according to a very early text-book, was de-
fined as the art of handling numbers discreetly, and this 
definition still applies to political arithmetic. The com-
promise that shall provoke the least effective complaint 
1 See Ch. X V . 
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seems to be the democratic ideal of practical justice. I t is 
perhaps only in Russia that the fixed ideas of policy are 
relentlessly pursued independently of the personnel of the 
governors. In the most advanced democracies, laws are 
still made and unmade in the interests of powerful classes, 
and sometimes against the interests of considerable minor-
ities. Officials are still appointed for all sorts of reasons 
apart f rom merit and efficiency, and are removed, or not 
removed, on a similar diversity of excuses. The one and 
sufficient explanation of these shortcomings is, tha t gov-
ernment is carried on by men, and all men are imperfect. 
The best system of representation and of consti tut ional 
checks makes a very poor compensated balance, and the 
chronometer of the vessel of the State gains and loses by 
fits, and only by chance corresponds to the exact siderial 
time of theory. 
I t is t rue — to take the beneficial side of the meta-
p h o r — tha t the imperfections of individuals are to some 
extent remedied by the accumulated experience of the 
race, or of the nation, in morality and in wisdom. The 
laws of any country with a stable government are never 
repealed, and are seldom amended unt i l a defect is dis-
covered by some glaring abuse. W e are, indeed, inclined 
to rely on the wisdom of the past long af ter the conditions 
have changed which made it applicable. 
Again, as regards the administrative and the executive 
departments of government, there are, it is t rue, customs 
and traditions which command the respect of the most 
self-seeking officials. I t is as difficult for a judge to give 
judgment, consciously, against the law or to accept bribes, 
as for a soldier to act with cowardice in battle or to sell 
information to the enemy. On the other hand, however, 
we have examples of the vitality of evil traditions and of 
unreasoning routine. Governmental interference is always 
in danger of one horn of a dilemma. If the individual of-
ficial is lef t free to exercise his own judgment , there is 
the danger of caprice or jobbery, or simple foolishness; 
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if his freedom is curtailed, he must act by routine, and 
routine is not adapted to the ever changing conditions 
of modern societies. Though people still pray, like frogs, 
for the wise despot, they cannot get the wisdom, and they 
will not accept the despotism. 
Nex t to the imperfections of government due to the 
imperfections of man, we may notice the limitations im-
posed by the perfections of time. Time is an even, re-
lentless flow in politics as in physics. 
I t has general ly been recognised tha t legislation re-
quires deliberation. Deliberation means time, and the 
time available is limited. If the British Par l iament were 
to sit day and night, continuously, throughout the year, 
it could only ge t through a limited amount of legislative 
work. Accordingly, new measures and emendations of 
old s ta tutes must be introduced according to their impor-
tance. In democratic societies the relative importance 
is usually determined by the amount of popular support, 
and the excitation of this support again takes time. The 
members of the Decimal Association, for example, have 
been told, for the last fifty years, tha t they must educate 
public opinion. 
In the making of laws there is more of the proverbial 
law's delay than in their administration. Even when a 
sufficient number of people can be induced to shout the 
same th ing at the same time, loud enough for government 
to hear, the first s tep is, in general, a commission of in-
quiry, which is usually intended to give time to allow 
the clamour to subside; if the report necessitates a bill 
of some kind there are readings, committees, and reports 
in two houses to be surmounted ; the assent of the crown, 
or president, is then appended af ter a respectable interval, 
and the measure only becomes law at the appointed date. 
The judges then proceed to interpret the law according 
to the letter, when it is generally discovered that the 
framers of the act have used the wrong words to express 
the intentions of the promoters. A vast amount of liti-
G O V E R N M E N T A L I N T E R F E R E N C E . 
2-49 
gation is necessary to decide the correct interpretation, 
and long before the interpretation has become fixed the 
need for emendation is felt. Emendation, however, again 
requires time. 
Another limitation in lawmaking is found in the endur-
ance of the laws. Laws are now generally held to con-
tinue in force unti l they are definitely repealed. Thus , 
a law passed under popular excitement caused by tempo-
rary circumstances may become a nuisance, even in the 
nostrils of its promoters, before it has well got into opera-
tion. Some laws, like eggs, ge t addled in a very short 
time, and others lie dormant, like snakes, and become 
active when they are least wanted. If the endurance of 
laws has its advantages — if every generation of re-
formers can only hope to provide the necessary marginal 
increments — it has its disadvantages, especially in pro-
gressive societies. A n eternal law is in one respect, at 
least, much worse than Bentham's eternal husband ; the 
eternal husband may be got rid of by the act of God, but 
the eternal law only by the act of man. 
Next to the limitations imposed by time, we may notice 
the limitations on governmental action imposed the prin-
ciples of formal justice or uniformity. If a law is passed 
or the government otherwise interferes in favour of one 
set of persons, it must be prepared to extend sipiilar action 
to all similar cases. As far as the let ter of the law permits 
the courts will make the extension, but justice goes beyond 
the let ter of the law. Accordingly, laws beget laws af ter 
their kind as natural ly as microbes, al though they take 
longer about it. The danger of creating a precedent is 
nearly as great as tha t of making laws eternal. The most 
effective limit to public expenditure and to the assumption 
of new duties by the State, is the knowledge on the par t 
of the government tha t they must be prepared to apply 
the same principle to all similar cases. 
Every increase in the power of government and every 
extension of governmental interference increases the possi-
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bility of abuses. Appointments may be given or with-
drawn, not on account of fitness or incapacity, but for 
services to a political par ty — a kind of abuse abundantly 
i l lustrated in the " a n c i e n t " history of England and in 
" yesterday's " history of the Uni ted States of America. 
Power granted for one purpose may be misdirected to other 
purposes in the interest of the dominant political class; 
for even with the most effective representative systems the 
cabinet has very great power. There may be wasteful ex-
penditure under the influence of popular sen t imen t ; the 
machinery of government may be overburdened with work, 
and with the nicest ad jus tment of delegated authority 
some central control is always necessary. The self-in-
terest of officials may be opposed to the interests of the 
public, and reward by honour's and promotion depends for 
its effectiveness on the wisdom of selection. 
The authori tat ive prohibition of any course of conduct 
so far involves a limitation of freedom, and it may well hap-
pen that there will be no corresponding extension of free-
dom in other directions. On the principle of utility, the 
loss of freedom may too readily be held to be compensated 
by a gain of happiness in something else and by somebody 
else. Bu t the loss of freedom tends to starve the develop-
ment of character, and in the words of Mill, unless the 
conscience of the individual goes freely with the legal re-
straint, it partakes either in a great or in a small degree of 
the degradation of slavery. 
I t is sometimes supposed tha t a government of the 
people by the people or their representatives is alto-
gether different f rom a despotism ; and that under what 
is called a free government every individual must be 
free. This vague language will not bear analysis,1 and 
the idea which it is supposed to express has been forci-
bly exposed by Mill. " I t is no less important in a 
1 " Tha t the condition of a slave is better under an arbitrary than under 
a free government is, I believe, supported by the history of all ages and 
nat ions ." — A d a m S m i t h , p. 2 6 4 . 
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democratic than in any other government that all ten-
dency on the par t of public authorities to stretch their 
interference and assume a power of any sort tha t can 
readily be dispensed with should be regarded with unre-
mitting jealousy. Perhaps this is even more important in 
a democracy than in any other form of political society; 
because where public opinion is sovereign, an individual 
who is oppressed byr the sovereign does not, as in most other 
states of things, find a rival power to which he can appeal 
for relief or at all events for sympathy." 1 And again : 
" I n some countries the dream of the people is for not 
being tyrannised over, but in others it is merely for an 
equal chance to everybody of tyrannising. Unhappily, this 
last state of the desires is ful ly as natural to mankind as 
the former, and in many of the conditions even of civilised 
humanity is far more largely exemplified." 
In concluding this brief exposition of the general limita-
tions on governmental interference, I would again observe 
that the importance of well-established doctrines is not to 
be measured by the quant i ty of words necessary to convey 
the ideas. 
1 Political Economy, Bk. V., Ch. XI. , § 3. 
C H A P T E R V. 
THE EXPENSES AND THE REVENUES OP GOVERNMENT. 
§ 1. Revenue to be considered logically before Expense. 
The fur ther consideration of the limits of government must 
be lef t to jurisprudence and political science •— except as 
regards one of the most effective of these limits, viz., 
the expense involved. This expense may be simple and 
obvious, or complex and obscure; but i t is in the aggregate 
very real, and it gives the one impassable barrier to the ex-
tension of governmental functions. I t is sometimes said 
that the private person must regulate his expenditure by 
his income, whilst the State regulates its income by its 
expenditure.1 I t is t rue, to take an example from this 
country, tha t in practice the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
adjusts his Budget proposals to his estimates of expendi-
ture, and imposes or remits taxation according as he antici-
pates a deficit or a surp lus ; but the limits of expedient 
taxation, even in the most opulent countries, are soon 
reached, other sources of revenue are comparatively scanty, 
and resort to debt means simply the mortgaging of fu ture 
revenue. 
The most f ru i t fu l contrast between public revenue and 
expenditure lies in the fact that theoretically the lat ter is 
capable of indefinite increase according to the duties im-
posed on the State, whilst, even theoretically, the revenue 
is in comparison limited. There is never any difficulty in 
get t ing rid of a surplus 2 — there is always a difficulty in 
meeting a deficit. There is never any lack of proposals 
1 Cf. Bastable's Public Finance, p. 42. 
2 There are, however, disadvantages in collecting more revenue than 
is required. 
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for increasing State expenditure, and there are always ob-
jections to increasing taxes. 
And if we take a broad historical survey, we find that 
one of the most f requent causes of the ruin of nations is 
excess of public expenditure, whilst there is, perhaps, not 
a case on record in which the parsimony of the government 
can be accused of national disaster. 
A t the present time it is more than ever necessary to 
insist tha t the real limit to the expense of governments is 
to be found in the limitations of revenue. Against the 
benefits of State control in any form we have to place the 
cost of government. In some cases the under taking may 
pay its own expenses, and in a few, especially if aided 
by monopoly, may yield a profit. But undertakings that 
up to the present have been managed by the State without 
loss are relatively few, and those tha t yield a real surplus 
fewer still. How far taxation can be replaced or supple-
mented by profit will be considered la te r ; it is enough to 
point out tha t this source of income is, as a matter of fact, 
extremely limited under present conditions.1 
Accordingly, I propose as a question of method to con-
sider the principles of public revenue before dealing with 
public expenditure. 
§ 2. Practical Reason for the Prior Treatment of 
Revenue. Apar t from the logical a rgument of the last 
section there is a practical reason for the prior t rea tment 
of public revenue. Whi ls t from Adam Smith downward 
the principal source of modern State revenues, namely, 
taxation, has been treated with greater scientific elabora-
tion both as regards principles and details than any other 
department of economics, the investigation of expenditure 
, has been relatively meagre. Adam Smith himself treats 
expendi ture by the method of enumeration of cases; not 
as he treats revenue, and especially taxation, by the 
1 Under modern conditions, it is better to t rus t to taxation for the 
needed revenues, and allow the investment of capital to proceed f rom the 
action of individuals. — Bastable's Public Finance (2d edition), p. 218. 
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methods of principles and classification. He lays down, 
indeed, incidentally important observations; but in the 
main he is practical ra ther than scientific, and as a natu-
ral consequence his principal conclusions are no longer 
applicable, owing to the change in social conditions. No 
one now would endorse his opinion that it is only by means 
of a well-regulated standing army tha t a civilised country 
can be defended, or tha t the expense of the administration 
of justice may very properly be defrayed by those who 
give occasion to this expense, or tha t it is never possible 
to invent a more equitable way of maintaining bridges and 
highways than by tolls, or that the only trades suitable for 
joint-stock enterprise are banking, insurance, canals, and 
waterworks, or that those parts of education for the 
teaching of which there are no public institutions are 
generally the best taught . His chapters on defence, jus-
tice, companies, public works, and education, from which 
the foregoing opinions have been cited, no doubt contain 
besides many criticisms and suggestions of permanent value, 
but compared with his t reatment of taxation that of ex-
penditure is altogether unsatisfactory. Adam Smith's 
canons of taxation have become classical both in precept 
and in practice. The great financial reforms which cul-
minated in the work of Gladstone may all claim Adam 
Smith as their father, but he has given no such masterly 
leading on expenditure. His successors, both in the sci-
ence and the practice of finance, have shown a corre-
sponding preference for the t reatment of revenue, and at 
the present time expenditure in this country is growing 
by leaps and bounds by the easy method of t reat ing every 
case on its own merits. 
There is then much need to emphasise the position that 
just as demand and supply, consumption and production, 
exports and imports, are correlative and interdependent, so 
also are public revenue and public expenditure. And just 
as the development of the theories of demand and con-
sumption led to a corresponding development of the theo-
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ries of supply and production, so the development of the 
theory of public revenue ought to throw light on the theory 
of expenditure, and just as in practice imports and exports 
are inextricably blended, so also are public revenues and 
expenses. 
Accordingly, I propose to consider first the well-known 
and much studied principles and methods of taxation and 
the shift ing and incidence of taxes in the hope tha t the 
survey may suggest corresponding lines of inquiry in 
the less worked field of expenditure. I t seems reason-
able to expect that the great canons of equality, conven-
ience, certainty, and economy — and other subordinate or 
consequential rules — should have their analogies in pub-
lic expenditure, and also that, corresponding to the shift-
ing and incidence of taxes, there should be similar direct 
and indirect consequences of the various expenses of the 
State. 
VOL. I I I . — 8 
C H A P T E R VI. 
CHARACTER AND DEFINITION OF TAXATION.1 
§ 1. The General Characteristics of Taxation, ( a ) The 
principles of taxation are well adapted for the application 
of the historical method. Instead of deriving the modern 
conception of taxation f rom the modern conception of sov-
ereignty, we may trace the historical evolution of the 
principal characteristics. As in other cases, the continuity 
and variety of English economic history may be trusted to 
furnish evidence of the principal stages. The most gen-
eral feature of taxation, tha t marks it off plainly from other 
payments (in money, kind, or services) is, that the pay-
ment is compulsory. A tax is an exaction levied by 
superior force; it is not the result of charity, persuasion, 
request, or contract, a l though these names and sometimes 
the ideas which they stand for have been used to disguise 
or modify the original compulsion. 
The Romans had carried many economic ideas to stages 
of development far beyond our modern conceptions (e.g., 
in the power of capitalism over labour) , and they pushed 
the compulsion of taxat ion to its utmost limit. 
Lactant ius (300 A.D.), a century before the withdrawal 
from Britain, describes a scene in a provincial town where 
all the population of the distr ict was assembled to be 
taxed. " One heard noth ing bu t the sounds of flogging 
and of all kinds of to r ture ; the son was forced to inform 
against the father, the wife against her husband, failing 
everything else the men were compelled to give evidence 
1 The chapters on taxation were in the press before the publication of 
the valuable Memoranda on Imperial and Local Taxes, issued by the 
Royal Commission on Local Taxation. 
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against themselves, and were taxed according to the con-
fessions which they made to escape their t o rmen t s . " 1 
Roman provincial taxation perhaps shows better than 
any other the element of compulsion pure and simple, 
undiluted by the appearance of benevolence, persuasion, 
or contract. 
In Saxon times it is usually said that the king lived of 
his own ; he had his own lands and received revenues 
of the nature of rents. But apar t from these <?i<cm-private 
sources of income, which were more or less determined 
by custom, there were certain general burdens imposed 
on all lands ; viz., mili tary service, and the up-keep of 
forts and of bridges — the so-called threefold necessity 
(trinoda necessitas), f rom which in the largest grants of 
land there was no exception. 
There were, besides, compulsory payments or burdens of 
various kinds levied to support the digni ty of the sover-
eign, and the profusion of his household, and generally 
to pay the expenses of government . The nature of these 
burdens is best known from the enumeration of ex-
emptions which occur in the land charters. " Moreover, 
I will free the aforesaid land from all subjection in worldly 
matters, from enter taining the king, bishops, lords, alder-
men, bailiffs, keepers of hounds, horses, hawks ; f rom 
boarding and lodging all those who are called feasting-
men ; from all services, works, burdens, or inconveniences 
— what more or less shall I enumerate or s a y — from all 
liabilities greater and less known and unknown, let the 
land remain in all respects free forevermore except these 
four things which I will now name : expedition against 
pagan enemies, bridge-building, for t -making or removing ." 2 
There were burdens also imposed in connection wi th 
thief-catching, and more generally the administrat ion of 
justice. In all these payments the compulsory character 
is prominent ; they are all also of the nature of taxes on 
1 Quoted in Elton's Origins, p. 347. 
2 Earle's Saxon Land Charters, p. 85, 6. 
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land, but they are quite different f rom customary or con-
t ractual rents . 
The navy was kept up by similar levies, and every 
county had to produce its contingent of ships according 
to its hidage. The danegeld is perhaps the earliest gen-
eral tax levied in money, 2s. per hide being the custom-
ary rate. I t was collected by the sheriff of the county, 
and disappears as a separate item merged in the farm 
of the county in 1163. 
Af t e r the Norman Conquest the chief part of the 
revenue was derived from the demesne lands of the crown, 
but there were besides feudal revenues of various kinds 
oollected from other lands. Such were scutage,1 aids 
(iauxilia), casualties, fines, escheats, in all of which the 
element of compulsion appears, though disguised under 
feudal forms. There were, too, the special exactions of 
purveyance, preemption, and prisage. Taxes on movables 
begin wi th the Saladin t i the ( H e n r y I I . ) . The declara-
tion was in form lef t to the conscience of the tax-payer 
( the sanction being excommunication), but if anyone was 
suspected of giving too little, the secular power appointed 
a jury to assess the amount . The Saladin t i the shows in 
many respects the rudiments of the modern income-tax. 
Graduated poll taxes were imposed in 1379 according 
to ranks and professions, a duke paying ten marks and an 
a t torney half a mark (six and eight pence) — the rudi-
mentary form of a tax according to faculty. 
Benevolences were in origin voluntary grants by rich 
merchants, but under Henry VII . the refusers were im-
paled on Morton's fork — the collectors being enjoined to 
act on the principle tha t those who lived sparingly must 
have saved money, whilst those who lived well had 
clearly enough to spare. Genuine benevolences appear 
under Elizabeth, bu t the abuses by the Stuar ts led to 
their abolition by the Pet i t ion of Right .2 
1 See Bk. If . , p. 301. 
2 Cf. also origin of poor rates. See above, Bk. II . , p. 374. 
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Too much is made of the names assumed by early forms 
of taxes — the " g e n t l e t e r m s " donum and auxilium. 
There were, indeed, at times a few " g i f t s " in answer to 
the " prayers " of the king, but the prayers were in general 
of the quibus non contradici order, and the g i f t s were like 
the " precarious " services of servile tenants, or the boon 
works at the prayer of the lord (ad precem), which See-
bohm regards as the most distinctive mark of subjection. 
The most noteworthy characteristic of mediaeval taxes 
is that, levied first as proportionate and variable rates, they 
became fixed and customary — as in the case of the tenths 
and fifteenths, which came to mean a certain aggregate 
sum.1 
The principal modifications in this element of compul-
sion are found in the gradual t ransfer of the compelling 
r ight to the House of Commons, and it may t ru ly be said 
that the more effective the representation so much the 
more effective became the compulsion.2 
(V) The compulsion of taxation is, however, really 
modified when evasion is wholly or partially possible. 
Tha t a tax that can be evaded will be evaded may be 
il lustrated to the extent of an inductive proof. The eva-
sion may, as Professor Seligman remarks, be illegitimate, 
as in smuggling or false declarations of income, or legiti-
mate, as when the taxed commodity or process or service 
is avoided. Evasion in the first case is met by various 
penalties and preventions, and for scientific purposes an 
evaded tax of this kind is no tax. 
Evasion of the second kind, however, is not so complete. 
It is sometimes said tha t a tax upon commodities is volun-
tary, because the consumers may refra in from consump-
tion or resort to other things. Leaving aside the imprac-
ticable remedy of the taxation of all possible substi tutes, 
taxes of this kind have always an element of compulsion. 
It is t rue tha t a man may escape the tobacco duty by not 
1 Stubbs, Constitutional History, Vol. I., p. 578. 
1 Stubbs, Vol. I., pp. 577, 578 ; Vol. II., pp. 562, 604. 
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smoking (as, indeed, he may escape the income tax b}' not 
earning sufficient income), bu t his natural or acquired 
inclination to smoke is (as shown by the revenue) suffi-
cient to outweigh the pleasure of evasion. Probably no 
mortal ever gave up smoking or dr inking simply to de-
prive the government of revenue, though many may have 
stopped or limited their consumption through a rise in 
price caused by taxation. 
The legit imate evasion of taxes on productive processes 
in some cases leads to improvements and inventions, but 
in general the necessities of fiscal supervision by stereotyp-
ing old methods prevent natural progress. The necessity 
of taxation is only the stepmother of invention. 
(c) The objects for which taxes are imposed are coex-
tensive with the objects of public expenditure. 
In the course of progress we find tha t special taxation 
for special purposes has given way to general taxation 
for general purposes. The method of assigning part icular 
revenues for part icular expenses (e.g., the aids for making 
the king 's son a knight , or marrying his eldest d a u g h t e r 1 ) 
has generally fallen into decay, a l though it still survives 
in local taxation, and there are occasional reversions to 
this older method. Even in local taxation, however, it 
has come to be recognised that special rates for special 
services are, in many ways, uneconomical (e.g., separate 
rates for schools, poor, roads, police, e tc . ) . 
(c?) Payments , however, may be made to government 
which are only part ial ly of the nature of taxes. Such, 
for example, are the prices paid by the consumers of com-
modities sold by the State, and fees for services rendered. 
If the State has a monopoly and fixes prices or fees above 
what would be the case with natural competition, the extra 
price or fee is of the nature of a tax. If the State com-
petes with other agencies and charges only competitive 
rates, this element of direct taxation vanishes. If, as is 
often the case, the State charges less than cost price ( in-
1 Cf. Dowell, History of Taxation, I . , p. 50. 
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eluding supplementary costs), the deficit must be met by 
other taxes, and itself is of the nature of a bounty on 
consumption.1 
I t is to be observed that in a sense every tax tha t is 
levied for the public good may be regarded as providing 
in its expendi ture a quid pro quo, and some writers have 
endeavoured to t reat taxat ion entirely from this point of 
view. I t seems best, however, in the modern State, to 
apply the term tax to payments which are made prima-
rily for the public service and in which the benefit to the 
individual is not primarily considered. T h u s the income 
taxpayers cannot connect their payments with any par-
t icular advantage. There are other payments in which 
the public service is predominant , bu t an element of 
private advantage may be discovered (e.g., registrat ion 
fees for marriages) . In others the public service becomes 
of less, and the private of more, c o n c e r n — a s the expense 
of Sta te railways, partially designed for s t rategic purposes 
in t ime of war, but generally conducted on the lines of 
private enterprise. Finally, in some payments to the 
State the main object is the special benefit to the indi-
vidual, and the public purpose is only incidental, e.g., the 
parcel post. 
(e) In modern times the revenues of the State tha t 
imitate most nearly voluntary contr ibut ions for the public 
services are those derived from public loans. To meet 
extraordinary expendi ture (as in war ) a loan is contracted 
and subscription to the loan is voluntary. The element 
of compulsion, however, is only t ransferred f rom the 
present to the f u t u r e taxpayer . In teres t and principal 
1 Cf. Seligman, Essays on Taxation, p. 303. " A t one ext reme lie 
prices which depend upon the relation of the government to some particu-
lar industry or individual ; at the other ext reme lie taxes which depend 
upon the relation of the government to all industries and all individuals ; 
midway between these extremes lie fees. The essential characteristic of 
a fee is the existence of a measurable special benefit, together with a pre-
dominant public purpose ; the absence of public purpose makes the pay-
ment a price ; the absence of special benefit makes it a tax." 
250 ECONOMIC. F U N C T I O N S OF G O V E R N M E N T . 
can only be paid out of fu ture taxes. This elementary 
t ru th , which has been painful ly learned by the central 
government , is now being rapidly unlearned by the mu-
nicipalities. I t used to be said tha t an old tax is no 
tax ; we now seem to believe that a fu ture tax is no 
tax. Loans for productive purposes, redeemable out of 
the revenues earned over a term of years, are of course 
on a different footing. 
( / ) Taxes are nominally imposed upon various forms 
of wealth in the widest sense, but as Professor Bastable 1 
often insists, all taxat ion is really imposed on "pe r sons . " 
This proposition is derivative from the general concep-
tion of wealth. One of the essential marks of wealth is 
appropriat ion, and taxat ion is a process of t ransfer r ing 
wealth from private individuals to the State. Every 
public tax diminishes so far the wealth of private indi-
viduals. I t is of course t rue tha t in most cases there is 
some set-off to the disuti l i ty of taxation in the ut i l i ty of 
the government , and the ut i l i ty may exceed the disuti l i ty 
even to the part icular payer. Occasionally, also, the im-
position of a tax may indirectly benefit certain persons, 
as in the typical case of protection duties. 
I t is, however, in a general survey, best to look on 
taxation as involving in itself a contr ibution on the par t 
of persons on the compulsion of the State, and to con-
sider separately the benefits of public expenditure, and 
the economic, constitutional, and other limitations imposed 
on the exercise of this compelling power. 
Professor Bastable's definition of taxation sums up in 
a convenient form the principal results of the foregoing 
analyses : " A tax is a compulsory contribution of the 
wealth of a person, or body of persons, for the services 2 
of the public powers." If the State is already the owner 
of all the forms of wealth tha t it requires, no taxation is 
1 Op. cit., p . 250. 
2 This neutral phrase is preferable to " the common benefit or in teres t ." 
Seligman, Essays, p. 304. 
C H A R A C T E R O F T A X A T I O N . 265 
necessary; if it requires more wealth, it must make it 
( industr ia l domain) or take it ( t axa t ion) . 
I t is not necessary for economic purposes to introduce 
any difficulties connected with " j u r i s t i c " persons. In 
the last resort juristic persons for the purpose of taxation 
are resolvable into private persons. A tax on the income 
of a company falls on the separate incomes of the share-
holders ; taxes on a borough or county (common forms 
of mediaeval taxat ion) fall on the persons who const i tute 
such corporations. 
I t may be observed tha t what is first imposed as a tax 
tends to become in some cases a form of State ownership. 
A land-tax regarded as perpetual becomes a rent-charge 
owned by the State. Thus the expression that an old tax 
is no tax really means, in this case, tha t taxat ion has been 
merged in State ownership. The real incidence of the 
original tax is upon the original owner ; at the imposition 
of the tax the value of his property is diminished by the 
capital value of the tax.1 
1 Cf. Seligman on "Capital isat ion or Amort isa t ion," Incidence of 
Taxation, Bk. I I . , Ch. IV. 
C H A P T E R V I I . 
T H E CANONS OF TAXATION — EQUALITY. 
§ 1. Adam Smith's Canons of Taxation — First, Equal-
ity. The t rea tment of the general principles of taxation 
may well begin with a critical analysis of Adam Smith 's 
celebrated canons. The t ru ths which they embody may 
no doubt be set fo r th wi th greater logical precision, and 
with a much greater profusion of technical language; bu t 
as s tated by him they had sufficient energy to enable a 
series of great financial reformers 1 to completely revolu-
tionise the Bri t ish system of taxation-; and they have 
formed the text for the most considerable par t of the sub-
sequent commentaries on the general theory.2 
The first canon, Equality of Taxation, s tated in full, is 
found to contain the germs of several dist inct theories of 
what consti tutes equal or just or equitable taxation. I t 
is too often quoted in par t only, the par t omitted being 
of ten rediscovered and inserted by way of criticism or 
supplement . The full s ta tement runs thus : — 
" The subjects of every State ought to contr ibute toward 
the support of its government , as nearly as possible in 
proport ion to their respective abilities, tha t is, in propor-
tion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy under 
the protection of the State. The expense of government 
to the individuals of a grea t nation is like the expense of 
management to the joint tenants of a great estate, who 
1 Cf. Gladstone's Financial Statements. 
2 F. A. Walker (Political Economy, p. 513) indeed charged Adam 
Smith with "feebleness " and " want of g rasp" in his treatment of tax-
ation ; but a fourth part of the Wealth of Nations can never be justly de-
scribed in such language. 
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are all obliged to contr ibute in proportion to their respec-
tive interests in the estate. In the observation or neglect 
of this maxim consists what is called the equali ty or ine-
quality of taxation. Every tax, it must be observed once 
for all, which falls finally upon one only of the three sorts 
of revenue above mentioned (viz., rent , wages, profits) is 
necessarily unequal so far as it does not affect the other 
two. In the following examination of different taxes I 
shall seldom take much fu r the r notice of this sort of ine-
quali ty, but shall in most cases confine my observations to 
that inequali ty which is exercised by a part icular tax fall-
ing unequally upon that par t icular sort of private revenue 
which is affected by it ." 
§ 2. Equality and Sovereignty. To begin with, the use 
of the phrase " t h e subjects o u g h t " implies tha t it is the 
du ty of the subject to contribute, and the r igh t of the 
sovereign to impose, taxes. Thus the r ight of taxat ion 
may be derived directly from the conception of sover-
e i g n t y — which again brings to view the compulsory char-
acter of the contribution. 
This doctr ine of sovereignty as the basis of taxat ion 
finds impor tant il lustrations in history. Taxes have been 
imposed, not for the value of the real revenue they may 
bring in, nor f rom any idea of public advantage, nor even 
for the private advantage of the monarch or other per-
sons in authori ty , but simply to show to the subjects the 
right of the sovereign. I t was the determinat ion to insist 
on this barren and malignant sovereign r ight which led to 
the retention by the Brit ish government of the threepence 
per pound duty on tea, " tha t figment of a tax, tha t pep-
percorn rent ," and of the s tamp duties tha t never paid the 
cost of collection, — "shea r ing the wolf ," — tha t lost the 
British the American colonies. 
I t is not often, however, especially in modern times, 
tha t the sic volo sic jubeo is considered sufficient author i ty 
for new taxation, and the pure and simple doctrine of 
sovereignty has been mit igated and complicated by other 
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political theories. The Americans (and on their side 
were some of the greates t of English statesmen) opposed 
to this absolute doctrine the grea t consti tutional rule, 
tha t taxation ought to be coincident with representation 
— that only those who shared in the power should be 
called on to bear the burdens of government , a position 
heart i ly approved of by Adam Smith, and made by him 
the basis of his great scheme of imperial federation. 
The whole course of consti tutional history is marked 
by the s t ruggle of the payers of taxes for the control of 
taxat ion. And tak ing a general view, it may be said that 
the burden of taxation tends to fall most l ightly on those 
who have the greatest political power.1 The situation in 
the Transvaal before the war furnished a forcible illustra-
tion of this danger . 
A n d the relations subsisting between taxation and rep-
resentation in the Uni ted Kingdom itself show tha t the 
ad jus tment is not yet perfect — if, indeed, perfection of 
ad jus tment is possible. Thus , at one end of the social 
scale many wealthy women and at the other many poor 
able-bodied men have no share in representation, al though 
our present system of taxat ion hits both severely. Again, 
as already explained, taxes fall upon persons, but repre-
sentation is assigned to localities, and the localities only 
correspond very roughly to population or taxpaying capac-
i ty or both. The present representation of Ireland was 
par t ly excused by its author on the ingenious theory that 
the greater the distance from the seat of government , the 
greater should be the representation. 
The doctr ine of sovereignty as the basis of taxation, 
logically carried out, results in the maxim tha t a govern-
ment should impose such taxes as are " most easily assessed 
and collected " (McCul loch) . .Just as a general looks to 
the efficiency of his army as a whole, and is prepared to 
sacrifice any portion if necessary, so it may be said tha t 
the State should not regard the part icular interests of 
1 One element of truth in Loria's argument. 
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individuals, bu t ra ther consider the power of the State 
as a whole and what is most conducive to tha t power. In 
times of national peril, when the political existence of the 
State is concerned, this view seems to meet with general 
acquiescence. But in ordinary times in the modern State, 
such a complete sacrifice of the individual is never con-
templated, and the sovereign power in taxat ion is sup-
posed, even on McCulloch's view, to be used in the way 
" m o s t conducive to the public interests ." And since one 
of the pr imary public needs is the equitable t r ea tment of 
individuals, we advance f rom the general proposition tha t 
the subjects ought to contr ibute to the support of the gov-
ernment, to the important qualification, tha t they should 
do so " as nearly as possible in proportion to their respec-
• tive abilities." Adam Smith goes on to explain, tha t the 
measure of abilities, in his view, is the revenue enjoyed 
under the protection of the State, and thus the na tura l 
result of his first canon is tha t taxat ion should be pro-
port ionate to revenue. But this simple interpreta t ion has 
not always been accepted. 
§ 3. Equality of Sacrifice. The critical examination of 
the term " abilities " discloses two very different bases of 
taxation, which may be described provisionally as subjec-
tive and objective, according as stress is laid on the incon-
venience or disutility involved in the payment of taxes on 
the one side, or, on the other, on the ability or facidty1 of 
the taxpayer as indicated by his proper ty or income. The 
development of the subjective basis of taxat ion leads to 
the principle of equality of sacrifice. " Equa l i ty of taxa-
tion," says Mill, "as a maxim of politics, means apportion-
ing the contr ibution of each person toward the expenses 
of government, so tha t he shall feel neither more nor less 
inconvenience from his share of the payment than every 
other person experiences from his ." I t is t rue t ha t Mill 
— as is his w o n t — h a s t e n s to add tha t this s tandard, like 
other s tandards of perfection, cannot be completely real-
1 See below, § 7. 
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ised. A complete realisation, indeed, would logically end 
in communism. The sacrifice involved in paying taxes 
will vary, not only according to how much is taken, but 
how much is lef t . A n d if the real burdens are to be 
equalised in this way, if, as the result of taxation, all are 
to be lef t equally comfortable or uncomfortable, we arrive 
logically at communism. But, al though this extreme 
position is not reached, the s tandard of equali ty of sacri-
fice (or minimum of d i su t i l i t y 1 ) , is pu t forward as the 
principal ground of various practical modifications of 
systems of taxat ion. 
§ 4. J . Free Minimum Income.2 In the first place it 
may be u rged tha t if taxation in the case of A leads to a 
sacrifice of " necessaries," whilst in tha t of B the sacrifice 
is only of " superfluities " or " luxuries," the burden of A « 
is infinitely greater . A n d since we can never establish 
equali ty between the infinite and the finite, it follows as 
a practical maxim tha t the necessary minimum of income 
must be exempt al together . 
The distinction, however, between "necessa r ies" and 
" luxuries," as Adam Smith pointed out, is difficult to 
draw, especially in communities advancing in civilisation ; 
and the critical analysis of later wri ters has increased the 
number and weight of the difficulties, so tha t M. Pan-
taleoni 3 is induced to exclaim tha t the distinction between 
necessary and superfluous wants is untenable in nearly 
every shape in which it has been presented. A want 
which might be deemed a luxury for one individual may 
be a necessary for another, and what is t rue of individuals 
is t rue also of social classes, as for example, brain-workers 
and hand-workers . 
1 Cf. Edgworth, " P u r e Taxa t ion , " Pt. I I I . , Economic Journal, De-
cember, 1897, for a very able and learned discussion of the sacrifice theory 
of taxation on util i tarian principles. He prefers to state the ideal as 
" minimum " sacrifice instead of equal, and this s ta tement seems the more 
logical on the pure util i tarian theory. On grounds of formal justice the 
equality of sacrifice may be preferred. 
2 For early examples, see Dowell, History of Taxation, Vol. I., p. 75. 
3 Pure Economics, p. 54. 
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The difference also between the expansion and the con-
traction of wants may be brought forward. An increase 
of wealth, as, for example, the gradual increase in income 
obtained by the growth of power and skill, leads to the 
positive expansion of wants in a determinate order, and 
the consumption of " supe r f lu i t i e s " is increased. 
If, thereaf ter , the income is contracted, as by taxation, 
a compression of wants, or a curtai lment of their satisfac-
tion, must take place, but this negative expansion will be 
different from the previous positive expansion.1 A n d it 
is well known tha t " necessaries " in the shape of food are 
often curtailed before "super f lu i t i es" in the shape of stimu-
lants, or even ornaments. Thus taxes, which are supposed 
to fall only on " luxuries," may in effect check the con-
sumption of "necessa r ies" which are lef t untaxed. 
I t may be said, however, tha t the principle of a free 
minimum income has been partially applied in the Uni ted 
Kingdom : first, in the abolition of most taxes on such 
necessaries as food, clothing, f u e l ; and secondly, in the ex-
emption from direct taxes of incomes below a certain mini-
mum and also of savings in the shape of insurance. But 
as regards indirect taxation in general, it may be said tha t 
a considerable par t of the revenue f rom st imulants (alco-
hol, tobacco, and tea) is derived from persons whose in-
comes are below what is generally considered a reasonable 
minimum for the s tandard of comfort, and the same th ing is 
t rue of some forms of direct taxes, e.g., various local rates. 
A n d however plausible the doctrine of a free minimum 
income may appear, it is always limited by the great prac-
tical rule tha t taxes must be productive. 
§5. Equality of Sacrifice and Progressive Taxation. The 
principle of equality of sacrifice is also advanced in support 
of graduated, or progressive, taxat ion. And at first s ight 
— having regard to the law of diminishing uti l i ty — 
equality of sacrifice seems necessarily to lead to progres-
sion. W e may suppose tha t the more money any person 
1 Pantaleoni, Pure Economics ( t ranslat ion) , p. 53. 
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has (whether as capital or income) the less is the uti l i ty 
to him of successive increments, and therefore the less the 
disutilit ies of decrements caused by taxat ion. I t seems 
to follow tha t a greater amount should be taken from the 
relatively rich, and tha t a merely equal percentage would 
not involve equal real sacrifice. 
I t is, however, one th ing to admit tha t equal percentages 
do not involve equal real sacrifices, and quite another to 
formulate any rational scheme of progression merely on 
the theory of ut i l i ty and disuti l i ty. The judgment of 
Professor Bastable is in complete accord with the general 
views of the theory of ut i l i ty adopted in various portions 
of this work (e.g., the problem of consumers ' rents ) . " The 
economic calculus," he writes,1 " is not at present compe-
ten t to deal wi th such comparisons (e.g., the real sacri-
fices involved in the taxation of different incomes). The 
weightiest difficulty tha t the theoretical advocates of pro-
gression have to meet is the essentially subjective na ture 
of their s tandard. The translat ion into an objective rule 
of taxation can only be accomplished by the aid of assump-
tions as to the relations of enjoyment in different classes 
tha t must contain a large element of conjecture. The 
modern developments of the theory of ut i l i ty fail to supply 
any definite practical basis on which to f rame a scale of 
progression." 
The opinion of Professor Seligman to the same effect 
is also worthy of citation, especially as on other general 
grounds he is inclined to support the principle of progres-
sion. " This brings us," he writes,2 " to the very core of 
the objection to the equal sacrifice theory regarded as the 
paramount consideration in the construction of any defi-
nite rate. The imposition of equal sacrifices on all tax-
payers must always remain an ideal impossible of actual 
realisation. Sacrifice denotes something psychical, some-
1 Public Finance, p. 297. 
2 Progressive Taxation, p. 143. This is an excellent critical study of 
the theory, history, and practice of progressive taxation. 
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th ing psychological. A tax takes awayr commodities which 
are something material, something tangible. To ascertain 
the exact relations between something psychical and some-
th ing material is impossible. No calculus of pains and pleas-
ures can suffice, for no a t tempt to reduce the heterogeneous 
to the homogeneous can ever succeed. But even assuming 
tha t this could be doue, the case for the advocates of equal 
sacrifice would not be much bet ter . The sacrifice occa-
sioned by a tax is only one factor in the problem, and may 
be a minor fac tor . " 
I entirety agree with this judgment , and the theoretical 
and practical importance of the last sentence will receive 
abundant i l lustration in the sequel. A t the same time, 
however, it may be admit ted tha t the ideal of equali ty 
of sacrifice, a l though vague and ill-defined, is one of the 
supports of certain kinds of exemptions and progressions. 
I t may be regarded rather as a canon of criticism of the 
un jus t than as a rule for the instruct ion of the just . 
Thus , if it can be shown tha t certain kinds of taxes 
necessarily involve very unequal sacrifices, so far such 
taxes are condemned, or, what comes to the same thing, 
if they are adopted some kind of compensation should be 
introduced, either in taxation or in expenditure. In most 
cases, however, it will be found tha t the sacrifice involved 
is only one of the elements to be considered. Taxes 
on necessaries, for example, may be condemned on this 
ground, but they are also open to other objections. 
The idea of equality of sacrifice, we may conclude, has 
much more political force than it is enti t led to on the 
grounds of the pure theory of ut i l i ty . T h e recent re-
ad jus tments of the exemptions and remissions in the 
English income tax were par t ly justified by their ap-
provers on this ground, and so, also, was the progressive 
scale of the new succession duties. 
§ 6. Sacrifice and the Sources of Income. Before leav-
ing the principle of equali ty of sacrifice it may be worth 
while to notice one more favouri te application. I t is 
V O L . I I I . T 
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alleged tha t a tax on income ought to vary according to 
the source of the income — that , in particular, incomes 
from realised wealth, e.g., land, should be taxed at a 
higher rate than incomes from talent , and professional 
and business capacity — or more generally, t ha t terminable 
incomes should be taxed at a lower rate than perpetual 
incomes. In its practical form this discrimination is jus-
tified on the part icular ground tha t the professional man 
is obliged to pu t aside, by way of insurance for him-
self or his family, a larger proportion of his terminable 
income. Thus there is a smaller free income from which 
to pay the tax, and consequently a greater sacrifice. It-
may be observed tha t in the English income tax exemp-
tions on the ground of insurance were reintroduced by 
Mr. Gladstone in 1853, and have since been continued. 
In the case of Mr. Gladstone, however, this must be 
regarded as a political concession, inconsistent with his 
general t r ea tment of the income tax. No man ever 
showed more clearly than Mr . Gladstone the inequalities 
of the income tax, but his general conclusion is this : 1 
" There are, it may be, certain distinctions between each 
of these cases ; but what I say is this, — that when you 
come to define these distinctions and to t ry to make some 
broad ground upon which you are to take your stand, 
and to say here you will be exempt, there you shall pay 
the exceptional rate of tax, there is not one of the classes 
t ha t I have mentioned with respect to which you will find 
it possible to fix as the limit of this intended opera t ion ." 2 
The exemption of a par t of the income saved for insur-
ance shows very well the difficulties of discrimination. 
This exemption discriminates between forms of investing 
savings in favour of one ; if a man invests par t of his 
1 Financial Statements, p. 45. 
2 Space does not admit of fur ther quotation, but the reader may be 
reminded tha t Mr. Gladstone's great Budget speeches contain some of the 
best expositions of financial principles ever made, though this side is apt 
to be overlooked through the at tention given to the practical details and 
emergencies of the times. 
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income in higher education for his children, or in buying 
his house or farm by instalments, or in any of the multi-
tude of other indirect modes of providing for the objects 
of insurance, he has logically an equal claim to exemption, 
but practically he obtains none. 
§ 7. The Faculty Theory of Taxation. The develop-
ment on the objective side of Adam Smith 's position, tha t 
the subjects ought to contribute in proportion to their 
abilities, leads to the faculty theory. " T h e facul ty theory 
of taxation is very old. The word ' f a c u l t y ' is the usual 
one in Latin and French for tax laws and is the general 
term employed in all the early American laws. Fo r a long 
time, however, the best practical test of facul ty was sup-
posed to be general proper ty . Thus all th rough the Mid-
dle Ages, when local taxes were levied at all they were 
assessed on general property, on the principle juxta bonorum 
facultatem, or pro bonorum facultate." 1 In England the 
word " ability " is first used in a general s ta tu te in the Eliza-
bethan poor law — " according to the ability of the parish " 
•—ability being interpreted to mean proper ty . La ter 
on, f rom meaning property, ability or facul ty came to 
mean income, and Adam Smith explains abilities to mean 
revenues. 
The great mer i t of the facul ty theory is tha t i t sub-
st i tutes an objective for a subjective s tandard . I t does 
not look to the feelings of the taxpayer , bu t to the 
money value of his taxable capacity. T h e State takes 
more f rom the rich, not because they will feel it less in 
proportion, bu t because they have more to give. 
But al though the facul ty s tandard is objective, it does 
not follow tha t it is simple, and what is the proper meas-
ure of facul ty is still a subject of dispute both in theory 
and in practice. Historically the rule of simple propor-
tion has been generally adopted. Bu t it is worth observ-
ing t ha t this rule was first of all insisted on in order tha t 
the property of various privileged classes should not be 
1 Seligman, op. cit., p. 126. 
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exempt. T h a t subjects should contr ibute in proportion 
to their revenues was directed against the privileges of 
the nobility, clergy, and other favoured classes. 
In course of time, however, the method of simple pro-
portion has been a t tacked with reference to both extremes 
of the social scale. 
§ 8. Faculty and a Minimum Free Income. In the first 
place it has been maintained tha t the minimum of subsist-
ence ought to be exempted, not as before, on account of 
the infinite sacrifice involved, bu t 011 purely economic 
grounds. I t is a rgued by Ricardo tha t if minimum real 
wages are diminished by taxat ion, the result will be a 
diminut ion of labour unti l the wages rise by the amount 
of the tax, so t ha t the real incidence will be on the richer 
classes, whilst the process of t ransfer will involve a loss. 
This arguvnent may be s t rengthened by the modern posi-
tion tha t the consequent degradation of labour would lead 
to inefficiency, and tha t the State would lose more indi-
rectly than it gained directly. It may be s t rengthened 
also by the position tha t pauperism would increase, and 
wi th pauperism poor rates. 
Taxat ion which diminishes the general efficiency of 
labour diminishes the whole faculty of the State, and is 
thereby on the simple facul ty theory suicidal. 
§ 9. Faculty and Capital. I t was soon seen, however, 
t ha t a similar a rgument might be applied to capital and 
profits. Taxa t ion which prevents productive capital from 
being restored and renewed also so far tends to diminish 
the general facul ty of the owners or employers of capital. 
Accordingly, it has been maintained, tha t on the faculty 
theory taxat ion should only be imposed on the net profits 
of gross incomes and on the net value of property. T h a t 
taxat ion ought , as far as possible, to leave unimpaired the 
product ive powers of the society — including land as well 
as labour and capital — m a y be regarded as logically im-
plied in the faculty theory, and is practically one of the 
most impor tant rules of finance. 
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But i t does not follow tha t the general rule is best 
applied by being insisted on in every part icular case. To 
exempt f rom taxation a certain minimum rate of profits 
would mean that more must be taken f rom the higher 
rates, and thus a premium would be placed on inefficiency, 
and a check imposed on enterprise. 
§ 10. The British Income Tax. The British income 
tax is a good example of the application of the simple 
facul ty theory, the proportion being tempered by de-
gression1 in incomes below certain specified amounts. In 
appearance the income tax is a simple tax of so many 
pence in the pound on all incomes above seven hundred, 
with various abatements for lower limits. But in reali ty 
the income tax is, as Mr. Gladstone long ago described 
it, not a single tax, bu t a great code of taxation. W h a t 
is and is not taxable income — what, for example, is to be 
pu t down as profits, and what is to be deducted for 
repairs — can only be decided by reference to a complex 
set of judicial decisions, in terpre t ing various complex 
statutes. 
Great as these difficulties are, however, — and they are 
so great tha t Mr. Gladstone over and over again declared 
the income tax was not adapted to become a permanent 
par t of the Brit ish tax system, — they are as noth ing com-
pared with the difficulties of the sacrifice theory. The 
facul ty theory remains objective. 
More recently it has been proposed to abandon the 
method of proportion at the higher end of the scale, not 
only to exempt the minimum, but to impose progressive 
rates above a certain point. 
§ 11. Faculty and Progressive Taxation. The progres-
sive method may be supported on the facul ty theory on 
the ground tha t " the facili ty of increasing production 
often grows in more than ari thmetical proport ion. The 
rich man may be said to be subject in some sense to the 
law of increasing r e t u r n s . " 2 Money makes money. The 
1 Cf. Bastable, p. 299. 2 Seligman, p. 191. 
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objections usually advanced are : ( a ) tha t any scale of 
progression will be arbitrary.1 This objection, however, 
appears to me purely formal. I t is equally applicable to 
every par t of the whole tax system compared with the 
whole, as, for example, the relative proportion of direct 
and indirect taxes, and again, in either group of the 
relative amounts assigned to part icular kinds of taxes. 
(6) It is alleged tha t the motives for evasion are stronger, 
and the means of prevention less effective, in the case of a 
progressive than of a proportional tax . As regards 
motives, it would ra ther seem tha t where the burden is 
less felt, the desire of evasion would also be less felt . As 
regards the means of prevention, it is urged tha t a pro-
gressive rate could not be levied at the source of the 
income with the same ease as a proportional rate. But, 
a l though the personal method of declaration must be 
applied to the surplus, it will still be as effective as in 
other cases, and the chance of evasion may be allowed for. 
Similarly, the objection that progressive succession duties 
will lead to g i f t s inter vivos applies only to the donations 
affected, and it may be said tha t g i f t s inter vivos are more 
likely to be in the public interest than purely family 
successions. 
(c) I t is said tha t these will be a check to accumulation 
and an encouragement to the exportat ion of capital. 
Both of these objections, however, apply to all taxes on 
capital, and in a society in which accumulation is going 
on at an increasing rate they are not of much force. Of 
greater weight , it seems to me, is the objection tha t pro-
gressive taxat ion tends to act as a differential tax on 
production on a large scale, and may thus hinder the 
na tura l employment of capital. The force of this objec-
tion, however, depends entirely on the degree of the 
taxat ion and the rate of progression. 
( d ) I t is said tha t the productiveness of a progressive 
tax on income is not as great as is popularly supposed. 
i Bastable, p. 292. 
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The obvious answer is, t ha t if on balance — af ter allowing 
for indirect and direct losses — t h e r e is any appreciable 
yield, it so far enables relief to be given in another direc-
tion where the in jury to faculty (not to recur to the real 
bu rden ) is greater . 
On the whole, I am inclined to th ink tha t on the faculty 
theory a moderate rate of progression migh t be advan-
tageous as regards income, as it has proved to be as re-
gards succession duties. " I t is not very unreasonable," 
says Adam Smith, " tha t the rich should contr ibute to the 
public expense not only in proportion to their revenues, 
but something more than in tha t p ropor t ion . " 1 
§ 12. Faculty and Sources of Income. The application, 
however, of the simple method of proportion to income 
or property may be fu r the r modified on the facul ty theory. 
W e may consider (as before on the sacrifice basis) not 
only the amounts of the wealth, bu t the sources of such 
wealth. From the national point of view, the best system 
on the facul ty theory is tha t which least impairs the 
product ive powers of the society. As we have already 
seen in considering the economic bases of property and 
the principles of the distr ibution of wealth, the adjus t -
ment of reward to effort is the grea t s t imulus to labour, 
accumulation, and generally to industr ial activity. Heavy 
taxat ion has been proved over and over again to be the 
greates t check to industr ia l development. But there is 
a large class of incomes which, compared wi th ordinary 
profits and wages, may be classed as " unearned," and it 
may be argued tha t taxation of these incomes does not 
impose a corresponding check on indust ry . " Both 
ground-rents and the ordinary rent of l and , " 2 says Adam 
Smith in a path-breaking passage, " a r e a species of rev-
enue which the owner in many cases enjoys wi thout any 
care or at tent ion of his own; though a par t of this revenue 
be taken from him in order to defray the expenses of the 
State, no discouragement will thereby be given to any sort 
1 p. 379, McCulloch. 2 Nicholson's edition, p. 315, 6. 
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of indus t ry . The annual produce of the land and labour of 
the society, the real wealth and revenue of the great body 
of the people, migh t be the same af te r such a tax as before. 
Ground-rents and the ordinary rent of land are, therefore, 
perhaps, the species of revenue which can best bear to 
have a peculiar tax imposed upon them. Ground-rents 
seem, in this respect, a more proper subject of peculiar 
taxat ion than even the ordinary rent of land. The ordi-
nary ren t of land is in many cases owing, par t ly at least, 
to the a t tent ion and good management of the landlord. 
A very heavy tax might discourage too much this at ten-
tion and good management . Ground-rents , so far as they 
exceed the ordinary ren t of land, are al together owing to 
the good government of the sovereign, which by pro-
tect ing the indus t ry either of the whole people or of the 
inhabi tants of some part icular place, enables them to pay 
so much more than its real value for the ground which 
they build their houses upon. Nothing can be more 
reasonable than tha t a f u n d which owes its existence to 
the good government of the State should be taxed pecul-
iarly, or should contr ibute something more than the 
greater par t of other funds toward the support of tha t 
gove rnmen t . " Later on, Adam Smith applies the prin-
ciple still fu r ther , and argues tha t the gains of monopo-
lists, whenever they can be come at, are certainly, of all 
subjects, the most proper for taxat ion. 1 This is indeed 
an obiter dictum, but may be referred back to the position 
tha t all monopolies are creatures of government by gran t 
or sufferance, and that in the profits of monopolies there 
is generally a large unearned element. A similar argu-
ment may be applied to " conjunctur" profits, and those 
portions of ^wcm'-rents tha t may be classed as " unearned." 
The consideration of the expediency or the justice of 
adopting " peculiar " taxation of this kind may be deferred 
to a later stage.2 
§ 13. Faculty and Savings. Other modifications of the 
1 Nicholson's edition, p. 378. 2 See below, Ch. XI. , § 5. 
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facul ty theory are found in the proposal tha t temporary 
incomes should be taxed less than permanent . So far as 
this proposal depends simply on time, i.e., the durat ion of 
the income, it involves a fallacy. If the temporary income 
is less durable, so also is the taxat ion thereof. Sometimes 
the extreme position is taken up (as in one place by Mill) 
tha t only expenditure and not savings ought to be taxed. 
This a rgument rests par t ly on the fallacy of double taxa-
tion — which was subtle enough to deceive Mill, bu t 
happily no longer requires r e fu t a t i on 1 — and par t ly on the 
assumption tha t saving is a secretory process which builds 
up the social system, expendi ture an excretory process 
tha t wastes it. I need not pursue fu r the r this t empt ing 
physiological analogy, nor again diverge into a discussion 
of the social funct ions of saving and spending. I t is 
more to the present purpose to observe tha t the modi-
fications of the facul ty theory in the directions jus t 
examined and the proposals for peculiar (i.e., extra-pro-
por t ionate) taxes lead up to the consideration of another 
general basis of taxat ion — that , namely, which may be 
termed the benefit or social dividend theory. 
§ 14. The Benefit Theory of Taxation. According to 
this theory taxes ought to be considered as payments for 
valuable services rendered by the State to individuals. The 
essence of this doctrine may be found in Adam Smith 's 
reference to the revenues which are enjoyed under the 
protection of the State, and in his comparison of the indi-
viduals of a great nat ion to the joint tenants of a great 
estate. I t is easy to show, as Mill does, t ha t if protec-
tion is taken in its narrowest signification, as a mat te r of 
fact the poor need more protection than the rich, and 
as a consequence, tha t the protection theory would lead 
to regressive taxation. Bu t A d a m Smith 's own appli-
cation of the theory, already noted, to the case of 
ground-rents and monopolies, shows tha t such a narrow 
interpretat ion is not justifiable, and has, certainly, never 
1 See Bastable 's Public Finance, p. 305. 
250 ECONOMIC. F U N C T I O N S OF G O V E R N M E N T . 
been appealed to in practice. The theory in its wider 
meaning implies tha t ihe State is a par tner in all individ-
ual under tak ings by providing, not only for security, but 
for many other elements necessary and advantageous to 
their development. A n d as one of the members of every 
industr ia l par tnership the State is enti t led to a share in 
the profits. If, however, the theory even in this ex-
tended form is advanced as the only just basis of taxation, 
and if taxes are to be levied only and exactly in propor-
tion to the benefits received, the foundation is obviously 
too narrow for the edifice. I t might serve to exercise the 
archi tectural imagination of the pure theorist , but would 
be al together unworkable in practice. 
But the theory has a par t icular application in those 
cases in which the services rendered by the State and the 
benefits accruing to individuals are easily discovered and 
estimated, and it is of special importance in local finance. 
The terms " f e e s " and " p r i ces" are, however, bet ter 
adapted to the payments made for special services ren-
dered by the State, and the principles are considered more 
properly in connection with State expendi ture and mu-
nicipal t rad ing . I t is misleading to a t tempt to connect 
the payment of taxes by individuals with their supposed 
share in the general benefits of gove rnmen t ; it is bet ter 
ra ther to emphasise the distinction between " f ees" paid 
for par t icular services and taxes levied for general 
purposes.1 
§ 15. The Social Function of Taxation. The benefit 
theory of taxat ion is closely allied wi th another theory, 
according to which the kinds and amounts of revenues 
derived from taxation should be adjusted according to 
their social and political effects. I t is no doubt t rue tha t 
in all cases the indirect consequences of taxation are im-
portant , and in some cases the provision of revenue may be 
considered as of secondary importance. Protect ive duties, 
for example, so far as purely protective are non-produc-
1 Cf. Seligman, Essays on Taxation, p. 303. 
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tive of revenue. In the same way, the heavy duties on 
st imulants are often justified, not because ( in fac t ) they 
yield a large revenue, but because (in theory) they check 
consumption. Adam Smith remarks tha t " i t has been, 
for some time past, the policy of Great Britain to dis-
courage the consumption of spiri tuous liquors on account 
of their supposed tendency to ruin the health and corrupt 
the morals of the common people." The same Adam 
Smith, however, also shrewdly observes tha t " if we con-
sult experience the cheapness of wine seems to be a cause 
not of drunkenness bu t of sobriety.1 The inhabi tants of 
the wine countries are, in general, the soberest people in 
Europe. People are seldom gui l ty of excess in wha t is 
their daily fare. A gentleman d runk wi th ale has scarce 
ever been seen among us . " Accordingly, he concludes 
tha t if the duties 011 foreign wines and the excises upon 
malt, beer, and ale were to be taken away all at once, i t 
might indeed occasion in Great Britain a " pre t ty general 
and temporary d runkennes s " among the middl ing and 
inferior ranks of people, bu t would probably be soon 
followed by a permanent and almost universal sobriety. 
Another of the social aims supposed to be specially 
adapted for a t ta inment by taxation is the more equal 
distr ibution of the national wealth. Mill 's peculiar pro-
posals regarding the laws of bequest and inheri tance 
were mainly justified by him on this ground, and in effect 
his proposal logically leads to succession duties, carried 
to the extreme limits imposed by the conditions affecting 
accumulation and evasion. 
I t is not necessary to revert to the general considera-
tion of the communistic ideal. I t may suffice here, to 
observe tha t the same end may be promoted by the ad-
jus tment of expenditure, and it would seem bet ter econ-
omy to aim directly at improving the condition of the 
poorer classes than t o a t tempt to make the poor less poor, 
simply by making the rich less rich. Heavy progressive 
1 Op. tit., p. 200. 
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duties which lopped away all incomes above a certain 
amount would soon become unproductive, whilst a wealthy 
nation, by general taxes, may provide for an increasing 
number of social needs. 
The equalisation of incomes by taxation is very like 
the social levelling by death. 
On the general question the summary of Professor 
Bastable seems temperate and well founded.1 " The re-
sults of financial experience are of some value in respect 
to the use of taxation for other than fiscal purposes. The 
taxing power has often been employed to encourage in-
dustry, to improve taste, to benefit health, or to elevate 
morals, but in none of these applications has the desired 
success been obtained. There is, therefore, a presump-
tion against its use in remedying the inequalities of 
wealth. I ts definite and universally recognised function 
is the supply of adequate funds for the public services. 
To mix up with one very important object another differ-
ent, and perhaps incompatible one, is to run the risk of 
failing in both. . . . If the socialistic rSgime is the goal 
to be aimed at, there are more direct and more effective 
modes open than the manipulation of taxat ion." 
There are, in brief, the mult i tudinous methods of legal 
enactment and of public expenditure. 
§ 16. The Principle of Formal Justice. Finally, what-
ever basis of taxation be adopted, the principle of formal 
justice noticed in the conclusion of Adam Smith's first 
canon must be considered. If i t is just — for any of the 
reasons usually assigned — to tax A, it is just to tax B 
under precisely similar circumstances. Thus stated, the 
principle seems purely abstract and as empty as any other 
pure form of thought . On the analogy, however, of the 
principle of equality before the law and similar political 
principles, i t is easy to give it a material content. For 
fiscal purposes we may substi tute the term " practically " 
— for precisely — similar. Thus, the possible extension of 
1 p. 313. 
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a tax to all similar cases (or conversely, the remission) 
may suffice to destroy the primd facie reasonableness of 
extension (or remission). W e shall see later tha t the same 
principle is of vital importance in the correlative depart-
ment of expenditure, and as we have already seen, it is 
one of the general limitations to governmental action. 
This long, but necessary, examination of the meanings 
of " equality of taxation " may be concluded with the ob-
servation that , as a mat ter of fact, in every civilised com-
munity a highly complex system of taxation is adopted, 
which is, to a large extent , the result of far-reaching his-
torical influences. The universal difficulty in financial 
reform is the necessity of providing for immediate ex-
penses. I t is generally more popular and easy to continue 
an old tax with its old abuses, than to inst i tute a new tax 
with its new benefits. There is a widespread and well-
founded opinion tha t all taxes are evil, and it is difficult 
to carry any financial reform which involves an immediate 
loss of revenue and the consequent imposition of new 
burdens, — al though alleged to be temporary. T h e grea t 
reforms effected by Sir Robert Peel and Mr. Gladstone 
through the imposition of the " t e m p o r a r y " income tax 
were only possible through the t remendous power concen-
trated in the political genius of their personalities. 
C H A P T E R V I I I . 
T H E CANONS OF TAXATION ( c o n t i n u e d ) . 
§1. Adam Smith's Second Canon of Taxation—Cer-
tainty. T h e three remaining canons of Adam Smith 
give more part icular rules for the a t ta inment of equal i ty 
and product iv i ty in the whole tax system by reference to 
the methods employed in the imposition and collection of 
par t icular taxes. They are, for the most part , compara-
t ively simple and require but l i t t le explanation, a l though 
the course of history and the present actual condition of 
d i f ferent nations show tha t they are only carried into 
effect wi th considerable difficulty. 
T h e second — the canon of certainty — lays down t h a t : 
" T h e t ime of payment , the manner of payment , the quan-
t i ty to be paid, ought to be clear and plain to the contribu-
tor and to every other person." T h e positive elements in 
this maxim br ing out the importance of definiteness and 
publici ty. On the negative side it is aimed against the 
a rb i t ra ry exactions of the sovereign power and the job-
bery and abuses of its officials. A p a r t from the general 
social and political evils connected wi th the exercise of 
a rb i t ra ry power, uncer ta in ty of taxat ion involves an eco-
nomic waste. Ad valorem duties on imports are open to 
the objection tha t the importer is never certain in what 
grade his commodity will be classed for taxation. The 
method of declaration which applies to a large part of the 
r e tu rns to the Brit ish income tax fails in publicity, and the 
fai lure in publici ty leads to i r regular i ty and uncer ta inty . 
§2. The Third Canon—-Convenience. The canon of 
convenience enjoins tha t " Every tax ought to be levied 
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at the time and in the manner in which it is most likely 
to be convenient for the contr ibutor to pay i t . " I t is 
justified, not only on the general grounds of good govern-
ment, but also on the special economic ground of the 
greater productiveness of taxes which satisfy this condi-
tion. I t is found possible to raise a considerable revenue 
by taxes on commodities, the payments of which are made 
by the consumers in insensible portions, when it would be 
impossible to collect the same amount by direct taxation 
at comparatively long intervals. 
§ 3 . The Fourth Canon—Economy. This canon has 
for its governing principle t h a t : " Every tax ought so to 
be contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the 
pockets of the people as little as possible over and above 
what it brings into the public t reasury of the State ." 
Taxes may break this rule by requiring a large number 
of officials for their collection, by involving restraints on 
trade and production, by encouraging evasion, or by caus-
ing unnecessary vexation, for " though vexation is not 
strictly speaking expense, it is certainly equivalent to the 
expense at which a man would be willing to redeem him-
self from it ." 
§ 4. Other Rules of Taxation. To these general canons 
of Adam Smith the following may be added, most of which 
are implied in different passages of his t rea tment of taxa-
tion, but have been expanded more ful ly and emphasised 
by subsequent writers.1 ( a ) A given amount of revenue 
is as a rule more conveniently raised, both from the point 
of view of the government and its subjects, from a small 
number of very productive taxes than from a larger num-
ber with smaller re turns per unit.2 This was one of the 
principal reforms advocated by Adam Smith with refer-
ence to the British customs duties, and was carried into 
effect by Sir Robert Peel and his successors. The inex-
tricable confusion of the customs duties levied before 
1 Cf. Helferich in Schonberg's Bandbuch for convenient summary. 
2 An extreme case is the single tax ; cf. Bastable, op. cit., p. 319, 20. 
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these reforms, and the unproduct ive character of most of 
them, can only be realised by reference to the details of 
the history of taxation.1 I t is thought , however, by some 
financiers of the first rank tha t this concentration has been 
carried too far in the Uni ted Kingdom, and that the bur-
den of indirect taxation would be less fe l t if spread over a 
larger number of commodities. The process of simplifica-
tion and concentration has also been partially applied to 
the direct taxes, bu t in many cases (especially in local 
taxat ion) the rule is still more honoured in the breach 
than in the observance. 
( J ) A good system of taxation ought to provide for a 
self-acting increase in the revenue in proportion as wealth 
and population and the consequent demands of govern-
mental expendi ture increase. Thus a land-tax of a fixed 
amount per acre is in general much less advantageous 
than a proportionate amount of rental . The income tax 
and taxes on st imulants have the advantage of showing an 
increasing return wi th increasing wealth and numbers. 
(e) Those taxes are best which yield a steady calcula-
ble re turn . The calculations of the estimates for the 
Budget in the Uni ted Kingdom are now made with ex-
traordinary exactness. The reason for this rule is found 
in the advantage of adjust ing normal expenditure to nor-
mal revenue. 
((?) Those taxes are to be preferred which in case of 
need can be most conveniently increased in amount with-
out involving new machinery or increased expenditure in 
collection, e.g., the income tax in fact, and in theory the 
tax on beer. 
(e) A t the same time in the progress of society it may 
be expedient to abandon old sources of revenue and to 
adopt new methods under the new conditions, notwith-
s tanding the disadvantages which ceteris paribus attach to 
all changes in taxation. 
1 Cf. Dowell 's History of Taxation in England; Sydney Buxton, Fi-
nance and Politics, 1783-1885. 
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Finally it may be observed that if, as is almost inevita-
ble, there is, as regards any proposed tax, a conflict of 
advantages and disadvantages as tested by the canons and 
rules of taxation, the less important rule must be surren-
dered, the importance being judged according to circum-
stances. Adam Smith, for example, states emphatically 
that the experience of all nations shows tha t a very con-
siderable degree of inequality is not near so great an evil 
as a small degree of uncertainty. Again, productiveness 
covers a mult i tude of sins, and as Professor Bastable re-
marks, " The successful administration of the State is the 
final object, and therefore convenience or even equity may 
have to yield to productiveness." 
I t is also important to point out explicitly that all the 
rules must be applied to a system of taxation as a whole. 
There are, of course, some taxes which would be bad in 
any conceivable system of taxation ; but, in most cases, a 
criticism of a part icular tax is of little value unless con-
sideration is also given to the other taxes with which it is 
combined.1 
§ 5. Transition to the Incidence of Taxation and the 
Classification of Taxes. In considering the effects of the 
system of taxation and of its component parts, it is always 
necessary to take into account the real incidence. I t is of 
no avail to set up an ideal s tandard of equality, if the 
actual methods adopted, though nominally and ostensibly 
in accordance with the standard, lead to inequali ty. JSTo 
part of the theory or practice of taxation has given rise to 
so much controversy as the real incidence of various par-
ticular taxes. The " shif t ing " of taxes may lead not only 
to inequalities, but to injurious effects on the productive 
powers of the society as a whole. 
A good example of the necessity of considering the real 
incidence of taxation is found in the common saying that 
if the foreigner taxes our goods we ought to tax his goods. 
1 Mr. Gladstone's Financial Statements furnish abundant illustrations 
of the importance of this consideration. 
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I t is quite possible — both in theory and practice — tha t 
retaliation of this kind will only increase the in jury to 
ourselves. Taxes, as already explained, fall not on things 
but on pers6ns; and if taxes on foreign goods are really 
paid, not by the foreign producer, bu t by the home con-
sumer, the retaliation is wholly nugatory. I t is, however, 
also possible that such taxes may really fall wholly or par-
tially on the foreigner, and even if they do not, the retali-
ation may be expedient on other fiscal or political grounds. 
The real incidence of export and import duties and the 
estimate of their effects on foreign and domestic trade con-
st i tute a group of the most difficult problems in economics. 
I t will be found convenient, however, to consider briefly 
the classification of taxes before proceeding to the question 
of incidence. 
C H A P T E R I X . 
T H E CLASSIFICATION OF TAXATION. 
§ 1. Difficulties of Classification in Taxation. " In taxa-
tion there are almost as many classifications as writers," 
says one of the latest and ablest surveyors 1 of the field of 
public finance. The reasons are not far to seek. Taxation 
may be treated for different purposes from different points 
of view, and the classification will vary accordingly. For 
theoretical purposes the plan adopted by Adam Smith 
seems still the most logical, and, at any rate as a prelimi-
nary, the most useful . 
The primary object of taxation is to take portions of the 
revenues or the property of private persons for the service 
of the State. Since what is taken by compulsion by the 
State might have been consumed as revenue, we may say 
logically that all taxes are paid out of revenue, though — 
as in the case of succession duties — sometimes the inclu-
sion under revenue may be only formal, and taxes may be 
paid out of capital. 
Adam Smith takes as the basis of classification the three 
great species of income, and examines in order taxes upon 
rents, profits, and wages. W e may bring his t rea tment in 
line with the subsequent development of economic theory 
by resolving these general classes into more precisely dif-
ferentiated species, e.g., by taking account of pure economic 
rent and g'wem'-rent and of the searching analyses of profits 
and wages. 
I t may be objected, however, tha t one result of modern 
analysis is to show tha t even for general theory wages, 
profits, and rents cannot be sharply defined, and that in 
1 Professor C. Plehn, Introduction to Public Finance. 
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the actual tax systems to which the theories must be ulti-
mately applicable — if they are not imaginary hypotheses 
— we never find taxes arranged on this simple tri-partite 
plan, and still less with the gwcm'-technical subdivisions. 
The British income tax, it is true, divides incomes into 
classes in which rents of " lands ," profits on "capi ta l , " and 
wages of " l a b o u r " find a place; but there is 110 separate 
schedule for pure economic rent or ^wcm'-rents or net in-
terest or wages of superintendence, and the wages of other 
labour is only represented by the salaries of those not com-
monly called labourers, e.g., various officials. 
The incomes of individuals are also often derived from 
different sources, and, as in the British income tax, the 
same individual may re turn his income under different 
schedules. 
These objections, however, seem to me to be purely 
formal. The revenues of individuals can be classified and 
subdivided according to important marks of difference, and 
seeing t ha t taxes must be paid out of these revenues, it is 
important to trace the consequences, especially as regards 
" s h i f t i n g " or real incidence. Logically it makes no dif-
ference tha t the same person may have different kinds of 
income or tha t the official schedules may apply the same 
name to different economic categories. The business of 
all science is to discover differences in similars and simi-
lars in differences. 
A second more important objection to the theoretical 
classification proposed is found in the fact that actual 
taxes are not levied only in the direct manner at first 
assumed, but are imposed upon some persons with the in-
tention and expectation that they will be transferred to 
others. Taxes are also imposed nominally upon " objects " 
or things, al though their ul t imate burden must lie upon 
" subjects " or persons. 
There are, for example, taxes upon consumable com-
modities, including various materials of production — e.g., 
the large classes of customs and excise duties — arid al-
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though these taxes must be ult imately paid out of rev-
enues of some kind, they certainly cannot be divided 
according to the revenues on which they fall. Adam 
Smith ingeniously makes a separate class of those taxes 
which are intended to fall indifferently upon each of the 
three great species of revenue, and then considers under 
this heading a number of particular taxes of various kinds. 
The logical connection, however, of this class wi th 
revenue as the basis of classification is of the slightest . 
The ul t imate incidence is in many cases said to be on the 
consumer, and no fu r the r reference is made to the source 
or kind of the consumer's revenue. 
I t seems best then to supplement the theoretical classi-
fication according to revenue by the historical or empirical 
enumerat ion of the most impor tant concrete forms of taxa-
tion. The use of the terms historical, empirical, and con-
crete suggests tha t this enumerat ion will not lend itself 
to any simple method of classification. A n d i t will be 
found tha t when once the idea of ul t imate incidence on 
economic revenues is abandoned, taxes may be grouped or 
classified according to very different characteristics. Some 
of the most important of these classes and dist inctions are 
explained in the following section. 
§ 2. Direct and Indirect Taxes. One of the oldest and 
most important divisions of taxes is into " d i r e c t " and 
" i n d i r e c t . " A direct tax is defined by Mill — and this is 
the definition generally accepted — as a tax demanded from 
the very persons who it is intended or desired should pay 
it . An indirect tax is demanded f rom one person in the 
expectation and intent ion tha t he should be able to t rans-
fer it to another. 
In general this distinction is clear enough, but , as usual 
in economic definitions, there is a wide debatable margin . 
Taxes on various classes of income, e.g., dividends f rom 
public companies, interest on loans national and local, may 
be demanded from the companies tha t earn the dividends 
or the banks tha t pay the interests on the debts. Logi-
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cally, however, the companies and banks may be regarded 
as financial agents of the government, as is fu r the r shown 
by the fact tha t the tax may be recovered by those who 
are exempt on a graduated scale. 
Similarly taxes on the owners of property — e.g., lands 
and houses — may be in the first place collected from the 
occupier who in turn deducts it from the rent. Again, 
taxes on wages (e.g., to meet the labourers' share in com-
pulsory insurance) may be taken in the first place from the 
masters. 
But apar t from this formal question of agency there are 
real difficulties in this interpretat ion of direct taxation. 
Even when direct taxes (so-called) are demanded from 
one set of people with the expectation and intention that 
they alone will bear the burden, it f requent ly happens tha t 
this expectation is not realised, and par t of the tax is trans-
ferred to other classes or persons. Thus a tax on wages, 
even if taken from the labourers directly, might in some 
cases lead to a fall in profits or to an increase in the price 
of the commodity to the consumer. 
And apart from the actual burden of the tax itself there 
are always indirect consequences and unseen effects which 
are often of more importance than the original tax. 
These considerations are of still greater weight when 
applied to the converse case of indirect taxes. The typi-
cal example is a tax on a commodity which is intended to 
be t ransferred to the consumer. Whether or not the tax 
can be wholly t ransferred depends upon a number of con-
ditions, e.g., demand and supply, competition and monopoly, 
mobility of labour and capital, and other variable elements. 
And in estimating the whole burden of the tax we have 
to consider the restraints imposed on the development of 
the taxed industry which may prejudicially affect both 
profits and wages. 
I t might then be maintained tha t the distinction should 
turn , not on the intention of the government, but on the 
actual fact of transference — those taxes only being classed 
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as indirect which are actually t ransferred. The adoption 
of this plan, however, would make it necessary to place 
incidence before classification, which in a t rea tment of 
principles is obviously undesirable. 
Another in te rpre ta t ion 1 of the terms " d i r e c t " and " indi-
rect" ' is to confine the term " direct " to taxes taken from 
income or capital directly assessed, not indirectly estimated 
through expenditure. Non-transferable taxes on expen-
di ture (e.g . , on the employer of men-servants) would 
be direct according to the first definition, bu t not accord-
ing to the second — the tax is indeed paid directly by the 
employer, and is probably never t ransferred even partially, 
but it cannot be regarded as an income tax. 
This distinction may be expressed more generally thus : 
" Direct imposts are those levied on wealth in its immedi-
ate manifestations, persons, incomes, es ta tes; indirect, those 
levied on the secondary manifestat ions of the wealth of 
the contributors, e.g., t ransfers and consumpt ion ." 2 
This mode of s ta t ing the distinction natura l ly leads up 
to the definition which rests upon adminis t ra t ive or official 
practice. Direct taxes are those levied on permanent and 
recurr ing occasions, and are assessed according to some 
list or roll of persons (cadastre) . The taxpayer is re-
garded as definitely and permanent ly ascript to the 
t reasury. 
Indirect taxes, on the other hand, are levied according to 
a tariff on the occurrence of transactions and events which 
are not previously ascertainable as regards part icular per-
sons. The amount of a direct tax assessed in this way is 
certain and regular, whilst an indirect tax is uncertain and 
irregular, as regards individuals. T h u s the income tax is 
direct on this view, but succession duties are indirect, it 
being uncertain when they will be paid and by whom, see-
ing tha t all taxes are payable by persons, and the dead can 
be taxed no more, and their heirs are uncertain. 
§ 3. Other Distinctions. I n respect to the mode of 
1 E.g., McCulloch. 2 Cossa's Taxation, p. 66. 
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assessment, the amount to be obtained may be first fixed 
and a rate ad jus ted accordingly so tha t the amount is just 
obtained f rom the contr ibutors . The " r a t e s " of Brit ish 
local finance are ostensibly of this character, and the old 
fifteenths and ten ths came to be definite amounts for towns 
and counties, which were apportioned amongst the tax-
payers. Professor Bastable accordingly calls these taxes 
" appor t ioned." But instead of the amount to be raised be-
ing fixed and apportioned the charge per un i t may be fixed, 
the total yield being uncer ta in . T h u s whilst the local 
authori t ies impose a rate to raise a certain sum for the 
school-boards, the Chancellor of the Exchequer lays a 
penny 011 the income tax, the yield being only estimated. 
Professor Bastable calls these taxes " ra ted," which term, 
however, has the disadvantage of sugges t ing local rates 
which are "appor t ioned . " A better term to be contrasted 
with apport ioned would be simply " non-apport ioned," or 
if apport ioned taxes are styled " rates " in accordance with 
practice, we may adopt the popular division of rates and 
taxes — the rates being apportioned, the taxes not .1 
Taxes may be payable in kind (e.g., t i thes of produce, 
prisage of wines, mil i tary services) or in money. The 
transi t ion to payment in money is of historical impor-
tance, the principal survival of the other class being con-
scription. 
Taxes are classed as " real " and " personal ." Real taxes 
(a l though paid by persons u l t imate ly) are those levied on 
certain objects wi thout regard to the part icular faculty of 
the owner or consumer, e.g., specific duties on imports, or 
taxes on land wi thout allowances for mortgages. Personal 
taxes are levied directly on persons (e.g., capitation taxes 
according to rank, business, or profession), or according to 
their supposed economic conditions or faculty as indicated 
by their income or proper ty . 
Taxes on revenue and taxes on capital are nominally dis-
t inct , bu t as already noted the la t ter may be merged under 
the former. 
1 Cf. Cannan, History of Local Bates in England, p. 4. 
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Finally, I may quote the useful summary of Professor 
Bastable, which combines the general theoretical basis of 
Adam Smith with the enumeration of the principal forms 
of taxes on the empirical or historical method. 
" T h e main division is into ' p r i m a r y ' and ' secondary . ' 
The primary taxes are those on land, on business and cap-
ital, on persons, and on labourers ' earnings. The combi-
nation of these pr imary forms gives us the general income 
and property taxes which come next in order. Passing to 
the secondary forms of taxation, we find (1 ) taxes on com-
modities including all excises and customs; (2 ) taxes on 
communications and t ranspor t ; ( 3 ) the remaining taxes on 
commerce and legal t ransactions; ( 4 ) taxes on the t ransfer 
of proper ty ; ( 5 ) succession dut ies ." 
C H A P T E R XIV. 
INCIDENCE OF TAXATION — G E N E R A L PRINCIPLES. 
§ 1. Importance of the Study of Incidence. The inci-
dence of taxation is a subject of great importance and diffi-
culty, both theoretically and practically. Even as regards 
direct taxation, it may well happen that , although the per-
son who first pays the tax is the person who bears the bur-
den in the sense intended by the government, yet indirectly, 
in ways not contemplated by the government, part of the 
original burden and part also of the additional burden in-
cidentally created may be shifted to others. 
Suppose, for example, tha t the State imposes a tax upon 
houses, and tha t it divides the amount payable in definite 
proportions between the owner and the occupier, and duly 
collects these proportions from each separately. Here we 
have apparently the simplest examples of direct taxation 
possible. 
But an examination of the incidence of the house-tax 
shows tha t under certain condit ions1 part (or even the 
whole) of the nominal payment of the occupier may be 
shifted to the owner — that is to say, in consequence of 
the tax the occupier may pay so much less rent, whilst 
under other conditions, par t (or even the whole) of the 
nominal payment of the owner may be shifted to the occu-
pier by a rise in rent. And apart from this redistribution 
of the house-tax itself between owner and occupier, there 
may be indirect effects upon agricultural rents and upon 
particular classes of profits. 
1 Cf. Edgeworth's " Pure Theory of Taxation " for full statement of 
incidence of house-tax under various conditions, Economic Journal, 
March, 1897. 
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Again, nothing could appear more direct and simple 
than the incidence of succession duties ; the former owner 
of the property is dead, and the State takes a par t to itself. 
But if it is known that a f te r death the State will take a 
large share, a s t imulus is at once given to evasion, e.g., 
through the checks to accumulation, the encouragement of 
consumption, and g i f t s inter vivos. I t is thus possible tha t 
heavy succession duties might prejudicially affect the 
wages of labour. And there can be no doubt that histori-
cally, in countries tha t are burdened with excessive taxes, 
apar t f rom the share supposed to fall on labour, there is 
an additional burden due to the contraction of enterprise 
and accumulation. 
If, however, in the case of taxes nominally direct, we 
have to penetrate beyond the seen to the unseen, still more 
necessary is the s tudy of real incidence in the case of taxes 
ostensibly indirect. I t may happen first tha t the intent ion 
of the government tha t the tax should be shif ted f rom the 
original payer is not realised at all or only part ial ly ; sec-
ondly, it may happen tha t the par t tha t is shi f ted is shif ted 
in .a way not contemplated ; and thirdly, there are all the 
af ter effects and indirect consequences as in the case of 
direct taxat ion. 
I t may also happen tha t the imposition of a tax, whether 
direct or indirect, will not only impose a burden, in tended 
or not intended, bu t may incidentally create an advantage 
and confer a benefit, sometimes intended, sometimes not . 1 
J u s t as pauperism is a t t racted by high expenditure, so 
capitalism is a t t racted by low taxation, and thus heavy 
taxation in one distr ict gives an advantage to other dis-
tr icts l ight ly taxed. Protect ive duties are intended to 
protect , but other taxes may create monopolies not origi-
nally intended. 
I t is clear, however, that , whatever meaning or meanings 
be given to equality of taxation, we must always refer to 
the ul t imate real incidence with all its burdens, direct and 
indirect. 
1 Cf. Edgeworth, op. cit., pp. 53, 62 n. 
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In every problem of incidence, for the complete solution, 
two questions must be answered : first, who ult imately 
pays the tax received by the State ; second, who bears the 
burdens or enjoys the advantages incidentally created. In 
the discussion of the general principles we are mainly con-
cerned wi th the first question, the incidental burdens and 
advantages being subject to variations according to the 
na ture of the part icular tax . 
§ 2. The Incidence of Taxation as determined by Law 
and Custom. The general problem of incidence is a prob-
lem of distr ibution, and for the solution we must refer 
back to the general principles already examined. A n d it 
must be observed tha t just as distribution cannot be en-
t irely reduced to exchange, so neither can the incidence 
of taxat ion be considered merely as an application of the 
theory of value. 
The power to shi f t the payment of a tax or to recoup 
the payment f rom another source depends, in the first 
place, upon the influence of law and custom in the widest 
sense of the terms. This influence may be so grea t tha t 
there is no possibility of sh i f t ing the tax otherwise than as 
directed by the rules laid down by the State or submit ted 
to under the customs of the society, though even in this 
case there are indirect consequences, both in the way of 
burden and of advantage. 
The influence of law and custom may be best observed 
in societies in which exchange is not yet of fundamenta l 
importance, as, for example, in those under the dominance 
of feudalism or village communities. 
W e find in the development of the incidence of taxation 
an i l lustrat ion of the universal progress f rom status to 
contract . A t first, the force of law and custom directs 
the t ransference of the tax to its most minute ramifica-
tions ; gradual ly this compelling power is limited to the 
collection of the tax from the original payers, they in their 
t u rn t ransfe r r ing the whole or par t of the burden, accord-
ing to the principles of contract and exchange. 
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Take, for example, the development of taxation in Eng-
land. Taxes at first, with few except ions 1 (e.g., the 
rudiments of the customs duties, and of the income and 
property (movables) t ax ) , are levied on land. They dif-
fer f rom rents in being occasional burdens levied for 
definite objects of expenditure, but they tend to become 
permanent burdens and thereby rent-charges. 
" All the imposts of the Anglo-Saxon and Norman 
reigns," says Stubbs,2 " were, so far as we know, raised on 
the land and according to the computation of the hide. 
This generalisation covers both the national taxes like the 
Danegeld and the feudal exactions by way of aid ; both 
were levied on the hide. . . . Under the general head of 
donum auxilium and the like,3 come a long series of im-
posts which were theoretically g i f t s of the nation to the 
king, and the amount of which was determined by the itin-
erant justices af ter separate negotiation with the payers. 
The most important of these, t ha t which fell upon the 
towns and demesne lands of the crown, is known as tallage, 
and the part icular method in which it was to be collected 
was determined by the community on which it fell or by 
special ar rangement with the par t ies . " 4 
As a part icular case we may take scutage. The normal 
amount was assumed to be 40s. for each knight's fee or 
scutum. Each knight ' s fee was assumed to contain four 
hides. And as four virgates usualty went to each hide, so 
each virgate should contribute one-sixteenth of a scutum. 
There are several entries in the Hundred Rolls ( O x o n ) 
which state that when the scutage is 40s. each virgate pays 
2s. 6d . , i.e., one sixteenth of 40s.5 
1 " The indirect taxation of this period is obscure and of no great im-
por tance . "— Stubbs, Vol. L, p. 580. 
2 Constitutional History, Vol. I. , p. 580, 581, 583. 
3 On the use of these gentle terms, see above, p. 261. 
4 Cf. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, Vol. I. , 
pp. 600-604. 
6 Cf. Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, Vol. I., p. 562, 
under "Fiscal Powers ." " T h e king, f rom time to time, grants to his ten-
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Scutages and other ancient imposts were thus " rad ica ted 
in the so i l . " 1 Even as regards taxes on movables we 
are told that the documents prescribe bow the tax is to 
be levied. " O f any sum of money cast on the vill as a 
whole, we read no w o r d ; each individual man of the 
k ingdom is to pay a fifteenth of his movables." But by 
the reign of Edward I I I . , the effect of repeated taxations 
is tha t certain quotas have already s t ruck root in the soil 
of the vills. " Even a tax on movables cannot live with-
out roots ; it must a t tach itself to the l a n d . " 2 
Thus , t ak ing a broad survey of the mediaeval feudal sys-
tem, there was no room for a theory of incidence founded 
on contract or exchange ; the king 's chief taxers and their 
assessors followed the tax to its minutes t source.3 
The history of the revenues of India is part icularly in-
structive, and is inextricably blended wi th the history of 
the " p r o p r i e t o r s h i p " and "occupancy " of land. The set-
t lements effected by the British Government are mainly 
of two kinds. In the first (e.g. , Bengal ) the " chief t a x e r " 
becomes the " p r o p r i e t o r " ; in the second (e.g., Bombay) 
the cult ivators are taxed direct. In the first case where-
ever a set t lement was made with, and the proprietary r ight 
conferred on, some head-man, zamindar, or other individual, 
over the village landholders generally, there were almost 
ants the power of taking an aid or a scutage from their tenants, and 
though these imposts may be regarded as feudal services, yet in practice 
they cannot be collected without a royal writ, and in course of time even 
theory seems to require tha t the king should have granted his tenants in 
chief their scutages, and have given them leave to levy their a ids . " 
1 Ibid., Vol. I. , p. 601. 
2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, Vol. I., p. 605. 
8 Cf. Do well's History of Taxation, Vol. I. , p. 80, and Appendix, 
p. 254. In this appendix an example is given of the assessment for the 
general fifteenth in 1301 in the Borough of Colchester. The assessor en-
rols in detail the particulars of the movables, and specifies the value 
upon each heading of property; e.g., William of Tendring, the tailor, has 
an old clock, 3s., a bed, 2s. 6d., a brass pot, Is. 6d., and a pair of scissors, 
3d., total, 7s. 3d., and Walter the Weaver has a " s u r t o u t valued at 2s. 
8d., nothing m o r e . " 
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sure to be some others whose rights, though in a subordi-
nate grade, had to be taken care of.1 Though the za-
mindar was recognised as proprietor, his r ight was by no 
means unlimited as regards the " r a i y a t s " under him. He 
was responsible to the government for the aggregate taxa-
tion on his " proper ty ," but it was supposed that the 
amount fixed was such as to take away all pre text for 
rack-rent ing his tenants, and he was not allowed to levy 
unauthorised dues and exactions. In some of the settle-
ments the middleman is only an ideal body — the jointly 
responsible community ; 2 but the part icular contr ibutions 
are fixed by custom. 
In the second class of set t lement the government takes 
the revenues directly f rom the " r a i y a t s " wi thout the in-
tervention of any middleman — whether zamindar or vil-
lage community. The land is surveyed and each field or 
holding separately demarcated, and an assessment fixed on 
i t ; the holder of the field—the raiyat — whoever he is, 
holds it on the simple terms of paying the assessment to 
the government direct. 
For the present purpose it would obscure rather than 
il lustrate the influence of law and custom in direct ing the 
incidence of taxation to enter into fu r the r detail as regards 
the development of the land revenues of India . The history 
of India is the history of a series of waves of immigration 
and conquest. 
Beneath these waves the villages remain comparatively 
undis turbed ; they pay a customary tr ibute, and custom 
determines in the last resort the amount of the produce of 
each field tha t is to go to the rulers as revenue ; at first 
the payments are in kind, but in time they are converted 
into money. Besides these land-taxes there are other 
taxes analogous to the aids and benevolences of feudalism 
and other mediaeval exactions.3 
1 Baden-Powell, Land Revenues of British India, p. 94 ; cost of 
sett lement, p. 156. 2 Ibid., p. 125. 
3 " T h e Raja of Utraula took his grain share, and the rest of his reven-
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But of the sh i f t ing of taxation in the modern sense by 
contract and exchange there is scarcely any t r ace ; the 
ul t imate incidence is determined by law and custom lay-
ing down rules, and by the predatory and parasitic prac-
tices of the tax-gatherers in breaking the rules. 
A n d in modern societies, though the arbi t rary abuses 
of the collectors have been almost abolished, a large par t 
of the incidence of taxation still depends on law and cus-
tom, and the tax remains where it is placed.1 
§ 3. Incidence of Taxation as determined by Contract 
and Exchange. In modern times the State levies certain 
taxes, — on persons directly or indirectly through com-
modities, — bu t the taxed persons may be able to shif t the 
burden according to various economic conditions. The 
ul t imate incidence is no longer al together determined by 
the compulsion of law and custom and the rapacity of the 
collectors, bu t par t ly by the voluntary actions of indi-
viduals. 
When a tax is imposed on any person (wi th no legal 
power of t r ans fe r ) , he is natura l ly led to reconsider his 
whole economic position so that he may make the burden 
a minimum on the whole. The possibility of compulsory 
legal t ransference being now excluded, he can only get 
rid of his burden (wholly or par t ia l ly) by a change in his 
bargains — and it takes two at least to make a bargain. 
I t is quite clear tha t the mere fact of the imposition of 
ues were derived from numerous and ingenious taxes ; there was the tax 
exacted for the clothes for the new-born heir, the fur ther levy when the 
child 's head was shaved for the first t ime ; taxes to pay for the repair of 
his fort, and for a horse or an elephant. The wood cut from the jungle 
was taxed, and road fees, bridge tolls, and trade taxes were exac ted ." 
Baden-Powell, p. 50. 
On Liberties and Franchises, see Pollock and Maitland, Vol. I., p. 558 ; 
Expropriat ion and Penal Powers, Seligman's Essays, pp. 266, 267, 208. 
1 The supporters of the single tax and of the equal diffusion theory 
really assume that the shift ing of taxes is so complete and easy tha t there 
is no dis turbance of economic relations. The same assumption is, how-
ever, also large enough to prove that all systems of taxation are equally 
equitable. (Cf. Seligman, Incidence, of Taxation, Bk. II . , Ch. I I I . ) 
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a tax will not in general be sufficient reason for the origi-
nal taxpayer to ask and receive an indemnity from others. 
If we take the terms " seller " and " b u y e r " in the widest 
sense, — as applied to the purchase and sale of land, labour, 
and capital, ei ther absolutely or for certain uses, for certain 
times, under certain conditions, — we may suppose tha t the 
State extracts f rom the seller a certain par t of his price, 
or imposes on the buyer an official charge for the privilege 
of being allowed to buy. 
To take the first a l te rna t ive : if on the imposition of 
the tax the seller can simply say to the buyer, you must 
give me so much more on account of this tax, the question 
natural ly arises why did the seller wait for the s t imulus 
or suggestion of the tax to raise his price ? If the seller 
had a monopoly, it may be assumed tha t he had already 
fixed — having regard to the demand — the best price in 
his interests. If the seller were one of many in competi-
t ion it may be assumed tha t the price was so adjusted as 
to equate demand and supply, and that a rise in price be-
yond this rate would check the demand. The mere fact 
tha t the seller has to pay a tax will increase neither the 
desire of the buyer to buy nor his means of payment . 
T o take the second a l t e rna t ive : suppose the tax is 
imposed on the buyers, they cannot simply say to the 
sellers, you must sell for so much less. The utmost they 
can do is to restrict or threaten to restr ict their demand, 
and the sellers may or may not make an alteration in the 
price in response to this change in demand. A n d it is 
possible tha t under certain conditions the sellers may at 
first lower and ult imately raise the price. The simple 
t r u t h is tha t a tax paid by the seller immediately dimin-
ishes his profits, and a tax paid by the buyer immediately 
diminishes his consuming power, and in either case there 
is an immediate disturbance in the equation of demand 
and supply, and there are also ulterior ad jus tments and 
readjus tments of various kinds. 
Thus the theory of the shi f t ing of taxation — when the 
VOL. I I I . X 
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shi f t ing no longer depends on law or custom or compul-
sion in any form — is essentially, as Professor Marshall 
points out, an application of the theory of value in the 
broadest sense. 
I t seems unnecessary again to go through the various 
cases seriatim, or to rewri te the theory of value with 
special i l lustrat ions f rom taxat ion. I t is sufficient in this 
chapter to show the mode of applying the general prin-
ciples, and to examine later the effects of some important 
species of taxes. 
§ 4. The Immediate Effects of a Tax on Demand. The 
immediate effect of a tax on the buyer (or consumer or 
demander ) is so far to decrease the quanti ty demanded. 
T h a t is to say, less will be demanded at the old price 
plus the tax (or par t the reof ) than at the old price without 
addit ion. This follows at once from the general law of 
demand. The degree of the effect on the quant i ty de-
manded will depend par t ly on the intensi ty or the elasticity 
of the demand, and par t ly on the possible use of substi-
tutes. I t is plain tha t if subst i tu tes are untaxed and are 
otherwise equally desirable, the demand for the taxed th ing 
will be destroyed ; if, however, all possible subst i tutes are 
proport ionately taxed or are less desirable, the check to 
demand will be so much less. 
Even, however, in the case of necessaries in which the 
elasticity of demand is very small and the possibility of 
subst i tutes inconsiderable (as in food for clothes, clothes 
for fuel , e tc . ) , a t ax fal l ing immediately upon the buyers 
mus t to some extent check the demand, if only for the 
general reason that the tax of itself cannot increase their 
revenues, and some, at any rate, must already be spending 
as much as they can afford ( the marginal demanders) . So 
far I have considered the effect on demand only, wi thout 
reference to supply. 
§ 5. The Immediate Effects of a Tax on Supply. Simi-
larly the immediate effect of a tax on the seller is to lessen 
the quan t i ty offered, and again the degree of the fal l ing 
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off will depend on the elasticity of the supply. If the sup-
ply is very inelastic, or in the extreme case cannot be with-
drawn, the tax has li t t le or no immediate effect on the 
quant i ty offered ; if, on the other hand, the supply is 
elastic,-—-if, for example, the commodity could be exported 
to non-taxed markets , — then the tax might kill the sale 
al together in the taxed market . 
§ 6. The Immediate Effects on Price of a Tax. The 
immediate effect of a fall in demand ( the conditions of 
supply remaining the same) will be a fall in price (as 
paid to the seller) . But the extent of the fall is indeter-
minate. Before the price has fallen to the full amount of 
the tax, the withdrawal of supply in response will create a 
new equilibrium. If the tax is imposed on the seller ( the 
demand remaining the same), the immediate effect is to 
raise the price paid by the buyer . But again the extent 
of the rise is indeterminate, because before the price has 
risen to the ful l extent of the tax the check to demand 
will produce a new equilibrium. I t makes no difference 
theoretically whether the tax is taken in the first place 
f rom the buyer or the sel ler ; the ul t imate incidence 
depends on the shif t ing, and the sh i f t ing on the elasticity 
of demand and supply. The general principle is tha t the 
tax inflicts more loss on either party the less the elasticity 
of tha t party 's demand or supply, other th ings ( including 
the other par ty 's elasticity) being the same.1 
If the buyers are taxed in the first place, they demand 
so much less, how much less depending on the elasticity 
of their demand ; and the competition of sellers reduces 
the original price — the degree of the fall again depend-
ing on the elasticity of their supply. If the rise in price 
would decrease great ly the quant i ty demanded (a very 
elastic demand) and a similar fall in price would have 
very little effect on the quant i ty offered (a very inelastic 
supply) , the greater par t of the tax will fall on the seller. 
If the sellers are taxed in the first place, they will so far 
1 Cf. Edgeworth, op. cit., p. 48. 
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offer less, and the competition of unsatisfied demand will 
t end to raise the p r ice ; and again the new price will 
depend on the elasticity of demand and supply. 
In general, however, except in the extreme or l imit ing 
cases, the seller will always receive something less and the 
buyer will pay something more than the original price, the 
dis tr ibut ion of the burden being dependent on the relative 
elasticities. A n d in general also the effect of the tax will 
be to diminish the amount bought and sold. 
In the l imit ing case of perfect non-elasticity of demand, 
if the buyer is determined to have so much quand mime, 
the whole of the tax would fall on the buyer ; and similarly, 
if there is perfect non-elasticity of supply and the seller 
must sell quand mime, the whole of the tax would fall on 
the seller. If both demand and supply are perfectly non-
elastic, the dis tr ibut ion is indeterminate. If both are per-
fect ly elastic, t ha t is, if the smallest addition to the price 
will kill demand or smallest subtraction kill supply, the 
t ax kills the market , and there is no incidence because the 
tax cannot be collected.1 
1 The general argument of this section can be best expressed by the 
use of curves. The figures given by Edgeworth, Theory of Pure Taxation, 
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§ 7. Ulterior Effects of Taxation on Prices.—It must 
be borne in mind that in the preceding section only the 
immediate effects on marke t prices have been considered. 
tha t in any market the quant i ty offered tends to rise with every rise, and 
to fall with every fall in price. 
If the buyer pays the tax aE, Eh will be the price received by the 
sel ler; if the seller pays the tax (receiving ah f rom the buyer) , his net 
receipt is still Eh, and a t this price Oh will be offered, and at the price 
ah, Oh will also be demanded. Therefore Oh is the quant i ty demanded 
and'offered a t the net price to the seller of Eh, and at the gross price to 
the buyer of ah. And the result is the same whether the buyer or the 
seller pays the whole of the tax in the first place. 
The price ah exceeds the price AH by na, and the price Et\ is less 
than the price AH by En, and na plus En equals the tax. I t will be seen 
tha t if DD' becomes more elastic, the proportionate rise in price above 
the original is less, and in the extreme case the whole tax falls on the 
seller. 
Conversely, demand remaining the same, and elasticity of supply in-
creasing, there is a greater rise in price to the buyer. 
If the tax is collected in any definite proportion, indicated by q, f rom 
both buyer and seller, the result is also the same. The seller pays Eq to 
the State and the buyer qa; but the seller, as before, receives Eh net, 
and the buyer pays ha gross, namely, qa to the State and hq to the seller. 
If the buyer sought to retain qE, at the price ah minus qE more would be 
demanded than Oh, and at the price Eh minus Eq less would be offered. 
Thus Oh is the equilibrium quant i ty , hE the seller's net receipt, and ah 
the buyer ' s gross payment in any case. 
But the rise of ah above y l i / a n d the fall of Eh below AII will depend 
on the elasticity of the two curves, DD' and SS'. 
Oh is obviously less than Oil; ha is greater than AH, and Eh less than 
AH, except in the limiting cases when DD' or SS' become horizontal or 
vertical straight lines. 
By way of fu r the r explanation, it may be added tha t the SS' curve 
shows how much is offered in response to certain prices ; if, by a tax, so 
much is extracted from each of these prices, the whole supply curve is 
raised. Conversely of DD'. If the buyer must pay so much more per 
unit the whole demand curve is lowered. 
The effect of a tax which is paid by the buyer is equivalent to a fall in 
demand. The desire to possess (relatively to other things), and other 
conditions remaining the same, the buyer will pay the same total price as 
before ; therefore, if par t goes as a tax, he offers so much less to the seller 
in every case. 
Similarly, if the tax is taken from the sellers, they will sell for the 
same set of net prices as before ; tha t is equivalent to a rise in supply. A 
higher price is needed to extract the same supply. 
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The ulterior effects on prices will depend on the various 
conditions affecting product ion or supply, wi th the reac-
tion on demand. 
These conditions can only be stated in extremely gen-
eral te rms if they are to be applicable to production (or 
supply) in the widest sense, including the production of 
labour and of capital, and also of the adaptat ion of land 
and natura l agents for product ive purposes. 
Amongs t such general conditions — which have tq, be 
taken account of in the determination of the incidence of 
part icular taxes — are: ( a ) The influence of competition 
and monopoly respectively, which again depend for their 
efficiency or pur i ty on a variety of causes, e.g., the mobility 
of labour and capital and of land (in the sense of adapta-
tion to different uses or t ransference to different owners) , 
and the power of voluntary or State-aided combination. 
(b) W e have to consider whether the tiling produced fol-
lows the law of increasing, decreasing, or constant re turn 
— whether the available supply is for thcoming at a uni-
form cost or at different costs, (c) W e must take into 
account the method adopted in taxation, whether the tax 
is ad valorem or specific, proportionate or graduated, 
whether imposed directly on the final product , or at prior 
stages. ( d ) W e must consider whether the tax is gen-
eral or part icular , or equal or unequal, and how far it 
affects subst i tutes or correlated articles. 
The general na ture of these conditions and of the sub-
jects covered by taxation shows tha t the general principles 
of the ul t imate incidence of taxat ion must be considered 
in reference to the various classes of taxes, and it will be 
found tha t these conditions are of varying importance 
and operate in different combinations in different cases. 
The theory of the incidence of taxation involves, indeed, 
an application of all the economic principles, theories, ten-
dencies, and disturbances already examined. 
C H A P T E R XIII. 
TAXES ON KENT AND LAND. 
§ 1. Taxes on Pure Economic Rent of Agricultural 
Land. Economic rent (pure) of agricultural land is gen-
erally mingled in practice with other forms of revenue 
due to capital or labour, and not merely to the natural 
qualities of the soil. But for theoretical purposes we 
may assume that the economic rent may be isolated from 
these other elements. In the normal case the produce-
rent will depend on the excess above that of the margin, 
and the money-rent will depend on the amount of produce 
and the price per unit which is determined by the mar-
ginal cost of production. Thus economic rent is a surplus 
which depends upon natural conditions that may vary to 
any extent, and on price, which is independent of rent. 
We may fur ther assume for a first approximation tha t 
there are separate owners of the various portions of land, 
tha t the owners are not in combination, and tha t the lands 
are let by competition every year on an accurate estimate 
of the produce surplus and its price. 
And, also, we may assume tha t there is only one kind 
of produce, or that the land can be let only for one 
purpose. 
In measuring the economic rent we do not take units 
of land, but units of productive power (labour and capital) 
applied to different qualities of land. The rent arises 
from the different returns to the same amount of power 
applied under different natural conditions. 
Wi th these various assumptions it is quite clear that a 
tax on economic rent cannot be shifted by the landowners. 
I t cannot be transferred to the consumer of the produce, 
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owing to the competition of the marginal land tha t pays 
no rent and therefore no tax, nor to the farmer, since 
competition leaves him only ordinary profits. 
The amount of each particular rental depends upon 
units of surplus produced (varying to any extent accord-
ing to the superior natural conditions), and on the mar-
ginal price, which is independent of these superior 
conditions. And, accordingly, a tax tha t strikes the 
surplus only, remains where it first falls. 
Even if the tax is very unequal, and is such tha t after 
payment superior land yields a lower net re turn than 
inferior land, there is no readjustment of the burden. 
The same reasoning applies if we consider all the land 
to be of the same quality, and the surpluses that consti-
tu te rent to arise from the different returns to successive 
doses of capital, or if, as is usual, we find the extensive 
and intensive application of the law of diminishing re-
turns conjoined.1 
Also in the case of simple scarcity rent where, though 
lands and costs are uniform, there is a marginal rent (or 
differential profit over ordinary employments of capital), 
the tax lies where it falls.2 
Generally, under the conditions laid down, a tax on 
economic rent cannot be shifted by the owner of the land ; 
and if levied in the first place on the occupier, he can 
retain it from his rent, the mobility of capital acting as 
effectively as if he were empowered to make the transfer 
by the law of the land. 
§ 2. Variations in the Conditions Assumed. W e may 
now observe the variations in incidence according to 
variations in the assumptions. As shown in a previous 
chapter,3 on rent in relation to value, under certain 
conditions the payment of economic rent may affect the 
price of the produce. In general, the land may be used 
for different purposes. If the rent is taxed for one pur-
1 Book II. , Ch. XIV. 3 Book I I I . , Ch. IX. 
2 Ibid. Also Vol. II., p. 77. 
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pose and not for others, the differential tax will fall on 
the consumer of the part icular produce. Suppose, for 
example, tha t the rental of land devoted to deer forests 
is taxed, whilst if the land is let for sheep it is free.1 If 
the lands are equally suitable for both, or yield in the 
various cases equal rents to deer and sheep, the lessees of 
the deer forests (who are in this case the consumers of 
the deer) must pay the exceptional tax, as otherwise the 
landlord would indemnify himself by throwing the land 
under sheep. I t must be supposed, however, t ha t already 
the landlords have exacted the highest competition rents 
possible for their forests. As a consequence any rise in 
the rents will to some extent check the demand, and if 
the tax is very heavy the check may be considerable. So 
far the tendency would be for some of the land to be con-
verted into sheep farms. The increase in the supply of 
sheep would lower their price, and therefore rents of 
sheep farms would fall. B3' the consequent reaction ( the 
alternation of uses being supposed per fec t ) the rents ob-
tained by the landowners from deer would also fall. Thus 
par t of the tax on deer forests will fall on the rental of 
mountain land generally, and par t on the lessees of deer 
forests, an indirect effect being a fall in the price of 
sheep. If, however, the price of sheep is determined in-
dependently, e.g., by foreign competition or by the price 
of substitutes, the tax on deer forests must fall entirely 
on the lessees, all the land of the less enthusiastic (or 
marginal) deer-stalkers being let for sheep at the old 
rents . 
If, as is probable, some of the deer land has exceptional 
advantages for deer, such a t ransfer of uses could not be 
made wi thout loss, and so far the tax would fall par t ly on 
the landowner. In the extreme case, where all the " for-
est " land could only be used for deer, the tax would fall 
^The Scottish deer " f o r e s t s " consist, for the most part , of mountain 
land tha t practically can only yield a rent under deer or sheep, and a 
heavy tax has been proposed as a means of checking afforestation. 
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wholly on the land-owners, as explained in the last section. 
A similar reduction to the first case would occur if the tax 
is imposed equally on rent, whether the land is under deer 
or sheep. 
In the pure theory it is assumed tha t the application of 
capital to the land stops at the last profitable dose.1 But 
under certain conditions the cultivation may be pushed 
beyond this point. T h u s peasant proprietors may make 
what seems an economic rent out of the wages of labour, 
there being no t rue surjilus. A n d similarly farmers may 
pay less than the t rue economic rent, par t being retained 
as interest on capital, itself yielding less than the normal 
rate.2 I t is qui te possible tha t capital may be sunk in 
land to such an extent that , if it is only renewed, the 
whole economic rent disappears. In these and similar 
cases the price of produce is lower than it otherwise would 
be, and what seems economic rent is paid out of wages or 
profits or interest on capital sunk in the land. 
If , then, a tax is imposed upon t rue economic rents and 
also upon those falsely so classed, there will be a check 
to the cult ivation of the land. If the lands of peasants 
are supposed to yield a t rue economic rent which is in 
effect par t of the wages to their labour, the taxation of 
their wages will check their indus t ry . If , however, the 
peasants had been paying such a rent to a land-owner, the 
t ax would as before fall entirely on the owner. 
Again, if the landlord is really taxed on the interest of 
capital sunk in the land (prof i t - rent being assumed to be 
economic), a check is placed on the renewal of the old 
capital and on the investment of new. In either case the 
price of the produce rises th rough the check to cultivation, 
and thus, so far, the tax falls on the consumer. And t rue 
economic rents rise owing to this rise in jirice. 
If the land-owners form an effective combination 
(whe ther open, tacit , or cus tomary) , the case is so far one 
1 Cf. Vol. II . , p. 78. 2 Ibid. 
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of monopoly.1 If the tax is imposed during the currency 
of a lease (as sometimes on local rates) on the occupier, 
on the occupier it remains till the expiry of the lease. 
§ 3. Taxes on Agricultural Lands and Produce. So far 
we have assumed that the tax is levied only on surpluses, 
though indirectly there may be an effect on marginal pro-
duction and price. Let it now be supposed that the tax 
is imposed in such a way as definitely to str ike the land 
on the margin or the marginal produce. Such would be 
the case of a t i the on all produce, or of a land-tax imposed 
according to the estimated capital employed in the land 
or according to the estimated profit. 
The case of a tax imposed on land as such, e.g., so much 
per unit of measurement, may be lef t out of account. 
For although, historically, such taxes have been levied, 
e.g., on the hide as consisting of so many acres, they have 
soon been transformed, that is to say regard has been 
paid to the faculty of the land, just as capitation or poll 
taxes have given way to faculty taxes on income.2 
The first effect of a new tax str iking the margin is tha t 
the produce must rise in price, as otherwise the land would 
go out of cultivation. I t is not necessary to assume mobility 
of capital and equality of profits. Even under the most 
rudimentary conditions there may be marginal land, and, 
if the cultivators are taxed, their livelihood would be gone. 
The ulterior effects of the rise in the price of the prod-
uce will depend on the elasticity of demand. 
If the demand is non-elastic, the same amount of land 
is still used. Therefore other rents will rise in propor-
tion to the tax on the produce, and the owner will only 
lose the- amount of the tax on the margin, and may be 
more than compensated by this rise in price. The prod-
uce-rent remains the same, and each unit rises in price 
in proportion to the tax, whilst the deduction for tax de-
1 For taxes on monopolies, see Marshall 's Principles, Vol. I. (4th 
edition) Bk. V. , Ch. X I I I . 
2 St. Vincent and British Guiana still retain the uniform tax. 
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pends on the marginal capital. If, therefore, the produce-
ren t is relatively large compared wi th the margin, the 
land-owner gains by the tax. If, however, produce-rent 
is small, he will lose.1 
If the demand is elastic, the margin will recede owing to 
the rise in price. There will thus be a fall in produce-
rents, and also the new marginal price will be less than 
the original marginal price plus the tax. The rise in 
price due to the tax will be par t ly checked by decrease in 
the cost of product ion. 
In this case the new rents will still rise if on the whole 
the rise in price more than compensates the loss by the 
tax and the loss in produce-rent . 
If, secondly, we assume tha t the tax is not uniform, bu t 
proport ional to the produce (e.g., a t i the) , there will be as 
before a rise in price, and so far there will be a condensa-
t ion to the fall in produce-rents tha t must occur by the 
subtract ion of the t i the . But in proportion as the demand 
is elastic, there will be a fu r the r fall in produce-rents and 
in the net money-rent . 
There may be also a f u r t h e r fall in ren t due to indirect 
and more remote effects. In the pure theory as worked 
out by Mil l 2 (wi th the materials of Senior) the usual as-
sumptions are made as to an isolated country, the depend-
ence of the minimum wages on the cost of food and of 
minimum profits on the cost of labour. W i t h these as-
sumptions i t is easy to show tha t in the ul t imate result 
the minimum of profits will be reached wi th a smaller capi-
tal and population and a lower rental than if the course of 
th ings had not been dis turbed by the imposition of the 
tax. This view of the subject is i l lustrated by l ikening 
the effects of t i thes to those of natura l steri l i ty of the soil, 
and the differences between the two cases serve to illus-
t ra te the assumptions involved and the deductions ob-
tained by the classical political economy. 
1 The exact conditions can only be laid down by mathematical curves 
or formulae. 2 pp. 60S, 607. 
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Under present conditions, however, the assumption of 
an isolated country is so unreal tha t it is bet ter to assume 
tha t the price of corn would be determined independently 
of the tax, supposing, which seems equally unlikely as re-
gards the United Kingdom, such a tax were possible for 
food. 
§4. Taxes on Economic Rent—Building-land.1 Similar 
reasoning may be applied mutatis mutandis to the case of 
bui lding land. 
To begin with the simplest case : let it be supposed 
tha t the land is only of use for building, tha t the same 
amount of capital is applied to each site, tha t there is per-
fect mobility of capital, and tha t the economic rent varies 
solely with advantage of situation. Under these condi-
tions it is clear tha t a tax on economic rent falls entirely 
on the land-owners. The builders are immune because 
their capital can be applied to other purposes, and the oc-
cupiers escape because the land cannot be used otherwise, 
and already the land-owners have obtained the best resul ts 
by competition. 
The result is the same if we suppose tha t the buildings 
are extended in height unti l the marginal storey is reached. 
To vary the conditions, assume next, t ha t some of the 
land, e.g., the suburban land, can be used for agricul ture. 
The agricul tural rental will depend on the conditions af-
fect ing agricul ture generally, and the peculiarities of the 
land ; so tha t we may say tha t the agricul tural ren t is 
independent of the urban conditions. If , then, a t ax is 
imposed on building, bu t not on agricultural , rental, the 
tax on ground-rent on the margin will obviously fall on 
the occupier. Land will not be devoted to building unless 
it gives at least the agricultural rent plus the tax. I t is 
also argued (as by Mill) tha t this amount of tax on ground-
rents will fall on all the occupiers, because as the result of 
1 Cf. Edgeworth 's " Pure Taxa t ion , " Economic Journal, March, 
1897, for a full t rea tment by mathematical methods, the results being ably 
translated into literary English. 
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competition for sites the values of the differences in the 
net advantages will remain constant .1 This assumption, 
however, is purely arbi t rary and not very probable, as it 
assumes similar elasticity (or inelastici ty) in the de-
mands for various sites. I t might , however, happen tha t 
nearer the margin a small rise in price would have greater 
effect on the demand than at the other extreme. T h u s 
suppose the marginal land is worth £ 1 0 an acre for nur-
sery gardens, and if let for building must pay £ 5 per acre 
in addition. Then if it be assumed tha t building-lands 
are graded by addit ions of £ 1 0 runn ing up to £1000 per 
acre, Mill 's theory assumes that in each case £ 5 will be 
added to the rental of the occupier : i.e. £ 1 0 becomes 
£15 , £ 9 9 0 becomes £995 , and £1000 becomes £1005 . 
But it is qui te possible tha t though, owing to the alter-
nat ive use in the case of the £ 1 0 land, the whole £ 5 may 
be th rown on the occupier, the occupiers higher in the 
scale will not be forced to pay the £ 5 . They may say — 
not tha t they will give £ 1 0 more for one site than for an-
other quand meme— but t ha t quand meme, having regard 
to other expenses, they will pay only so much for house-
rent . People may be forced to pay £ 1 5 per acre to get 
some accommodation, bu t ra ther than pay £ 3 0 instead of 
£ 2 5 they would submit to some inconvenience. 
The transmission of the £ 5 per acre through the as-
sumption of fixity in the differences of values becomes 
more difficult when we take into account the greater capi-
tal expended on the buildings of the superior land as in 
the flat system compared with villas. If villa gardens 
were taxed £ 5 per acre, it is not easy to see why a flat in 
the centre of the city should pay some fractional par t 
(say a penny) more, by way of ground-rent . 
Instead of assuming, however, tha t the tax is uniform 
on all lands, we may make the more real assumption tha t 
1 " But whatever raises the lowest ground-rents raises all others, since 
each exceeds the lowest by the market value of its peculiar advantages." 
— Mill, p. 502. 
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the tax is imposed on the bui lding-rent and ground- ren t 
conjoined as house-rent. 
In discussing this case Mill again makes an assumption 
which has the advantage of simplicity but is purely arbi-
t ra ry : he supposes, namely, tha t a tax of ( say) 10 per 
cent on house-rent will fall on the ground-rent and on the 
bui lding-rent exactly to the extent of 10 per cent in each 
case ; and whilst tha t on the ground-rent remains on the 
landlord, tha t on the building-rent remains on the occu-
pier. If the building-rent is regarded as determined by 
the ordinary rate of profit, and the occupier's demand is 
inelastic, a tax on the total house-rent levied from the 
occupier must fall in the first place on the occupier. But 
on the same assumptions he cannot t ransfer any par t to 
the land-owner. If, however, the demand is elastic, and 
as before the building-rent constant, par t of the tax will 
be th rown on the landlord — but the amount will depend 
on the elasticity of demand. A n d the transference can 
only take place, of course, on the assumption tha t the con-
tracts for the hire of the land are subject to constant 
renewals on any change of circumstances. 
I t follows, then, tha t in general a tax on ground-rents , if 
intended to str ike the landlord, should be levied directly, 
and not be lef t to be shifted by the occupier on the 
renewal of his lease. And the longer the lease, still more 
necessary is it to levy the two portions independently. 
There is, however, always the practical difficulty of de-
te rmining how much of the total house-rent is to be 
ascribed to the ground, and how much to the building, 
when we are considering buildings erected under different 
conditions. There is besides, in business premises, the 
value of the good will, and in ordinary residences, the 
value of the tenant - r ight as shown by the general condi-
tion and amenity. 
Still the fact remains t ha t dur ing the lease any new tax 
levied from the occupier cannot be shifted, and on the ex-
piry of the lease may not be shif ted in the proportion 
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in tended. In the case of feu-duties in Scotland, the 
ground is let in perpe tu i ty at a fixed rental .1 T h u s 
the actual feu-duty may differ to any extent f rom the 
t rue ground-rent . Occasionally the feu-duty is so heavy 
tha t the bui lding will not, qua building, obtain the ordi-
nary rent, but in a progressive state the feu-duty of ten 
becomes much less than the t rue ground-rental . 
I t is clear tha t a tax on the occupier or the feuer cannot 
be t ransfer red to the owner of the feu-duty, unless power 
is given by law, and then we have a case, not of shift ing, 
bu t of legal incidence. 
These feu-dut ies or perpetual rent-charges are, how-
ever, constant ly bought and sold according to variations 
in the rate of interest ( the security being generally sup-
posed perfect as being a first charge) , and a tax levied on 
them should be governed by the rates applicable to similar 
first-class securities. 
The ground (subject to the f eu -du ty ) also changes 
hands, the value being determined by the estimated 
ground-renta l under the new conditions. The buildings 
also are let at varying rents — and may be displaced by 
other buildings, as, for example, when dwelling-houses are 
removed to make way for business premises. T h u s in 
any actual case it becomes difficult to assign the t rue share 
of the gross renta l due to the pure value of the land. 
Any tax intended to s tr ike " land values," which really 
s tr ikes the occupiers of houses, has important ul terior 
effects. As regards dwelling-houses, it may lead to over-
crowding and may check improvements, and as regards 
businesses, it may check their development or in some 
cases may fall on the consumers of the articles supplied. 
On the other hand, a special tax on land suitable for 
bui lding which is being held up for the rise in value, and 
in the meantime is only rated at its agr icul tural or un-
buil t value, would tend to th row the land sooner into the 
1 Omitting casualties and various feudal burdens which may in general 
be commuted. 
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hands of the builders, and so far in the meantime general 
house-rents would fall. But the ulterior effects might be 
tha t lands would be used for inferior buildings which it 
would be expensive to remove later on, so that ul t imately 
the lands would not be so well occupied and would yield 
lower rents and also lower taxes, and besides would have 
buildings not so well adapted for the use of the tenants . 
§ 5. Taxation of Land Values — Practical Conclusions. 
The preceding sections indicate the principal theoretical 
difficulties in connection with the incidence of taxes on 
land, and by varying the hypotheses, and by making dif-
ferent combinations, many other cases might be presented. 
Enough, however, has been brought forward to jus t i fy 
some important practical conclusions regarding the pro-
posal to tax " l a n d values." 
( a ) A n y tax intended to str ike pure economic rent 
should be taken directly from the owners of tha t rent . 
The shif t ing by the occupier is uncertain, and the uncer-
ta inty causes inequality. The part ial evasion by the oc-
cupier (i.e., legitimate evasion) as by tak ing inferior 
accommodation, or by charging higher rates to the cus-
tomers of his business, is product ive of economic loss tha t 
may far more than neutralise any gain of revenue to the 
State or the municipali ty. 
(b~) I t follows also that if these inconveniences are not 
to ensue, the amount of the t rue economic ren t must be 
accurately determined, and the ownership definitely 
traced. Both of these problems present great practical 
difficulties. True economic rent is in practice nearly 
always combined with other forms of revenue. The rent 
tha t is paid for agricultural land is part ly, and very often 
largely , ' s imply interest on the various forms of capital 
sunk in and about the land. This interest is, in general, 
calculated at a low rate. Any exceptional taxation on 
" economic r e n t " that actually s t ruck profit rent , would 
check agricul tural improvement, and lead to the deterio-
ration of land already improved. 
v o l . i i i . y 
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Again, as regards the ground-rents of urban lands, al-
though the pure economic rent seems, at first sight, more 
easily ascertained, it is, as a mat ter of fact, very difficult 
to determine accurately, and there must be a considerable 
margin of doubt. If houses were ten ts or tabernacles 
tha t could be easily shifted, and required no connections 
wi th systems of roads, water , l ighting, drainage, etc., the 
economic ren t of a " s t a n c e " would be simple enough. 
Bu t the more complicated the bui lding and its connec-
tions, and the more it is adapted for special purposes, 
so much the more difficult is it to separate the pure eco-
nomic rent of the ground from other elements included in 
the gross rental . 
Fur ther , even when the amount of the pure economic 
ren t has been determined, there is still the difficulty of 
discovering the t rue owner, tha t is to say, for the purposes 
of this exceptional taxat ion. The " t r u e " owner from the 
point of view of those who advocate this par t icular penal ty 
is in the position of the " original thief " of stolen goods. 
J u s t as a purchaser in marke t overt is not held to be lia-
ble to restore the goods, so neither should the person who 
has paid the ful l value for land to the original thief be 
liable to restore the land (or its value) to the original 
owner — the community. But in old countries the origi-
nal thief has long ago been lost sight of — he cannot be 
t racked th rough the maze of contracts. 
I t is said, however, tha t apar t f rom this original sup-
pression of free land, there is a continuous exploitation 
by pr ivate owners of the increasing revenues really due 
to the g rowth of the State, or more precisely to the envi-
ronment of the land. This is, no doubt, perfect ly t rue in 
progressive societies under certain conditions — though 
not necessarily and universally t rue as is shown by the 
grea t fall in the rental of some agricul tural lands in Eng-
land in recent years, and in the decaying par t s of some 
towns and cities. But supposing tha t this unearned — 
this continually " becoming " increment — could be sepa-
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rated, it would still be difficult to tax the t rue owner or 
the actual exploiter. If the exceptional tax were im-
posed on the sales of lands, it would check the t ransfer of 
lands, and a corresponding tax carried over to the lands 
not sold would be difficult to estimate accurately. If the 
tax were imposed on new leases, it would give a relative 
advantage to the old lessees ; and if they were taxed ac-
cordingly, there is again the difficulty of estimation. 
(c) The proposal to tax land values — in the sense of 
" unearned increments " •—• is simple only in appearance. 
I t is not only difficult to dist inguish in rentals between 
unearned and earned, and between the respective owners 
of these portions, but it is difficult to know when the ap-
plication of the principle is to stop, and the fear of creat-
ing precedents is one of the greatest and most salutary 
checks on governmental interference. I t has already 
been explained tha t there are large unearned elements in 
every species of revenue. Bu t there can be no question 
tha t any a t tempt to seize them as they arise would cramp 
the general activity of the society, and to seize them af te r 
they have been suffered to accumulate would be an ex post 
facto policy which would quite as effectively encourage the 
others not to make any such gains. 
I t is, of course, assumed in this a rgument tha t the seiz-
ure is complete and differential , for such addit ions to prop-
erty and income are of course subject to general taxat ion 
of an ordinary kind. There can be no question tha t the 
a t tempt generally to differentiate between earned and un-
earned income would logically end in socialism, and would 
destroy the efficiency of the present system. 
( d ) A n d thus we again reach the position that , if the 
ul t imate aim is socialism or any approximation thereto, it 
is bet ter to t ry to at tain the end, not indirectly by excep-
tional taxation, bu t directly by more general methods. 
And still more is this the case if the reforms contemplated 
are not so subversive of the present system as to be fai r ly 
called socialistic. There are many positive abuses con-
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nected with the private ownership' of land, and there are 
many defects resul t ing from a want of land for public pur-
poses. Bu t to suppose tha t those abuses and defects will 
be counterbalanced or obviated merely by the absorption 
of unearned increments is al together illogical. I t is amaz-
ing tha t people who th ink they are extreme land reformers 
should imagine that , if they can only seize the unearned 
increment of land, everything else will follow. I t is not 
only possible and probable tha t the method of seizure 
adopted, if a t all general and exhaustive, would create still 
greater abuses and defects, bu t the total value — af ter al-
lowing compensation to holders in good fai th — would be 
ridiculously small for the social elevation of the masses, 
the professed object in view. The pursui t of this will o' 
the wisp of an unearned increment turns the at tent ion 
away from possible, though difficult, substantial reforms. 
Such reforms are prevented by the too great deference 
still paid to the owners of land in dealing with definite 
abuses. Improvements in cities are constant!}' prevented, 
not only by the ransom to be paid by way of compensation 
to vested interests, bu t also by the vague respect shown to 
land as dist inct f rom other proper ty . The method of legal 
enactment — justified by various legal principles — would 
soon reduce this compensation and these ant iquated rights 
to reasonable limits. The method has already been applied 
with effect, but is capable of much wider and more rapid 
extension. 
Land, again, may be applied to various purposes of great 
public utility, but of l i t t le commercial value to part icular 
individuals. Free access to mountains and quasi-waste 
lands would cause li t t le monetary in jury either to farmers 
or sportsmen, and for any real in jury compensation might 
be given. Similarly r ights of way might be given through 
cult ivated l a n d — a c c o r d i n g to the old English custom 
there was a foot-path way between villages — and in many 
other ways the amenity of land might lie enjoyed without 
any serious in jury to its commercial exploitation. 
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By the theory of English law it is said that the owner 
of the land can prosecute for trespass those who sail above 
it in a balloon, al though happily his remedy would consist 
only in the damages proved to result. But very few people 
know anyth ing of the law of trespass, and the threat of the 
utmost rigour of the law placarded on mult i tudes of notice-
boards throughout this country is a ridiculous exploitation 
of the law-abiding habits of the community. 
The provision of open spaces in crowded neighbourhoods 
is now considered so important tha t great expense is in-
curred in widening streets and making gardens in the older 
parts of towns and cities; and yet we find tha t such cities 
and towns are continually extended into purely agricul-
tural land without any adequate reservation of space for 
l ight and air in the dwellings, convenience of communica-
tion, or facilities of recreation. Instead of a t t empt ing to 
obtain the unearned increment f rom new, crowded dwell-
ings, it would be fa r bet ter f rom every social s tandpoint 
to extend the area of building, not by taxing vacant build-
ing-lands, but by compelling all new building-land to con-
t r ibute a share toward providing for the perpetual vacancy 
of sufficient land for public purposes. As it is, a town is 
extended as if the inhabitants intended to for t i fy it with a 
wall able to resist modern artillery, and as if the means of 
communication were restricted to muddy mediaeval roads. 
Tha t a par t of newly occupied land should be reserved 
for public purposes is a custom of the highest ant iqui ty . 
Mr. Seebohm, in his classical work on the Engl ish village 
community, was unable to account for the origin of l i t t le 
odds and ends of unused land which have f rom time im-
memorial been called " no man's land," or " any one's land," 
or " J a c k ' s l and ." Mr. Gomme,1 however, has suggested 
tha t an explanation may be found in a Scottish custom.2 
Clootie's crof t or the gudeman's field consisted of a small 
1 The facts cited are taken f rom Mr. Gomme's Village Community, 
pp. 114, 115. 
2 Quoted from Henderson 's Folklore of Northern Counties, p. 278. 
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portion of the best land, set apar t by the inhabitants of 
most Scottish villages as a propit iatory g i f t to the devil, on 
which property they never ventured to in t rude. I t was 
dedicated to the devil 's service alone, being lef t unfilled 
and uncropped, and it was reckoned highly dangerous to 
break up by tillage such pieces of ground. In several 
places in Devonshire similar patches of ground are also 
found. The explanation of them comes from the non-
A r y a n villagers of India. Among the aborigines of Gang-
pore a f ragment of the primitive forest is lef t when the 
first clearance is made, as a refuge for the sylvan deities 
whom the clearing might have dis turbed. 
Auld clootie no longer haunts the gudeman 's field — the 
sylvan deities have vanished -—" they live no longer in the 
fa i th of reason " — b u t still the hearts of men have the old 
longing to keep bits of land sacred from private ownership. 
The laws affecting land (as typical of na tu re ) — whether 
as regards hire, purchase, or public use, whether as used 
for agriculture, building, or mining, or considered as fur -
nishing motive power or providing recreation — are neces-
sarily complex. But the legal principles that are still 
applied are to a great extent ant iquated, and their reform 
is prevented because the effective energy of reformers is 
dissipated in vaporous schemes for nationalisation and tax-
ation of land values.1 
1 This chapter was in the press before the publication of The Final 
Report of the Royal Commission on Local Taxation. 
C H A P T E R XIII. 
TAXES ON PROFITS AND CAPITAL. 
§ 1. Taxes on Profits. Profits (according to the analy-
sis previously given of the common acceptation) consists 
of three elements : viz., interest, insurance against risk, and 
wages of superintendence (or earnings of management) . 
The principle of the tendency of profits to equality may 
be applied to each of these elements separately, but it can 
only be applied to the incidence of taxation when the vari-
ous qualifying conditions are taken account of according 
to the circumstances of the case. We may, to begin with, 
assume perfect mobility of capital and business power (and 
coordinate forms of professional labour), and assume, fur-
ther, perfect competition, but if the object is to discover the 
ultimate real burden of certain forms of taxes, the modifica-
tion of these perfections by partial immobility and partial 
monopoly must also be considered. I t must be remem-
bered also that all that the theory of equality of profits 
asserts under the most favourable conditions is that if any 
particular form rises above or falls below the ordinary cur-
rent rate (having regard to g<w<m'-permanent causes of dif-
ference), such a rise or fall will be unstable. Thus it is 
seen at once that the shif t ing of taxes through this ten-
dency of profits to equality must always be a matter of 
practical difficulty. A t the same time it is not necessary 
to resort to the extreme of Cliffe Leslie, and to suppose that 
the theory is of no practical importance whatever. As a 
matter of fact a large par t of actual taxation, e.g., taxes 
on commodities, depends on a theory of shif t ing which 
is based on this tendency to equality, and the shift ing 
does take place with — it is t rue — important disturbing 
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causes. I t will be convenient to examine in the first 
place the three elements of profits in order and later on 
to consider taxes on commodities, and general income and 
property taxes. 
§ 2. Taxes on Interest. The interest on capital in any 
industr ia l or commercial area in which the conditions of 
perfect competition are approximately realised tends to 
equali ty, provided the security for the payment of princi-
pal and interest is the same. If, then, a tax is imposed on 
every form of pure interest , the incidence will be in the 
first place on the owners of the capital. They cannot 
shi f t the t ax by the removal of the capital to untaxed in-
dustr ies. Bu t two indirect consequences will follow. 
( « ) As Adam Smith remarks, the proprietor of stock is 
properly a citizen of the world, and is not necessarily at-
tached to any part icular country. He would be apt to 
abandon the country in which he was exposed to a vexa-
tious inquisition in order to be assessed to a burdensome 
tax, and would remove his stock to some other country, 
where he could carry on his business or enjoy his for tune 
more at his ease. This a rgument applies, it is t rue, to 
profits generally, but it is still more t rue of pure interest, 
or of interest with allowance made for difference of secu-
ri ty. If, then, capital is sent abroad, the ul t imate result 
will be tha t the country in which the tax is imposed will 
possess less capital, and this will yield so far a higher rate 
of interest and thus counterbalance the burden of the tax. 
(6) But secondly the tax will tend to check the accumula-
tion of capital within the country so far as interest received 
is a cause of accumulation. I t must, however, be recalled 
tha t the rate of interest is only one of the causes affecting 
the accumulation of capital. 
A tax on some part icular form of interest (securi ty still 
being supposed perfect) , for example, on mortgages on land, 
would fall on the borrowers, because the lenders could 
escape the tax by lending in other ways. 
In general, however, the security is more or less imper-
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feet, and insurance against risk is allowed for in the rate of 
interest charged on borrowed capital. Thus a tax which 
takes an equal percentage from all species of interest will 
be in par t a tax on insurance against risk, and the ten-
dency must be for such a tax to fall on the borrowers of 
the capital. 
Suppose at any t ime a perfect security yields 3 per cent, 
and one with greater risk 6 per cent, then 3 per cent repre-
sents the estimated value of the insurance against risk. 
A tax ( say) of one-third for simplicity which reduces the 
net yield on the first to 2 per cent would reduce the net 
yield on the lat ter to 4 per cent. In order then for the 
insurance against risk to remain undis turbed, the gross 
yield in the la t ter case must rise f rom 6 to 7J per cent.1 
I t follows then tha t a tax levied on all forms of interest 
(no allowance being made for r i sk) would tend to check 
investments in proportion as risk was involved. This re-
sult would follow, even al though the rate of interest on 
perfect security, owing to the causes noticed above, were 
raised in proportion to the tax. 
3. Taxes on Earnings of Management. A tax on tha t 
par t of profits known as earnings of management would, 
if imposed generally, fall in the first instance on the entre-
preneurs or employers of capital, and with similar indirect 
consequences to those observed in the case of interest . 
Capital would tend to flow abroad and accumulation would 
be checked, especially so far as the employers of capital 
are also the owners. 
If the differences in the net advantages of different 
methods of employing capital are supposed to remain con-
s tant according to the various causes of differences of 
profits in different employments, a proportional tax on 
profits must be in par t t ransferred to the consumers of 
the articles produced, in the same way as a tax on interest 
with insurance was shown to fall on the borrower. 
T h a t element in gross profits which is styled quasi-rent 
1 One-third taken f rom 1\ is equal to 5, and 5 minus 3 is 2. 
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may, so far as taxat ion is concerned, be t reated by tlie 
principles applicable to rent so far as the immediate inci-
dence is concerned. There is, however, an ulterior effect 
to be noticed. §itasi-rents their most important form 
may be regarded as rewards for the adoption of more ef-
fective methods of production or distributive consumption. 
Taxat ion intended to str ike such exceptional gains heavily 
will so far tend to check improvements and enterprise. 
I n the same way taxes on speculative gains will check 
speculation with consequent reaction upon prices. 
A tax on some part icular form of profits (as distinct 
f rom a tax on general profi ts) will, it is generally said, 
fall 011 the consumer of the article produced on the ground 
of the tendency of profits to equali ty. This view will be 
examined in connection with taxes on consumable com-
modities. 
I t will be seen from this general survey that the inci-
dence and effects of a tax on profits ( t ak ing the term in 
i ts common acceptation wi thout analysis) are extremely 
difficult to determine, and the practical difficulty is still 
greater than the theoretical. Profi ts are always fluctuat-
ing and extremely difficult to estimate. " Prof i t ," says 
Adam Smith, in the most effective presentment of this 
peculiari ty yet made, — "p ro f i t is so very fluctuating tha t 
the person who carries on a part icular t rade cannot always 
tell you himself what is the average of his annual profit. 
I t is affected, not only by every variation of price in the 
commodities which he deals in, bu t by the good or bad 
for tune both of his rivals and of his customers, and by a 
thousand other accidents to which goods, when carried 
either by sea or by land, or even when stored in a ware-
house, are liable. I t varies, therefore, not only from year 
to year, but f rom day to day, and almost f rom hour to 
hou r . " 
The practical difficulty in est imating profits is shown 
by the various empirical rules adopted for assessing profits 
for taxat ion. T h u s it is assumed tha t in England farmers ' 
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profits are equal to one-half the rent, and in Scotland to 
one-third, though any farmer who th inks himself over-
taxed may show his books and have the amount adjus ted . 
§ 4. Taxes on Capital. Taxes on capital, as distin-
guished from taxes on the revenues derived therefrom, 
are levied principally, at the present time, when property 
changes hands, and may be divided as they are by Adam 
Smith, according as they are levied when property passes 
( a ) f rom the dead to the living, ( J ) f rom the living to the 
living. 
I t is obvious as regards incidence tha t taxes of the first 
class ( a ) are the most direct of all taxes, in the sense tha t 
they cannot be t ransferred to other persons by the bene-
ficiaries. The principal difficulties connected with the 
" d e a t h " duties arise in connection with the canon of 
equality of taxation. Opinion is still divided as to 
whether different classes of property should be taxed 
at different rates, e.g., personal and real estate, and on 
what principles, as well as on the advisabil i ty or equi ty 
of making such taxes graduated or progressive. These 
questions have already been discussed 1 in respect of the 
principles involved, and fu r the r discussion may be re-
served for the t rea tment of local finance. As regards 
capital — in the sense of productive capital — it may be 
observed tha t heavy graduated succession duties would 
give a st imulus to personal extravagance and impose 
a check on accumulation, and as a consequence pro-
duction might be lessened, par t ly by want of capital 
and par t ly by the check placed on production on a large 
scale. A heavy tax on large capitals at home will place a 
premium on investments abroad.2 W i t h the present rate of 
accumulation in this country the st imulus to exportat ion 
is not perhaps of much importance, but it might become 
so, and every check to product ion 'on a large scale would 
tend to check economies and place the country at a dis-
1 See above, Ch. VI I . 
2 I.e., supposing they can evade the succession duties. 
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advantage in foreign competition. Indirect ly the creation 
of joint stock companies might be artificially encouraged. 
These objections, however, to progressive succession duties 
do not appear to be of much importance so long as the 
duties are not excessive. 
Taxes on the t ransference of capital from the living to 
the l iving cannot be very easily taken directly, as Adam 
Smith points out, since such transactions may be easily 
kept secret under the cover of nominal ownership or 
t rus ts . This possibility of evasion has led to the inven-
tion of s tamp and registrat ion duties. The penalty of 
invalidity a t tached to unstamped documents of various 
k inds has proved a very effective deterrent to evasion. 
A tax on sales will vary in its incidence according to 
the principles already examined, e.g., the elasticity of 
demand and supply, the conditions of competition and 
monopoly, etc. The famous alcavala of Spain was a tax 
of so much per cent upon the sale of every sort of prop-
erty, whether movable or immovable, and was repeated 
every time the proper ty was sold. I t is, perhaps, of all 
historical taxes tha t which offends most against all the 
canons, and to it is ascribed alike the ruin of Spanish 
manufac tures and agricul ture. 
If taxes on sales — e.g., of lands or s tocks—are imposed 
in such a way as to fall less heavily on large transactions, 
the tendency will be for the differential portion of the tax 
at least to fall on the purchaser of a small amount, and 
accordingly transactions in small amounts will so far be 
discouraged. 
C H A P T E R X I I I . 
TAXES ON CONSUMABLE COMMODITIES. 
§ 1. Meaning and Origin of Taxation of Commodities. 
Since all taxes fall on persons, and must be paid by them 
out of their income or property, it follows that taxation of 
commodities is only a method of reaching the wealth of 
persons. Even under modern conditions it is found inex-
pedient on various grounds to push direct taxation beyond 
certain limits, and in the United Kingdom under free 
trade about half of the imperial revenue from taxation is 
derived from customs and excise duties. 
In ancient t imes 1 the direct taxation of freemen was 
considered a degradation. In Rome under the republic, 
as in Athens, a citizen paid no tax on his personal income; 
his property also was burdened with taxation only as an 
extraordinary resource in case of need. The chief sources 
of income were public estates, fines, tributes, and indirect 
taxes. 
The levying of a \ l i r ec t tax 011 a freeman, to the Teu-
tonic man as to the man of antiquity, seemed an insult, 
and the regularity of a personal tax a sign of bondage. 
So late as the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 2 there 
was an enthusiasm for indirect taxes, and the saying of 
Montesquieu, that the excise is an at t r ibute of liberty, was 
expanded by Thiers into the dictum that indirect taxation 
is the method of the most advanced peoples, direct taxa-
tion that of barbarians. The contrary opinion, however, 
is now generally accepted both on historical and theoreti-
cal grounds. 
1 Cohn, op. cit., § 56. 2 Ibid., § 62. 
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§ 2. Methods of Taxing Commodities. Under modern 
conditions, taxes on consumable commodities are levied in 
three ways : ( a ) directly on the consumer, e.g., licenses to 
use certain things ; (6) indirectly through the inland pro-
ducer, e.g., excise duties ; (e) indirectly th rough the ex-
porter or the importer — customs duties. The term 
" consumable commodi t ies" must be taken in a large 
sense, e.g., qua the dog tax, the owner is the consumer of 
the commodity dog, and by analogy the employer is the 
consumer of his liveried servants (and not the converse). 
( a ) Of taxes tha t are imposed primari ly on the con-
sumer the most important in modern times is the house 
tax, if the occupier is regarded as the consumer of that 
commodity. The incidence, however, of the house tax is 
best considered in connection with taxes on land and 
rent,1 and the other characteristics of the tax under local 
finance. 
Other direct taxes on consumption may be described as 
licenses on use. Such licenses are of very ancient origin. 
Some were payments for privileges, as in the old forest 
laws ; some were gran ted originally by way of exemption 
f rom sumptuary regulat ions ; various prohibitions affect-
ing ornaments, dress, and festivities were commuted into 
a fiscal composition.2 In some of the mediaeval German 
towns the fees paid for wedding feasts formed a regular 
source of income. Other licenses may be traced to royal-
t ies3 of various kinds ( inc luding monopolies). The 
monarch claimed an increasing number of prerogatives by 
which he could exact payments for the use or enjoyment 
of various th ings and privileges. 
Under present conditions direct taxation of the con-
sumer is not considered a convenient source of revenue 
except to some extent for local purposes.4 The great 
objection to such taxes is tha t they are inconvenient to 
1 S e e above, Ch. XI. 2 Colin, § 57. 
8Ibid., § 69. An enumeration of four hundred regalia is mentioned. 
4 Bastable, p. 466. 
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the taxpayer, and unproduct ive to the revenue. In the 
United Kingdom the annual average (on carriages, dogs, 
guns, etc.) from this source is now only £1,360,000. 
Some of these licenses, however, are retained part ly for 
police purposes. 
(6) The present excise duties — levied on the inland 
producer — may be connected historically with direct con-
sumption taxes. In England, as already observed, the 
Saxon monarch lived of his own, but he also took directly 
much consumable wealth in the course of his journeys 
through the country. The royal court travelled like a 
host of locusts. The next step in advance was the 
development of the r ight of purveyance or preemption. 
The k ing paid for his commodities, but he did so at prices 
fixed by his own officers and with tallies tha t were not 
always honoured on presentation. In the literal significa-
tion these exactions were excises, bu t they differed from 
the modern excise duties in tha t they were sporadic and 
not uniform, and were often taken, not from the "p ro-
ducer," but f rom the " c o n s u m e r . " They were also 
extremely unequal . Purveyance in Eng land lasted till 
the Civil War , of which it was a con t r ibu to ry 1 if 
minor cause, and was not formally abolished till 1660. 
I t is noteworthy tha t the first excise in the modern 
sense was granted by the Long Par l iament in 1643 : 
i t was one of the numerous Brit ish imitations of the 
Dutch. 
Excise duties may also be traced to another source. 
The k ing possessed large feudal r ights in the shape of 
market dues and tolls, and the transit ion f rom exactions 
of this k ind to taxes on sales was natura l and in most 
countries was accomplished very early. 
The crown also enjoyed certain prerogatives for the 
regulat ion of t rade. Many fines were imposed and licenses 
1 On the unpopulari ty at tha t t ime of purveyance and preemption, 
see Dowell, Vol. II . , p. 19, and for earlier times Stubbs, Vol. II . , 
p. 535. 
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gran ted in mat ters affecting t rade and merchandise.1 
From regulat ion to taxat ion the transi t ion also seemed 
easy and na tura l unt i l the revolt of the American Colonies 
shat tered the survivals of this mediaeval prerogative. 
(e) The customs duties — levied on exports to aiid on 
imports f rom foreign countries — are of very ancient origin. 
The term " customs," or i ts Lat in equivalent " consuetu-
dines," was a t first applied to all k inds of customary 
payments, including inter alia various k inds of ecclesias-
tical dues.2 Customs duties in the modern sense may be 
traced like excise duties to different sources. Tolls were 
levied by the k ing at the po r t s ; there was prisage of 
wines ; there were dismes and quinzimes of general mer-
chandise ( ten ths and fifteenths) ; and licenses were 
granted conferr ing exemptions and privileges. Some of 
these early customs have been supposed to be examples of 
the benefit theory of t a x a t i o n — t h e payment being regarded 
as a purchase of the king 's security, and thus as a species 
of insurance against risk. They were, however, more 
probably a development of the r igh t of prisage. 
The duties levied at the ports had become customary 
before Magna Charta,3 and a t tempts at additions were con-
demned as maletotes. These ancient and lawful customs 
were continued f rom 1215 to 1275 when the foreign 
merchants g ran ted some addi t ions 4 which, wi th those 
formerly in use, consti tute the " ancient and g r e a t " 
customs. The reign of Edward I I I . was always referred 
to as the golden age of customs, the principal contribu-
tion being f rom the export du ty on wool. 
1 Madox, Exchequer, Ch. XI I I . , § 3, gives examples of fines for leave to 
trade. 
2 Madox, Exchequer, Ch. XVII I . , p. 525. See for full details of the 
origins, II. Hall 's History of the Customs Revenue. 
3 In the 6 King John the quinzime for the port of London was .-£836 
12s. KkZ., whilst tha t of Boston was £780 15s. 3d .— Madox, Exchequer, 
p. 530. 
4 The private bargain of the king with the foreign merchants was an 
at tempt to evade the regulation of Parl iament , and was set aside. 
i 
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This k ing had obtained practically, by successive par-
l iamentary grants , a permanent revenue from tunnage and 
poundage . 1 His successors, however, only obtained them 
for limited times, or at most for life. All the Tudors 
were granted tunnage and poundage for their lives. The 
assumption of the r ight without the consent of Parlia-
ment by Charles I . was even more than purveyance a 
contr ibutory cause of the Civil W a r . 
§ -3. British Customs and Excise in the Nineteenth Cen-
tury. The history of the Brit ish customs and excise 
duties in the nineteenth century, when they had become a 
fearful ly tangled growth, is the best possible commentary 
on the principles of taxat ion laid down by Adam Smith 
and developed by his successors. There is not one of the 
grea t canons which we are accustomed to take for g ran ted 
which was not transgressed in every conceivable applica-
t ion before the conclusion of the great French war (1815). 
Taxes were, apparently, supposed to fall not on persons 
but on things, and everything was taxed, — exports, im-
ports, and home produce for home consumption : " Taxes 
upon eveiy article which enters into the mouth, or covers 
the back, or is placed under the foot. Taxes upon every-
t h i n g which it is pleasant to see, hear, feel, smell, or taste. 
Taxes upon warmth, l ight, and locomotion. Taxes on 
everyth ing on earth or under the earth, or everyth ing tha t 
comes f rom abroad or is grown a t home. Taxes on raw 
material , taxes on every f resh value tha t is added to it by 
the indust ry of man . " 2 
In spite of this enormous taxation of " t h i n g s " the 
nat ional debt was increased by £622,000,000, and we 
have i t on the author i ty of Mr. Gladstone tha t if the 
income tax, which in 1814 was 2s. in the pound, had 
been imposed before 1806, there need have been no fresh 
1 Tunnage refers to the tun of wine ; poundage to the pound value of 
merchandise. 
2 Sydney Smith in the Edinburgh Bevieio (1820). This celebrated pas-
sage is quoted in extenso in Dowell, I I . , p. 251. 
V O L . I I I . Z 
3 3 8 250 ECONOMIC. F U N C T I O N S OF GOVERNMENT. 
debt. Ill 1792 the total expenditure of the British 
government was about £18,000,000, in 1811 it was 
£112,000,000 ; namely, £31,000,000 from loans and 
£78,000,000 f rom revenue taxes.1 The wisdom or the 
necessity of the management of the debt wi th the constant 
" i m p o r t " of loans and " e x p o r t " of repayments has been 
disputed, but there can now be no dispute as regards the 
t remendous burden imposed directly and indirectly by 
this cumbrous system of taxation of commodities. W h e n 
the war terminated, the income tax was taken off and the 
indirect taxes were left . A parl iamentary report of 1829 
showed tha t £6,000,000 were raised by taxes on the raw 
materials of manufacture , — the worst of all methods, 
because advanced by the producer at the first s t age ,— 
whilst, per contra, protective duties were levied on every 
manufac ture whatever — on those not specially enumerated 
20 per cent, and in some cases 75 per cent. Agr icul ture 
was protected still more — there were not only corn laws 
bu t animal laws ( the du ty on an ass being 10s. and 
on a horse £ 1 ) , whilst the importat ion of animals used 
as food was absolutely prohibited. Even in 1832, the year 
of the great Reform Bill, the popular agitat ion was mainly 
directed against sinecures, not against dear food. By the 
customs tariff of 1842, 262 articles of raw materials of 
manufac ture yielded about £2,000,000, and 200 finished 
manufactures yielded less than £500,000; and t ak ing a 
general view we find tha t there were 704 articles which 
al together yielded a li t t le over £1,000,000. 
The excise duties give corresponding results : many 
were unproduct ive and many were prolific in evil resul ts 
(e.g., taxes on bricks, glass, paper, soap). 
The period of reform began practically in 1842 under 
Sir Robert Peel. In tha t year he reimposed the income 
tax, which enabled him to abolish or reduce many of the 
most injurious customs duties, e.g., duties on raw mate-
rial were lowered to a maximum of 5 per cent, and duties 
1 John Noble's National Finance, p. 4. 
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on manufactures to a maximum of 20 per cent. In 18-15 
the income tax was renewed for three years to effect fur -
ther reforms, and 430 articles were taken off the tariff and 
other reductions were made. In 1846 the corn laws were 
repealed, and animal food (alive or dead) was admit ted 
free, and many other customs duties (as also the excise 
on glass) were abolished. The same policy was continued 
under Lord John Russell, the Navigation Acts being 
repealed in 1850. In 1853 Mr. Gladstone became Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer, and celebrated the occasion by the 
delivery of a Budget speech 1 of five hours ' durat ion — 
probably the finest oration on finance ever delivered, and 
certainly the strongest in a rgument . His main theme 
was the renewal of the income tax. He showed, as has 
never been shown before or since, the inequalities and the 
difficulties of this tax, and yet, in order to effect f u r t he r 
reforms in indirect taxation, he not only renewed the tax, 
but he lowered the limit of exemption from £ 1 5 0 to £100, 
he extended the tax to Ireland, which had formerly been 
exempt, and finally, to mark its temporary character, he 
imposed it for seven years. The most noticeable of the 
reforms he was enabled to effect th rough this increase of 
direct taxat ion was the abolition of the soap tax. The 
reasoned s ta tement for the abolition is one of the best 
examples of critical analysis and has been quoted and 
requoted as a model of exposition in form and sub-
stance". The interpolation in the main argument , " To 
extinguish the Afr ican slave-trade, repeal the soap 
tax," shows the touch of the master in firmness and deli-
cacy. 
A t the same time 123 articles were set free f rom cus-
toms and 133 reduced. The Crimean W a r checked the 
progress of reform, but the final result was the reduction 
of the tariff to such a degree of simplicity tha t practically 
only four articles — spirits, tea, tobacco, w i n e — w e r e re-
tained for revenue, the rest of the tariff being either to 
1 Reprinted in Gladstone's Financial Statements, 1863. 
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support excise duties or to prevent substi tut ion. The 
Budget of 1901, wi th an export du ty on coal and an import 
du ty on sugar, is the first re trograde step since the great 
reforms ins t i tu ted in 1842. I t ought, however, to be 
borne in mind also tha t for the first time in this Budget 
the revenue from direct taxation exceeds tha t from indi-
rect, so that the proposals may, perhaps, be regarded rather 
as a change in the details of a method than in the substance 
of a principle. 
§ 4. The Incidence of Taxes on Commodities (Internal). 
The incidence of taxes on commodities furnishes a good 
i l lustration of the general principles already examined.1 
If the tax is imposed directly on the consumer, it so far 
tends to check his demand. This check to demand so far 
will cause a contraction of supply when equilibrium is re-
stored. The extent of the contraction will depend part ly 
on the elasticity of demand,2 which again depends on vari-
ous factors {e.g., the possibility of subst i tut ion) and part ly 
on the conditions of supply. The ult imate effect on price 
will vary according as the commodity follows the law of 
increasing, diminishing, or constant re turn, and according 
as it is produced under free competition or under a com-
plete or part ial monopoly. 
If the tax is imposed in the first place on the producer 
or the dealer, he will endeavour to shif t it to the consumer, 
and whether he can do so or not depends upon similar con-
ditions. In fact, theoretically it is a mat ter of indifference 
from whom the tax is collected in the first place, and prac-
tically the method of collection is generally only of impor-
tance as regards the real burden on the first imposition of 
the tax. 
When the general conditions are so complex, it is only 
possible to i l lustrate the principal cases. I t is generally 
said tha t a tax on a commodity must fall on the consumer 
because the producer must get the ordinary or adequate 
1 See above, Bk. V. , Ch. X., § 7. 
2 Ibid., Bk. III . , Ch. IV. , § 2. 
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rate of profit. This is 110 doubt the case of most impor-
tance practically, and for purposes of exposition the others 
may be treated as exceptions. Two assumptions are nec-
essary, however, to establish the general case. The pro-
ducer must be able to t ransfer his capital to some other 
employment, the product of which is not taxed ; and the 
commodity must be sold previous to the tax at a price 
determined by competition, not by monopoly. In practice 
neither of these conditions is perfectly fulfilled — there is 
nearly always some degree of immobility and some degree 
of monopoly. In the long run, however, the supply of 
capital will be adjusted to the diminished demand,and prob-
ably the imposition of the tax will increase the degree of 
the monopoly. 
This last consideration brings into view another effect 
of the taxat ion of commodities, namely, tha t the price will 
rise to the consumer more than in proportion to the tax. 
This, it is maintained, will take place because the super-
vision necessary for the tax will prevent various economies 
and improvements ; the rise in price will check demand 
and contract supply, and there will thus be a fa r ther check 
to economies and improvements ; a large capital may be 
required to advance the tax, and this advantage to large 
capitals restricts competition and increases the power of 
monopoly and combination. There is no doubt a solid 
substratum of t r u t h in these positions, as is abundant ly 
proved in the history of British finance. 
A t the same time, however, the exceptions are of in-
terest theoretically. If the commodity follows the law 
of diminishing return, the tax will cause a recession of 
the margin, and the marginal cost being less apar t f rom 
the tax the price will so far rise less than by the amount 
of the tax. If, however, the commodity follows the 
law of increasing return, the price will rise through the 
contraction of supply more than in proportion to the tax. 
If there is a monopoly, in general the price will not 
rise to the ful l extent of the tax, and in certain cases it 
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may not rise at all, the whole tax fall ing on the monopo-
list .1 
I t is to be observed tha t the producer may, in certain 
cases, be able to shi f t par t of the tax to wages as the 
contraction of supply will lower the demand for labour. 
Ult imately, however, the relative net advantages of the 
kinds of labour involved must be restored, al though if 
there has been a monopoly element in the wages the loss 
will not be recovered. 
In all cases of internal taxation it is, of course, assumed 
tha t corresponding customs duties are levied on similar 
commodities and possible substi tutes. 
§ 5. The Incidence of Import Duties. The determina-
tion of import duties depends on the theory of foreign 
trade, and, in my opinion, is best worked out in terms of 
prices.2 Suppose tha t a heavy import du ty is suddenly 
imposed, the foreign producer will not send the product to 
the tax ing country, if other free markets are open, unless 
the importer pays the tax. The payment of the tax will, 
however, check the demand, and there will be a consequent 
reaction on production. If the taxing country has been 
tak ing a large par t of the foreign supply (a part ial buyers ' 
monopoly), the foreigner may be compelled to bear par t 
of the tax to lessen his loss, and if the commodity is more 
or less of a producers ' monopoly, or is produced according 
to diminishing re turn, the price to the taxing country will 
never rise to the ful l extent of the tax. If, on the other 
hand, the demand of the taxing country is relatively 
small, if supply can be readily adjusted, and if other free 
markets are predominant , the whole of the tax will fall 
on the consumer, and the price may rise more than by the 
amount of the tax, owing to the indirect influences already 
noticed. Most commonly the tax falls (wi th the sur-
charges) on the consumer, and it seldom happens that the 
conditions are such tha t it will strike the particular foreign 
1 See the theory of monopoly values, Bk. I I I . , Ch. VII . 
2 See above, Bk. III. , Chs. XXVII . , XXVIII . 
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producer seriously. He will seek other employment for 
his capital or other markets for his produce, i t must be 
remembered also that the case of a monopoly is much 
more rare than may appear at first sight. I t does not 
follow that , because one country only produces a certain 
commodity, it is therefore sold at a monopoly price. In 
order that this may be done, there must be perfect com-
bination amongst all the producers, as appears to be the 
ideal of modern t rusts . But under modern conditions 
there are very few important commodities, if any (having 
regard to effective subst i tu tes) , which are confined to any 
one country, and a combination between producers, of 
different countries is still more difficult to obtain. 
The case of diminishing re tu rn is also practically of 
still less importance. If, for example, Britain imposed a 
tax on wheat, it is doubt fu l if any par t of it would fall on 
the foreign producer. 
W h e n equilibrium is restored af ter the imposition of 
the tax, it is plain tha t the price in the taxing country will 
differ from the price in the producing country by the 
amount of the tax (and its charges) and the cost of 
carriage.1 In general, the price will be determined by the 
conditions of supply and demand in the country of origin, 
and the taxing country as a rule has only a minor in-
fluence, relatively to the whole commercial world, upon 
the demand. 
The ulterior effects consequent on the disturbance of 
international t rade and the necessary readjus tments will 
also, in general, be unfavourable to the country imposing 
the tax. The diminution of imports will check exports 
either directly or indirectly, since imports are paid for by 
exports. I t is t rue tha t the productive power formerly 
employed in making these exports may be used to make 
commodities for the home market , and at the same t ime 
1 Omitting the case in which to retain the market a higher price is 
charged by an open or tacit combination to the consumer of the producing 
country than to the foreign importer. 
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also the taxation of the foreign products may lead to an 
increased demand for the products of home labour. This, 
indeed, is the foundat ion of one par t of the theory of 
protection. A t present, however, we are concerned with 
revenue duties. A n d it is clear tha t if before the du ty 
the product ive power of the country had been most 
advantageously distr ibuted, the redistr ibution consequent 
on the du ty must involve some loss. In brief, any import 
du ty so far restricts the aggregate of foreign trade, and in 
general such a contraction is disadvantageous al though 
there are exceptions.1 
An import du ty to be effective for revenue purposes 
must be supported by corresponding excise duties on the 
commodity and its substi tutes. Similarly the commodity 
must be taxed whatever its use. Thus it is said t ha t the 
new import du ty on sugar will also fall on blacking into 
which molasses enters, and to some extent also it will fall 
on beer and ham. 
§ 6. The Incidence of Export Duties. The imposition of 
an export du ty on coal by the British government in 1901 
has given a special interest to the general theory of such 
duties. The popular idea is tha t because a tax on an im-
por t falls on the home consumer, therefore a tax on an 
export will fall on the foreign consumer. But this argu-
ment omits two essential considerations. The export duty 
is not and cannot be supported by corresponding excise 
duties in the foreign country, and, secondly, the foreign 
country, instead of being a limited area, consists of the 
whole commercial world. Accordingly, to f rame a case of 
an import du ty which would correspond to an export du ty 
we ought to suppose tha t the imjjort du ty is levied on the 
product of one foreign country only, whilst home produc-
ers and other foreign producers escape the tax. Suppose, 
for example, tha t wheat is taxed when imported into Eng-
land from Russia, but not when imported from any other 
country, and not when grown at home. Does any one 
1 See above, Bk. I I I . , Ch. X X V I I I . , § 7. 
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suppose tha t the British consumer would pay the tax on 
Russian wheat ? I t is clear that if the Russian exporters 
( including under tha t heading all engaged in the produc-
tion, the t ransport , and delivery of Russian wheat in Eng -
land) do not pay the tax, they cannot enter the Bri t ish 
market — the British consumer will take other wheat. 
If export duties fell wholly or mainly on the foreign 
country, it would surely be to the economic interest of all 
nations to adopt export duties. 
But , a§ Professor Bastable 1 forcibly remarks, the com-
plete abolition of duties on exports would hardly affect 
the finances of the European states, whilst anyth ing tha t 
disturbed the revenue from imports would be the cause of 
grave concern to nearly all nations. If, however, duties 
on exports fell on the foreigner, whilst duties on imports 
fell on the home consumer, it would be astonishing tha t 
such a degree of self-renunciation should be practised by 
all the nations of Europe. 
I t is t rue tha t so long as the Mercantile System pre-
vailed the main idea was to discourage imports and to en-
courage exports so as to promote a favourable balance of 
t rade. But even under tha t system there were many and 
heavy export duties and, at any rate, the mercantile theory 
of a favourable balance has long since been abandoned 
even by the most protectionist nations. 
The mercantil ists imposed specially heavy duties on 
certain exports, e.g., on the raw materials of manufacture 
and on the ins t ruments of production. These duties, 
however, were intended to check exportat ion rather than 
to yield revenue; and in the extreme case, which was very 
common, they were intentionally prohibitive. The idea 
was to preserve peculiar national advantages for the home 
producer, and in some cases to cheapen important com-
modities to the home consumer. 
The case of revenue export duties may be first consid-
ered. No doubt on the first imposition the t rader will ask 
1 Public Finance, p. 514. 
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the foreign consignee to pay the duty , but whether the 
foreigner will consent to do so, in whole or in part , de-
pends on the possibility of bis obtaining subst i tutes and on 
the intensi ty of his demand. W i t h the extension and de-
velopment of commerce and the advance of the practical 
sciences bear ing on industry , the possibility of finding 
subst i tu tes is vastly increased and the intensi ty of demand 
is proport ionately lessened. If, however, the foreigner 
can obtain his supply from other sources, plainly he will 
not pay the tax. Accordingly the producers of the export 
( inc luding the whole series engaged in completing the act 
of production by delivery into the hands of the foreign 
consumer) must pay the tax, or the t rade must cease or be 
greatly diminished. If the tax is not very heavy and the 
export has been considerable, the producers may bear the 
tax, because the a t t empt to get rid of the supply formerly 
exported will lower the price. The distr ibution of the 
loss between the various productive agents ( including 
those engaged in t r anspor t ) will depend on the conditions 
affecting wages and profits in the part icular country. In 
general, however, there will be some decrease of supply, 
and af ter a period of disturbance the relative advantages 
of the part icular industry will be restored. The varia-
tions on this general position depend on the conditions of 
production, whether according to constant, increasing, or 
diminishing returns, and on the degree of competition or 
monopoly. In the case of constant re turn the decrease 
of supply will leave the price unaltered, with increasing 
re tu rn it will rise, and with diminishing re turn there will 
be some fall in price. In the la t ter case also there will 
be a fall in rent . 1 
If the taxed commodity comes under the rare category 
of national monopoly, it is possible tha t the whole of the 
tax may fall on the foreign consumer. The term " mo-
nopoly," as in the case of customs duties again requires a 
1 So many examples have already been given of the operation of these 
" l a w s " tha t a detailed deduction seems unnecessary. 
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careful interpretat ion. Even supposing tha t only one 
country, ( say) England, produces a part icular commodity, 
( say) smokeless coal, tha t is a " necessary" to other 
nations, it will not command a monopoly price unless all 
the producers make an effective combination.1 
And, moreover, if there were such an effective com-
bination which had secured a monopoly price, the export 
duty would fall wholly, or to a great extent , on the mo-
nopolists. If the t rade would bear a higher price and 
yield a greater return, why did the t raders not impose the 
tax for their own benefit ? 
If, however, the producers of the so-called monopoly 
had been competing with one another, then it is qui te pos-
sible tha t the imposition of the export du ty may cause a 
rise to the foreign consumer, and if his demand is highly 
inelastic, or he must get his supply quand meme, he will 
pay practically the whole of the tax. 
In this case there would be no check to the export 
t rade, and accordingly no secondary dis turbance of the 
home trade. 
W e may now consider the case where the main object 
of the du ty is to check exportat ion — rising in the ex-
t reme case to prohibition under severe penalties. Here, 
no doubt, if the duty is high enough to be effective, there 
is on the first imposition a fall in price through the 
increase of supply in the home market . As a conse-
quence of this fall in price even on the portion still 
exported the foreigner only pays (or ra ther suffers f r o m ) 
part of the tax. The ulterior effects of this fall in price 
will depend on the conditions of production. There can 
be l i t t le doubt tha t the old prohibition of the export of 
wool lowered the price, prevented improvements in qual-
ity, and also lowered rents. 
To apply the general a rgument to the export du ty on 
coal proposed in the British Budget of 1901 it would 
appear tha t just as there are fagots and fagots, so also 
1 See above as regards import duties. 
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there are coals and coals. Some of the coal exported 
from this country is subject to severe foreign competition. 
I t is not of a monopoly quali ty in any sense of the term. 
The foreigner is not likely to pay a shilling a ton more 
for the coal when he has other sources of supply free. If, 
however, the coal is of tha t exceptional quali ty which 
admits of no subst i tut ion (which used to be the fond and 
fallacious belief regarding English wool), and if the 
producers have not already by a tacit or open monopoly 
exacted the highest profitable price, then on this coal the 
tax may be t ransfer red to the foreign consumer, at any 
rate for the most par t . 
I t must be observed also tha t if the tax is specific and 
not ad valorem, it will fall with greatest force on the 
cheaper kinds or the non-monopoly qualities. In these 
qualities, accordingly, it is still more probable that the 
foreigner will not pay the tax. Owing to the conditions 
affecting labour and capital, it is possible tha t the home 
producers may pay the tax to preserve their market , and 
then by a tacit or open combination they may part ly 
recoup their loss by charging higher prices at home, and 
they have lat terly had considerable practice in raising 
prices in this way. If, however, the producers cannot, 
and the foreigner will not pay the tax, there must be a 
diminution of exports, and indirectly imports and fre ights 
will suffer. On the other hand, there will be some fall 
in price in the home market , and users of coal (e.g., iron 
masters) will gain. I t is possible tha t the price may fall 
nearly to the extent of the tax, in which case the foreign 
trade would revive. 
On the whole, the wisdom of this export du ty is very 
doubt fu l . The estimated yield, supposing exports remain 
the same and no rebates are allowed, is only equal to a 
penny in the income tax. The disturbances of trade will 
involve a national loss, a comparatively small portion of 
the tax will fall on the foreigner, and to a t tempt to impose 
par t of a war tax on the foreigner seems beneath the dig-
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nity of a great nation. The great meri t of our free-trade 
policy has been its simplicity; many theoretical exceptions 
have been admit ted from Adam Smith downward ; but 
they are like the exceptions to tell ing the t r u t h which 
serve rather to illustrate the great principles of common 
sense morali ty than to affect practical rules of conduct. 
If the main object of the cluty were to protect our coal 
supplies,— especially those of superior quality,—-the duty 
is far too small to have any considerable effect. When 
Adam Smith wrote the du ty on coal was 5s, per ton, and 
McCulloch in a note states that instead of being abolished 
it ought to have been raised to 7s. 6d. A du ty of this 
amount would probably not yield much revenue, bu t it 
would so far counteract the exhaustion of the supply, and 
in the homely language of the proverb we should keep 
" our ain fish guts for our ain sea-maws." 
§ 7. Rules for Taxes on Consumable Commodities. The 
general canons of taxation have been applied to f rame 
special rules for taxes on commodities.1 ( 1 ) Only such 
taxes should be imposed as will yield a considerable 
revenue, or, in other words, the taxes ought to be produc-
tive. The expense of collection is considerable, and the 
indirect losses consequent on interference wi th the natu-
ral course of t rade are often still greater, so tha t taxes 
with small re turns may easily involve a net loss f rom the 
national point of view. The principal exception to this 
rule is when the tax is levied not solely for revenue, bu t 
for some ulterior purpose, e.g., to enforce sumptua ry laws, 
or to assist in police regulations, or to foster home indus-
tries by protection. Mill places first in his list of rules 
tha t luxuries (especially vanit ies) ought to be as highly 
taxed as possible; bu t as Adam Smith had observed long 
before, such taxes are in general unproductive. Taxes on 
commodities tha t are to yield a large revenue must fall on 
masses of the people, e.g., taxes on spirits and beer, as 
contrasted with wine,— on tea and sugar, as contrasted 
1 Cf. Mill, Bk. V., Ch. VI. , § 3. 
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with carriages and plate. The object of revenue must be 
clearly dist inguished from the ulterior objects. I t is often 
said that, the British taxes on st imulants are intended to 
check consumption ; but in 1901 the chancellor of the ex-
chequer refused to raise the duties on the very ground 
tha t the limit of product ivi ty had been reached, and in 
general such duties unduly encourage inferior qualities. 
( 2 ) The canon of equality enjoins that , if possible, 
taxes should be ad valorem and not specific. There are, 
however, great practical difficulties in different iat ing com-
modities ad valorem, and in general such duties encourage 
inferior qualities. This same canon also has a wider 
application. If smaller incomes are exempt from direct 
taxation, they may so far be expected to bear a larger 
share of indirect . And again, if one set of consumers 
(e.g., of beer) are taxed, other consumers (e.g., of tea) 
ought to be taxed. One a rgument for extending the 
number of indirect taxes is based in this principle of 
equali ty. The rule tha t the area covered by the tax 
should be as wide as possible also depends par t ly on 
equality, bu t partl}r also on economy. 
(3 ) The canon of certainty enjoins that the tariff should 
be clear to all concerned. One great difficulty in ad valorem 
duties is the uncer ta inty as regards tests of quali ty. The 
possibility of readjus tments of the tariff dis turbs trade, 
and accordingly the t e rm of years fixed in commercial 
treaties is so far advantageous. 
( 4 ) The canon of convenience finds its chief illustration 
in taxes on commodities. The piecemeal payment, to re-
call Adam Smith 's graphic description of the coal-heaver 
and his pots of porter, is highly convenient. A lump sum 
for a license to dr ink porter would be much more trying, 
and once paid would promote thi rs t unduly. A large reve-
nue may be raised from commodities when the limits of 
productiveness by direct taxation have long been lef t be-
hind. Mill gives as his second rule that when possible 
the tax should be levied directly from the consumer. On 
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the ground of economy this is perhaps theoretically justi-
fiable, bu t it breaks down as regards convenience. I t is 
much more convenient to the authorit ies and to the tax-
payers to levy import and customs duties than to a t tempt 
to collect the taxes directly from consumers. Theoret i-
cally, the old proposal of Sir Mat thew Decker to impose 
licenses on all kinds of consumption is not unreasonable, 
and licenses to dr ink alcohol have recently been revived 
in some American States as formerly in Holland people 
paid for a license to dr ink tea ; bu t the American legisla-
tors may be referred to Adam Smith 's criticism. 
(5) The canon of economy also finds f requent illustra-
t i o n — both positive and negative — in taxes on commodi-
ties. Such taxes are more costly than appears at first 
s ight . The official s tatements of the cost of collection of 
such taxes cannot include the indirect cost through the 
restraints imposed upon trade.1 Consider the case of the 
Brit ish customs duties. A large number of officers are 
required not simply for collection, but to prevent evasion. 
I t is quite clear tha t if goods could be landed at any point, 
collectors would be required a t every possible landing-
place. Accordingly, only certain ports are allowed the 
privilege of import ing goods liable to du ty . Again only 
some of these ports are especially privileged as regards 
certain commodities (e.g., wine and tobacco) in which spe-
cial tests are required. I t is obvious tha t the l imitation 
of imports also limits exports. The " bonded warehouse " 
system, which is adopted so as to postpone payment of the 
du ty unt i l the commodity is required for consumption or 
is wi thdrawn for re-exportation, al though in itself of great 
advantage, necessarily leads to still fu r the r interference : 
only certain ports are warehousing ports, and only certain 
buildings are set aside for the purpose. A general objec-
tion to this system of licensing ports is tha t the customs 
commissioners cannot find out except by trial what ports 
1 Cf. Cliffe Leslie's Essay on Financial Reform. Cobden Club Essays 
(1871-1872). 
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will be the best to select. Manchester, for example, a f te r 
much opposition, in 1862 obtained the privileges of a port , 
and in seven years in the amount of customs collected it 
was seventh in the list. One of the main reasons why the 
tea t rade was concentrated chiefly in London was tha t 
other ports had not the requisite warehouses. A minor, 
but sometimes a serious, evil, is t ha t the warehouses are 
inconvenient and cramped. The interference, however, 
does not cease at the ports. There must be bonded ware-
houses in inland places, otherwise the merchants must pre-
pay the du ty or run the risk of being short of supplies. 
T h u s again there must be a limit to the privilege. In 
some cases the imposition of a customs duty requires for 
its protection a prohibition of production in the home 
country (e.g., tobacco), and in all cases corresponding ex-
cise dut ies must be levied and duties on all possible 
substi tutes. 
As regards excise duties there are peculiar sources of 
loss. The necessary surveillance checks improvements 
directly, and indirectly the restrictions encourage monop-
oly, which again checks improvements. The rise in price 
consequent on the duties also diminishes consumption and 
thus contracts the supply, and again various economies are 
prevented. In some cases the protection of the excise 
duties leads to prohibitions of certain processes and thus 
renders it necessary to import certain qualities f rom 
abroad. The evils incident on heavy excise duties have 
been well i l lustrated by Por ter in the case of glass.1 Be-
tween 1801 and 1833 the population increased by one-half, 
but the consumption of glass only by one-eighth. When 
the du ty was increased the consumption fell, and when the 
duties were lessened the revenue increased. A manufac-
ture r who had improved bottle-glass was stopped in his 
operations because the revenue from flint glass, which was 
more highly taxed, might suffer ; and, on the other hand, 
owing to the regulations, glass could not be made sufh-
1 Progress of the Nation, pp. 155-159. 
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ciently fine for optical instruments , and had to be im-
ported. 
Similar evils resulted from the excise duties on candles, 
soap, and paper ; there were few improvements relatively 
to untaxed manufactures, consumption was checked, and 
the excise duties were, in effect, duties on light, cleanliness, 
and knowledge. 
There were besides indirect taxes through the effects on 
subsidiary industries. We thus again arrive at the rule 
tha t as few articles as possible should be taxed ; and that 
they should be so taxed as to interfere as l i t t le as possible 
with the natura l course of t rade. On the ground of their 
productiveness Adam Smith allowed that there might be 
good reasons for continuing the taxes on salt, leather, soap, 
and candles, al though they are necessaries. Luxuries may 
be taxed more heavily (e.g., spirits and tobacco). 
On the principle of economy the area of taxation should 
be as wide as possible. Thus customs duties collected at 
the ports of the United Kingdom not only cost less in 
the collection, but have far less d is turbing effects on trade 
than if similar taxes were imposed in all sorts of local 
areas. Hence, with few exceptions, local taxes on com-
modities have disappeared, though octroi dut ies still pre-
vail abroad. The German Zoll-Verein was one causa 
causans of the empire. Generally the adoption of a 
uniform customs tariff over a large area (e.g., as in the 
Uni ted States) , means the adoption of f ree t rade within 
tha t area. 
§ 8. Direct and Indirect Taxes Compared. In spite of 
the evils tha t are associated with indirect taxation, and 
are only partially prevented by fiscal improvements, it has 
been found necessary by all the great nations of modern 
t imes to retain customs and excise duties as an important 
par t of the tax system. In England, Russia, and France 
the excises and customs yield about half the national reve-
nues. In Germany the Imperial legislation regulates the 
customs and excises on salt, tobacco, spiri tuous liquors, 
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beer, and sugar, and wi th t h r e e 1 exceptions the con-
s t i tuent States do not tax these things. In the Uni ted 
States the federal government draws most of its revenue 
from excises and customs in nearly equal proportion. In 
comparing direct and indirect taxes both must be consid-
ered as parts of the whole t ax system. The chief merit in 
either case is tha t the one remedies the defects of the other. 
Both are simply methods of t ak ing wealth from private 
persons for public purposes. In favour of direct taxes it 
is argued tha t the contr ibutors know exactly what they 
are paying, and accordingly, under a system of represent-
ative government , it is supposed tha t they will exercise a 
judicious check on expendi ture . 2 On this ground it is a 
mat te r for regre t tha t in Britain the limit of exemption 
f rom the income tax has been placed so high. On the 
other hand, however, it is maintained that direct taxat ion 
of incomes below a certain minimum involves dispropor-
t ionate sacrifice, and the mode of payment causes a still 
greater loss. Direct taxes cannot be collected piecemeal. 
I t was found in Germany t ha t in the case of smaller in-
comes direct taxes were paid by selling and pawning the 
fu rn i tu re — an evil which still prevails in spite of the rise 
in the limit of exemption. Except on their first imposi-
tion the amount of indirect taxes is not known by the tax-
payers. An old tax is no tax in many senses — inter alia it 
seems to form par t of the natura l or cost price. How 
many of the consumers of spirits and tobacco have any idea 
of the portion of the cost tha t depends on taxation ? This 
concealment of the burden, though it may be convenient 
to the taxpayer, is likely to promote extravagance on the 
par t of the government . Direct taxation in many forms 
is liable to the f rauds incident on self-assessment or other 
modes of evasion. The British Income Tax has furnished 
1 Bavaria, Wiirtemberg, and Baden. 
2 The answer, tha t with a large direct taxation the voters would 
unduly cramp expenditure, is at present in all countries of purely hypo-
thetical interest. 
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star t l ing examples, and the American property tax is still 
more notorious. On the other hand, taxation of com-
modities is a direct encouragement to adulterat ion and 
to smuggling. A certain glamour formerly at tached to 
the doings of the old " free-traders," but historically smug-
gling was associated with incredible brutal i ty 1 and 
degraded the whole tone of public morals. W h e n direct 
taxes are submitted to by the payers without any serious 
protest, if the cause of expendi ture is approved, it is evi-
dence of a high ethical s tandard. 
Once a system of taxation has become firmly established 
with an ad jus tment of the relative parts tha t commends 
itself to public opinion, any changes in taxation should 
be made so as to leave this harmony as far as possible 
undisturbed. The proposals of the Brit ish Budget of 1901 
sinned against this rule. The natural compensation to 
the income tax is found in the succession duties as Mr. 
Gladstone stated in 1860, and since 1894 the adoption 
of the principle of gradat ion according to the value of 
the estate, has compensated the income tax to a much 
greater degree than when the gradat ion depended only on 
the degree of kinship. In this Budget , however, though 
the income tax was increased, there were no changes in the 
succession duties. On the other hand, it must be granted 
that the imposition of the sugar dut ies was intended solety 
to keep up the proportions of the system. 
1 See details in a curious book entitled Smuggling Days and Smug-
gling Ways. 
C H A P T E R X I V . 
F R E E TRADE AND PROTECTION.1 
§ 1. Meaning of Free Trade. Free trade is sometimes 
used in a loose popular sense as equivalent to laisser-
faire or non-interference, but historically it refers to a 
particular policy as regards international or foreign trade. 
In this sense its principal characteristics are absence of 
differential duties and of artificial encouragements such 
as bounties by which the home producer would be favoured 
as compared with the foreigner in the same industry. 
The essence of free trade is equality and uniformity in 
the financial t reatment of home, colonial, and foreign 
produce of the same kind. Thus taxes on commodities 
for revenue purposes only, although they are of foreign 
origin exclusively (e.g., tea) , are not held to infringe the 
rule, nor are duties on imports, provided there are corre-
sponding excise duties on similar products. Similarly, 
absolute prohibition of imports, if equivalent penalties 
are imposed on the home production, does not offend 
against the principle of free trade (e.g., immoral books 
or pr ints) . The principal practical difficulty arises in 
the interpretation of " s u b s t i t u t e s " and "similars." I t is 
not easy to find a fair common measure for home and 
foreign articles tha t differ in quality. Thus with wines, 
beer, and spirits the alcoholic test alone is obviously unfa i r ; 
and a simple ad valorem tax is also inequitable, because 
1 The literature of Free Trade and Protection is too extensive for 
notice in a general work. In the present chapter the object is simply to 
indicate the method of applying the arguments and to attempt a judicial 
estimate of their value. 
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the effect on demand will vary in different cases. In a 
sense, indeed, any taxation of foreign goods which cannot 
be produced at home (e.g., tropical produce) gives an 
artificial encouragement to home industries. If tea and 
coffee are taxed, the use of aerated waters and home-made 
wines may be encouraged. The case of drawbacks pre-
sents similar difficulties. If the drawback is exactly the 
equivalent of the duty, it simply restores t rade to the state 
of freedom; but if it exceeds the original tax, it degenerates 
into a bounty, and, indeed, most bounties on exports are 
disguised in the form of drawbacks. 
§ 2. Free Trade and the Consumer. If the question 
be regarded solely from the point of view of the consumer, 
it is easy to establish the general case in favour of free 
trade. W i t h freedom of competition no foreign com-
modity would be imported unless it could be sold at least 
as cheaply as when produced at home, and in general it 
may be said the foreign article would only gain an entrance 
by being offered at a lower rate. T h u s to discourage 
importat ion by taxes would be to raise prices. Free 
imports encourage cheapness and abundance. I t may 
also be argued tha t free exports give the greatest encour-
agement to free imports, whilst bounties on exports by 
lessening the supply at home raise prices to the home 
consumer and lower them to the foreigner. 
But even to this simple aspect of the question there are 
exceptions. Present cheapness may be sacrificed to ulti-
mate dearness, as in the rapid depletion of peculiar na tura l 
resources (e.g., coal and iron, and even the soil i tself) ; 
and, theoretically, bounties on any commodities tha t 
admit of increasing re turn with larger production may 
lower the price more than by the amount of the bounty. 
Cheapness also may lead to a more than proportionate 
degradat ion in quali ty, and in brief there are all the cases 
to be considered in which the consumer is not the best 
judge of his own interests. On the whole, however, if 
the consumer only is considered, and the indirect effects 
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on production are le f t out of the account, free t rade is 
generally advantageous and the exceptions are of rela-
tively small importance. 
I t may be objected, however, tha t all cheapness is rela-
t ive to the means of purchase, tha t is, to incomes of the 
consumers, and tha t in the last resort incomes depend 
upon production in the large sense of the term. 
§ 3. The Protection of Home Industries : General View. 
A t first sight it seems plausible to assert tha t if foreign 
products are wholly or partially excluded from the home 
markets, there must be so much more employment for 
home labour and capital, and thus an increase of wages 
and profits. The refu ta t ion of this fallacy in its crude 
form is one of the greatest t r iumphs of the political 
economy which the successors of Adam Smith rendered 
simple and popular. The main positions in the refuta t ion 
are indeed derived from Adam Smith. Bastiat 's petition 
of the candle-makers against the sun, praying for the 
closure of windows in order tha t the production of artifi-
cial l ight (and all the subsidiary industr ies) might be 
encouraged, was probably suggested by Adam Smith 's 
i l lustration that wine could be made from grapes grown 
in Scotland. 
Again, tha t industry is l imited by capital, and that a 
government cannot directly augment capital, and, conse-
quently, at the best can only determine the direction and 
not the volume of industry, is also taken directly from 
Adam Smith. Protection on this view may increase em-
ployment in any favoured industry, but it can only do so 
by wi thdrawing productive power from other industries 
in which the country has a greater natural advantage. 
The grea t maxim of free t raders that imports must be 
paid for by exports amounts to saying tha t if foreign 
labour is encouraged by the free admission of foreign 
goods, home industries must be equally encouraged be-
cause goods to an equal value must be exported to pay 
for these goods. Conversely, protection by prevent ing 
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imports must discourage exports. In any case, also, the 
very object of protective duties is to raise the prices of the 
protected products in the home markets, and accordingly 
the consumers so far suffer and they have less to spend on 
" other th ings ." Not only do the labourers lose as con-
sumers, bu t protection to some industries leads to a lessened 
demand for the products of other industries, and " the 
mischief circulates." 
There is no doubt tha t these elementary arguments 
embody important practical t ru ths which, as history 
proves, are liable to be overlooked. A t the same time, 
however, the case for free t rade has been great ly weak-
ened by neglecting to make clear the assumptions implied 
and the qualifications to which they give rise. 
§ 4. The Assumptio?is of the General Argument for Free 
Trade.1 I n the first place, it is assumed tha t labour and 
capital can be turned wi thout loss or difficulty f rom a 
decaying into a thr iving industry, and tha t if any home 
product is displaced by foreign competition, " something 
else " can be made immediately with the displaced pro-
ductive power. But it may be objected tha t every 
indus t ry requires a certain amount of specialised capital 
and peculiar skill and training. There is so much force 
in this objection tha t Adam Smith himself pointed out 
tha t freedom of t rade should only be restored by slow 
gradations if the employment of labour would be endan-
gered. And, conversely, it may be argued that " t empo-
rary " protective duties should be enforced when an old 
indus t ry is suddenly at tacked by foreign competition. 
The difficulty of the t ransference of capital, however, is 
likely to be exaggerated, and the a rgument for vested 
interests may be tu rned round. One grea t practical 
objection to " t e m p o r a r y " protective duties — for what-
ever reason granted — is the danger of creat ing vested 
interests which cannot be disturbed without some kind of 
compensation. 
1 Cf. Bastable 's ITieory of International Trade (3d edition) Ch. VII . 
360 250 ECONOMIC. F U N C T I O N S OF G O V E R N M E N T . 
Secondly, the popular general a rgument assumes that 
the capital and labour of a country must remain within 
its own borders. This position again is in the main so 
t rue tha t it is taken as the basis of the theory of inter-
national t rade. But the appeal to history also shows tha t 
industr ies may migrate, not only f rom place to place 
wi thin a country (an " economic nation " ) , but also from 
country to country. 1 Thus , foreign bounties might destroy 
some impor tant home indust ry which, even af ter the 
removal of the bounties, the country might never recover. 
More generally a free-trade country placed in the midst of 
a group of protectionist countries is liable to disturbances 
and at tacks which may vitally in jure its industries. 
Thirdly, this last consideration is impor tant in con-
nection wi th the maxim tha t imports are paid for by 
exports . No doubt all t rade is reciprocal, bu t it may be 
said tha t unless a country 's exports are sent by the best 
route to the best market , they cannot purchase so great 
a quant i ty of imports, and we may more reasonably regard 
the export t rade as active and the import t rade as passive 
than the converse. If, for example, to take an extreme 
case, other nations or an important combination effectually 
excluded Engl ish exports f rom their markets, England 
would be unable to pay for her imports, and imports must 
cease. 
Practically, no doubt, the foreign countries concerned 
could not afford to lose the English market for their goods 
if the closure were applied suddenly and extensively, but 
the danger lies in the cumulative effects of foreign pro-
tective duties, and the gradual exclusion of English goods 
f rom foreign markets . The natura l remedy would appear 
to be found in commercial treaties on a reciprocity basis, 
but the great difficulty for the free- trade country is tha t it 
has no part icular advantages to offer in exchange. 
Fourthly, the general a rgument assumes tha t so long 
as the capital of a country can be employed with equal 
1 On the migration of labour and capital, see Bastable, op. cit., Ch. X. 
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profit, the method of application is a mat te r of indifference. 
Not only was this position not approved of by Adam 
Smith, but it was distinctly controverted by him. This is 
shown in the most s t r iking manner by his t rea tment of 
the monopoly of the colonial t rade. The key to the argu-
ment is tha t this monopoly raised the general ra te of 
profit throughout the country, and thereby in jured the 
nation as a whole, and each of the great industr ial classes 
individually. This high rate of profit artificially created 
by the monopoly, in Adam Smith 's view, lowered directly 
wages and rents, and, indirectly, the aggregate income 
from capital. 
Adam Smith used as his principal test of the advantages 
of employing capital, not the rate of profit to be obtained, 
but the amount of labour employed in the home country, 
and the benefit derived from the direct consumption of 
the capital. Thus, under na tura l conditions, any home 
t rade was more advantageous than any foreign trade, the 
near t rade was more advantageous than the distant , the 
direct t rade of consumption than the roundabout , and 
the roundabout t rade of consumption was more advanta-
geous than the carrying t rade. For some time past, in 
the Uni ted Kingdom, there has been a superabundance of 
capital, t ha t is to say, more than sufficient for all these 
modes of employment, in spite of continuous large ad*-
vances to foreign countries. A n d it must be observed 
tha t Adam Smith himself looked upon a flourishing carry-
ing trade, tha t is wi thout artificial encouragement, as a 
species of high-water mark in the t ide of general pros-
perity. But the foundation of his a rgument remains 
unshaken : profit is only one element in advantage. 
Fifthly, the popular argument , tha t if protection is 
good for one country against another, it must also be good 
for one district, town, etc., against others in the same 
country, which is supposed to be a reductio ad absurdmn 
of protection, is, in reality, qui te irrelevant and generally 
fallacious. From the national point of view, the migra-
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tion of industries within its borders is a matter of indiffer-
ence, or rather, is, in general, a national gain. Thus the 
abandonment of the mediaeval protectionist system in 
which every town protected itself against all others, and 
insisted on its " ancient customs," was accompanied by a 
great expansion of industr ial power ; but, at the same 
time, whilst some places waxed, others waned. And, 
al though this parochial protectionism has disappeared, the 
commercial rivalry of nations is as strong as ever, and the 
land would fare ill from which the capital and labour 
migrated, though the rest of the world might gain. There 
is not only the possibility of a "something else," but of 
a " somewhere else " to be considered ; and herein lies the 
danger of organised attacks by foreign competitors. The 
recent purchase of the Leyland line by an American 
syndicate, though relatively a small matter in itself, may 
be regarded as a significant symptom of a possible danger. 
The popular argument that the natural employment of 
productive powers, which, at the time, is most profitable, 
is also both immediately and ultimately the most advan-
tageous to a nation, also breaks down theoretically when 
applied to particular cases. 
§ 5. Theoretical Exceptions to Free Trade.1 The prin-
cipal theoretical exceptions to free trade may be de-
duced from the possible disadvantages of foreign trade to 
a particular country, the subject of an earlier section in 
this work,2 and they are properly considered in con-
nection with the general theory of foreign trade. A t 
this stage, where we are rather concerned with the advis-
ability of giving practical effect to the theory, a simple 
enumeration of the important cases must suffice. 
I t is said, first, that every nation should retain for the 
benefit of its own people any peculiar natural resources 
1 " Special cases for the application of protection" would perhaps be 
a bet ter title for this section. Compare Bastable 's International Trade, 
Ch. IX. 
2 Bk. I I I . , Ch. XXVIII . , § 7. 
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and. if possible any inventions and artificial means of pro-
duction. In former times there were heavy duties, and in 
some cases prohibitions, on the exports of various raw 
materials (e.g., wool, coal, e tc . ) and also on the instru-
ments of production, including the living ins t rument 
man. This policy, however, was definitely abandoned 
by Britain in 1845 and the export du ty 011 coal in 1901 
was intended by its originator not so much to check 
exports as to yield revenue. I t is impossible as regards 
the remote fu tu re to tell whether the peculiar value at-
tached to natura l resources will continue whilst the 
immediate in jury to t rade is obvious. J u s t as sea-coal 
displaced charcoal, so water power and electricity may 
displace steam ; and as regards the export of machinery, 
prohibition is useless when th ings can be imitated, and 
the limitation of export would check development. 
A second exception to free t rade has been urged on the 
ground of national independence. Adam Smith apparent ly 
approved of the principle of the Navigation Acts,1 a l though 
it is generally forgot ten tha t when dealing wi th colonial 
policy2 he strongly condemns all the regulations and ma-
chinery by which this principle was carried out. A n d as 
a matter of fact this was the first par t of the mercantile 
system to be severely at tacked. This a rgument of 
national independence was chiefly relied on by the op-
ponents of the repeal of the Corn Laws, but it now needs 
no showing tha t Bri tain has gained far more in mili tary 
s t rength th rough the growth of wealth and population 
than she has lost by the contraction of corn-growing. 
Again the independence of nations is mutual , and the 
best guarantee for peace is the extension of commerce. 
A third exception to free t rade is especially applied to 
new countries. I t is argued tha t protection is necessary 
to promote manufactures and the growth of towns, and 
that such development is necessary even for the encourage-
ment of agriculture, e.g., wheat and frozen meat may be 
1 Wealth of Nations, Bk. IV. , Ch. II. 2 Ibid., Ch. VII . 
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exported, but not all the by-products of agriculture, and 
in any case there is a loss in the cost of carriage. Tha t 
the commerce of the towns causes the greatest improve-
ments in the country, and that the nearer the consumer is 
brought to the producer the better, are favouri te positions 
of Adam Smith. 
I t may be answered, however, t ha t temporary protec-
tion is impossible owing to the creation of vested inter-
ests, t ha t new countries especially require capital, which is 
repelled and diminished by protection, and tha t the artificial 
forcing of new industr ies is not advantageous in the long 
run . Professor Taus s ig 1 has shown by a detailed account 
of the development of the cotton, woollen, and iron manu-
factures in the first par t of the nineteenth century in the 
Uni ted States that , though all the conditions were favour-
able to the protection of young industries, l i t t le if any-
thing was gained. 
A fourth exception is the celebrated case of retaliation. 
This has been generally approved, provided the object is 
to compel the foreigner to take off objectionable duties. 
The practical objection, however, is tha t retaliation is 
likely to provoke fu r the r retaliation rather than recipro-
city. 
A fifth exception to free t rade is found in the alleged 
necessity of protect ing highly paid labour against the 
pauper labour of foreign countries. I t may be replied 
tha t high wages do not make dear labour, and that they 
promote efficiency ; and if protection is necessary to keep 
up the rate of wages, the higher wages are a tax upon the 
consumers of the article produced and in general the 
higher nominal wages are gained at the expense of a fall 
in real wages. Still, theoretically, this exception is valid 
under certain conditions, and cheapness to the consumer 
may be of less importance than the well-being of the pro-
ducer. 
A number of exceptions to free t rade are to a great 
1 Tariff History of the United States, p. 61. 
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extent, political and social, and only part ial ly economic in 
the narrower sense. This is part ly t rue of the cases 
already noticed, and in other cases is still more marked. 
Sometimes the object of interference is to in jure other 
nations, as the Navigation Acts were mainly directed 
against the Dutch ; and sometimes conversely to concili-
ate by conceding advantages, as in the case of the great 
French Commercial Treaty of 1860. The exclusion of 
certain foreign products is sometimes justified with the 
view of improving the qual i ty of home labour. No nation 
would be content to remain as a hewer of wood and 
grower of corn, and the higher the forms of indus t ry in 
which the workers are engaged so much the bet ter for 
the nation as a whole. The great a rgument of Frederick 
List is tha t protection is necessary for social development.1 
I t is assumed tha t if foreign wares of the higher class 
are excluded, they will be produced at home by native 
artists and craf tsmen. I t is, however, at least as proba-
ble that the absence of foreign competition would check 
development, and tha t the best way to promote the higher 
forms of industry is not by the simple process of exclu-
sion, but ra ther by improvements in the education of the 
people. 
The natura l result of free t rade is to st imulate compe-
tition, invention, and variety of enterprise, whilst the 
natural result of protection is to establish routine methods. 
Finally, there are certain exceptional conditions under 
which it is theoretically possible by the judicious manipu-
lation of duties to extract a certain amount of revenue 
from the foreigner. Such cases occur when the country 
in question has either a buyer 's or a seller's monopoly ; 
in the former case it may gain by import , and in the 
1 Cf. Professor Patten, The Economic Basis of Protection, p. 7 : " T h e 
older doctrines of protection were short-sighted in that they sought pro-
tection merely for specific ends. . . . Protection now changes from a 
temporary expedient to gain specific ends to a consistent endeavour to 
keep society dynamic and progressive." But it may be rejoined that this 
is the final cause of f ree trade. 
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la t ter by export, duties. Technically, duties of this kind 
inf r inge the general maxims of free trade, and practically 
they are of little importance, and, so far as practicable, 
are likely to lead to retaliation and to foster national 
animosity. Tax ing the foreigner is very like shearing 
the wolf. 
On the whole, then, it appears that , at any rate, in the 
case of highly developed nations, al though there are many 
cases " wor thy of deliberation," there are very few worthy 
of adoption. A n d this view is s t rengthened by the nega-
t ive a rgument in favour of free t rade and by the appeal 
to experience. 
§ 6. The Negative Argument for Free Trade. I t is one 
th ing to allow tha t provided a government were perfectly 
wise and perfectly powerful — in brief, a deus ex machina 
worked by perpetual motion — it might impose such taxes 
at its f ront iers as would not only yield a revenue in some 
cases, but in others would assist in directing the labour 
and capital of the country into the most advantageous 
channels ; but it is quite another th ing to admit tha t any 
government is capable of managing the affairs of a great 
nat ion in this way. Those who quote Adam Smith for 
his theoretical exceptions, forget tha t he always laid most 
stress on the negative side of his a r g u m e n t ; that is to 
say, on the weakness and incapacity of governments. His 
final opinion is tha t the statesman who should a t tempt to 
direct private people in what manner they ought to employ 
their capital, is guil ty of dangerous folly and presump-
tion. This opinion is confirmed and il lustrated by the 
appeal to history elaborated in the four th book of the 
Wealth of Nations. And, if here and there a few frag-
ments of the old policy have been rescued from the general 
wreckage by the labours of subsequent writers, the cumu-
lative effect of the a rgument has hardly been weakened. 
Nor has i t been much affected by the history of the nine-
teenth century, if in the interpretat ion the fallacy of post 
hoc ergo propter hoc is avoided. In the United Kingdom 
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there can be li t t le question tha t the rapid industrial devel-
opment that has occurred was only possible through free 
trade. And, as regards the Uni ted States, it must be re-
membered tha t the immense area over which internal free 
trade prevailed was amply sufficient to secure most of the 
benefits of free competition. Similarly, the recent experi-
ence of German trade is associated wi th the Zoll-Verein 
over a wide area. Professor Taussig concludes his excel-
lent history of the tariff in the Uni ted States wi th the 
reflection tha t " t h e permanent retention of the extreme 
protection, which is the unexpected residuum of the war 
troubles, should not be permit ted ; proposals, such as are 
occasionally brought forward for the fu r the r increase of 
protective duties, are to be uncompromisingly opposed; 
and a careful and judicious pruning of the present duties 
is the par t of sound policy for the immediate f u t u r e . " 
The recent developments in America of the t r u s t system 
have s t rengthened this opinion, and the enormous increase 
of American exports is likely to open the eyes of American 
consumers and producers to the advantages of free imports . 
The author i ty of List himself could not be advanced in 
support of protection in the Uni ted States under present 
conditions. Af t e r enumera t ing 1 the maxims of protection-
ism by which he conceives (contrary to Adam Smi th) tha t 
England obtained her commercial supremacy, List con-
cludes wi th a remarkable passage tha t seems precisely 
applicable at present, both to the Uni ted States and to 
Germany. " I t is a very common clever device, tha t when 
any one has obtained the summit of greatness, he kicks 
away the ladder by which he has climbed up, in order to 
deprive others of the means of climbing up af ter him. In 
this lies the secret of the cosmopolitical doctrine of Adam 
Smith. Any nation which, by means of protective duties 
and restrictions on navigation, has raised her manufac tur -
ing power to such a degree of development tha t no other 
nation can sustain free competition wi th her, can do noth-
1 National System of Political Economy ( t ranslat ion), p. 306. 
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ing wiser than to throw away those ladders of her great-
ness." List may be wrong in his in terpreta t ion of his-
tory, as he was certainly wrong in overlooking the intense 
patr iot ism of Adam Smith; bu t no wri ter has presented 
the case for protection wi th such vigour and success, and 
what has been abandoned by so eminent a supporter of 
protection is not likely to receive much support f rom other 
economists. 
In conclusion, one other aspect of the negative a rgument 
may be emphasised. As regards most countries, the total 
foreign trade is a minor par t of its whole t rade. Even in 
the Uni ted Kingdom there are at present fewer persons 
employed in all the textile trades than in agriculture. 
The aggregate value of the receipts of the railways of the 
Uni ted Kingdom are about equal in amount to the total 
value of yarns and texti le fabrics exported, which again is 
about one-third of the total exports. 
A n d not only is the foreign t rade only a minor par t of 
the aggregate t rade of most nations, bu t the utmost effect 
of artificial restraints and encouragements is relatively still 
less. Protect ive duties and bounties, at the best, can only 
direct the employment of a comparatively small amount 
of the labour and capital of a coun t ry ; the greater par t 
will be employed according to the natural and acquired 
advantages of the country relatively to those of other 
countries. " The tariff system of a country is but one of 
many factors enter ing into its general prosper i ty ." 1 
1 Taussig, op. cit., p. 121. 
C H A P T E R XVI. 
CHARACTER OF PUBLIC E X P E N D I T U R E . 
§ 1. Importance of determining Principles in Public 
Expenditure. I t has already been observed 1 that public 
expenditure has received much less attention than public 
revenue, whether at the hands of scientific writers or of 
practical statesmen. Yet, to say the least, the two subjects 
are of coordinate importance. " T h e question of expendi-
ture," says Professor Bastable, " i s just as much a finan-
cial problem as that of revenue. Neither in theory nor 
in practice is it advisable to separate them completely." 
The opinion of Mr. Gladstone2 is still more emphatic, 
" Good finance consists more in the spending than in the 
collecting of revenue." 
Tha t there must be some general principles guiding 
public expenditure, whether formulated or not, is obvious 
from one very simple consideration. Public expenditure 
is limited by public revenue, and the greater par t of reve-
nue (under actual conditions) is limited by the produc-
tiveness of taxes,3 by the consent of the taxpayers, by the 
indirect effects on the productive powers of the country, 
and various other economic and political facts, which 
together place an insuperable barrier to the indefinite 
expansion of taxation. 
The objects of public expenditure on the other hand are 
many in number, and in no case is it possible to reach the 
satiety point. Every public department is constantly 
crying out for more, and every social reformer is crying 
out for fresh, expenditure. There is thus a perennial 
1 See above, Ch. V. 
2 Sir A. West 's Recollections of Mr. Gladstone, Vol. II . , p. 309. 
8 The industrial domain of the State is best considered separately. 
v o l . in . — 2 b 309 
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s t ruggle between conflicting claims,1 e.g., the navy and 
army, education, poor relief, sanitation, etc., and it is diffi-
cult to decide on the best method of distr ibution. The 
whole of our actual imperial revenue might easily be spent 
on defence, or on education, or on poor relief, and still 
leave unsatisfied demand. 
A n d yet Sir Edward Hamilton, in one of the most valu-
able official reports of recent years,2 observes with t r u t h 
tha t the old cry for " r e t r e n c h m e n t " 011 the par t of the 
government of the day is no longer heard. 
I t is quite t rue t ha t the actual normal expenditure in 
any year is largely determined by previous legislation and 
by historical conditions. There is, for example, the inter-
est on the national debt, and there are various political 
obligations at home and abroad. But this recognition of 
the cont inui ty of national life and of the influence of the 
past does not dispense with the appeal to principles any 
more than in the case of taxat ion. There are new objects 
constantly arising and old objects decaying, and expendi-
tu re ought to be readjusted in various ways. Under a 
system of popular government (wi th expendi ture con-
s tant ly increasing) a reference to principles is more than 
ever necessary. There are also questions of fundamental 
importance regarding the best methods of expenditure, 
and we ought to consider (as in taxat ion) the indirect as 
well as the direct effects. And indeed, as already sug-
gested, the t rea tment of taxation may in almost every 
part icular be made the basis of a similar t rea tment of 
expenditure. 
§ 2. The General Characteristics of Public Expenditure. 
Jus t as taxation is compulsory, from the point of view of 
the sovereign power, so also from the same point of view 
public expenditure may be said to be arbitrary. If, how-
ever, we trace the historical development of taxation and 
expenditure, we find tha t just as the compulsion of the 
1 Cf. Cohn's Finanz-Wissenschaft, § 153. 
2 Introduction to Memoranda on Imperial and Local Taxes (1899). 
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former has been modified by the representat ion of the tax-
payers, so also the control of expendi ture in the interests 
of the public has been substi tuted for the arbi t rary caprice 
of the sovereign power. The principle of no expendi ture 
wi thout the consent of the representatives was, however, 
only converted into a maxim of finance long af te r its ana-
logue in taxation had been accepted. As early as the 
four teenth century, in England, a socialistic p o e t 1 could 
say with t ru th , — 
T h e k i n g t a x e t h n a t his men 
B u t by assent of t he commina l t e . 
But though in the same century there were the beginnings 
of " inquisitions " into expenditure, the principle of appro-
priation of supplies was not definitely established till af ter 
the Revolution of 1689.2 
Again, the ancient rule in England, tha t all proposals for 
expenditure must come f rom the crown, which had its ori-
gin in the mediaeval conception of sovereign power, has 
been developed into the modern constitutional doctrine 
tha t the ministry is responsible for the estimates sub-
mit ted in the Budget . 3 Thus, al though the representa-
tives of the people may throw out a government for the 
expenditure it proposes, they cannot direct ly subst i tute 
other schemes. 
Other countries have followed England at long intervals, 
both in t ime and in method, as regards the control of ex-
penditure. In the middle of the eighteenth century (1755) 
Von Just i , the principal Cameralist writer , only reflected 
the ideas of the t ime in t rea t ing the wealth of the people 
and the people itself (which was par t and parcel of the 
1 The Plowman's Tale, in the main an attack on the corrupt practices 
of the monks, friars, and clergy. Generally included in Chaucer 's works, 
but by an unknown author. In Skeat ' s Chaucer, Vol. VI I I . , p. xxxi . 
and p. 168. 
2 Hallam's Constitutional History, Vol. III. , p. 117; Bastable 's Public 
Finance, Bk. V., Ch. I. 
3 Cf. Bastable, op. cit., p. 697. 
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State) solely f rom the point of view of the State's reve-
nues.1 The fur ther ing of the people's well-being was 
long regarded only as a means to the ends of the State. 
"L'etat c'est moi" and " pauvre royaume pauvre roi" are 
concrete expressions of the same idea. 
The same process of development may be seen with re-
gard to the management of the industrial domain of the 
State and of royalties and similar sources of revenue. 
The old idea was that, as in the case of private estates, the 
property of the crown should be managed so as to yield a 
maximum net revenue. If, as generally happened, it was 
not so well managed, the misfortune was the personal loss 
of the monarch. The modern idea is that the production 
of net revenue is altogether of secondary importance. 
The post-office and, since the fall in silver, the mint, both 
produce in England a net revenue, but the yield of revenue 
ought to be considered as purely incidental if not acci-
dental. The present tendency in local finance to look to 
municipal t rading for the relief of rates seems from the 
point of view of history regressive rather than progressive. 
§ 3. Classification of Public Expenditure. I t might, per-
haps, be thought of the nature of a truism to assert that 
public expenditure ought to be for public purposes; but in 
expenditure as in taxation the quid pro quo principle is 
sometimes applied. The classification of public expendi-
ture made in Germany,2 which has recently become popular 
in America, takes as the principle of division the degree 
in which the public expenditure is for the common benefit 
or for the benefit of individuals. The summary given by 
Professor P l e h n 3 may be quoted for the sake of brevity. 
There are in this scheme four classes of expenditure ac-
cording to the benefit conferred: — 
First, the largest and most important, those which con-
fer a common benefit on all citizens, e.g., defence. 
Second, those which confer a special benefit on certain 
1 Cohn, op. cit., § 9. 2 Ibid., § 91. 
3 Public Finance, p. 28. 
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classes that is treated as a common benefit because of the 
incapacity of those classes, e.g., poor relief. 
Third, those which confer both a special benefit on cer-
tain persons and a common benefit on all the others, e.g., 
the administration of justice. 
Fourth, those which confer only a special benefit on indi-
viduals, e.g., State industries. 
I t will be found on examination tha t two distinct ideas 
are blended in this classification: first, the idea of benefit 
( the quid), and, secondly, the payment made ( the pro 
quo). I t is better to take them separately. As regards 
benefit alone, all these kinds of public expenditure must 
be held to confer a common benefit or to satisfy a public 
want as their essential justification, although they also 
— all of them — incidentally confer special benefits on in-
dividuals or classes or localities. Thus defence is placed 
in the first class because ostensibly it is for the common 
benefit only; but as a matter of history most wars have 
been undertaken in the defence of particular places or 
classes or even individuals. Poor relief is ostensibly for 
the benefit of the particular individuals concerned; but as 
a matter of public policy it confers common benefits in the 
prevention of crime and in the satisfaction of the sense of 
justice or of charity. Free education manifestly confers 
special benefits both on the particular children and their 
particular parents ; but, again, the common benefit is so 
great tha t by Professor Plehn it is placed in the first 
class. Finally, as regards class four, which is said to 
confer only a special benefit on individuals, it may be 
said that the final cause of all progress in public expen-
diture has been the abolition of this class. From be-
ing the greatest, it has become the least in importance. 
Public expenditure which does not confer some common 
benefit or answer some public purpose, ought not to 
exist in the modern State. This was the position em-
phatically laid down by Adam Smith, e.g., " T h e protec-
tion of any particular branch of trade is a part of the 
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general protection of trade, a part therefore of the duty 
of the executive power . " 1 And it may t ruly be said 
tha t the greatest financial reform effected since his time 
has been the substitution of the principle of common 
benefit for the benefit of particular places or placemen 
or " interests." 
Even if the particular individuals benefited pay the 
whole cost of the undertaking, and, to take a still stronger 
case, even if they pay so much as to give a profit, public 
management is not justified unless it can be shown that 
some public interest is subserved. 
Before considering this point, however, the second idea 
in the classification under review may be considered, 
namely, the payment for the benefit conferred. 
Here again it may be objected tha t the payment ought 
not to be considered from the point of view of the indi-
vidual. The penny tha t is paid for sending a letter to 
New Zealand does not in any sense represent the benefit 
to the particular individuals directly interested. The 
proper basis of classification ought to be the whole amount 
of revenue obtained by the State in re turn for the services 
rendered. On this basis public expenditure may be classi-
fied as follows: — 
First, expenditure without any direct re turn by way of 
revenue, e.g., poor relief ; or in extreme cases even with 
indirect loss, e.g., expenditure on war. 
Second, expenditure without direct return, but with in-
direct benefit to the revenue, e.g., for education, it being 
supposed tha t eventually the educated are better taxpayers 
or cause less expense as paupers or criminals. 
Third, expenditure with partial direct return, e.g., edu-
cation for which fees are received, subsidised railways that 
pay par t of their expense. 
Fourth, expenditure that obtains a full re turn or in ex-
treme cases yields a profit in addition, e.g., the post-office, 
gas-works, and generally State industries. To what extent 
i Wealth of Nations, Bk. V., Ch. I., Par t I I I . 
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expenditure of any of these kinds should be under taken 
by the State depends on the principles of expendi ture 
recognised by the State in question. These principles have 
varied great ly from time to time, and still vary, even in 
democratic S t a t e s — j u s t as the principles of taxation 
which determine how the revenue in each case is to be 
provided have varied f rom time to time, and still vary 
from State to State. A t this point it is sufficient to notice 
tha t it by no means follows that the four th class of expen-
di ture may be indefinitely increased without in jury because 
it is recouped or even yields a profit. Sometimes the full 
expense is not properly calculated, the share in various 
supplementary charges being often omitted, and sometimes 
the under taking owes its success to monopoly. In general, 
if an under tak ing is likely to yield a profit, it may be le f t 
to joint-stock enterprise. The pr imary business of the 
State is to provide for the social wants to which private 
enterprise is unequa l ; and in some cases even where ulti-
mate profit is probable, Sta te intervention is necessary 
to provide the necessary combination, or to secure the 
under tak ing against unfa i r competition. W i t h the ever 
increasing complexity of modern societies there will of 
necessity be an increase in the funct ions of the State which 
are beyond the sphere of private effort, and in spite of all 
economies by delegation and decentralisation there is a 
danger of the governmental machine being overworked. 
As a rule, it may be said that , contrary to the prevail ing 
popular opinion, the principal business of the State is to 
perform funct ions tha t directly do not yield a correspond-
ing revenue. The idea tha t each part icular source of ex-
pense should be met by some part icular tax is, as a mat ter 
of history, mediaeval. In general, except in local taxa-
tion, like the other " pa r t i cu la r i t i e s" of the mediaeval 
system, it has been abandoned. And even as regards 
local taxation, it may be pointed out tha t the principal 
reform effected in this century has been in the amal-
gamation of r a tes ; and the principal reform required is 
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tha t local budgets should be inst i tuted after the imperial 
model. 
§ 4. Other Analogies from Taxation. Other character-
istics of taxation suggest corresponding analogies in 
expenditure. Corresponding, for example, to the illegiti-
mate evasion of taxes we have the illegitimate appropria-
tion of public funds — an enormous evil in former times ; 
whilst to the legitimate evasion of taxes by the process of 
substitution may be likened the claims for doles and sub-
ventions from the treasury or the evasion of the duty of 
self-support. 
All taxes, it has been seen, fall on persons, although nom-
inally imposed on things or transactions. The natural 
correlative might appear, on first inspection, to be that all 
public expenditure benefits particular persons. Such an 
inversion, however, is not in conformity with the general 
characteristics already described. I t would rather appear 
tha t in public expenditure the benefit to the individual is 
not the primary consideration. The State must rather be 
held to spend public money for public objects, and the 
nature of these objects is determined partly by history and 
tradition, partly by various political, religious, social, or 
moral ideas and ideals.1 It may be argued, of course, that 
the satisfaction of individuals is the ult imate object, but 
this position is even less defensible than the quid pro quo 
theory in taxation. W e certainly cannot trace out the 
particular benefits of public expenditure in the same way 
as we can the particular burdens of taxes. The people 
who receive the interest on the national debt receive no 
particular benefit — they would get rather more with equal 
security from a good railway debenture. The soldiers and 
sailors would in general gain higher wages in other employ-
ments, and ship-builders and makers of armaments are 
only supposed to receive competition rates of pay. The 
poor no doubt benefit by relief, and the children of the 
poor by education, but in both cases the expenditure of 
1 See next chapter. 
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public money is not so much primari ly in tended to benefit 
the particular recipients as to satisfy the public conscience 
and promote the public good. 
On the strict analogy of the definition of taxat ion the 
definition of public expenditure may be formula ted: — 
" Public expendi ture is the distr ibution by the sovereign 
power of the revenues of the State for the service of the 
public powers." 
The government or certain depar tments of i t may also 
under take various public works and inst i tut ions which are 
intended to be more or less self-supporting. So far, how-
ever, as they are independent of taxation, the expendi ture 
is not an expenditure of the revenues of the State, and 
the question is one of municipal t rad ing or management 
of the industr ial domain, or in the last resort of socialism. 
C H A P T E R X V I . 
P R I N C I P L E S OE PUBLIC E X P E N D I T U R E . 
§ 1. The Principle of Equality: the Utility Basis. It 
lias been shown in a previous chapter that the principle of 
equality of taxation " holds in solution " several different 
conceptions. A similar analysis may be applied in the 
case of public expenditure. 
The simple doctrine of sovereignty as the basis of 
taxation finds its analogue in expenditure in the position 
tha t the State spends its revenues according to the dic-
tates of the sovereign power. The fur ther question, how-
ever, at once arises, especially in democratic States with 
representative governments, Wha t should determine the 
dictates of the sovereign power? The general answer, as 
in the case of taxation, is tha t the money should be used 
in the manner most conducive to the public interest. I t 
took many centuries to convert this saying from a para-
dox into a truism. 
I t may also be argued, pursuing the former line of 
enquiry, that one great public interest is justice, and that 
the analogue to equality of sacrifice in taxation is equality 
of benefit in expenditure. But even as regards taxation, 
it has been shown that equality of sacrifice, considered as 
the ult imate basis or test, is open to serious objections, 
and these objections are far stronger when applied to the 
converse case of equality of benefit in expenditure. The 
greater par t of public expenditure is for public objects in 
which no at tempt can be made to distribute the benefit 
amongst individuals, e.g., the cost of defence. 
The ideal of minimum sacrifice, or disutility, seems much 
better adapted than equality of sacrifice for conversion 
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into a maximum of expenditure. Tlie na tura l analogue, 
it may be said, to minimum disutil i ty in taxation is maxi-
mum utility in expenditure. And al though the application 
of the conception is ra ther formal than material, it may be 
of service as a regulative idea and as a destroyer of falla-
cies, especially when expressed with reference to total and 
marginal utilities. There is no more popular fallacy than 
to suppose tha t because some kinds of public expenditure 
are classed as necessary, therefore they must always rank 
before those which are only classed as optional. In the 
concrete, for example, it is argued tha t the expendi ture 
on the army and navy should only be limited by consid-
erations of efficiency as determined by the mil i tary au-
thorities without any regard to other possible modes of 
expending the money. And similarly th rough the whole 
range of public expenditure it is popularly supposed tha t 
each case ought to be decided on its own merits, regard-
less of other conflicting claims. 
But just as in taxation — as Mr. Gladstone never wearied 
in rei terat ing — every remission or exemption in one place 
means imposition or addition in another, so also in expen-
di ture what is given to one object is taken from another . 
Accordingly, the system of expendi ture ought always to 
be viewed as a whole and an adjudicat ion made on con-
flicting claims, and he is the best master of finance who 
best unders tands the relations of the parts to the whole. 
And although the uti l i tarian calculus cannot be applied 
very far, the distinction between total and final ut i l i ty 
may often indicate the necessity of checking extravagance 
in one direction and beginning a necessary expendi ture in 
another. A minimum amount of defence or protection 
may have assigned to it an infinity uti l i ty, but the uti l i ty 
rapidly diminishes, and necessity passes into luxury or dis-
play. A point is reached where the statesman must decide 
whether other public objects have not greater claims, e.g., 
village asylums for pauper lunatics in place of separate 
cubicles for soldiers. The ideal of public expendi ture on 
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the uti l i tarian principle would be at tained when the pub-
lic ut i l i ty of the marginal expenditure in each case is 
equal. 
The ideal is no doubt unattainable, but it is not un-
thinkable, and the pursui t of i t may lead to important 
practical results. W i t h o u t a beacon of this kind, expen-
di ture may be continued in certain directions long after 
it is justified by changing conditions, and the most neces-
sary reforms may be met with the non possumus of passive 
inertia. 
§ 2. The Principle of Utility in Relation to Rich and 
Poor. T h e most popular application of the uti l i ty theory 
is in favour of increasing the expendi ture on the poor and 
needy. Logically, however, the principle may be applied 
in favour of diminishing public expenditure on the rich 
or less needy. From this point of view the idea of mak-
ing old age pensions universal is absurd ; to the poor in 
very deed, and to the deserving poor in particular, the 
ut i l i ty of a moderate pension would be very g r e a t ; but to 
those already provided for by children or fr iends the pen-
sion would be a bad subst i tute for natural chari ty. 
On the same principle there is no reason why education 
should be f ree in all cases because in the public interests 
it is made free in some. 
The essential idea of public expenditure, as already 
insisted on, is tha t it should be for the public benefit 
independent ly of the part icular effects on classes or indi-
viduals. If , however, th rough ideas of charity, justice, or 
expediency the needs of certain classes are met by public 
expenditure, it follows tha t the expendi ture should dimin-
ish and finally cease as the need diminishes and ceases. 
The maxim that the State should not do for people what 
they can do for themselves, may also be supported on the 
principle under consideration. I t may well happen that 
State aid, which is very useful in extreme cases of poverty, 
becomes less and less useful as we ascend in the social 
scale, and finally becomes harmful or mischievous. 
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§ 3. The Faculty Theory and Expenditure. The appli-
cation of the faculty theory to expenditure gives as the 
first result tha t the s tandard must be objective, not sub-
jective. Such an objective s tandard is provided in the 
constitutional rule t ha t the money voted by the popular 
assembly is appropriated, and can only be applied, to cer-
tain specified kinds of expenditure. The taxes tha t are 
levied according to facul ty are expended according to 
public requirements, which admit of a definite concrete 
statement. The apport ionment amongst these public re-
quirements is determined by the representative govern-
ment, which again represents various ideas and various 
interests. 
A parl iamentary discussion on the appropriation of 
supplies, though it does not secure the " equali ty of final 
ut i l i t ies" in public expenditure, ought to give an oppor-
tuni ty for correcting old abuses and for promoting new 
public functions. Such discussions at the t ime may ap-
pear rather aimless, bu t the cumulative progress in the 
Victorian era has been very great . 
The faculty theory of expendi ture may also be applied 
(as in the converse case of taxat ion) to more special prob-
lems. Thus, if for various reasons or sentiments it is 
decided to spend a certain sum for any public purpose, 
the expenditure of the necessary funds should be so man-
aged as to increase, or at least not lessen, the productive 
powers of the society. The indirect effects of expendi-
ture may be as important as the indirect effects of taxa-
tion. The case of poor relief is obvious and per t inent . 
But the case of poor relief is exceptional ra ther than 
typical. The facul ty theory looks to the functions of the 
State as a whole ; the effect on the particular individuals 
directly concerned is, in general, of relatively small impor-
tance. If the voluntary efforts of individuals are unequal 
to the task of providing various desirable public works or 
institutions, it is no valid objection to say tha t public ex-
pendi ture on those objects would primari ly only benefit 
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some of the richer members of the society, and not the 
poor. Poor relief may be the first, but it is certainly not 
the last, du ty of the State. There are many departments 
of scientific research, of historical, and statistical inquiry, 
of aistlietic display, of general culture, which can never be 
adequately worked by voluntary private effort . The dig-
nity of the crown would be ill supported by payments 
made for royal appearances at public functions, and in the 
great spending depar tments of government the primary 
object ought to be the efficiency of the public service, and 
not the comfort or interest of the public servants.1 
§ 4. The Social Function of Public Expenditure. The 
social and political effects of public expendi ture are gen-
erally of even greater importance than in the converse 
case of taxation. The pr imary object of taxation is to 
raise revenue ; the social effects are indirect and second-
ary. But the very object of public expendi ture is to 
a t ta in certain social and political ends. The correspond-
ing analogue, however, to this aspect of taxation seems 
rather to be tha t in expendi ture also there may be indirect 
and secondary effects which sometimes are considered of 
more importance than the primary or ostensible object. 
The ulterior effects may altogether exceed in benefit the 
immediate results, as in the claim made for free education. 
In the days when the religious instruction of the people 
was considered a primary duty of the State, logically and 
theoretically the ult imate results ought to have given an 
enormous benefit compared with the initial expenditure. 
Unfortunately, however, there were also ulterior results 
of a counteract ing tendency. On the whole, it may be 
said that in public expendi ture (as in taxat ion) great care 
should be taken to avoid indirect evils, and the hopes 
placed on indirect benefits should not be exaggerated. 
These, no doubt, are formal counsels, but they are none 
the less useful guides for the arrangements of facts ; and 
1 The benefit theory of public expenditure has been examined in the 
previous chapter. 
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the reference to history shows their vital importance,—• 
witness the indirect effects of public expendi ture on the 
church, the poor, and the privileged classes. 
§ 5. Tlie Principle of Formal Justice. The principle of 
formal justice may also be applied to expenditure. If 
public money is spent on any public object, i t should be 
spent on other objects that are practically similar. The 
example may be set even by foreign countries, as was ob-
served by Mr. Gladstone in his great budget s ta tement in 
1863, — there is a rivalry of nations in armaments and a 
rivalry in philanthropy. A t present the British expendi-
ture on the navy depends on tha t of foreign countries, — 
the British navy must be equal to any two foreign navies. 
Grants of public money ought not to be used to favour 
specially some particular local area or indus t ry or class on 
any principle which cannot be extended to similar cases. 
The Kantian imperative, " A c t on a maxim which thou 
canst will to be law universal ," is certainly the golden rule 
for the exchequer. I t must be observed, however, tha t 
special benefit may be conferred on one class or area or 
industry, without infr inging this maxim, if thereby the 
public would benefit — whilst in other cases apparent ly 
similar this would not be the case. The actual expen-
di ture of public money for defence no doubt benefits cer-
tain districts, e.g., naval ports and military centres, and it 
benefits, also, certain industries ; bu t such part icular bene-
fit is only secondary and conditional. The real object 
ought to be efficiency in case of war, and not false chari ty 
in time of peace. 
The great use of the rule is nega t ive : never act on a 
principle that cannot be extended, e.g., do not give to the 
Irish cottar what you will not give to the Scottish crof ter . 
I t may, however, be admit ted that sometimes the Sta te 
should revert to the mediaeval device of making experi-
ments, l imited in various ways in t ime and place. 
Much of the public expendi ture for local purposes is 
provided by local taxation. If the benefit, e.g., a public 
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garden, is purely local, the poorer localities, on this priru 
ciple, have no claim on the central government or 011 richer 
areas for assistance in providing the benefit; but con-
versely, if the expense is to fulfil a public duty , e.g., com-
pulsory education, such a claim holds good and is generally 
recognised. 
§ 6. Canon of Certainty. Publ ic expenditure ought to 
be definite and certain, and open to public criticism. The 
appeal to history is decisive, both as to the reali ty and the 
importance of this rule. A t the end of the reign of James 
I I . the average expendi ture of the crown was <£1,700,000, 
and of this amount £90,000 was for "secre t service." I n 
the last year of Queen Victoria the vote for the secret 
service was £30,000 (of which nearly £5000 was not 
spent ) , whilst the total expendi ture was £107,771,000 
(March 31, 1900). A t present it is quite possible, as was 
stated in the debates on the South Afr ican war, tha t more 
money might be spent with grea t advantage by the British 
government on secret service, bu t the abuses of the old sys-
tem were so incredibly great tha t the total abolition would 
be preferable to the risk of their revival. William I I I . 
followed the practice of the Stuar ts in clandestine cor-
rupt ion, and induced by secret bribes the leaders of the 
par l iamentary opposition to betray their cause on particu-
lar questions. The example of the king was followed by 
the people, and the speaker of the House of Commons re-
ceived from the city of London a present of 1000 guineas 
for his services in carrying a bill th rough the House. The 
practice of direct bribery continued, according to Hallam,1 
unt i l the terminat ion of the American war. Apar t from 
the secret-service money, other parts of the civil list were 
f ree from all public examination, and placemen and pen-
sioners formed " a very undue proportion " of the House 
of Commons, and dependents on the favour of government 
were made its censors and counsellors. The secrecy in 
respect to public revenue and expenditure tha t was for-
1 Constitutional History, Vol. III . , p. 206. 
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merly so noticeable, and which has been expelled by the 
growth of constitutional government, had extremely in-
jurious effects. On the one hand, prodigali ty and injus-
tice often escaped notice; while on the other hand, fair and 
legitimate taxation and expense were, through ignorance, 
f requent ly regarded as grievances. Publici ty and respon-
sibility have been shown by a lengthened experience to 
be necessary conditions for an efficient administrat ion of 
finance.1 
I t is beyond the scope of this work to consider the 
machinery that is adopted in various countries to secure 
efficient administrat ion and control.2 I t may, however, be 
observed tha t the efficiency of the machinery depends in 
the last resort on the practical wisdom and the incorrupti-
bility (direct and indirect) of the individuals who repre-
sent the people. 
In practice, also, publicity involves an independent and 
searching audit . " Of all expedients for the preservation 
of public property, it is the most simple, ready, and self-
a c t i n g . " 3 
§ 7. The Canon of Convenience. The canon of conven-
ience may be best i l lustrated from the opposite. The 
local finance of England afforded a s t r iking example, unt i l 
the recent reforms, of the inconvenience of a mul t i tude of 
boards spending money for different objects. " The t r u t h 
is, we have a chaos as regards authorities, a chaos as re-
gards rates, and a worse chaos than all as regards areas." 4 
One great difficulty in the control of expendi ture is to 
reconcile the necessary routine of official practice with the 
1 Bastable 's Public Finance (2d edition), p. 679. 
2 Cf. Bastable, op. cit.. Bk. VI. 
8 Local Government, by W. Blake Odgers, p. 257. When, in 1879, the 
highvmy accounts were first brought under the audit, amongst the items 
disallowed were for expenditure on sparrow-shooting clubs, mole-catching, 
visits to the theatre, presentation portraits, champagne, plover's eggs, and 
wedding presents. 
4 Mr. Goschen, April 3, 1871, quoted in Mr. Palgrave's Local Taxation, 
p. 39. 
v o l . h i . — 2 c 
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convenience of the public. This difficulty is most serious 
and noticeable in times of Avar or other public strain, al-
though at all t imes the inconvenience associated wi th red 
tape is proverbial. 
In general, however, the canon of convenience, in the 
larger sense of the term, may be brought under the canon 
of economy. 
§ 8. The Canon of Economy. Magnum parsimonia est 
vectigal — of which the legend, " For God's sake vectigal, 
Mr. B u r k e , " 1 is an excellent mnemonic — ought to be 
applied in every budget ; parsimony in one direction may 
avoid taxat ion in another. The usual practical rules by 
which economy, in this narrow sense, is at tained must , 
however, be widely extended with the development of the 
term " e c o n o m y . " 
Economy in the means is the natural corollary of equi ty 
in the objects of expendi ture . The aim ought to be to 
at tain these objects in the most effective manner. Any-
thing tha t is paid by government beyond what is requisite 
for efficiency is inequitable; it benefits one class, or ra ther 
a few members of one class, at the expense of the public. 
I t is t rue, no doubt, tha t there is room in State expendi-
ture also for the economy of high wages, and even in the 
purchase of materials the dearest may be the cheapest wi th 
governments as with individuals; but high wages are only 
economical in proportion to efficiency, and high prices in 
proportion to quali ty. A t the present t ime there is a re-
crudescence of an old fallacy : t ha t the government ought 
to set the example of paying high wages — from the low-
est to the highest appointments. The idea seems to be 
tha t the chief factor in the determination of wages ought 
to be the benevolence of the employer, and that as the 
government obtains its funds wi thout any real cost, its 
benevolence should be so much the greater . Neither sup-
position will bear analysis. There may occasionally be an 
1 Burke is reported in one of his orations to have said vectigal, to the 
horror of Lord North. 
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element of poor-relief in wages, and occasionally the wage-
earners may be said to depend on the rich. But tha t the 
benevolence of the rich is the main source of wages, is as 
false as the twin fallacy tha t the public revenues are ob-
tained without real cost. 
As regards the higher official appointments, where wages 
are styled salaries, instead of government being expected 
to give higher rates, lower rates for corresponding services 
seem more reasonable. All experience shows tha t govern-
ment appointments are considered more honourable than 
corresponding appointments in private businesses. Honour 
still remains a great par t of the reward of all honourable 
profess ions—witness law, l i terature, science, and ar t . As 
regards government, some of the highest and most re-
sponsible work is unpaid, and in many cases the payment 
does not cover the incidental expenses imposed by the 
custom of the office. To replace this public spirit by 
mercenary motives would be a national loss. 
The greater par t of public expendi ture is for purposes 
tha t in the narrow sense are unproductive,1 and in the 
largest sense they only yield a far-off interest in the shape 
of increased taxable capacity. The servants of the k ing 
are in some respects economically on the same footing as 
domestic servants. Their services are not fixed or em-
bodied in vendible commodit ies; they establish vested 
interes ts ; their numbers cannot be decreased nor their 
duties increased wi thout an outcry. 
Similarly, as regards the purchase of commodities, it is 
sometimes thought tha t the government ought to give 
more than private people. Economically it ough t to give 
less. I t buys in larger quantities, its payments are certain, 
and its custom is valuable as an advert isement. A n d if in 
1 F o r an excellent criticism of the " S m i t h i a n " concept of productivity 
as applied to state expenditure, see Cohn, op. cit., § 515. The use, however, 
of the adjective " S m i t h i a n " as a term of abuse is unhistorical. The idea 
criticised was not Adam Smith's. Throughout his work Professor Cohn 
too often quotes " Smith ianismus" in place of the real Wealth of Nations. 
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a case of need or of monopoly the State has a r ight to modify 
prices in the public interest , so it may also modify them 
in the interest of its own administrat ion of public affairs. 
And yet the custom of government 's paying extravagant 
prices is accepted as if it were a law of nature . Take the 
case of the expropriat ion of land for public purposes either 
for direct use by the central or local authorities, or to pro-
mote various works t ha t indirectly are of great public 
advantage. In Eng land the rule seems to be established 
tha t all expropriat ion for public purposes must be con-
sidered as involving a practical k ind of disagreeable 
compulsion tha t must be paid for at extravagant rates. 
Accordingly, the owners of slums, who ought under ade-
quate sanitary laws to be mulcted in heavy penalties, the 
speculators who have been holding on in the hope of some 
pressing public requirement, the urban owners most of 
whose property will be immensely improved by the expro-
priat ion of a part , the country gentleman whose amenity 
is only disturbed by an invisible railway which raises his 
ren ts — in short, every owner of land, who is obliged to 
sell it for public purposes, is supposed to be entit led to a 
heavy pretium affectionis. 
The only conceivable advantage of this inequitable cus-
tom is tha t it imposes a barr ier on injudicious state pur-
chase. Not only, however, is a barrier of this k ind a very 
poor defence, but the progress of society in wealth, popula-
tion, and " culture " of necessity demands a large increase 
of public expendi ture of this k ind. These extravagant 
payments made by the State in the way of compensation 
weaken ra ther than s t rengthen the security of the institu-
tion of private proper ty . They encourage £he persistence 
of abuses tha t otherwise would die a natural or a legal 
death.1 J u s t as the amelioration of the old bankruptcy 
laws in favour of the debtor improved the general secu-
ri ty, so also would the reform of the laws and customs 
tha t regulate compensation to vested interests. 
1 See Bk. II . , Ch. IV. 
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The principle of economy may, however, sometimes be 
applied directly as a check on State enterprise. All un-
productive expenditure involves taxation, and all produc-
tive expenditure tha t is to pay its cost must either be a 
monopoly which so far involves taxation, or it must be 
conducted like any other business. If pr ivate enterprise 
or voluntary association is sufficient to meet any public 
want, the government, whether central or local, should 
generally let it alone. The chance of profit is balanced 
by the chance of loss, and the simple plan of taxation is 
preferable to speculation for profit as a method of pro-
viding public funds . There will always be a sufficiency 
of under takings to exercise the powers of self-government 
beyond the limits of the most ambitious or philanthropic 
private association.1 Let the State keep to its own domain 
and avoid alike the evils of paternalism and of bureau-
cracy ; and let those who th ink this counsel a t ruism 
refresh their minds with history (e.g., Colbert ism). 
§ 9. Other Rules of Expenditure. A number of subor-
dinate or derivative rules of expendi ture may be extracted 
f rom the experience of nations and the wisdom of the 
books on finance, and again the clue afforded by taxat ion 
may be followed. Government expendi ture should be di-
rected to a comparatively small number of grea t objects, 
and not to a mul t i tude of small affairs. A driblet here and 
there is sure to offend against the canons of equi ty and 
economy. Grants in aid tend to be given in response to 
popular clamour or as rewards for political services, and so 
far take the place of the ancient pensions and direct brib-
ery of the representatives of the people. I t is sometimes 
said government should do a certain th ing because the 
expense is trifl ing. A trif l ing expense, on the contrary, 
shows, as a rule, tha t it is no fit mat ter for governmenta l 
action. Trif l ing expenses ought to be met f rom the small 
change of charity, not f rom the millions of public rev-
1 See Lord Avebury on the Growth of Municipal and National Expen-
diture, Statistical Journal, March, 1901. 
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enue ; if necessary, they should be the occasion not of 
appeals to government, but to persons. 
A good system of expendi ture should as far as possible 
be se l f - regulat ing; it should expand (and contract) with 
the public requirements . W i t h growing wealth and popu-
lation it is necessary to provide for increasing expenditure, 
and the various depar tments should be so const i tuted as to 
admit of natural expansion. A t the present time this rule 
ought to be specially applicable in the provision for the 
naval and mili tary services. Again, contraction of ex-
pendi ture according to lessened requirements in certain 
branches is necessary both for economy and subst i tut ion. 
The expendi ture also, in the various departments , ought to 
be accurately estimated. In practice, the normal expendi-
tu re should be met from normal revenue. Supplementary 
votes and extraordinary demands should be avoided as far 
as possible — otherwise the control of Par l iament becomes 
nominal. I t is bad policy if Par l iament is only made to 
sanction expendi ture already accomplished. There are no 
doubt exceptions : Inter bella silent leges, as in a commer-
cial crisis the Bank Act is suspended by the Executive. 
In the progress of society, moreover, it is necessary to 
incur new modes of expenditure. No provision of machin-
ery to meet old wants will suffice for the satisfaction of 
new demands. In many cases, however, the expense ought 
to be met not by increased taxation, but by substi tut ion. 
W i t h increase of wealth the increasing demands for educa-
tion ought to be partially met, at any rate, by diminished 
demands f rom the poor ; as the education rate rises, the 
poor rate ought to fall. This also is a counsel of perfection. 
Finally, in case of a conflict of rules, if a compromise is 
impossible, the guidance of the stronger must be accepted. 
I t may be said, for example, of expenditure, with still more 
force than of taxation, tha t a considerable degree of in-
equal i ty is preferable to a small degree of uncer ta inty ; 
inequali ty only affects the private interests of part icular 
persons, whilst uncer ta inty vitiates the whole system of 
public administrat ion. 
C H A P T E R XVIII. 
PRINCIPLES OF LOCAL F I N A N C E . 
§ 1. Fundamental Agreement of Local and Imperial 
Finance. There is no essential difference between local 
and imperial finance, and the same principles are appli-
cable in both cases. " A rate," says Professor Bastable, 
" ra ised by the smallest parish is as much a tax as if it 
were raised by the Imperial Pa r l i amen t " ; and Mr. Can-
nan in his excellent monograph 1 on the history of local 
rates in England is still more emphatic: " The real diffi-
culty is not to find a local tax which is not a rate, but to 
find any tax which is not local. A New York State tax 
is local in relation to the United States, and so is a Prus-
sian National tax in relation to the German Empire ." 
Professor Cohn,2 also, in his account of the historical devel-
opment of public economy, points out tha t the microcosm 
of the modern State first makes its appearance in the 
German towns of the Middle Ages, and tha t the fiscal 
system developed in these towns was af terwards extended 
to the larger commonwealth of the State ; and in particu-
lar he observes tha t the difficulties and struggles of the 
modern income tax were already being fought out in the 
economy of the mediaeval municipalities, as was also 
the case in England. Although, however, the same prin-
ciples are applied to both national (or imperial) and to 
local finance, there is a difference of emphasis, and there 
are differences in practical limitations. A large par t of 
local finance is concerned with the provision by the local 
authorities of various services and " utilities " for which 
1 I am much indebted to this work, especially in the following section. 
2 Op. cit., § 55 sq. 
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payment may be exacted according to the benefit received 
to a much greater extent than is possible in imperial 
finance. I t is noteworthy, however, tha t in general, even 
in this case, the benefit theory is not applicable in all its 
par t icular i ty . 
As regards the practical l imitations of local finance, 
they may be deduced f rom the interpretat ion of the term 
" l o c a l . " From the economic point of view, capital and 
labour move freely f rom locality to locality according to 
the expected reward, but they do not move so freely from 
nation to nation. I t may, then, be assumed provisionally 
t ha t differential taxat ion as between " local i t ies" will 
cause a migrat ion of the taxed subjects where tha t is 
possible, and the possibility must be avoided and fixed 
proper ty taxed. 
Again, in every independent State the sovereign power 
is supreme, and theoretically it can impose any taxes for 
any purposes. But as regards local authorities, the whole 
of their power is conceived as delegated from the central 
author i ty , and the central author i ty may reserve to itself 
certain kinds of taxation and expendi ture ; and as regards 
the powers actually in t rus ted to local authorit ies all kinds 
of l imitations may be imposed. Accordingly, at the pres-
ent time,1 the systems of local finance are not always sur-
vivals or even revivals of the past, bu t they are often 
entirely new inst i tut ions destined to satisfy certain needs 
for which the devolution of authori ty has been deemed 
expedient. 
If we take a broad historical survey, we find tha t vari-
ous public wants have been met sometimes by the local 
and sometimes by the national authorities. As regards 
police, education, and poor relief, for example, there has been 
a variable distr ibution of public powers under different 
conditions, and there has been no steady and continuous 
progress in one direction. 
This distr ibution of funct ions between the central and 
1 Cf. Bastable, p. 366. 
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local authorities, though always actually dependent on 
various historical and geographical conditions, is also the 
result of the conscious or unconscious application of prin-
ciples. 
The central government, it is obvious, ought to concern 
itself with public interests of a national character as dis-
t inct f rom interests that vary f rom place to place.1 T h u s 
defence and justice are mainly national interests, and 
l ight ing and sanitation are mainly local concerns. Bu t 
apart from the distr ibution according to objects there is 
the distr ibution according to administrat ion or manage-
ment . From this point of view, certain duties connected 
with national interests (e.g . , defence, justice) may be 
assigned to the local authorities, and, on the other hand, 
the State may perform local functions, e.g., enforcing gen-
eral sanitary regulations. This interchange of funct ions 
also brings into prominence the important consideration 
tha t between the central government and the "p r imi t ive 
c e l l " of the ancient township there have always been 
various other local authorit ies wi th powers over different 
areas, e.g., hundreds, shires, ridings, wapentakes, parishes, 
boroughs, and districts for all sorts of purposes. 
If we were to a t tempt to condense the history of local 
government into a sentence, it might be said tha t in 
ancient times most government was local, t ha t in the 
course of progress the central government absorbed much 
of the old local powers, and tha t recently, owing mainly 
to the overburdening of the central authorities, a decen-
tralising movement has begun. Similarly, history shows 
tha t local governments at first rested 011 a widely demo-
cratic basis, were a f te rward limited to privileged and 
propert ied classes, and again in recent years have become 
still more democratic than in ancient times. 
Such generalities are, however, of l i t t le value except 
as a warning not to a priorise history according to the 
1 Local Government, by W. Blake Odgers (1899), gives an excellent 
r£sum6 of the whole subject. 
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theory of evolution. As a mat ter of fact, in England, 
before the great reforms ins t i tu ted by the Local Govern-
ment Acts of 1888 and 1894, each special need had been 
met for the most part by creating new and special author-
ities, with the result tha t the local government of the 
country was summari ly described as " a chaos of areas, 
a chaos of authorit ies, and a chaos of ra tes ." 
I t falls, however, within the scope of the present chapter 
only to deal with the purely financial aspects of local gov-
ernment , — as, for example, the methods of taxation and 
the rules of expenditure, and tha t only in a general way. 
A brief historical survey of the salient points in the his-
tory of local rates in England will serve to illustrate the 
difficulty in the application of principles tha t in theory 
seem quite simple. 
§ 2. History of Local Rates in England. Local rates 
from the earliest times were inst i tuted for two purposes, 
— namely, local benefits and national duties ; but in both 
cases were of the nature of " t axes . " 
First, if the burgesses (circa Edward I .1) wished to 
repair their walls, bridges, or streets, they had to apply 
to the king for a g ran t of murage, pontage, or pavage. 
The petition came before the royal council in Parl iament, 
and thus the " local rate " was f requent ly a " parliamen-
tary t a x . " The king, however, also gave his boroughs the 
r igh t to tallage themselves ; and he f requent ly sold charters 
to the richer members, exempting them from the tallages, 
and thus, as some unknown Gladstone pu t on record, 
" threw the burden on the smaller folk to the destruction 
of the c i ty ." These tallages were for the " benef i t " of the 
locality, but they were not in practice levied in proportion 
to the part icular benefit received by the inhabitants. 
Secondly, there Were, besides, contributions levied in the 
shape of fines and amercements which were apportioned 
amongst the rate-payers. Thus, in place of doles from the 
imperial treasury to the localities, we have " forced g i f t s " 
1 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, Vol. I., p. 062. 
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from the localities to the treasury; " From 1334 onward, 
the fif teenths and tenths ( the national tax on movables) 
were levied as local r a t e s . " 1 I t is noteworthy, however, 
that the principal par t of the ordinary revenues of the 
borough was derived from tolls, including " passage, pont-
age, lastage, stallage, bothage, ewage, tronage, scavage,"2 
and the like, the idea of a perfectly " free t rade " being 
an unlimited power to tax other people. In a sense, also, 
these tolls may be regarded as payments for benefits re-
ceived or services rendered by the borough. And to 
anticipate a little, it may be observed tha t Adam Smith 3 
thought it was scarce possible to invent a more equitable 
way of maintaining such works as roads, bridges, etc., 
than tol ls ; but in practice, according to an eminent au-
thority, it became " the most extravagant mode of main-
taining roads which the ingenuity of man or fiend could 
devise." 
The benefit theory was more directly applied in the 
case of drainage, prevention of floods, and the like. In 
the case of Romney marsh in 1250, the sea walls were to 
be repaired according to the quant i ty of lands and tene-
ments subject to the perils of the sea ; and a li t t le later 
the. repairs were allotted not merely according to the 
number, but the value of the acres protected. 
The church-rates, e.g., for the repair of the church, 
which were well established by the beginning of the four-
teenth century, were levied according to ability simply 
( the benefit to the payers not being measurable) , and the 
ability was shown by the value of lands and stock. 
In some cases also equal poll taxes were levied for local 
expenses. The poll taxes were occasionally graduated 
according to classes and social ranks ; but by the fif teenth 
century the rates were generally apportioned according to 
each man's ability and substance, generally as evidenced 
1 Cannan, p. 13. 
2 Pollock and Maitland, Vol. I., p. 604. 
3 Bk. v . , Ch. I. , Pt . III . , Ar t . I. 
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by the occupation of lands and houses. In the four-
teenth, and even as late as the sixteenth century, how-
ever, it is never " th ings ," but always " persons," tha t 
were supposed to pay rates and taxes. But in the rural 
districts, the relative abilities of the taxpayers were natu-
rally assessed according to the number or value of their 
acres and their stock (cat t le and sheep) ; and in the towns, 
a natura l objective measure of abilities was afforded by 
the size or the value of the houses occupied. When these 
methods of measuring ability had become customary, by a 
natural transit ion it came to be thought that the lands 
and houses alone were taxed. 
Three impor tant consequences followed : first, persons 
were taxed qua their lands and houses, though they them-
selves were resident in another taxing area ; secondly, other 
forms of property and sources of income came to be 
exempt from taxat ion; thirdly, if the occupier of certain 
lands or houses were taxed, it was considered inequitable 
tha t the same lands and houses should be taxed again. 
Thus though the lands occupied were supposed to indi-
cate the profits (and thus the abi l i ty) of the farmer, they 
were not supposed also to indicate the rents (or the abil i ty) 
of the landlord. Possibly it was thought there was a 
t ransfer of the burden from the occupier to the owner, 
more probably the fallacy was adopted tha t " t h i n g s " and 
not " p e r s o n s " were taxed, and tha t the same " t h i n g " 
ought not to be taxed twice. I t is, however, quite clear 
on reflection that the use of the same th ing might indicate 
the facul ty of a number of users ; and, as regards the case 
in point, the present income tax assumes that , on the 
average, farmers ' profits bear a certain proportion to rent , 
though the incomes of landlord and farmer are quite dis-
tinct, and both pay the tax. In certain cases, however, it 
became clear tha t it was the owner of the property and 
not the occupier who gained most by permanent or quasi-
permanent improvements ; and not only were the owners 
compelled to contribute, but the tenants were allowed to 
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deduct the owner's share from their rents, " a l l contracts 
to the contrary, past, present, and to come, being declared 
vo id ." 1 In other cases, when "con t rac t ing o u t " was not 
prohibited, deductions from rent were allowed (e.g., for 
repairing s treets) if no such contracts existed. 
In brief, from the earliest times, two principles of ra t ing 
were recognized; namely, benefit received and ability to 
pay. If the benefit were quasi-permanent, the owner of 
the property was rated in proportion to its value, and if 
the expenditure were recurrent, the occupier was rated. 
When ability was taken as the s tandard, in principle, per-
sonal property was also liable, and, in principle, an ele-
mentary theory of equali ty of sacrifice was recognised. 
But the practical difficulties proved too great to carry out 
the theory in its elegance ; personal property proved elu-
sive, and the measurement of sacrifice illusory. 
The history of the poor-rates, which eventual ly became 
the model of all rates, brings out very clearly the recogni-
tion of principles and the difficulties of practice. To begin 
with, there was the idea tha t chari ty ought to be volun-
tary, or, at most, the resul t of ecclesiastical persuas ion; 2 
but when, owing to various causes, the poor and their 
poverty increased, compulsory payments were exacted. 
Here, again, the idea was tha t the compulsion should be 
according to ability, and the ability was understood to 
refer to all forms of wealth and income. The grea t act 
of 1601 directs tha t the overseers are to raise the money 
" by taxation of every inhabitant, parson, vicar, and other, 
and of every occupier of lands, houses, t i thes impropriate, 
or proprietors of tithes, coal mines, or salable underwoods." 
The phraseology is suggestive of an income tax, but diffi-
culty at once arose when an inhabi tant was peripatetic, or 
an absentee, or a householder divided. Practical expedi-
ency overcame theory, and the " things " and not the per-
1 Cannan, p. 36, on the ease of Scarborough pier. 
2 See the account of the Poor Laws given above, Bk. I I . , Ch. XII . , 
§7. 
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sons were made the basis of assessment,—and not all things, 
but, in the end, lands and bouses. The local income tax, 
from the force of circumstances, degenerated into the rate 
on the occupier.1 I t was, however, not till 1840 that an 
act was passed to " exempt stock-in-trade from being 
rated for the relief of the poor," and, in fact, as Mr. Can-
nan observes, this act amounts to a repeal of the s ta tute 
of Elizabeth so far as the word " i nhab i t an t " is concerned. 
If, as regards the leading idea of the act of 1601, custom 
had overcome law, in another respect law had overcome 
common sense. The special mention of coals and salable 
underwoods was held to exclude other mines and woods, 
and this legal exemption was not got rid of till 1874, and 
thus, at last, " the poor-rate came to apply to all immovable 
and to no movable proper ty ." 
As already indicated, in process of time, " a s the re-
sult of the practice of the local authorities, the decisions 
of courts of law, and the enactments of Parl iament, the 
whole of local rates with trifling exceptions have become 
lit t le but addit ions to the poor- ra te ." 2 But a curious 
anomaly, or ra ther contradiction, has emerged.3 I t is only 
by an economic fiction that the payers of poor-rates can 
be supposed to benefit in proportion to their payments ; 
and in all cases analogous to poor relief, the idea of benefit 
is out of place. On the other hand, there are cases (e.g., 
repairs and improvements of s t reets) in which not only 
the benefit to the adjacent property is prominent, and the 
ability of the inhabi tants irrelevant, but originally the 
burden was imposed on such proj>erty. To use the same 
basis of assessment for cases essentially different is plainly 
illogical; pa} rment according to ability, for public expen-
di ture in which very often the benefit varies inversely as 
the payment , is a totally different th ing from payment by 
which property is specially benefited. 
1 The details of the process and an account of ratable survivals are 
graphically presented in Ch. IV. of Mr. Cannan ' s essay. 
2 Cannan, p. 102. 3 See note on next page. 
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In theory, also, ability should be estimated by income 
from whatever sources, whilst benefit should be measured 
by value received. Practically, however, local income 
taxes proved to be impossible, and the precise measure-
ment of benefit was also impossible the more the service 
rendered came to be of a public character. Notwith-
s tanding the "incompatibi l i ty of canons," 1 when allowance 
;,s made for their ul t imate incidence, the rates imposed on 
real property furnish, on the average, a fairer test of ability, 
and also a fairer tes t of benefit than might be expected. 
As a rule, the occupiers and the owners of highly rented 
property have large incomes (and conversely), and they also 
receive large benefits ( and conversely of the smaller folk 
and their propert ies) . There are of course exceptions, 
though not so great in ul t imate as in pr imary incidence. 
In the course of progress the tendency has been to remove 
the expenses which ought to be borne in proportion to abil-
i ty f rom the sphere of local taxation. They have been spread 
over wider areas, e.g., unions and districts, and at last over 
the whole kingdom. There have also been grants in aid of 
local expendi ture for general purposes.2 A n d as already 
shown, even as regards the whole kingdom (not to speak 
of the empire) taxat ion according to ability is an ideal to 
which only rough approximations are made. The benefit 
theory, also, even in the most narrow local expenditure , is 
also an ideal very roughly realised in practice, as is shown 
in the provision of water, the removal of sewage, the l ight-
ing of streets, the payment of police, etc. The great use 
of ideals, however, is to remove g lar ing anomalies, and not 
to provide a series of revolutions. 
1 Cf. Memoranda on Imperial and Local Taxes (1900), p. 53, on the 
incompatibility of the canons of benefit and ability. 
2 This is well illustrated by the growth of expenditure in education. 
Thus in England and Wales, in 1881, the amount raised by rates was 
£1,500,000, and the amount f rom fees £370,000, tha t is, about one-quarter. 
In 1875 school fees had fallen to £74,053, whilst the total expenditure 
(apar t f rom loans) was £0,802,531, of which about half was raised from 
rates and half received from the central government. 
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§ 3. The Incidence of Rates.1 The incidence of local 
rates has already been considered 2 in the il lustration of 
general principles, e.g., the house tax and taxes on land 
and rent . Here it need only be observed t h a t : First, the 
pr imary incidence must be dist inguished f rom the ult imate 
incidence. T h u s rates on shops, al though paid by the 
shop-keepers in the first instance, will be mainly trans-
ferred to the owners of the property, though par t ly in 
exceptional cases to the consumers of the articles sold. 
Secondly, any change in taxat ion will fall on the occupier 
dur ing the currency of his lease unless legal t ransfer is pro-
vided. Thirdly, in any case there is always some difficulty 
in the t ransfer , and the tax tends to lie where it first falls. 
§ 4. Principles of Local Expenditure. In expendi ture 
as in taxation the same principles are applicable in the case 
of " localities " as in " countries " or empires. Here also, 
however, there are special differences according to objects 
and methods. 
Some of the earliest forms of local expendi ture may be 
described as of the na ture of compulsory cooperation for 
the benefit of the cooperators; and th roughout local 
finance, as already shown, the benefit theory is applied 
to a much greater extent than is possible with kingdoms, 
empires, or republics. 
A local author i ty primari ly inst i tuted for one set of 
purposes may have assigned to it other duties. Recently 
municipal authori t ies have embarked on various forms of 
t rad ing enterprise, and even speculation. Some of these 
concerns, when allowance is made for all the supplementary 
charges and for insurance against fu tu re loss or depreci-
ation, do not really pay their expenses, and ult imately in-
volve an increase of the rates. Thus we have in disguise 
a recrudescence of the practice of taxation by private per-
sons for pr ivate purposes. Even when the under tak ing 
1 The Memoranda on the Classification and Incidence of Imperial and 
Local Taxes is a storehouse of facts and opinions on this subject. 
2 See above, Ch. XI. 
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is self-supporting and yields a profit, it must be considered 
how much of the payments received for the services are 
due to a complete or part ial monopoly; which again, on 
analysis, may involve private t axa t ion ; and in any case 
the amount of profit is only one element in the public 
interest . 
The canon of economy is of special importance in local 
finance. Local authorit ies are more subject to the malign 
influence of private interests and to sanguine estimates as 
regards reproductive outlay. They are also even more 
ready than the central government to resort to the easy 
method of public debts. On the other hand, local author-
ities may exercise a more dil igent supervision, and rates 
are for tunately more unpopular than taxes. The increase 
of local expenditure in recent years is the best comment 
on the need for economy. The ratable proper ty of Eng-
land and Wales is no doubt increasing rapidly, but in 
spite of this increase the rate per pound is increasing. 
Tak ing an average in 1891-1892, the rate per pound was 
3s. 5d, in 1895-1896 it had risen to 4s. 5d. Again as re-
gards indebtedness in 1875, the local debt of England and 
Wales was £92,180,000, in 1896 i t was £243,209,862. I t is 
t rue most of this debt is supposed to be paid off in certain 
periods of years, but (as with the old s inking f u n d ) new 
debts are incurred faster than the old are paid off.1 
I t seems hopeless to rely on the judgment and restraint 
of the local authorit ies, and the only effective check seems 
to be more thorough and severe control f rom above, and 
in part icular by an increase of the powers of the local 
government board as regards methods of prepar ing annual 
budgets, audi t of accounts, and limitations of borrowing 
powers. 
§ 5. The Unity of Local and Imperial Finance. I t was 
stated a t the beginning of this chapter tha t the same 
principles were applicable in local as in imperial finance. 
1 The property of local bodies may also be considered as a set-off against 
debt, though its adequacy may be questioned. 
VOL. I I I . — 2 D 
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As a mat ter of fact , however, this application of princi-
ples remains a counsel of perfection as regards each 
system severally, and still more as regards the two con-
joined. No a t t empt is made in the United Kingdom, for 
example, to make any allowance for variations in rates 
in imposing taxes ; the income tax is levied independent ly 
of local rates, and local rates receive no proport ionate 
subvention from the proceeds of the income tax. Thus 
the principle of equali ty of taxation is violated. Nor is 
this violation much mit igated by benefit received or by 
grants in aid or by assignment of certain revenues. 
One of the greatest financial problems of the fu tu re is the 
redistr ibution of local and imperial revenues, whether as 
regards collection or expendi tu re . 1 ' 2 
1 See the detailed account of the various subventions in relief of local 
taxat ion in the United Kingdom in the Memoranda referred to above. 
Appendix I I I . , p. 58. 
2 The Final Report of the Royal Commission on Local Taxation (1001 
— [C. R. 038]) has appeared too late for use in the text. The present 
system of grants and assigned revenues is carefully explained. The anom-
alies are so great that three of the Commissioners, Lord Balfour, Sir G. 
Hamilton, and Sir G. Murray, in a very able separate report, would make 
a clean sweep of the whole system. They would substi tute for the system 
of assigned revenues a fixed charge on the consolidated fund, and in the 
distribution they would have regard to the necessity and the ability of 
the various localities. 
C H A P T E R X V I I I . 
PUBLIC CREDIT AND PUBLIC DEBTS. 
§ 1. Public Credit and Private Credit: English His-
torical Survey. Roth theoretically and historically pub-
lic credit may be regarded as a development of private 
credit. For purposes of illustration here, also, the case 
of England may be taken as fairly representative. In the 
mediaeval period " the king was, both in theory and in 
practice, the financier of the nation," 1 and if he had to 
provide security for a loan, he did so upon his own per-
sonal c red i t : sometimes he pawned his jewels, sometimes 
his Jews, sometimes his customs, sometimes his friends. 
The mixture of public and private economy is well 
illustrated by the fact tha t in the time of Edward I. the 
outlay on the army and navy was registered in the rolls 
of the king's wardrobe. The crown of England and the 
royal jewels were more than once pawned, and it is 
recorded tha t in 1340 the Archbishop of Canterbury-
was arrested as a surety for the king's debts, and on one 
occasion the king himself was detained at Brussels very 
much like a prisoner.2 The mediaeval kings also levied 
forced loans from the towns and the clergy,3 and very 
often these loans were repaid, though Edward I I I . " d i d 
not pay his debts ." But even at this early stage the 
nation was expected to pay the king's debts, and the great 
mischiefs that would have arisen from repudiation com-
1 Stubbs, Constitutional History, Vol. II. , 529 seq. 
2 Ibid., p. 532. 
3 In the fourteenth century the clerical " t e n t h " yielded £20,000, a 
fourth part of the ordinary royal revenue. See also Macpherson, Annals 
of Commerce, Vol. I., p. 588. 
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pelled the parl iaments to submit (S tubbs) , and incident-
ally led to greater parl iamentary control. The essence 
also of all these transactions was the anticipation of 
revenue ; which is indeed the essence of all public debts 
incurred on a sound basis.1 Henry VII . , by avarice and 
extortion, lef t a t reasure of nearly two millions sterling, 
bu t Henry V I I I . very easily replaced it with a debt. 
Elizabeth paid off the debt, but for her own purposes 
was obliged to resort to foreign money lenders, and pay 
interest sometimes at 12 per cent. The Stuar ts inter alia 
succeeded in destroying the personal credit of the mon-
arch, and the origin of the present national debt is gener-
ally ascribed to a floating debt of Charles I I . ( to give a 
gent le name to misappropriation of other people's money) , 
which eventually obtained parl iamentary recognition. In 
1692 an act was passed to raise a million pounds sterl ing 
on the security of certain taxes, the loan to be repaid by 
terminable annuities. The funded debt is first mentioned 
in 1694, when the Bank of England was founded to ad-
vance its capital to government at 8 per cent. 
Anticipat ion of revenues from taxes, and the sale of 
annuities, made more at t ract ive by the introduction of 
the gambling element in the form of lotteries and ton-
tines,2 remained the staple methods of public credit 
dur ing the eighteenth century. In the early part of the 
century the security was considered bad, and the interest 
was high, but by the middle of the century the 3 per cent 
stock was generally a t par, and sometimes above. 
The enormous increase of the debt, owing first to the 
American war and later to the great French war, was 
natura l ly accompanied by a rise in the rate of interest 
or, wha t is the same thing, a fall in the price of the issues 
1 Adams, Finance, p. 526. 
2 The last holder of a tontine died in 1870. See John B. Mart in 's 
Grasshopper in Lombard Street. On an original investment of £100 in 
1777, at his birth, in the last year of his life this survivor of the fittest 
annui tan t received nearly £8000 income. 
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of the stock. From 1793 to 1801 the 3 per cent stock 
was issued on the average at £ 5 7 7s. 6d. per £ 1 0 0 stock, 
and from 1803 to the termination of the war the average 
price of issue was £ 6 0 7s. 6c?.1 On January 5, 1816, the 
nominal capital of the national debt was £885,186,123, 
and the annual charge was £32,457,441. I t is worth ob-
serving that compared with the population of the United 
Kingdom the capital amounted to £ 4 4 5s. per head and the 
annual charge to £ 1 12s. Before the South Afr ican W a r 
the value per head of the nominal capital was about 
£ 1 5 13s., and the annual charge ( including sinking f u n d ) 
about 12s. 5d. Thus, even if the wealth had only 
increased in proportion, the present burden per head 
would be only about one-third, but the weal th of the 
nation has increased probably threefold at least per head.2 
A reference to the whole course of history down to the 
recent South Afr ican W a r shows tha t the great cause of 
the growth of the national debt has been war, though bu t 
for the recent great increase of public expendi ture in 
other directions the rate of repayment would have been 
much more rapid. Prussia is almost the only country 
in which a considerable par t of the national debt has been 
incurred for reproductive purposes, a net gain of over five 
and a half millions sterl ing per annum being realised from 
the State railways.3 In most countries,4 as in Britain, debt 
and war run together , and in recent years, owing to the 
development both of war and credit, the concurrence is 
more marked than formerly. 
§ 2. The Development of Public Credit: Theoretical 
Survey. Al though public credit is essentially the same 
1 For fur ther details and a criticism of the " sinking fund " methods, 
see Por ter ' s Progress of the Nation, p. 485, and Noble's National Finance, 
p. 5. 
2 See Giffen's Growth of Capital, p. 110. In 1822 property per head 
was £120, in 1885 £270, and there has been a great rise since. 
3 Bastable, 206. 
4 Cf. Cohn, §§ 4 7 0 ^ 9 4 for other countries. 
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as pr ivate credit , it differs in two characteristics, which 
are sometimes of great importance.1 First, the State, 
relatively to individuals, has supreme power, and thus 
may make forced loans — the State may command where 
the private person must beg. This superior power of the 
State, however, puts public credit in its early stages at a 
relative disadvantage. The element of force is a hin-
drance, and the hindrance is only overcome by the exac-
tion of pledges. These pledges (even the crown and 
jewels of the monarch) are at first actually pu t in the 
hands of the creditor, and the next step in development 
is when a r ight to claim is subst i tuted for actual posses-
sion. Lit t le by lit t le this r ight to particular pledges 
gives way to this assignment of part icular sources of 
revenue for the payment of interest and the redemption 
of the principal; and, for greater security, the taxes or 
revenues may be farmed out to the creditor. 
Gradually, however, the obligation of the State is 
accepted, and, finally, there is no mention of any par-
t icular source of revenue. The State borrows, so to 
speak, on its personal security. 
I t is recognised ul t imately t ha t the consequences of 
repudiation are so serious to the nation at large tha t 
any possible taxation is submit ted to rather than run 
this r isk; and thus the credit of the State rests on the 
whole resources of the nation, al though there is no defi-
nite assignment of any part icular portion. Thus, the 
sovereign power, which at first is a source of weakness 
in contract ing loans, is in the end a source of s t rength. 
The second characteristic of the public credit is its rela-
tive permanence : individuals pass away, but the State is 
supposed to endure fo rever ; it is the greatest of all cor-
porations. This relative permanence, again, is at first a 
source of weakness. Public debts, to begin with, are 
incurred on special emergencies for short periods. I t is 
difficult to borrow for distant objects and for lengthened 
1 Cohn, §§ 495-501. 
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periods, and yet the permanence of the State renders bor-
rowing under these conditions desirable. In the end, how-
ever, this permanence also becomes a source of s t r eng th : 
the State is enabled to borrow not simply at emergency 
rates, but with regard to the f u t u r e course of the rate of 
interest . The terms of a debt con t rac t 1 are three in num-
ber : the amount of the debt, the time of repayment, and 
the interest . Under early conditions the t ime was short, 
the interest was high, and the amount to be repaid was the 
amount borrowed. Under modern conditions the State may 
fix i ts own time for repayment, i t may offer its loans at a 
discount or at a premium, and the price it pays will depend 
simply on the rate of interest as determined by the present 
and anticipated conditions of the money market . Thus , 
supposing the credit of the State is perfect (as at present 
in the United Kingdom), the loans can be placed on the 
cheapest possible terms and in the manner thought most 
convenient to the State. In former times public debts 
were often incurred on more onerous terms than pr ivate 
mortgages. 
§ 3. Modern Uses of Public Loans. The development 
of the power of the State in contract ing loans has natural ly 
been accompanied by an increase in the exercise of the 
power. Under modern conditions loans are incurred for 
three purposes.2 In the first place, temporary loans may 
be used to cover casual deficits. I t is clear tha t the 
revenue will not always precisely correspond to the esti-
mates of expendi ture nor the expendi ture to the estimates, 
and, accordingly, the State must either borrow, in case of 
a temporary deficit, or else make the estimates of expen-
diture so high as to fall short of the smallest probable 
revenue. This al ternative br ings to l ight the controversy 
between financing on a surplus and on a deficit.3 The 
1 Cf. Adams, Finance, p. 550. 
2 Adams, Public Debts, Par t I., Ch. V. 
3 Bastable, p. 567, approves of a moderate surplus ; Adams, Public 
Debts, p. 80, of a moderate deficit. 
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principal consideration is, tha t surplus financing encour-
ages extravagance, and moderate deficit financing economy. 
The surpluses of the United States af ter the Civil W a r 
offer the most remarkable i l lustration of the dangers of 
extravagance, and in the Uni ted Kingdom the surpluses 
of the last five years have no doubt encouraged the growth 
of ordinary expendi ture . 
On the other hand, continual deficits lead to a large 
floating debt, which is not properly under parl iamentary 
control and must eventually be funded ; and it is against 
good economy to inctir permanent debt in this casual man-
ner. There can be 110 doubt tha t the more nearly the 
ordinary revenue and expendi ture can be estimated and 
provided for, so much the be t te r ; and the question as to 
whether the t u r n of the scale should be in favour of a 
deficit or a surplus is of minor importance. 
Secondly, the occurrence of a grea t and unexpected 
emergency, especially through the outbreak of war, is 
historically and actually the principal cause of modern 
increase of debt . In this case, i t may be said, borrowing 
is the only resource. The national credit takes the place 
of the king 's t reasure. Taxat ion to be effective needs 
time, and the limits of possible or beneficial taxation are 
soon reached compared with the expenses of modern wars. 
How much present taxes should be increased and to what 
ex ten t new taxes should be levied, or, alternatively, how 
far resort should be made to debt, depends on a series of 
complex considerations. A just war (and all wars a t the 
t ime profess to be jus t ) is waged in the permanent inter-
ests of the State, and therefore par t at any rate of the 
charge should be thrown on fu tu re generations. But 
apar t f rom this consideration, taxation beyond a certain 
point injures the productive powers of the State, and thus 
in jures f u t u r e generations more than would the obliga-
tions of a loan. Indeed, in the last resort, excessive taxa-
tion will become unproduct ive, and the nation will be 
obliged to borrow, and thus will suffer from both evils. 
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Regard must also be paid to the probable increase (or 
decrease) of revenue in the fu ture . W i t h wealth and 
population rapidly growing, a greater charge may fairly 
be lef t to the fu ture . Under present conditions, however, 
throughout the world, and especially in the United King-
dom, there is no need to emphasise the possibilities of the 
fu ture , which are already heavily mortgaged. Mr. Glad-
stone desired to carry through the Crimean W a r without 
loans, — it is t rue that he failed, —- but no one has even 
proposed such heroic self-sacrifice in the South Afr ican 
War . 
The third great cause of public debts is on account of pub-
lic works and inst i tut ions. These again may be divided 
into two great groups, — product ive and unproduct ive. 
If the works are strictly productive, the corresponding 
debts may even yield a net revenue instead of imposing a 
burden, as in the famous case of the nationalisation of 
the Prussian railways. In general, however, as already 
explained, the real net yield of revenue is exaggerated, 
and in any case it is of subordinate importance compared 
wi th the relative benefits of public administrat ion or indi-
vidual enterprise. A t present local governments of all 
kinds are much at t racted by the glamour of product ive 
expenditure , and municipal socialism is the practical form 
in which State socialism is most favoured. 
As regards so-called unproduct ive expenditure, it must 
be remembered tha t the terms " product ive " and " unpro-
ductive " carry no ethical judgment . Product ive expendi-
ture in the narrowest sense of yielding money profit may 
be ethically indefensible, e.g., State lotteries, and sales of 
offices and honours which at one t ime were universa l ; 
whilst unproduct ive expendi ture involving an immediate 
monetary loss may represent the highest funct ions of the 
State, e.g., poor relief and education. Even af te r making 
full allowance for the indirect economic effects of various 
forms of public expendi ture (especially on education), 
there is lef t over in every modern State a large amount of 
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expendi ture which is unproductive. But all tha t is con-
veyed by the use of the term " unproductive " is tha t the 
result does not admit of pecuniary measurement. And 
it may be observed that according to the older presump-
tion any industr ial under tak ing tha t is likely to yield a 
profit may be lef t to private or joint-stock enterprise, 
whilst the principal cases for State interference are pre-
cisely those in which there is not sufficient expenditure 
of profit to encourage private speculation. 
The larger question here involved leads again to the 
controversy between socialism and individualism, and 
cannot be treated merely in passing. For the present 
purpose the point is tha t all unproductive expenditure 
which does not indirectly increase the economic faculties 
of a nation must in the end involve increased taxation. 
All debt is an anticipation of revenue; and if the revenue 
is not obtained from production, it must be obtained from 
taxat ion. Accordingly, loans proposed for social benefit 
must always submit to two tests : First, Is State manage-
ment necessary ? Has voluntary association failed ? Sec-
ondly, Is the object worth the cost in taxation ? And how 
does it stand in the competition with other social objects ? 
§ 4. The Economy of Public Debts. There are several 
questions that arise in connection with public debts which 
are of great practical importance, but in which the diffi-
culties are par t ly actuarial and part ly dependent on the 
circumstances of the time. 
The fallacy of keeping up a nominal sinking fund to 
be continually inflated by compound interest, whilst in 
reality greater additions are made to the debt, has often 
been exposed, and certainly needs no commentary at a 
time when the repayment of debt has been curtailed dur-
ing a period of profound peace and surprising surpluses. 
The classical example of the sinking fund is provided by 
England at the t ime of the great French war ; not only 
was the capital of the debt vastly increased through simul-
taneous redemption and borrowing, but it has been calcu-
P U B L I C C R E D I T A N D P U B L I C DEBTS. 411 
lated also that the annual charge imposed by the use of 
the sinking fund dur ing the period 1794-1816 was over 
£550,000.1 
Compensations for this loss are said to be found in the 
exercise of the patriotic resolve of Par l iament to pay off 
debt,2 and in the greater confidence of the public creditors 
as regards new issues; but they are of doubt fu l value 
whether monetary or ethical. 
The method of perpetual annuit ies has followed the 
method of the sinking fund . An annuity is a definite 
annual payment, and of course the amount cannot be 
reduced, e.g., most English railway debentures are in 
effect perpetual annuities. But the real burden (i.e., the 
interest charge) of a nominal capital sum may be reduced 
by conversion, if the rate of interest falls owing to the 
conditions of the money market , or if there is a rise in 
the credit of the particular State. 
Between perpetual and terminable annuities, however, 
there are endless gradations, and annuit ies terminable in 
relatively short periods are still favoured. T h e time fixed 
for repayment of the principal and the period dur ing 
which the guarantee against conversion should be main-
tained are mat ters of great importance, but no general 
solution is possible. A comparatively long period will 
enable the government to borrow at cheaper rates, but 
beyond a certain point there is practically l i t t le difference. 
The determination of the best period will depend upon a 
forecast of the probable movements in the rate of interest 
and of the fu r the r requirements of the government . This 
la t ter consideration, however, under modern conditions, is 
itself only one of the elements affecting the rate of interest. 
The rate of interest offered, it is now generally admitted, 
should be such as to secure the placing of the loan as 
nearly as possible to par . Of the importance of this rule, 
the English finance of the great Napoleonic wars provides 
1 Bastable, p. 653. 
2 Lord Rosebery's Pitt, p. 83. 
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a s t r ik ing il lustration and a warning. 1 Dur ing this 
period, debt was created to the amount of <£275,000,000 
beyond the amount received. " Discount financing," says 
M. Leroy-Beaulieu, " i s the principal cause for the dura-
tion of public debts in Europe." 
I t is no doubt t rue tha t the issue of a loan at a discount 
at a low rate of interest may be cheaper for the time being 
than an issue at par at a higher rate, because the discount 
is a t t ract ive to borrowers. But the ult imate burden on 
the State is greater and the immediate saving is small. 
The only valid reason for this method of borrowing seems 
to be that advanced by Lord Rosebery in the case of Pi t t , 
viz., t ha t " he had no choice . . . tha t he had to borrow 
not in accordance with his own views, but with those of 
the lenders ." 2 
The convers ion 3 of a debt must always be a mat ter 
of voluntary agreement with the creditors, otherwise it 
amounts to a part ial repudiation.4 The possibility of con-
version depends part ly on the conditions of the money 
marke t ; but par t ly on the judicious handling of the great 
monied interests affected, Mr. Goschen succeeded where 
Mr. Childers failed. 
§ 5. The Repayment of Public Debts. The expediency 
of repaying public debt depends on a conflict of argu-
ments, of which the following are the principal. I t is 
a rgued tha t the payment of the interest, so long as the 
debt is held within the country, is only a t ransfer of 
wealth from one set of people — the taxpayers — to an-
1 Cf. Bastable, p. 641 ; Adams, Public Debts, p. 175; Noble, National 
Finance, p. 5. 
2 Life of Pitt, p. 210. See also Newmarch, Statistical Journal, 
XVII I . , p. 104 sq. 
3 See Conversion and Redemption (1889), by Sir Edward Hami l ton ; 
Adams, Public Debts, Par t III , Ch. V., pp. 217-238. 
4 Creditors are usually offered the repayment of the principal or the 
acceptance of a lower rate of interest. This offer of course does not 
involve repudiation in any sense, though it may conflict with public 
expectations. 
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other set — the fund-holders; or, as is sometimes said, it 
is the lef t hand paying the right, and involves no real 
burden. This a rgument may be s t rengthened by the con-
tention tha t the fund-holders, if they received payment 
of the principal, would invest the proceeds in similar secu-
rities, and would, in reality, be as great a burden on the 
nation as a whole. The reply 1 is tha t all taxation in-
volves loss of productive powers both directly and in-
directly, and the interest on the debt involves taxation ; 
it cannot be considered a part of the earnings of capital. 
A t the same time, this reply must not be pushed very far, 
and within the limits of a moderate charge the burden of 
the interest on the national debt cannot be held to cramp 
productive power. 
I t is said tha t the natural progress of wealth will ren-
der repayment more easy in the fu tu re . If we were to 
take the rate of progress of the nineteenth century as 
normal, then there would be much force in this a r g u m e n t ; 
but a check to the rate of progress is possible, and an 
increase of expenditure, and consequently of taxation, is 
probable. 
Closely allied to this a rgument is the assertion tha t the 
tendency of the rate of interest is to fall, which is, how-
ever, doubtful , over periods of political importance.2 
I t is said that fu tu re generations ought to bear their 
share of national obligations ; but the reply is tha t the 
present ought also to pay for its own ideas, and the new 
burdens of the fu tu re will probably be sufficient. 
In favour of repaying debt in t ime of peace and pros-
perity, i t may be urged tha t in case of war or other na-
tional emergency, the nation can borrow more easily. 
Credit is treasure. This is no doubt t rue relatively, but 
at the same time the rate of borrowing will depend upon 
the general conditions of the money markets of the world. 
The argument founded on the appreciation of gold and 
1 Cf. Adams, Public Debts, pp. 243-245. 
2 See above, Bk. IV. , Ch. VI. 
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the increasing burden of debts is not near so popular as 
it was when the supply of gold was decreasing and t rade 
was suffering from profound depression. 
Since debt is, in the last resort, an anticipation of taxes, 
the essence of the problem always is to compare the bur-
dens of present and fu tu re taxes. People, it is urged, be-
come used to a system of taxation, and instead of remi t t ing 
taxes which it may be difficult to reimpose, the surplus 
should be devoted to the extinction of debt. The s t rength O 
of this argument , however, depends entirely 011 the nature 
of the tax system and the real burdens imposed 011 the 
taxpayer and on the productive powers of the State. 
There is also the danger tha t the surpluses will be used 
for ext ravagant expendi ture instead of for the reduction 
of debt. 
T h u s it appears tha t the question, how far a nation 
should strive to reduce its debt, and at what rate, admits 
of no general answer ; it is like the question as to the 
amount of reserve which should be kept by a bank. So 
long, however, as taxat ion is considered by the mass of the 
taxpayers as a burden, and not as a privilege, the accumu-
lation of debt must also be considered as involving a bur-
den, and the benefits of the expendi ture must be carefully 
weighed. A t present, however, countries and localities 
are s tepping forward into the morass of debt with a light 
heart , regardless of fu tu re cost and of fu tu re demands. 
When Mr. Gladstone introduced his budget of 1862-1863, 
his estimated expendi ture of £-70,000,000 is annotated 
wi th the familiar Gallic expletive " [sensation.The 
budget s ta tement of 1901-1902, with an estimated ordinary 
expendi ture of nearly double the amount,1 was received 
with the apathy of the int imation of a collection in church. 
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, indeed, repeated his 
1 To the estimate of ordinary expenditure, £127,372,000, must be added 
the suspension of repayment of debt, £2,000,000, and grants to local au-
thorities, £9,739,000, or in all, £139,000,000. See Economist, May 11, 
1901. 
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warnings of five years before, the only result of which, how-
ever, as he observed, had been an increase of £34,000,000, 
or 34.8 per cent in the ordinary expenditure. 
§ 6. Dangers of Excessive Public Debts. W e are accus-
tomed to scoff at the alarm of the eighteenth century 
financiers over public debts, which appear to us ridicu-
lously small. The prophecy tha t the nation must destroy 
the public debt or the public debt will destroy the nation, 
like all the other pessimistic prophecies of the old econo-
mists, has hi ther to been falsified. But if it is just criti-
cism to say that Adam Smith was needlessly alarmed at 
a debt of £130,000,000 and argued from a too limited 
experience of the possibilities of progress, it is equally 
just criticism of the present optimism to say tha t the 
nineteenth century is as l imited as the eighteenth, and is 
not necessarily typical. I t is always possible tha t the 
continued increase of public indebtedness may ul t imately 
lead to a revolt of fu tu re generations ; they may object 
to pay taxes to which they have never consented, except 
by a political fiction, and repudiat ion may appear the 
lesser of two evils : excessive taxat ion is a very hot-bed 
for revolutionary ideas. 
C H A P T E R X I X . 
COLONIES AND DEPENDENCIES. 
§ 1. Early History of British Colonies and Dependencies. 
If in any depar tment of economic inquiry British history 
may be fairly taken as representative, i t is surely in 
the mat ter of colonies and dependencies. As in the case 
of other European nations, most of the British colonies 
were founded, and most of the dependencies acquired, 
under the influence of political ideas and ideals tha t 
would no longer be tolerated. Take first the case of 
colonies. I t might natural ly be supposed tha t the press-
ure of population and of capital at home gave a st imulus 
to colonisation, as in the case of the old Greek cities. I t 
was, however, not the overflow of well-being, bu t of 
disorder and injust ice in Europe which peopled and 
cult ivated America.1 Religious persecution and political 
intolerance drove out Pur i tans , Quakers, Catholics, and 
Jews to make new sett lements. Later on, the transporta-
tion of criminals relieved the prisons of the home country 
and provided the colonial plantat ions with l abour ; and 
if this source of supply was insufficient, it was perhaps 
only owing to the preference of our lawgivers for capi-
tal punishment . From the Restoration to the death of 
George I I I . no less than 187 new capital offences were 
added to the criminal code. One of the greatest of our 
constitutional wri ters has said of this period : " The lives 
of men were sacrificed with a reckless barbar i ty worthier 
1 See Wealth of Nations, Bk. IV., Ch. VII. 
416 
COLONIES A N D D E P E N D E N C I E S . 4 1 7 
of an Eastern despot or Afr ican chief than of a Christian 
state. Life was held cheap compared with p r o p e r t y . " 1 
The colonial labour market was fu r the r replenished by 
kidnapping and so-called apprenticeship and by the 
importation and rearing of slaves. 
Such being the const i tuent elements of the masses of 
the governed, we may now glance at the characters of 
their rulers. " As to the civil officers appointed for 
America, most of the places in the g i f t of the crown have 
been filled wi th broken members of Parl iament, of bad if 
any principles, valets de chambre, electioneering scoundrels, 
and even livery servants. In one word, America has been 
made for many years the hospital of E n g l a n d . " 2 
As the colonies grew in wealth, the mother country paid 
them more at tent ion. The most obvious device to obtain 
a large share of tha t wealth for itself was to p revent 
it going to other countries, and an elaborate system was 
devised for the monopoly of the colonial t rade. " The 
maintenance of the monopoly," said Adam Smith just 
before the revolt of the American colonies, " has hi ther to 
been the principal, or more properly perhaps the sole end 
and purpose of the dominion which Great Britain assumes 
over her colonies." 
A t the very t ime when Adam Smith was wr i t ing it 
occurred to some of the most foolish and ignorant of our 
rulers tha t it would be an excellent th ing to impose taxes 
on the colonies for imperial purposes ; and by the famous 
duties on tea they succeeded in raising about <£300 and 
in losing the American colonies. 
I t might natural ly be supposed tha t this sharp lesson 
would have established, immediately and forever, the 
principle of non-interference in colonial affairs. But the 
contrary was the case. T h e colonies, however popular 
their institutions, were really governed by Brit ish minis-
1 Erskine May, Constitutional History, Vol. III . , p. 373. 
2 Letters of General Huske in 1768, cited by Erskine May, Vol. I I I . , 
p. 362 note. 
v o l . iii . 2 e 
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ters from Downing Street . In crown colonies this power 
was exercised direct ly; in the free colonies i t was exer-
cised indirectly, th rough the governors and their councils. 
Self-government was there in theory, but in practice the 
governors ruled according to orders from England, and 
were, in general, able by devious means to command the 
consent of the local legislators.1 Very often the interfer-
ence was more direct . Acts affecting only the internal 
affairs of the colonies were disallowed by ministers at 
home. The public lands were considered the property 
of the crown, and often obnoxious grants were made. 
Even religious inst i tut ions and endowments were regu-
lated from home. One of the greatest abuses was patron-
age. In fan t s in the cradle were endowed with colonial 
appointments, to be executed through life by convenient 
deputies. Ex t ravagan t fees and salaries were granted by 
England, raised by the colonies, and spent in England. 
Polit icians who consented to exile themselves to the colo-
nies were, in general, those who were wholly unfit for 
employment at home. 
I t is not surpris ing tha t the first years of the reign of 
Victoria were marked by a rebellion in Canada. The 
wonder is tha t Britain contrived to retain her dominion. 
The retent ion of dominion, indeed, was effected through 
the abandonment of the powers of irri tation and abuse. 
To Canada, over f if ty years ago, and to other free colo-
nies, as they obtained sufficient importance, the principle 
of responsible government was conceded. I t is beyond 
the sphere of economics to describe the nature and effects 
of these political concessions or recognitions. Suffice it 
to say, tha t the general result is tha t a colonial constitu-
tion has become " the image and reflection of parliamen-
tary government in Eng land . " And just as the crown 
in Britain has gained in populari ty what it has lost in 
nominal power, through the transference of the supreme 
author i ty to the representatives of the people, so aiso the 
» Cf. Erskine May, Vol. I I I . , p. 160. 
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mother country, by accepting to the full the principles of 
local self-government, has s t rengthened and, in many cases, 
has created the far more real bonds of affection. 
W i t h regard to the dependencies, of which India may 
be taken as the most marvellous example which the world 
has ever seen, for a long jieriod they also were given over 
to patronage and plunder and to all the methods of ex-
ploitation invented by unfet tered companies.1 But with 
the t ransfer of the powers and terri tories of the old East 
India Company to the crown came the recognition that 
the primary duty of the British government was to 
promote the large human interests of the millions of 
India, and not the narrow, pecuniary interests of a few 
British adventurers — great spirits though many of them 
were. 
Thus it would appear tha t the extraordinary growth 
of affection on the par t of the " possessions " toward the 
" possessor " dur ing the reign of Victoria is to be ascribed 
mainly not to the conscious efforts of statesmen to carry 
out their ideas of " t ightening the t i e s " of connection, 
bu t to the for tunate failures of such a t t e m p t s ; they are 
to be ascribed, not to the s t rengthening, but to the relax-
ing of the powers of the central, or imperial, govern-
ment . 
This relaxation is seen especially in the abandonment 
of the remains of the old system of commercial monopoly.2 
The recent denunciation of the commercial treaties with 
Belgium and Germany, and the g ran t to the colonies of 
essentially coordinate power in making such treaties, may 
be taken as the final step in the transi t ion from monopoly' 
to freedom. The mother country claims to be included 
on the " most favoured n a t i o n " footing : the colonies 
cannot discriminate against a foreign State to which the 
mother country has by t reaty granted the " most favoured 
1 See above, Bk. II . , Ch. X X I V , § 6. 
2 See the historical survey in Professor J . Davidson's Commercial 
Federation and Colonial Trade Policy, Ch. II . 
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n a t i o n " clause ; no colony, by direct or indirect negotia-
tion, is to obtain an advantage at the expense of any other 
part of the empire, and should it obtain any concession 
by way of preference from a foreign country the imperial 
government would endeavour to obtain similar privileges 
for the rest of the empire. These restrictions seem to 
consti tute a minimum of empire, and weak as they are 
they are only retained by consent. 
§ 2. The Profit and Loss to the Mother Country of Colo-
nies and Dependencies. If now, in the l ight of this broad 
historical survey, we inquire what is the balance of profit 
and loss to Great Britain of this immense empire of colo-
nies and dependencies, the answer at first sight does not 
appear to be very satisfactory, and the popular opinion 
tha t " someth ing ought to be d o n e " toward closer union 
seems plausible. 
One af te r another the possible advantages of empire 
seem to have been abandoned or to have fallen short of 
realisation. Consider the question of revenue and ex-
pendi ture . The great source of expense is found in the 
navy and army. The larger par t of the expense is in-
curred, not for the defence of Great Britain and Ireland, 
but for the empire; and though India and the colonies 
may be called on to meet par t of the expenditure for local 
defence, they contribute practically nothing to the expenses 
of the imperial government . Again, take the interest on 
the national debt. This debt is almost entirely due to 
wars for the maintenance and extension of empire, and 
not simply for the defence of the home country ; but the 
United Kingdom alone pays the interest and bears the 
burden. 
I t is t rue tha t the recent war has revealed a surprising 
depth of filial affection on the par t of the colonies and of 
India, and the former have contributed men and the lat ter 
horses and material ; but per contra the war itself with its 
enormous expense is a war, in the first place, in the inter-
ests of certain colonies, and not in the interests of the 
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mother country, tha t is to say, if interest is to be meas-
ured by pecuniary gain.1 
§ 3. Trade and the Flag. I t may perhaps be thought 
tha t though we lose directly by the expense of our fleets 
and armies, we gain far more indirectly through the ex-
tension of our trade. In dealing with this argument two 
distinct questions must be carefully separated. In the 
first place, it is undoubtedly t rue tha t this country de-
pends for the necessaries of existence — for food and raw 
materials of manufacture — upon supplies drawn from 
abroad ; and it follows, as was admit ted by Cobden, tha t 
we ought to keep the supremacy of the sea. B u t in the 
second place it is by no means so t rue tha t this extension 
of foreign trade has been due mainly to the extension of 
empire, and that this extension of empire has increased 
the security of our foreign trade. A few significant facts 
will show tha t if, to some extent, t rade follows the flag, 
to a much greater extent t rade pays no regard to flags. 
Our aggregate t rade with foreign countries ( inc luding 
exports of British produce and impor ts ) is nearly three 
times as great as with our colonies and dependencies ; 
our imports from the Uni ted States are greater than the 
whole of the imports from all the British dominions.2 
1 The general argument of the text is supported most emphatically by 
Mr. Chamberlain, as Colonial Secretary, a t the conference of colonial 
premiers in London in 1897. See Report of Proceedings, p. 7 (C— 
8596) : — 
" Y o u will find tha t every war, great or small, during the reign of 
Victoria, in which we have been engaged, has had a t bottom a colonial 
interest, the interest, t ha t is to say, either of a colony or of a great de-
pendency like India. Tha t is absolutely true, and is likely to remain true 
to the end of the chapter. If we had no empire, there is no doubt tha t 
our military and naval resources would not require to be maintained at 
anything like the present level." 
2 In 1898 — a normal year — the aggregate t rade (imports and exports 
of British produce) with foreign countries was £520,877,107 ; with Brit-
ish possessions, £182,660,710. In 1898 the imports from the United 
States were £126,062,155, and from all British possessions, £99,433,995. 
The total imports were £485,035,583, tha t is to say, the imports f rom 
British possessions were about one-fifth of the whole. 
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A n d al though recently the colonies have showed signs 
of giving preferential t rea tment to the mother country, it 
is qui te clear tha t free t rade within the empire with dis-
cr iminat ing duties against foreigners is u t te r ly impossi-
ble ; the colonial tariffs form one objection that for the 
t ime being is practically insuperable, and the relative 
proportion of colonial to foreign t rade is a still more 
formidable difficulty. 
Nor can it be said tha t our t rade is more secure owing 
to this vast and unwieldy extension of empire. Probably, 
indeed, the reverse is the case; the Uni ted Kingdom, as 
such, would be s t ronger with a concentration of empire 
in places specially adapted for the maintenance of a sea-
power. 
The other commercial advantages which are supposed 
to follow from the possession of colonies also become 
much a t tenuated when tested by facts. The surplus 
capital and the surplus labour of this country flow at 
least as readily to the Uni ted States as to any of our 
colonies. From 1853 to 1898 the total emigration of 
persons of Brit ish or Irish origin was 8,549,569, of whom 
5,690,712 went to the Uni ted States. The makers of 
modern empires have lost the Roman art of deportation : 
the Romans would have subdued the Transvaal with the 
mountain tribes of India, and civilised India by tu rn ing 
the stream of Ir ish emigrants f rom America. But though 
we have imitated the Romans unconsciously perhaps, but 
effectively, in the a r t of amalgamation, — by sparing the 
weak and warr ing down the proud, by encouraging also 
tribal wars, and, generally, by making the Briton a 
modern Roman citizen, any accidents to whom must be 
compensated in terr i tory, — we have, perforce, abandoned 
this simple method of deportat ion. The colonies long 
since refused to take our criminals, and they are now 
drawing the line at our paupers and Asiatics. In brief, 
our foreign t rade and the migration of labour and capital 
are determined mainly by economic, and not by political 
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considerations. Labour follows wages; capital follows 
profits; and neither follows the flag. I t is of course 
possible that if a foreign power acquired India, it would, 
by prohibitive duties, exclude British goods ; but esti-
mated merely by p r o f i t and loss, India does not pay the 
British taxpayer either directly or indirectly. 
§ 4 . Imperial Federation. The only " thorough " scheme 
for imperial federation ever propounded is tha t given by 
Adam Smith in the concluding chapter of the Wealth of 
Nations. I t is, moreover, far too thorough for acceptance 
by the feebler folk of to-day. His scheme was based on 
imperial taxation th roughout the empire, and representa-
tion in proportion to taxat ion. He contemplated the pos-
sibility of the t ransfer of the seat of political power across 
the Atlant ic in l i t t le more than a century ; and but for the 
political accidents which occurred as he wrote, the present 
United States would have been the s trongest par t of the 
Brit ish Empire, both in wealth and population, tha t is, 
so far as the English speaking races are concerned. If , 
however, the education and political emancipation of the 
" black man " had advanced in India as in America, and 
the franchise were not tempered by property qualifications, 
India would be sending a majori ty of representat ives to 
the Imperial Pa r l i ament ; and the logical outcome of 
Adam Smith's scheme would be tha t the representat ives 
of the Uni ted Kingdom would form less than 10 per cent 
of the whole. 
If federation of this " thorough " kind does not seem very 
at tract ive to our insular prejudices, in spite of the euphony 
of the cry " one man one vote," the federation of the cob-
web order tha t is now becoming popular seems quite as 
dangerous, in spite of its innocent appearance. The dan-
ger lurks in the sentiment tha t was embalmed in the speech 
of the colonial secretary to the premiers of the colonies. 
" I t may be tha t the t ime has come, and if not I believe 
it will come, when the colonies will desire to subs t i tu te 
for the slight relationship which at present exists a t rue 
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partnership, and in that case they will want their share 
in the management of the empire, which we like to th ink 
is as much theirs as it is ours. But, of course, with the 
privilege of management and control there will come the 
obligation and the responsibility. There will come some 
form of contr ibut ion toward the expense for objects which 
we shall have in common. Tha t , I say, is self-evident, but 
it is to be borne in mind even in these early stages of the 
consideration of the sub jec t . " 1 
The essence of this proposal is, tha t in re turn for a share 
in the management of the empire the colonies are to con-
t r ibute a share in the expense. For tunate ly , the collec-
tive wisdom of the colonial premiers placed on record tha t 
the colonies are not yet prepared to pay for this doubtful 
privilege. The colonies are content with present arrange-
m e n t s — they wish to " manage " their own affairs, and not 
the affairs of the empire. Nor can it be said that there is 
any appreciable feeling in this country in favour of trans-
ferr ing par t of the burden of our taxes to the colonies, 
though probably the admission of a few colonial repre-
sentat ives to Par l iament (wi thout taxat ion) would be not 
unpopular . The idea tha t the colonies should help to 
" manage " the empire, and should " p a y " for the privilege, 
may possibly appear to be good economy, but it seems bad 
in policy and false to history. The celebrations toward 
the conclusion of the reign of Victoria (1897) revealed a 
depth of loyalty to the crown which was never excelled 
in the age of chivalry ; the mutual good feeling of the 
representatives of the various nationalities of the empire 
seemed to rest more on family affection than on any recog-
nition of material interests, and instead of jealousy and 
envy, sympathy and confidence reigned supreme. The 
dissatisfaction tha t is sometimes expressed with the 
present s ta te of the management of the empire and 
the aspirations for closer union do not appear to rest 
upon any solid basis of discontent or any real grievance 
1 Report of the Conference, p. 0. 
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or even on any idea of economic advantage, but simply 
on a doctrinaire, or philosophical notion, that the union of 
the parts ought to be more formal and the constitution 
more logical. Those who are dissatisfied wish to see a 
greater Tlisplay of imperial power and visible contribu-
tions of revenues and ships: the power of the unseen 
eludes their grasp. But it may be objected: in the first 
place the whole constitution of the British Empire is full 
of anomalies — simply because the constitution was not 
made, but g r e w ; because it is the outcome not of one or 
two philosophical ideas, but of a mul t i tude of historical 
influences. And the test of the vitali ty of any growing 
insti tution is to be found, not in its accordance with the 
theories of political philosophers or philosophical politi-
cians, but in its actual working capacity under changing 
conditions. Tried by this test the consti tution of the 
British Empire is s tronger than ever. The colonies, it 
may be granted, are in an anomalous posi t ion; so is the 
cab ine t ; so, also, is the crown. 
And this leads to the second and greater objection to 
proposals for federation, in the shape of " t ightening the 
ties " of union. The method of est imating the advantages 
and privileges of empire in terms of money is al together 
inapplicable and fallacious. If Britain had parted with 
all the terr i tory tha t did not " pay," she would not have 
retained in her empire a single colony or dependency', and 
even Ireland would have been cast a d r i f t ; and if the 
British colonies had forsaken their allegiance because 
they had no share in the British Par l iament equally, also, 
the empire would have disappeared. The empire has 
grown in s t rength because l iberty and natura l affection 
have been allowed to displace narrow economic interests. 
Consider the question of defence. Every year of peace 
and control s t rengthens the affection to the empire of the 
colonies, and makes it more and more impossible for any 
other power to take our inheritance. W e may amuse our-
selves by supposing tha t a combination of hostile fleets 
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gained possession of the ports of Austral ia and New 
Zealand, but we cannot imagine tha t any combination of 
powers could govern them against the will of the inhabit-
ants. A n d in case the independence of the mother coun-
t ry were threatened, the resources of the whole- empire 
would form a last reserve, all the s tronger because it 
rested not on formal treaties or fixed contributions or 
shares in control, but upon gra t i tude and affection. Con-
sider even the question of commerce. I t is easy to say 
t ha t free t rade within the empire is desirable, and it is to 
be hoped tha t in the course of time this ideal will be real-
ised. But this country would not gain if this ideal must 
be purchased by sacrificing a t rade of threefold magni tude 
wi th foreign countries, by creat ing all k inds of local jeal-
ousies th roughout the empire, and by interfer ing with 
systems of taxation which the people who bear the taxes 
regard as beneficial, or, at any rate, satisfactory. 
Thus , on the whole, whether we look back on the slow 
march of historical realities or forward to the flying 
shadows of coming events, we find that the s t rength of 
the empire lies in the freedom of the const i tuent nation-
alities, — freedom, tha t is to say, in proportion to their 
political capacities, — and the advantage to the mother 
country lies in the i r affection. Instead of seeking to 
" t ighten ties," the ideal should be to enlarge the sym-
pathies ; and instead of t ry ing to barter government for 
revenues, the people of this country should endeavour 
more and more to govern by consent ; and instead of 
creat ing new councils and formal dignities in the style 
of empires in the last stages of decay, they should be con-
ten t with the sincere homage of imitation by the colonial 
assemblies.1 
1 The article on Colonies in Palgrave's Dictionary gives a useful bibli-
ography and r^sumfe. See also Lewis 's Government of Dependencies 
(Ed. Lucas) , Intro . , pp. xliv-lxii, and Chs. VI . - IX . 
C H A P T E R XVI. 
T H E RELATION OF POLITICAL ECONOMY TO MORALITY 
AND CHRISTIANITY. 
§ 1. Credo in Unum Deum. The purely negative atti-
tude hitherto adopted in the present work toward cognate 
moral and religious enquiries has been criticised and is 
liable to be misunderstood ; limitation is mistaken for de-
nial and toleration for indifference. Accordingly in this 
concluding chapter I propose to just ify the procedure and 
at the same time to get r id of the misunderstanding by 
resorting to a simple dogmatic method. I shall indicate, 
without argument, the connections between economic and 
moral and religious problems as they are presented to my 
own mind after this prolonged concentration on economic 
principles and methods. With every thought and every 
phrase I find myself in touch with deep feelings and keen 
intellectual controversies; and although certain great 
central ideas seem to stand out all the more clearly, I am 
forced to admit that with other minds it may be different. 
Thus the previous limitation of the field and the scientific 
method adopted seem justified. 
At the same time, also, the present dogmatic statement 
of these great central ideas ought to get rid of the mis-
understanding, so far at least as the present writer is con-
cerned, that the study of political economy leads to 
intellectual agnosticism and to moral pessimism. On the 
contrary the economist also is forced to begin his creed 
with the expression of belief in the unity of t ru th and 
in the reality of moral law : Credo in xinum Deum. 
§ 2. The Limitations of Economic Methods. From the 
standpoint hitherto taken up in this work economic ideas 
differ from ethical and religious ideas in two respects. 
427 
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First: The main business of the economist is to de-
scribe, classify, and analyse a certain order of social facts, 
and political economy is t reated as a positive science. 
And al though the historical and actual moralities and 
religions of the world may also be t reated from the posi-
tive standpoint , such a t rea tment can only be regarded as 
prel iminary by the moral philosopher and the theologian. 
The essence of ethics is to lay down the basis of r ight 
conduct, and so far as conduct is concerned the essence of 
religion is to furnish a spiritual basis for morality. The 
ethical ought cannot be derived from the observation of 
what is, or what has been. All grea t advances in morali ty 
have begun wi th conflicts with common opinion and prac-
tice ; what ought to be continually transcends what i s ; 
equally as regards the most advanced civilisations and the 
highest minds of individuals the actual always falls short 
of the ideal. 
Suppose, for example, tha t it is proved on the best of evi-
dence tha t economic progress, as measured by the increase 
of wealth, or more generally of material comfort, has been 
promoted by the growth of freedom of contract and com-
petition, it does not follow tha t therefore such freedom 
ought to be regarded as the ideal of the State ; nor, on the 
other hand, if it could be shown (as the socialists contend) 
tha t under present conditions the industrial freedom of 
individuals re tards economic progress, does it follow tha t 
such freedom is to be condemned. The deeper questions 
remain to be answered : Wha t is the moral worth of free-
dom? W h a t is the moral worth of material comfor t? 
And to these questions political economy regarded as a 
positive science has no answer. This reflection leads to 
a second distinction between economic and ethical and 
religious ideas. 
Secondly: The na ture of man is not satisfied by ma-
terial wealth and comfort even in their most extended 
interpretat ion. Besides the economic wants there are the 
moral needs ; and just as thirs t is not satisfied with bread 
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nor hunger with water, so also the moral needs of man are 
not to be satisfied by the acquisition and consumption of 
wealth. In the primary wants there is no subst i tut ion. 
Solitude is the most awful of all punishments ; man can-
not live his life without relations with his fel lows; tha t 
is to say, he cannot live without morality, for life with-
out some kind of morali ty is madness or imbecility. 
Morality is a pr imary want . 
Nor can a man choose his morali ty as he chooses the 
fashion of a garment . Conformity to custom or public 
opinion is not enough. Custom and opinion must submit 
to a higher test. Beyond the moral needs, as determined 
largely by human sympathies, are the spiri tual longings. 
Man by his nature desires not only to have r ight dealings 
with his fellows, but he longs also to be in communion 
wi th the spirit of the universe. There is no rest for the 
spirit of man except in communion with God ; and the 
soul demands from day to clay the ref reshment of spiri tual 
rest as earnestly as the body demands natural sleep. And 
thus we are led back to the oldest of all speculative en-
quir ies : How can a man by searching find out Gocl? His 
reason unaided is plainly inadequate to the task. Let any 
man who for the moment seems upl i f ted by his reason to 
a comprehension of the spirit of the universe consider 
within himself tha t all this vaunted reason is lodged in a 
perishable brain, and let him t ry to think how the knowl-
edge of the universe can be held by so small a bit of pulp. 
How can the brain of a man be a call office for all the 
telephones of the universe ? 
§ 3. Christianity and Economics. But this very help-
lessness and insignificance of man's reason prepares the 
way for the message of Christ . " I am the way, the t ru th , 
and the life : no man cometh unto the Fa ther but by 
me." Men only know Christ th rough his manhood and 
as much of God and of eternal life as is thereby revealed. 
The unity of nature is only realised by the union of man 
with Gocl. Fai th in Christ is at the same time as simple 
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and as inexhaustible as the belief in the uniformity of 
nature. Fai th also implies the uni ty of all t ru th . A n d 
the essence of Chris t iani ty as thus conceived remains as 
unshaken as the principle of the uniformity of nature by 
any changes in scientific conceptions or by any modifica-
tions of historical criticism. 
For rational proof Chris t iani ty may also use the induc-
tive methods. I t may appeal to the method of agreement : 
Day by day the risen Christ is revealed to thousands and 
millions as surely as the risen s u n ; to the keen intellect 
and to the simple child, to the s trong and to the weak, to 
the l iving and to the dying, the message comes: the word 
is nigh thee even in thy mouth and in thy heart . This 
simple universali ty of the Christ ian faith is one rational 
test of its t ru th , the multiplicity and variety of its results 
is another. Chris t iani ty offers itself to continuous experi-
ment and constantly furnishes by the lives of all kinds of 
men s tar t l ing examples of the method of difference. 
Al though we cannot ascend by means of economic or even 
of moral conceptions to the great t ru ths of Christ iani ty 
which rest on the personality of Christ , we may reverse the 
process and descend by these t ru ths to economic and social 
problems. The Christ ian religion is a practical rel igion; 
i t is not only a system of theism which gives the key to the 
uni ty of na ture and of knowledge, but it is a system of life. 
The appeal to Christ is the ul t imate appeal. I t is, more-
over, an appeal tha t must be made wi th the highest str iving 
of which the soul is capable. The man of science will 
make no progress by simply appealing to the uniformity 
of nature, nor the Christ ian by simply repeating his creed 
and saying his prayers. I t is al together out of harmony 
with the idea of Chris t iani ty to suppose tha t every par-
t icular individual is to receive in re turn for his daily 
prayers a continuous succession of particular miracles; 
the spiri tual life would be choked and the world revert to 
chaos with such an abundance of signs. Of every Chris-
tian prayer ' t h y will be done in e a r t h ' is the foundation. 
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But if the part icular i ty of continuous signs and wonders 
is unreasonable, it is al together reasonable and indeed 
necessary to suppose tha t the teaching of Christ and com-
munion with Christ should be applied to the conduct of 
life, including the ordinary business of life or what is em-
braced in economic affairs. I shall t ry , then, to indicate 
how the great t ru ths of Christ ianity may be applied to 
economic problems. 
I t may, however, be objected tha t the history and even 
the present practice of Christ iani ty reveal such diversities 
of conduct tha t no central t ru ths or accepted rules are 
discoverable. And, indeed, the history of the churches and 
of Christ ianity is to a great extent a lamentable history, 
a record of contentions and hatreds, and the book is not 
yet closed. The strongest a rgument and the most popular 
from time immemorial against Christ iani ty is found in the 
taun t ing quest ion: How can jjeople believe in Christ and 
do these th ings? To one unversed in theology the reply 
is suggested tha t when man becomes Christ ian he does 
not also become Christ and G o d ; he remains a feeble, pas-
sionate, ignorant man. If we accept the gospels in the 
tradi t ional form, we find that even his chosen disciples 
forsook and denied Christ , when he was before them to see 
with their eyes and touch with their hands, and the air 
was still filled with the noise of his miracles. If the foun-
dation rock of the Catholic Church became as quicksand, 
what may be expected of the popes, prelates, and common 
laymen ? 
But at this point there emerges another great Christ ian 
doctrine : imperfect faith is continually restored by repent-
ance. ' For every sin and every failure there is a remedy, 
and thus even through sin itself the spiri tual life is renewed. 
This doctrine, like every other, is liable to degradation, but 
in its pur i ty it is no more than is implied in Christ ian 
hope and humi l i t y : humil i ty shows the liability to sin, 
and hope the way to restoration. A n d what is t rue of the 
individual Christian is t rue also of the Christ ian Church. 
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§ 4. The Joyousness of Christianity. I t has sometimes 
been held, both in thought and practice, tha t the Christ ian 
should abandon the world and betake himself to a wilder-
ness to live a purely spiri tual life. Such a reading of 
Christ iani ty seems to discover but a small f r agment of 
t r u th . Prayer in solitude and steadfast control of the 
passions may be necessary for the highest exaltation of 
the spiritual life, bu t continued solitude and total repres-
sion of natural feelings are a species of self-slaughter 
al together unchrist ian. The Son of man came eating and 
dr inking, and his miracles assuaged physical wants and 
sufferings. A n d even if the higher criticism of the day 
has abandoned the matter , it has not abandoned the mean-
ing, of the miracles. The gospel itself was proclaimed as 
good t idings — that is the very meaning of the message. 
I t is surely s t range tha t of all the doctrines of Christ the 
one tha t is most forgot ten is tha t his yoke is easy and his 
burden is l ight. Joyousness of heart is the very f ru i t and 
bloom of Christian fai th. Christ himself made people 
joyous wi th food and health, and he commanded the rich 
to give to the poor, not only sympathy, but material goods. 
He went about doing good, and one regular accompaniment 
of this good was the relief of bodily wants. He healed 
the sick and a f te rward ordered them to glorify God. T h e 
satisfaction of physical wants is not only in accordance 
with Christ ian t ru th , but a grea t par t of Christian conduct 
is concerned with such satisfaction. 
§ 5. Christianity and the Family. Again, the teaching 
of Chris t regards the family and the family affections as 
good. God himself is the Father , and Christ the Son. 
Lit t le children are blessed and of such is the kingdom of 
heaven. The first miracle is to give joy to a marriage f eas t ; 
the last words of Christ commend his mother to John. The 
Mother of Christ has glorified motherhood to mill ions; 
the Madonna is the ideal of purity. And thus the first 
lesson of Christ ianity is respect to the family, to women, 
and to children ; for richer, for poorer, the home must be 
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kept sacred. And here, as throughout , Chris t iani ty 
answers to a fundamenta l want of human na ture — the 
sacredness of the hear th . But with human beings, as they 
are, the goodness of family life itself demands a basis of 
material well-being. Thus it becomes the first du ty of 
every fa ther to provide for his wife and children the 
elements of decency and comfort . If they ask for bread, 
will he give them a stone ? And, as the world goes, in 
order to make this provision it is necessary for men to 
work, and thus labour ranks as a pr imary Christian duty . 
Here also a natural want is satisfied ; sloth is repugnant 
to the heal th of the body and of the soul ; the slug on a 
cabbage stalk is no model for the Christian. 
§ 6. Christianity and Labour. May the Christ ian per-
form any kind of work ? May he make money out of any 
lawful occupation ? The answer would appear to be tha t 
the Christian ought not to do any work which his con-
science condemns or tha t is likely to degrade himself in 
his spiri tual being, or, what is at least as important , the 
higher selves of other people. Bu t I take it t ha t it by no 
means follows tha t the Christ ian ought to choose for him-
self a nice cleanly employment in which he will meet with 
neither trials nor temptat ions. On the contrary, the 
example of Christ and the virtues tha t are in harmony 
with his teaching should ra ther impel the Christ ian to 
choose the work in which he is most needed and for which 
he is best qualified. Take a test case : May a Christian 
become a soldier ? A t first s ight kil l ing and maiming men 
seems accursed — a th ing to be avoided at the risk of one's 
own life. But the question arises : Wi l l not war be in-
finitely worse if lef t entirely to unbelievers ? Has not 
warfare been softened by even the partial acceptance of 
Christ ian principles ? Christ himself sought af ter wretch-
edness and misery, and where is there greater suffer ing 
than on the battlefield and in the t rack of war ? I t is not 
simply by refusing to enlist as a soldier tha t the Christian 
will best repress and restrain war, any more than by refus-
voL. I I I . — 2 F 
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ing to become a magistrate he will repress crime. W a r 
in the ideal is only par t of the administrat ion of justice. 
There is, however, a glamour about war, and actual war-
fare calls for so great virtues, t ha t i t seems easy to show 
tha t a good soldier ought to be a good Christian, and re-
corded history gives abundant i l lustrations. But there 
are many occupations in the world which are l ightened by 
no glamour and are rather blackened by public contempt 
— they are the refuge of the outcast and the feeble. Sordid, 
grimy, and ugly, they seem to make man far lower than the 
beasts of the field. Can a Christian choose such w o r k ? 
Here and there it may be the choice will be deliberately 
made, and a devoted Christ ian man will carry his l i t t le 
lantern where the blackness is deepest. But for the 
average man the question as pu t is wrongly put . I t 
should rather b e : Can such as feebleness and misfortune, 
or crimes and sins, have degraded to the lowest social 
castes — can such become Christ ians? A n d then the 
answer comes back, loud and clear, tha t it was for SUQII as 
these tha t Christ came into the world. A n d even those 
who reduce Chris t to a man and his miracles to a myth are 
fain to admit tha t of all religions Christ iani ty is the 
religion of the l o s t ; it is the one religion of consolation.1 
But for tunate ly for human na ture and mankind these 
extreme cases of war and misery do not fairly represent 
the labour of life. The analysis of labour by the econ-
omists has given a sure foundation to the mediaeval belief 
tha t labour ought to elevate and pur i fy the soul. The 
work of the world under modern conditions calls for the 
highest efforts of mind and body. No man works by him-
self and for himself ; at every point there is scope for the 
exercise of the Christ ian spirit ; laws, customs, regulations, 
1 One of the most striking instances of the practical power of Christian-
ity is afforded by the record of a medical officer of convicts — a layman, 
Dr. Colin A. Browning, R.N., The Convict Ship and England's Exiles. 
Between 1831 and 1848 he was Surgeon Superintendent of Convict Ships 
between England and Tasmania. 
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and manners, need to be Christianised as much as indi-
viduals, but it is only by and through individuals tha t any 
spiritual advance can be made. The patience of Chris-
t ianity must be reconciled with fai th and hope and courage : 
" Agayns the horrible sin of Accidie [i.e. s loth] and the 
branches of the same there is a vir tue tha t is called Forti-
tudo or St rengthe ." 1 
§ 7. Christianity and J.he Consumption of Wealth. The 
latest analysis of economic consumption may also be used 
to present a great Christian t r u t h in a new l ight . The 
law of diminishing uti l i ty (or of satiable wants ) shows 
tha t the consumption of wealth beyond a certain point 
gives diminishing satisfaction and finally ends in wretched-
ness. Thus temperance in all th ings is good economy, 
and only a portion of t ime and of life should be given to 
the satisfaction of material wants . The Emperor Vitel-
lius is said to have devoured ten thousand pounds ' worth 
of our money in a day's meals. Had he been a Christian, 
he would have eaten less and enjoyed his meals more. 
Bu t Christian teaching goes far beyond the prudence of 
hedonism. In the ranking of wants the physical needs are 
not the first. Nor is such a position superhuman or ex-
t ravagant . In most honourable vocations physical com-
for t and life itself are often considered of secondary 
importance ; men give their lives to ideas; of the idea of 
du ty the du ty to oneself is a very small par t : " the courage 
of a soldier," says the great historian 2 of carnage, " is found 
to be the cheapest and most common quali ty of human 
na tu re . " 
§ 8. Christianity and Exchange. The analysis of ex-
change reveals a Christian character, and also points to 
the need for Christian guidance. I t is no paradox to say 
tha t exchange is reciprocal chari ty ; it blesseth him tha t 
gives and him tha t takes. No man, says Adam Smith, 
ever saw a clog exchange a bone with another dog. The 
1 " T h e Parson 's Ta le , " Skeats 's Chaucer, Vol. IX, p. 616. 
2 Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Ch. XXVI . 
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barbaric man is a dog in a manger ; he keeps for himself 
what he cannot use. The opening of markets is the be-
ginning of chari ty. Exchange is in origin an exchange 
of gifts , and even to this day every good exchange is also 
a good g i f t . The evils of exchange arise when charity 
and good feeling are absent, and force and f raud simulate 
the forms of exchange. 
There are, moreover, things that ought not to be bought 
and sold : exchange may be an exchange of sins ; in the 
modern world also the " s i n - e a t e r " drives a good t rade. 
In the l imitation of exchange Christ iani ty has played a 
leading par t ; what shall it profit a man if he gain the 
whole world and lose his own soul ? The money-power is 
an enormous power. Spending money means demand, 
demand guides supply, supply calls for labour, and labour 
is the life of man. Every buyer of evil things is a door 
of evil and a breeder of sin. To spend money well is a 
harder task than to earn money well ; in earning the task 
is generally prescribed, but in spending the spender takes 
the initiative ; it is no longer passive obedience, but a 
good will, tha t is required. 
§ 9. Christianity and Property. The analysis of pri-
vate proper ty also brings to light the influence and the 
requirements of Christ iani ty. Labour, effort and enter-
prise, contract and gif t , respect for peace and avoidance 
of quarrels, such are the economic bases of private prop-
er ty . The r ight of property viewed from the economic 
s tandpoint is a means to an end, and the end is the eco-
nomic welfare of the State. In economics there is no 
prescription of insti tutions, and the prescriptive r ight of 
individuals is l imi ted; any form of property that is in-
jurious to the economic activities of the State so far stands 
condemned. In particular, the laws regulat ing inheri-
tance and bequest, and the laws governing the appropria-
tion of natural agents, must be regarded as parts of a 
system, and not as conferr ing absolute r ights on individ-
uals. In economics, still less than in law, are there abso-
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lute r ights ; and in religion the r ights of man are the 
g i f t s of God. 
The development of economic societies has been accom-
panied by an increasing socialisation of property, alike in 
its acquisition and in its uses. A man can only acquire 
wealth with the cooperation of mult i tudes of his fe l lows; 
for himself and by himself man is more helpless than a 
lost dog. 
And a man can only use his w e a l t h — i f by use we 
mean enjoyment — with the cooperation of his fellows. 
Of the social conception of property Christ iani ty is the 
recognised and the strongest advocate. The Christ ian 
ascribes his wealth, not only to the cooperation of man and 
society, but to the cooperation of God himsel f ; and he 
strives, or ought to strive, to use his wealth for the 
greater glory of God. 
The Christ ian conception of property may be compared 
to feudalism, with Christ as the overlord. The Christ ian 
becomes Christ 's man, and devotes not only his property, 
bu t his life and his bravery, to his service. Christ ianity is 
the beau ideal of chivalry. Bu t just as the soul of chiv-
alry dies within the forms of heraldry, and just as feudal 
r ights become prescribed and l imited by parchments, so 
also the Christian idea of du ty becomes limited by creeds, 
and what ought to be the ful l and free g i f t s of the whole 
estate and the whole being, degenerate into pei^percorn 
rents paid th rough an agent. In one respect, however, 
Christ ianity differs from feudalism and other human 
insti tut ions : Christianity, af ter being shrunken and 
shrivelled, rises again and again to the ful l glory of its 
youth . 
Thus it appears tha t the economic analysis of property, 
which begins with self-interest, leads up to charity, just 
as Christian endeavour, tha t begins with a passionate cry 
for personal salvation, for eternal life, for self-communion 
wi th God, leads up to chari ty in that wide spiri tual mean-
ing in which it is greater than faith and hope. 
4 3 8 250 ECONOMIC. F U N C T I O N S OF G O V E R N M E N T . 
§ 10. Christian Charity. The enquiry in the present 
book began with the assumption tha t wealth is distrib-
u ted through the freedom of competition and of contract 
of individuals ; next the effects of various forms of vol-
un ta ry associations were examined ; and, finally, the ad-
vantages and limits of State control and management were 
considered. The t rend of the a rgument is tha t the failures 
and defects of simple individualism may be partially met 
by voluntary associations; where voluntary association 
fails the State may to some extent beneficially in tervene; 
in any case a certain measure of government is necessary 
to preserve the peace and to insure the conditions neces-
sary to the freedom both of individuals and of societies ; 
and thus the State not only contr ibutes to, but is the foun-
dation of, economic welfare. This a rgument is completed 
by the position tha t Christ ian chari ty is the foundation 
both of freedom and of law, and also provides remedies 
for failures beyond the reach of the natura l propensities of 
mankind or the rational systems of law. 
To begin with the simplest case, namely, the giving of 
material wealth for charitable purposes, the Christian 
ought to consider himself as holding his property in t rus t , 
to make of it the best use possible. Nor is there anything 
ext ravagant or emotional in such a view ; 1 it is indeed an 
1 Cf. Gladstone's Financial Statements, p. 430, " What a man wills 
on his deathbed, when he can no longer keep it in his own hands, is not 
charity in the same high and sound sense which the word carries when a 
man gives what it is his own to give and to e n j o y . " Mr. Andrew Car-
negie has followed the spirit of Mr. Gladstone's ut terance, though he has 
not as yet accepted his particular suggestion to build a great cathedral. 
The deed, creating a t rust for the Universities of Scotland, begins: " I, 
Andrew Carnegie, of New York and of Skibo in the county of Sutherland, 
having retired from active business and deeming it to be my duty and one 
of my highest privileges to administer the wealth which has come to me 
as a trustee on behalf of others, and entertaining the confident belief that 
one of the best means of discharging that t rus t is by providing funds for 
improving and extending the opportunities for scientific study and research 
in the Universities of Scotland, my native land, . . . " The argument 
in the text could find no better concrete illustration. 
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argument tha t might be advanced by the most serene 
intellect in the clear air of a mountain top at sunrise. 
No man has created his proper ty or earned his income 
solely by his own effort ; there are not only the contribu-
tions of nature or of God, but there are the contributions 
of mult i tudes of individuals and of many societies. I t is 
only common fairness to take account of these contribu-
tory agencies, and to direct to charitable purposes what 
cannot be distributed to the part icular individuals and 
societies concerned. The rough-hewn laws of civilised 
States permit an exclusive use and abuse of property that 
is not permit ted by the finer touch of Chr i s t i an i ty ; 
Christian chari ty extends far beyond the justice of 
codes and the expediency of polit ics; it is mercy tha t is 
not s trained. 
But this idea of good s tewardship does not involve 
an indiscriminate surrender of wealth and the complete 
abandonment of proper ty . The wealth of any individual 
compared with the possible claims upon it is relatively 
very small. There are numbers of excellent charities, all 
in need of funds, and there are mul t i tudes of individuals 
who might be benefited by pecuniary assistance. F i rs t 
come, first served, would be an abandonment of the pru-
dence of the good steward for the carelessness of the 
spendthr i f t . To give well is the most difficult of tasks, 
and in the present age it is not so much the du ty of giv-
ing tha t needs enforcement, as the methods of giving tha t 
need illumination. 
Christian charity, moreover, is far wider than mere 
almsgiving, and the Revised Version does well to adopt 
the literal translation, " l o v e . " In this sense chari ty is a 
rule of life, or a test of r ight living, tha t is to be applied 
in every line of conduct. I t is the root of honest work, 
of just saving, of heal thy consumption, of fair dealing 
wi th others. A n d when contracts and rules and laws fail, 
and even when the natural hear t of man tu rns away with 
repugnance, Christ ian chari ty steps in with open hand 
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and open h e a r t ; it br ings material help indeed, bu t it 
brings also sympathy and good feeling and honour to God. 
W e are apt to consider the mediaeval casuist as the uni-
versal provider of excuses for sinners. There was no 
doubt a degraded casuistry of this k ind at a t ime when 
even sinners felt the need of excuses. But the t rue 
mediaeval casuistry was an earnest a t tempt to moralise 
economy and to spiritualise morality, and to give the 
Christ ian a practical answer to the cases of conscience 
wi th which he was troubled. W h e n the reformed Church 
abandoned the degraded form of casuistry, it abandoned 
also to a great ex tent the t rue idea of which it was the 
degradat ion. T h a t idea was to test the ordinary business 
of life by religious principles. The mediaeval theolo-
gians were also economists, and they never abandoned the 
hope and the belief tha t Christ ian chari ty ought to per-
meate the whole of life. Chaucer 's men and women 
s tudded the land with churches and shr ines ; every mar-
ket place, every guild, every ferry, every town, had its 
pat ron sa in t ; at every twis t and t u r n of life a new 
glimpse of heaven was opened o u t ; the shortest measure 
of time was the time to say a pater noster, the longest the 
t ime to build a cathedral ; and just as all the people knew 
the constellations and the wanderings of the planets, so 
they knew also the lives and vicissitudes of the saints. 
W e moderns leave astronomy to the learned, and the 
saints have vanished like the stars in the l ight of common 
day. I t is t rue, no doubt, tha t the conditions of modern 
indus t ry are different and the same detailed rules of con-
duct are not applicable ; but the same spirit — if we still 
believe in Christ and in Christ ianity — ought to give new • 
rules. Throughou t the whole field of economic enquiry 
there are t ru ths which can only be developed, and abuses 
and defects which can only be remedied, by Christian 
chari ty in the wide sense of love and mercy which sums 
up the teaching of Christ . For the welfare of man free-
dom may do much and law may do much, but alike in 
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moulding character and in f raming laws Christian charity-
ought to take the place tha t in the animal world is held 
by what is now called natural selection. 
The answer, however, to the question : W h a t is char-
i ty ? is as difficult as the answer to the quest ion: W h a t 
is t r u t h ? Perfect chari ty involves perfect knowledge. 
The ways of charity, like the ways of t ru th , are as innumer-
able as the paths of the sea. A n d in both the mind of 
man is driven to one ul t imate postulate — to one guid ing 
star . All the paths of t r u t h must lead up to the being of 
God, and all the paths of charity must lead up to the per-
sonality of Chr i s t ; and in the faith of the Christian, t r u t h 
and charity are one, as God and Christ are one. 
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for risk, 121 seq.; to vested inter-
ests, excessive, 388. 
Competition : and monopoly, in ground-
rents, 103-104, and agricultural 
rents, 107; effect of excessive, 
ou rents, 107-108; progress of com-
petition reuts, 112-113 ; and interest, 
123; diminishes profits of inter-
change, 144; in production, 200-
206, 218-219; in distribution, 206-
210; ideal, 208-210, 219; and trusts, 
215-216; of retail traders, 228; and 
monopoly, as affecting incidence of 
taxes, 294, 305-310, 327, 332, 340-
341; how affected by taxes on com-
modities, 341, 346; stimulated by 
free trade, 365. 
Concentration: in taxation, 287-288; 
in public expenditures, 389. 
Conceptions, ancient, 122-123. 
Constantinople, monopolies and the 
ruin of, 131, 207-208. 
Constant return, see Law. 
Consumer, the: benefits by competi-
tion, 202; the subject of criminal 
law, 239-240; incidence of taxes on, 
293; direct taxes on, 334, 350-351; 
and taxes on commodities, 310-341; 
and free trade, 357-359. 
Consumers' rents, 16, 17 N, 123, 272. 
Consumption: benefits of freedom in, 
190-200, 218; failures of freedom, 
224-227; taxes on, 295, 333-355; and 
Christianity, 435. 
Contract: progress and freedom of, 
23; limited in Saxon times, 26; 
as determining rate of interest in 
ancient Athens, 125; enforcement 
of, as a function of government, 176, 
219, 241-244; contracts in restraint 
of trade, 220, 247; progress from 
status to, as determining incidence 
of taxation, 300, 302, 304 seq.; and 
property in land, 322. 
"Contracting out," 243; and local 
rates, 397. 
Contractors speculative : in Roman Re-
public, 128; muzzled in early Empire, 
130. 
Convenience: in taxation, 286-287; in 
public expenditure, 385-386. 
Cooperation in production, 170-171, 
216-217. 
Corn Laws, 67, 101, 110, 119; and na-
tional independence, 363. 
Corporations: their effect on labour 
and wages, 172; legal, artificial im-
mortality of, 217-218. 
Cossa, L., 295. 
Cost of production : of persons, as a 
measure of economic progress, 11, 
13; real, and cheapness, 15. 
Cottier reuts, in Ireland, 107-108. (Cf. 
112, 124.) 
Cotton manufacture, progress of, 83-
87. 
Cournot, A., 168. 
Credit: rests on metallic basis, 57-58; 
public, 138, 403-415. 
Credo in unum Deum, 427. 
Criminal law as a method of govern-
ment interference, 238-241. 
" C r o w n " gold, 37, 42. 
Cunningham, W., 19n, 21, 22, 92, 98n, 
112 n , 127 u , 130 n , 131, 134 n , 188 n , 
207 n . 
Currency: scarcity of, 43; depreciation 
in weight and value, 48-49; under 
Roman Empire, 131. 
Custom: substitution of money pay-
ments for, 23, 26: and rents, 111, 
140 seq.; as protecting the villein, 
133,134; and competition, 211; and 
sumptuary regulations, 240; and in-
cidence of taxation, 300-304. 
Customs duties: British, reform of, 
287-288; and excise, 292, 297, 301, 
333; origin of the "ancient and 
great customs," 336; British, in the 
nineteenth century, 337; restraint of 
trade, 351-352, 353; yield, 353; and 
free trade, 356. 
D a n e g e l d , 260, 301. 
Davidson, J. , 419 n. 
Debasement of currency, 31; the Tudor 
(1543), 32, 33-34, 40; its effect on 
prices, 52-55, 62-63. 
Debt, law of: 123 seq.; in Athens, 124-
127; in Roman Republic and Empire, 
127-132; in Middle Ages, 132-136,240. 
Debts, public, 138, 263-264, 40M15; 
local, 401. 
Decker. Sir M., 351. 
Deductive method exemplified, lliseq. 
(See also Taxation, incidence.) 
Deer forests, incidence of exceptional 
tax on rent, 313-314. 
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- Defence: cost of, 370 seq., 420; a na-
tional interest, 393. 
Deficit financing, 407, 408. 
- De Foe, 83. 
Demand and supply: of barley, 09-71; 
of building land, 103; interest deter-
mined by, 138; dependence of profits 
on, 144; and relatively low wages in 
agriculture, 157, 158; and women's 
wages, 163-105; paramount in deter-
mining wages, 172; of religious ser-
vices, 197-200; trade unions and, 
203; in ideal distribution, 209, 210, 
235-6; effects of a tax on, 304-
310, 340; and Christianity, 436. 
— Demand: benefits of freedom of, 190-
200; failures, 224-227. 
Democratic despotism, dangers of, 
252, 253. 
Denton, 19 n, 20 n, 21 n. 
^ Dependencies, British government of, 
419 seq. 
Depreciation : in weight of coins, 33 
seq.; does it imply depreciation in 
value? 48 seq.; of currency under 
Roman Empire, 131; of silver, its 
effect on gold prices, 58; lessened 
influence of, 45. 
— Devas, C. S., 167 n, 188 n, 198 n. 
Devonshire, Duke of, 113 N. 
Dictionary of Political Economy. (See 
Palgrave.) 
Differential duties, 356, 422. 
— Diminishing: (1) return (see Law); 
(2) utility, ib. 
Direct taxes, 288; definition and inci-
dence, 293-295, 298-9; a mark of 
degradation in antiquity, 333; on 
consumer, 350-1; compared with 
indirect, 353-355. 
Discount, the essence of interest, 147. 
Discount financing, 412. 
Discounting the future, 147, 227. 
Distribution: progress in, 24-7, 28; 
economic ideal of, 25, 28, 110, 210, 
219, 230-236; variety of factors 
affecting, 178; friction in, 180; 
government interference to secure 
equality of, 182-186; benefits of 
freedom of, 206-220; under perfect 
competition, 208-210; failures of 
freedom, — the economic test ap-
plied to rent, profits, wages, 229-
234; and the criminal law, 240; tax-
ation and, 283; the incidence of 
taxation a problem of, 300. 
_ Disutility: economic progress in terms 
of, 13-18,28; and ideal distribution. 
209; of taxation, 269; minimum, as 
ideal in taxation, 270, 378. 
Division of labour: increasing, 149-
150; and competition, 205, 210. 
Domestic servants: wages of, 161,162, 
165; better conditions of work, 205; 
independent bargaining, 210; num-
bers in United Kingdom, 211 N. 
Do well, S., 262 n, 270, 288 n, 302 n, 
335 n , 337 n . 
Drawbacks, 357. 
Dreyfus ease, the, 195. 
Dynamical conditious and equitable 
distribution, 236. 
E A R L E , 259 . 
Earning capacity, as a measure of eco-
nomic progress, 11, 13, 28. 
Earnings, see Wages. 
Economic: calculus, 272-273; condi-
tions, their complexity, 66; ideals, 
175-188 (see also Distribution); men, 
180; rents, 104, 107, 112-113, 114 
seq., negative, 113, taxes on, 311-
315, 317 seq.; utilities, 185, 391. 
(Cf. Utility.) 
Economic Journal, 40 N, 51 N, 160 N, 
270 n , 298 n , 308 n . 
Economic Progress, see Progress. 
Economy: as a canon of taxation, 287; 
and expenditure, 3S6-389; in local 
finance, 401; of high wages. (See 
Wages.) 
Eden, Sir F. M., 70 n, 74, 77 n, 79, 
112 N. 
Edgeworth, F. Y., 270 n, 298 n, 299 n, 
308 N, 317 u. 
Education : its cost as measuring eco-
nomic progress, 11-12, 28; and util-
ity, 15; tends to be made a free gift, 
24; its influence on employment of 
women, 165; not a purely economic 
question, 177; freedom of demand 
in, 192 seq.; preferable to protec-
tion, 365; a class of public expendi-
ture, 370 seq.; need not be free in 
all cases, 380; indirect effects, 382; 
and the poor rate, 390; expenditure 
on, 399 n . 
Edward I., 4, 20, 394, 403. 
Edward III., 336, 403. 
Efficiency: (a) of labour, adjustment 
of reward (see Adjustment) ; and 
taxation, 276; (b) of money, and 
economic progress, 57; and prices, 
62-63. 
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Egoism, 22.3-224. 
Eighteenth century: enclosures, 109; 
competition rents, 112; improve-
ments and reut, 110,114; and public 
credit, 404. 
Elasticity of demand and supply, and 
incidence of taxes, 300-310, 315. 319, 
332, 340, 340, 347. 
Eliot, George, 108. 
Elizabeth, 32, 37, 55, 112, 196, 245, 397, 
398. 
Ellison, 83 n, 84, 86, 87 n. 
Elton, 259 N. 
Enclosures, 109-110. 
England: in the fifteenth ceutury, 8, 
19-20; progress in morals and man-
ners, 20-21; Puritanism in seven-
teenth cent ury, 21; cheap education, 
24; progress in distribution, 25 seq.; 
monetary history, 31 seq.; history 
of prices, 47 seq., of relative prices, 
65 seq.; cotton manufacture, 84 seq.; 
roads, 92; canals aud railways, 63-96; 
ocean shipping, freights, exports 
and imports, 96-98; progress in ag-
riculture and rents 105 seq., 149, in 
interest, 132-140, in occupations aud 
wages, 150 seq.; contracts in re-
straint of trade, void, 220; laws 
that were "wr i t t en in blood," 239; 
development of taxation, 259 seq., 
301-302; history of local rates, 394-9. 
(See also United Kingdom.) 
Equali ty: before the law, 23,184, 284; 
of incomes, as an ideal, 182 seq.; 
of pure interest, 137-138, 328; of 
profits, 327 , 330; of taxation, 266-
285, 289, 299, 321, 331, 350; of public 
expenditure, 378-384. 
Ethic v. Ethnic races, 5. 
Ethics, and Economics, 427 seq. 
Evasion of taxes, 261-262, 278, 299, 321, 
332, 351, 376. 
Evolution, the theory of: 4; economic 
progress and, 9; a consequence of 
its acceptance, 192, 394. 
Exchange, 16: progress in, 22-24, 28; 
part of production, 98, UK), 229; and 
profits, 142-144: variety of factors, 
178; imperfections in mechanism, 
180: and criminal law, 239; and 
Christianity, 4:15-436. 
Exchange value, see Value. 
Exchequer: of the Jews, 134N, 135; 
public, golden rule for, 383. 
Excise duties: an attribute of liberty, 
3.33, 334; history in England, 335; 
British, in nineteenth century, 337-
340; incidence of, 340-342; evils in-
cident to, 352-353. 
Expenditure, public, 248; why treated 
after revenue, 254-257; adjustment 
for social ends,283-284; its character, 
comparison with taxation, 369-377; 
principles of, 378-390; -principles of 
local, 400-402. 
Experiments, State: in expenditure, 
383. 
Exports: of wool, 77-79 , 90, 100; of 
coal and iron, 88-90; excess of im-
ports over, 97-98; the payment for 
imports, 358, 360; prohibitions aud 
duties Oil, 78, 90,110, 347,363 ; bounty 
on, 101, 360; incidence of duties on, 
90 , 344-349, 363 , 365-366, on coal 
(1901), 347-349. 
Expropriation of land: extravagant 
compensation, 388. 
F a c t o r y system in Britain, 15. 
Faculty theory: of taxation, 269; 275-
281: of expenditure, 381-382. 
Family, the, and Christiauity, 432. 
Farming the revenues, under Roman 
Republic, 128; aud Empire, 131. 
Federation, imperial, 423-426. 
Feudalism: influence of break up on 
progress, 64, 105, 132; taxation, 260, 
300 seq.; and the Christian concep-
tion of property, 437. 
Field, C. O., 118n. 
Fifteenth century in Eugland, 8,19-21. 
Fifteenths and tenths: national tax on 
movables, 261, 296 , 336; levied as 
local rates, 395. 
Finance: (a) public, see Debts, Ex-
penditure, Revenue, Taxation; (b) 
local, see Local finance. 
Fine arts, no continuous advance in, 
' 45. 
Fleta, quoted, 111. 
Flint, R., 4, 29 N. 
Foreign : (1) coins, in England, 34, 36-
37, 38, 39 , 41; (2) exchanges and 
prices, 58-59; (3) trade, and agri-
cultural prices, 67,120, and relative 
prices, 82 seq.; has made agricultural 
land free, 113, of ancient Athens, 
125-127, a minor part of total trade, 
368, compared with colonial trade of 
Great Britain, 421-423. 
Foreigner, taxing the, 289-290, 348, 
365-366. 
Formal justice, see Justice. 
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Fortuity, the principle of, 90, 168. I 
Fourier, 82. 
Fox, Mr. Wilson, 149, 150n, 155 n, 100. 
Foxwell, H. S., 27. 
France: wages in, 155, 100, 161; com-
mercial treaty with, 365. 
Freedom: rational, 7; and material 
progress, 23 ; contracted under 
Roman Empire, 131; revival of, 132; 
in production aud distribution, and 
the principle of maximum utility, 
182; its benefits, 190-220; its essence, 
221-222, 234, 237; limited by govern-
ment interference, 252-253; as an 
ideal of the State, 428; Christian 
charity its foundation, 438. 
Free trade: and agricultural prices, 07; 
lessens influence of seasons on prices, 
80; and export duty on coal, iK>; 
lessens economic superiority of land-
lord, 113; and foreign imports, 151; 
progress towards, 204; great merit 
of the policy, 349; v. protection, 356-
368; meaning of free trade, 356; as 
affecting (a) the consumer, 357; (b) 
home industries, 358; assumptions 
of the general argument for, 359-362; 
theoretical exceptions to, 362-366; 
negative argument for, 366-369; 
early idea of, 395; within the British 
Empire, 422, 426. 
Freights, railway aud shipping, pro-
gress in, 94-98. 
French Revolution, 222. 
Functions of government: economic 
and other distinguished, 175-178; 
necessary and optional, 175«e^.,375, 
379, 381-382, 389. (See also Govern-
ment.) 
G a r d e n s mediaeval, 79. 
General prices, progress aud, 46-64. 
(See also Prices.) 
George, Henry, 101. 
German Emperor, 238 N. 
Germany: usury in, 134; customs aud 
excise, 353: direct taxes, 354; Zoll-
verein, a ^ , 367. 
Gibbon, 130, 131, 207, 208 N, 435. 
Giffen, Sir R., 12, 61 n, 97, 405 n. 
Gifts: forced, in mediaeval revenues, 
261, 394; inter vivos, 278, 299; taxes 
on, 331, 332. 
Gladstone, W. E., 229, 256, 266 y, 274, 
277, 285, 289 n , 337, 339, 355, 369, 379, 
383, 409, 414, 438 n . 
Gold: currency in England, 32 N, 34 
seq.; bezants, 34; first native coin-
age iu Europe, 34, 38; pennies is-
sued, 34-35; florins, 35; the noble, 
35-36; sovereign first coined (1489), 
36; crown gold, 37; the unite, the 
guinea, 37-38, 42; made sole stand-
ard (1816), 42, 43; most suitable as 
such, 45; causes hastening its adop-
tion, 45; effect of increased supplies 
ou prices, 57-58; probable general 
adoption, 59. 
Gomme, L., 18, 325. 
Gosehen, G. J., 385 n, 412. 
Government: (1) functious, economic 
and other, 175-178; ou the principles 
of natural liberty, maximum utility 
and Christianity, 178-188; (2) inter-
ference : as regards money, 30 seq.; 
need of general principles, 189—190; 
prima facie grounds for, 221-235; 
methods and limitations, 237-253; 
(a) methods of legal enactment, 
238-244; (6) methods of govern-
mental action, 244-248; limitations, 
240-241, 243-244, 248-253; (3) ex-
penses and revenues, 254-415. (See 
Expenditure, Taxation.) 
Graduated: poll taxes, 260 , 315, 395. 
(Cf. Progressive taxation.) 
Grain, progress and relative prices, 
67-72. 
Grants in aid, 389, 399, 402. 
Great Britain, see United Kingdom. 
Greece, ancient: debt and slavery, 
Solon's legislation, 124-127. 
Greek: conception of the course of 
history, 3-4; colonisation, 416. 
Gresham's Law: exemplified, 35-36, 
38-39, 40, 41-42, 43. 
Grierson : railway rates, 96 n. 
Groats, silver, 34. 
Grote, G., 124 n, 125 n. 
Ground-rents: progress and, 102-104; 
taxation of, 317 seq. 
Gudeman's field, 325-326. 
Guilds, 212, 239. 
Guinea, the, 37-38, 41, 42. 
Guizot, 132. 
H a l l , H . , a36. 
Hallam, H., 119 n, 136 n, 137, 195, 
196 n , 371 n , 384. 
Hamilton, Sir E., 370, 412 N. 
Happiness and wealth, 183 seq. 
Hawkins, Silver Coins of England, 
33 y. 
Hedonistic calculus, 186, 209, 273, 379. 
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Helferich, 287 N. 
Henderson, Folklore of Northern 
Counties, 325 N. 
Henley, Walter de, 112. 
Henry III., 31. 
Henry VII., 20, 36; Morton's fork, 260, 
404. 
Henry VIII., 33, 52, 404. 
Hesiod, 124. 
Hide, the, as a unit of taxation, 260, 
301, 315. 
Hired labour: in ancient Athens, 125; 
deterioration of, under Roman Em-
pire, 131; in modern England, 170-
171. 
— Historical method. 101, 122; and com-
parative, 123, 139, 171, 191 seq., 195, 
258 seq. 
History: materialistic interpretation 
of, 5, 6; ecouomic interpretation of, 
65. 
Hobbes, 244. 
Hoccleve, 19, 20. 
— Holland: ancient Athens compared 
to, 125; the cause of its prosperity, 
139. 
Homer, Henry, 92. 
Honey, rents in, 81. 
Hooker, Mr., 158. 
Hortou, D., Silver Pound, 41 N, 42 n, 
43 n . 
House-rent, taxation of, 298, 319, 334. 
— Houses and furniture of medieval 
English peasants, 76-77. 
— Howell, 73 n. 
Humanity, idea of, 23. 
I d e a l s : economic, 175-188, 208-210; 
in taxation, their use, 399. (Cf. 
269-270.) 
Immaterial wealth: protection of 
property in, 176; freedom of con-
sumption of, 192-200, 227; adultera-
tion of, 229; waste in freedom of 
production, 229; unearned incre-
ment, 233-234. 
Immovable property, as basis of local 
rates, 398-399. 
Imperial federation, 268, 423-426. 
Imports: of wool, 78 ; excess over ex-
ports, 97-98; prohibition of, 3:58, 
356; paid for by exports, 358 , 360; 
incidence of duties on, 342-344, 365-
366. 
Improvements, see Rent. 
Incidence of taxes, see Taxation. 
_ I n c o m e : individualism and inequali-
2 a 
ties in, 182-183, 224 seq.; limitation 
of, 191-192; taxation and minimum 
free, 270-271, 276-277 ; taxation and 
sources of, 273-275, 279-280; taxes 
on the different species, 291. 
Income tax: increasing return in Eng-
land, 8; law, 143 n ; Saladin tithe a 
rudimentary, 260; the British, 273, 
277 , 286, its history, 337-33N, 354, 
355; a progressive tax approved, 
279; in mediaeval municipalities, 
391: and farmers' profits, 396; out-
come of a local, 397-399; levied in-
dependently of local rates, 402. 
Increasing return, see Law. 
India: depreciation of silver, 59 (cf. 
45); "woven wind," 84; English 
Nabobs in, 130; land revenues of, 
303-305; a non-Aryan village cus-
tom, 326; British government, 419, 
420. 
Indifference, see Law. 
Indirect taxes: in United Kingdom, 
271, 288, 293-295; on raw materials, 
338; incidence of, 299, 340-349; com-
pared with direct, 353-355. 
Individualism : and inequalities in in-
come, 182-183; its benefits, 189-220; 
its failures and defects, 221-230, 238, 
375, 438. 
Inductive methods, 430. 
Industrial: domain of the State, 369 N, 
372 seq.; partnership, 214, 217 ; su-
premacy, condition of, 99. 
Industry: modern, complexity of, 150; 
limited by capital, 358; may migrate, 
360, 362. 
Inheritance and bequest, laws of, 246, 
436. 
Ill m a n , A. H., 60 N, 69 N . 
Innes, Cosmo, 20. 
Insurance: the principle recognised 
by the Canonists, 136, 141, 145, 147; 
income tax exemptions on ground 
of, 274; incidence of taxes on, 329. 
Interest: progress and rate of, 122-
140; pure, the result of evolution, 
123, 139, 146 (cf. Usury) ; in what 
sense rate measures industrial prog-
ress, 138-140; origin of percentage 
measurement, 140; and ideal distri-
bution, 232-233; rent and, 314, 321 ; 
incidence of taxes on, 328-329; and 
public debt, 404-405, 411, 413. 
Ireland : roads, 92; land hunger and 
cottier rents, 107-108 ; judicial rents, 
113; parliamentary representation, 
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268; income tax extended to (1853), 
339. 
Italy, mediaeval banking aud credit, 
1 3 6 - 1 3 7 . 
" J A C K ' s l a n d , " 325. 
Jacob, 24. 
Jacobs, J. , 134 n. 
James II., 384. 
Jerome, St., 230. 
Jeunesse dorie, the Roman, 129. 
Jews, the: aud the idea of progress, 
3-4; as money lenders in mediseval 
England, 131, 134, 135, 403. 
Joint products, 69, 78. 
Joint-stock companies, 214, 256. 
Justice: the principle ot formal, 135, 
in taxation, 284-285, in public ex-
penditure, 285, 38:5-384; natural, and 
natural liberty, 179, 181, 209; and 
maximum utility, 182; administra-
tion of, and freedom of demand, 
194-195; and public expenditure, 
373; and war, 434. 
Justi, Von, 371. 
Justinian, 131. 
K a n t i a n imperative, 383. 
Kempis, Thomas a, 187 n. 
Kenyon, 33 n, 34n, 37 n, 40n. 
Knight's fee, 301. 
L a b o u r : in relation to disutility, 17-
18; degradation, and debasement of 
coinage (1543), 53-55, through taxa-
tion of subsistence minimum, 276; 
and demand for metallic money, 
61-62; and appreciation of gold, 63; 
history of freedom of, 105-107; 
attempts to check migration, 112; 
growth of hired, in ancient Athens, 
125; profits, and the productive 
power of, 143-144, 146; progress, 
and the prices of different kinds, 
148-172; increasing differentiation, 
149-151, 205; reserve price for, in-
creases competition,203 ; competition 
as affecting, 204-206; supply depends 
only partly ou price, 235 n ; employ-
ment of, and free trade, 358-361, 366; 
highly paid, protection of, 364; pro-
tection to improve home, 365; and 
Christianity, 433-4.35. 
Labouring classes, Mill's forecast of 
their probable future, 170. 
Labour rents, 105-106, 110, 111. 
Lactantius (300 b.c.) quoted, 258. 
Laisser-faire, 178-181; iu consumption, 
191; carried to extremes, 206; and 
degradation of labour, 216; and free 
i trade, 356. 
Land: as a species of capital, 140; 
property in, and ideal distribution, 
230-231, 235 N; ownership, reform of 
abuses connected with, 32:4-325. 
Landed interest, progress aud, see 
Rent. 
Land-hunger, 107-108. (Cf. 112.) 
Landlord, his advantages iu bargain-
ing, 104-113. 
Land revenues of Iudia, 302-364. 
Land-tax: incidence of a perpetual, 
265,301; (a) uniform, 315; (b) pro-
portional to capital employed, 315-
316. 
Land values, taxation of, 317-326. 
Latin Union, 44 N, 59. 
Law: (1) of constant return, 310, .'(40, 
346; (2) of diminishing return, 1(M, 
226, 310, 312, 340-343, 346; (3) of 
diminishing utility, 184, 185, 224, 
271-273, 435; (4) of increasing re-
turn, 8, 310, 340, 341, 346; (5) of in-
difference, 68; (6) of substitution. 
(See Substitution.) 
Law aud custom, 105-106,109,211, and 
voluntary associations, 216, 217-218. 
(Cf. Authority.) 
Law of debt, see Debt. 
Lecky, W. E., 195, 197 N. 
Legal: (1) enactment, method of, 110, 
216; methods of, 238-244, 284; and 
land law reform, 324; (2) fictions, 
and the Canonist doctrine on usury, 
135-6; and administration of crim-
inal law, 241; (3) maximum rate of 
interest, attempts to fix, 125, 127; 
(4) training, and freedom of de-
mand, KM; (5) tender, progress and, 
30 seq., silver limited in, 42, 44. 
Leo VI., edict of the Emperor, 207. 
Leroy-Beaulieu, 183 N, 412. 
Leslie, Cliffe, 53, 62 n, 63, 327 n, 351 n . 
Lewis, S i rG. C.,426N. 
Leyland line, the, purchase of, 362. 
Liability: limited, the principle of, 
138; in joint-stock companies, 214; 
unlimited in partnership, 213. 
Liberty: natural, 178-181; individual, 
and the administration of justice, 
195; religious, 195-200; as result of 
perfect competition, 209. 
Licenses: in trade, 335-6; on con-
sumption, 334, 351. 
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- List, F., 365, 367-368. 
Loan interest, progress and, 122-140. 
Loans, public, 263-264. (Cf• Debts.) 
Local finance: (a) taxation, P r in -
c i p l e s OF, 391-400; special rates 
uneconomical, 262, and mediaeval. 
375; rates levied on incomes below 
reasonable minimum, 271; the "ben-
efit " theory applicable, 282,394-399; 
simplification and concentration 
j j ^ needed,288; rates as " apportioned 
taxes, 296; municipal trading for 
relief of rates regressive, 372 (cf. 
400-401); reforms accomplished and 
required, 375-376; aud the principle 
of formal justice, 383-384; (6) prin-
ciples of expenditure, 400-402. 
Local rates, history in Euglaud, 394-
399. 
Local taxation, Royal commission on: 
Memoranda, 258 n, 370 n, 399 n, 
400 n, 402 n ; Final Report, 320 n, 
402 n . 
— Lombards, in England, 134 N. 
Loria, M., 5, 6, 23, 268 N. 
Lotteries, public, 404. 
"f" M a c a u l a y : on England in 1865, 20, 
112 n ; recoiuage of 1696, 41. 
— McCulloch, J . R., 68, 70 n, 87 n, 136, 
268, 269, 295. 
_ MacphersoD, Annals of Commerce, 
h ( i 92 n , 93 n, 94, 97 n , 139 n, 403 n . 
, Madox, Exchequer, 134 n, 135, 336 n. 
„ Maine, Sir H. S., 132, 181, 242. 
Maitland, F. W., 69 N. (See also Pol-
lock and Maitland.) 
Maletotes, 336. 
— Malthus, 9. 
.. Management, see "Wages of manage-
ment. 
- Manorial system: labour and produce-
rents, 105-106, 111. 
~ Manufactures, progress in, 21, 82-89. 
. M a r g i n a l : dose, 104; cost, 115-116, 
311; men, 166; land and produce, 
104, 117 N, 312, 315; rent, 312; 
utility, 379. (See also Utility.) 
Marquardt and Mommsen, 129 n, 130 n. 
- Marshall, A., 116, 141 n, 142, 151 n, 
315 n . 
Martin, J . B., 404 N. 
-> Marx, Karl, 231. 
Massachusetts, wages in, 156, 160. 
Materialistic interpretation of history, 
5-6. 
Maximum : legal rate of interest, 125, 
127; utility, as an economic ideal, 
182-186, obtained by freedom of 
consumption, 191, 192, and of pro-
duction, 200 seq., and by perfect 
competition in distribution, 209, as 
an ideal in public expeuditure, 379. 
May, Erskine, 417, 418 n. 
Mayo-Smith, 95 n, 96 n, 156 n. 
Media axiomata, of economic action, 
181, 190. 
Mediaeval: idea of progress, 4; Eng-
lish money, 32 seq.; prices (general), 
48 seq.; prices (relative), 67 seq.; 
rents, 105-106, 111, 133-134; econ-
omy, break up of, 109; loan interest, 
132-137; casuistry, 135-136, 439-44Q; 
occupations and wages, 148 seq.; 
real wages, 169; spiritual life, 170; 
Christianity and economic activi-
ties, 187; spirit of monopoly, 207; 
taxes, 259-261; protection, 362; 
mixture of public and private econ-
omy, 403. 
Medical training, freedom v. state 
interference, 193-194. 
Menger, A., 27. 
Mercantile: (1) law, development of, 
241-242; (2) System, 345. 
Merchet, 106. 
Metayers, in Attica, 124. 
Migration: of labour, attempt to 
check, 112 (cf. 62, 15(i-158); of in-
dustries, 360, 362. 
Mill, J. S.: progress, production, and 
population, 7, 9; general and rela-
tive prices, 61 N; increase of rent 
an evil, 101; effect of improvements 
on rent, 116; progress and rents, 
profits, wages, 121; profits and 
prices, 142,143,146; probable future 
of the labouring classes, 170; com-
munism, 222 N ; government inter-
ference, 246-247; democratic despot-
ism, 252-253; equality of taxation, 
269; taxation of savings, 281; " pro-
tect ion" basis of taxation, 281; be-
quest and inheritance, 283; direct 
and indirect taxes, 293; incidence of 
tithes, 316; taxation of ground-
rents, 317-319 ; rules for taxation of 
commodities, 349-350. 
Minimum: (1) how far tendency of 
profits to a, 143-145, 146; (2) inter-
ference, the principle of, 178-181 ; 
(3) disutility, as ideal of taxation, 
270, 378. 
Mobility of labour and capital: as-
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sumed in argument for freedom of 
distribution, '219, 294; and incidence 
of taxes, 310, 312, 315, 327; and free 
trade argument, 359; limits local 
taxation, 392. 
- Mommsen, 127 n. (See also Mar-
quardt.) 
^ Money: measurement of progress iu 
wealth and population in terms of, 
8-13; in relation to measurement 
in terms of utility and disutility, 
13-18; money economy, and progress 
(see Commutation) ; its dangers, 22-
24, its abuses in mediaeval times, 
133-134, and profits, 142-147; prog-
ress and money, changes in the Eng-
lish standard, and in the medium of 
exchange, 30-45 (see also Gold, Sil-
ver) ; changes in the value of (see 
Prices), and Christianity, 436. 
-— Monopoly: element in ground-rents, 
103-104; and agricultural rents, 104 
seq.; transition to competition rents, 
107, 133; in Roman Empire, 131; in 
interest, 123, 133-134, disappears, 
137; in religion, 198; in mediaeval 
economy, 26, 207; in Constantino-
ple, 207; gives place to competition, 
206-208; and joint stock companies, 
215; and trusts, 215-216; and com-
bination, 226 , 247; governmental, 
244-245, 262, 375, 389; and incidence 
, J o f taxation, 294 , 305 , 310, 315, 327, 
\ '1 m 3 3 2 ' 3 4 ° ' 3 4 1 - 3 4 3 ' 34^347,348 ; of the 
' ' colonial trade, 361, 417 ; aud munici-
pal trading, 401. 
Montesquieu, 333. 
- Morality, relation of political econ-
omy to, 427. 
Mossman, K. C., 80 n. 
Municipal trading, 247 , 372, 377 , 400-
401. 
" Nabobs " and Roman proconsuls, 130. 
- National: debts, 337, 370, 403-415; 
dividend, 230; independence, argu-
ment for protection, 363; resources, 
peculiar, protection of, 345, 347, 349, 
362-363. (Cf. 89-90.) 
Natura l : liberty, the principle of, 178-
181; its benefits, 190-220, assump-
tions and failures, 221-236; surplus 
from land, 105-106. 
Navigation acts : repealed (1850), 339; 
Adam Smith on, 363; their object, 
365. 
Negative rent, 113. 
"Necessar ies" : of mediseval villein, ^ 
169, 191; and " luxur ies , " 270-271. 
Net value of contribution of each, as 
test of ideal distributiou, 230, 235-
236. 
Newmarch, W., 45, 52 N, 70 N, 71 N, 
80, 412 N. 
Newton, Sir Isaac, 41. 
Nicole, Jules, Le Livre duprifet, 207 n. 
Nineteenth century, 8; competition 
rents, 113; British customs and ex-
cise duties, 337-340. 
Noble, J. , National Finance, 338 n, 
405 n, 412 n . 
Noble, the gold, 35-36. 
" No man's laud," 325. 
Normal aud market prices, 66, 68-70. 
Norman couquest, 26, 31, 32; taxation 
after , 260. 
North, Lord, 386 n. 
Nys, E., 208. 
O c c u p a t i o n s : of the people, progress 
and, 150-151; of women, 162-163. 
Octroi duties, 353. 
Odgers, W. B., 385 n, 393 n . 
Old age pensions, 380. 
Old tax, no tax, 264, 265, 354. 
Open spaces iu towns, provision of, 
325. 
Organisation, of markets under com-
petition, 208, 210. 
P a l g r a v e , R. II. I., Dictionary of 
Political Economy, 78 N, 154 n, 
159 n, 426 n ; Local Taxation, 385 N. 
Pautaleoni, M., 180 n, 270, 271 n. 
Parallel standards, impracticable, 44. 
Parcel Post, 245. 
Pareto, 9 n, 24, 208 n. 
Par of exchange, 49. 
Partnership, characteristics of, 212-
214. 
Paston Letters, 140 n. 
Patronage, abuse of, in colonial ap-
pointments, 418, 419. 
Patten, S. N., 365 n. 
Pauperism, and progress, 21, 28; and 
taxation, 276. 
Pauper labour, argument for protec-
tion, 364. 
Peel, Sir R., 285, 287, 338-339. 
Penny: gold, 34 seq.; silver, fall in 
weight of, 49 seq., and general 
prices, 49-56; mediaival and mod-
ern, 94-95. 
Pensions, see Old age. 
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Persons: all taxation falls on, 264, 
290, 292, 333 , 337 , 376; basis of as-
sessment for local rates, 395-399. 
Pestilences, progress in control of, 19, 
22. 
Petty, Sir W., 100. 
Piece wages, 148-149,152, 160, 165. 
Piepoudre, court of, 241. 
Plebn, C. C., 291, 372, 373. 
Plener, Von, 15 n. 
Plowman's Tale, The, 371. 
Plutarch, 125. 
Political arithmetic, 8, 248. 
Political economy: its relation to 
morality and Christianity, 427^141. 
Poll taxes, 260, 315, 395. 
Pollock: on Contract, 241 n, 242, 
244 N; aud Maitland, History of 
English Law, 11 n, 301, 302 , 304 N, 
394 n , 395. 
Poor relief: 80, 247; origin of rates, 
260 n ; and taxation, 276; as a class 
of public expenditure, 370, 373, 374, 
376; and faculty theory of expendi-
ture, 381; history of poor rates in 
England, 397-398. 
Pope: his " fabulous " gains, 168; Es-
say on Man, quoted, 223 n. 
Population: progress of, and economic 
progress, 9 seq.; in terms of money, 
10-13; in terms of utility and dis-
utility, 13 seq.; as a criterion of 
economic prosperity, 18-21, 28; 
checks to, iu mediaeval England, 19, 
20; iucrease of, and reuts, 117; of 
England in fourteenth century aud 
now, 150. 
Porter, Progress of the Nation, 20,88, 
93, 119 n , 352, 405 n . 
Post Office: its monopoly, 245; yield 
of revenue incidental, 372. 
Pound, the silver, its transformation 
into gold sovereign, 32-42. 
"Preca r ious" services of the mediae-
val serf, 261. 
Precious metals, scarcity in mediaeval 
period, 40. 
Prescription and property, 436. 
Pretium affectionis: and urban 
ground-rents, 104; extravagant, 388. 
Price, and total utility, 13-15. 
Price, L. L., 57 n. 
Prices: interpretation of history of, 
31 seq.; progress and general, 46-
64; mediaeval, 48; not dependent 
entirely on weight of currency, 49 
seq.; mediaeval and Tudor compared, 
52 seq. (see also Debasement); not 
affected by recoinage of 1696, 56; 
effects of gold and silver discoveries, 
57-58; international influences, 58; 
general and relative, 59-63, 146; 
effects of improvements in produc-
tion, 59-61; how causes primarily 
affecting relative may affect gen-
eral, 61-63; no uniform connection 
between progress and general move-
ments in, 63-64; and profits, 141-
147; and rent and quasi-rent, 141-
142 (cf. 311 seq.); and trusts, 215-
216; and protection, 357, 359; ef-
fects of a tax on, (a) immediate, 
307-309; (b) ulterior, 310, 340, 341. 
Prices: relative, 53; connection with 
general prices, 59-63; changes in, 
and economic progress, 65-99; 
agricultural produce, different 
kiuds, 67-82; grain, 67-72; hay, 
straw, and barley, 72-73; beef, mut-
ton, and wheat, 73-74; candles, 
leather, oil, and beef, 74-75; oxen 
and bides, 75-76; houses and furni-
ture, 76-77; wool aud meat, 77-79; 
rabbits, 79; vegetables and fruit, 
79-80; salt, the importance of the 
seasons, 80 (c/. 88, 118-120) ; sugar, 
honey, and wax, 81; fish, 81; dif-
ferent kinds of birds, 81; eggs, 81-
82; wool and cloth, 82-83; cotton 
wool and cotton cloth, 83-87; wood, 
coal, iron, and lead, 87-90; trans-
port and communication — roads, 
canals, railways, 90-96; ocean ship-
ping, freights, exports, and imports, 
5)6-98; dependence of commerce on, 
98-99; profits depend on differences 
in, 143-145, 146-147; of different 
kinds of labour, progress and, 148-
172. (See Wages.) 
Primogeniture, origin of, 132. 
Principles, general, of public policy, 
essential, 189. 
Prisage, the right of, 336. 
Privilege, in distribution, displace-
ment of, 25-27, 28. 
Produce-rents, 105-106, 111. 
Producers' deficits, 16-17. 
Production, disutility of, 15-17 , 200; 
effects of improvements in, on prices 
general and relative, 59-fi3, 65; me-
diaeval agricultural methods sta-
tionary, 69; and commerce, 98; 
depends on a variety of factors, 178; 
consumption, its final cause, 190-
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200; benefits and drawbacks of free-
dom of, 200-200, 2011, 218-219, 228-
229; and the criminal law, 239. 
Productiveness: of taxation, 280, 287, 
289, 350-351, 353; public expendi-
ture not primarily for, 376, 387. 
Productive power, progress iu, 18, 21-
22, 28; profits and, 143-144, 146; of 
labour, diminished by corporations, 
172; taxation should leave unim-
paired, 276, 279, 289, as also should 
public expenditure, 381; iutiueuce of 
import duties, 343-344; employment 
of — profit v. national advantage, 
360-362; excessive taxation iujures, 
408, 413, 414. 
Profit-sharing, 170-171, 217. 
Profits: progress aud, 121-145; com-
plexity of the question, 121-122,140, 
144; pure interest the result of evo-
lution, 123; loan interest and prog-
ress, 122-140 (see Interest); origin 
of percentage measurement, 140-141; 
gross, 141; and prices, 141-147; how 
far tendency to a minimum, 143-
145,146; and ideal distribution, 232-
233; tendency to equality and inci-
dence of taxes, 319, 327-331; v. 
national advantage, 360-362. 
Progress, economic: in relation to prog-
ress in general, 3; need of separate 
analysis, 7; its dominating force the 
exercise of rational freedom of indi-
viduals, 7; its nature aud measure-
ment, 7-29; embraces more than 
material wealth, 8 seq.; its prin-
ciples not to be deduced from the 
general theory of evolution, 9-10; 
money value of the people as a test 
of, 10-13; progress of population in 
terms of utility and disutility, 13-18; 
increase of population as a mark of, 
18-21,28 ; in physical conditions, 19-
20; in morals and manners, 20-21; 
in productive powers, 21-24; in ex-
change, 22-24; iu distribution, 24-27; 
summary of characteristics, 27-29: 
increasing importauce of mental and 
moral factors, 28 ; and money, 30-45 ; 
and general prices, 46-64; and rela-
tive prices, 65-99; and rent, 100-120; 
and profits, 121-147 ; and wages, 148-
172; aud freedom (a) in consumption 
and demand, 191-200, (b) in produc-
tion and exchange, 200-206; from 
status to contract, and incidence of 
taxation, 300 seq. 
' Progress, general: the idea of, 3-6: not 
continuous, 6-7; nature of economic, 
see Progress Economic. 
Progressive taxation: and equality of 
sacrifice, 271-273; aud faculty 
theory, 277-279; succession duties, 
331-332. 
Property: protection of, as a function 
of government, 176; iu land, 230-
231; acquisition of, and the criminal 
law, 240; how the institution is 
weakened, 388; and Christianity, 
436-437. 
Protection: attempts to protect wool 
against cotton, 84-85,86; of home-
grown corn, 101, 110, 112; not likely 
to raise agricultural wages, 158; v. 
yield of revenue, 282-283; uninten-
tional, 299; after 1815,338; a theo-
retical basis of, 343-344; of peculiar 
national advantages, 345, 347 , 349, 
362-363; v. free trade, 356-368. 
Prussia, state railways, 405, 409. 
Public finance, see Finance. 
Publicity: of taxation, 286; of expen-
diture, 384-385. 
Public loans, 263-264. (Cf. Debts, 
public.) 
Public opinion: and economic policy, 
237; ultimate sanction of criminal 
law, 241. 
Public works and institutions : gov-
ernmental provision for, 247-248; a 
cause of public debts, 409. 
Puritanism in England in seventeenth 
century, 21. 
Purveyance and preemption, the right 
of, 335. 
Q u a l i t a t i v e and quantitative meas-
urement of economic progress, 7-29. 
Quantity theory of money and prices : 
Rogers misinterprets, 49-52, 53-64. 
Quasi-rent, 113, 141-142, 145, 233, 291; 
incidence of taxes on, 329-330. 
Quid pro quo: basis (1) of taxation, 
262-263, 281-282; (2) of expenditure, 
372, 373. 
R a i l w a y s and relative values, 94-96; 
Prussian, 405, 409. 
Rates, as taxes, 290, 391, 394 seq. 
Rational freedom, see Freedom. 
Real: cost and cheapness, 15, 17; cost 
of public revenues, 386-387; wages, 
144, 148-149, 1118-170, 364. 
Reciprocity treaties, 360, 364, 365. 
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Recoinage of, 1696 : 41, 43; no effect 
on general prices, 55 seq. 
Reformation, the: and the state of 
English roads, 91. 
Registration duties, 332. 
Regressive taxation, 281. 
Regulation and taxation of trade, 
mediaeval, 335-336. 
Relative prices, see Prices, relative. 
Y" Religious: liberty, progress in, 195-
197; services, their economic side, 
197 seq., monopoly of, 198, free 
trade in, 199, 240, indirect effects 
of expenditure for, 382; ideas, rela-
tion of political economy to, 427-
441. 
Renouvier, M., 5, 6 seq., 43 N. 
Rent-charge, 140; a perpetual laud-
tax becomes, 265, 301; Scottish feu-
duties as, 320. 
Rent: progress and, 100-121; as a 
measure of progress, 100-102; urban 
i ground-rents, 102-104 ; agricultural 
rents, 104-113, 133; effects of im-
1 ->?.t**^"provements on, 114-118; effects of 
the seasons on, 118-120; and profit — 
legal definition, 140; and price — 
quasi-rent, 141-142; of ability, 168; 
and ideal distributiou — the un-
earned increment, 230-231; taxes 
on, 291, 292; incidence of taxes on 
pure economic, (1) agricultural, 311-
315; (2) ground-rents, 317-323; aud 
export duties, 346. 
Representation and taxation, 268, 371; 
and public expenditure, 371, 378, 
381. 
Reserve price for labour, and competi-
tion, 203. 
Restraint of trade: contracts in, 220, 
247 ; aud taxes on commodities, 351-
352. 
Retail traders, tacit associations, 216, 
228. 
Retaliation, 290, 364, 366. 
Revenue: (a) public, 248; in relation 
to expenditure, 254-257, 369; its an-
itL- j ticipation the origin of public debt, 
404, 410, 414; (6) private, all taxes 
paid out of, 291-293. (See also 
Taxation.) 
Revenue duties: and free trade, 356; 
and protection, 365-366. 
Ricardo, 53, 117, 276. 
y . Rich and poor, application of utility 
principle to public expenditure on, 
380. 
Richard I., "b roadc lo th" regulation, 
239. 
Rights of way, 324. 
Risk: in lending, 136; and profits, 
145, 147; in partnership, 136, 213. 
(See also Insurance.) 
Roads: cost of transport by, 90-93; 
Roman, 128. 
Rogers, Thorold, 14 n, 31; fall ill 
weight of silver penny, misapplica-
tion of quautity theory, 46-52; de-
basement of 154:3-1560, its influence 
on labour, 53-5, 62, 56 N; Book IV., 
Ch. IV., passim ; 101,110, 111 u, 112, 
118, 149,150,152,153, 154 N, 156,159, 
169. 
Roman: slavery, 16, 25; roads, 21, 
128; power, cause of its fall, 25; 
economy, and the rate of interest, 
127-131; plunder of the provinces, 
ib.; art of selfish expenditure, 226; 
compulsion in taxation, 258-259; 
compared with British methods of 
colonisation, 422. 
Rosebery, Lord, Life of Pitt, 411 n, 
412. 
Royal Commission on Local Taxation, 
see Local. 
Ruding, Annals of the Coinage, 51 n. 
Rural depopulation: af ter 1540, 62, 
112; permanent causes of, 156-158. 
Ruskiu, John, 14, 170. 
Russia, usury iu, 134. 
S a c r i f i c e : equality of, as basis of 
taxation, 269-275; and local rates, 
397. 
Saladin tithe, the, 260. 
Sales, incidence of tax on, 332. 
Sauerbeck, A., index numbers, 70 n, 
74, 76. 
Savings, taxation of, 280-281. 
Saxon times: money compensation for 
accidents and injuries in, 10; privi-
lege and authority dominate distri-
bution, 26; land charters, 105, 259; 
compulsory element in taxation, 259, 
335. 
Scarcity: value, rent and, 104-105; 
rent., incidence of taxes on, 312. 
Schaffle, A., 192 n. 
Sclianz, 239 n. 
Scliloss, D. F„ 148 n, 165 n, 167 n. 
Schonberg's Handbueh, 287 n. 
Scotland: retrogression in mediaeval 
times, 20; evictions for sheep farms, 
109,110,139; employment of women 
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in agriculture diminishing, 161; deer 
forests, 313 N; feu-duties, 320; 
" Clootie's crof t ," 325-326. 
Scutage, 260, 301-302. 
Seasons: as affecting prices of salt 
and grain, 80; and iron, 88; and 
rents, 113,118-120. 
Second century, the, 130. 
" Secret service," as an item in public 
expenditure, 384. 
Securities, first class, as investments, 
147. 
Security: and distribution, 26,27 ; and 
freights, 97 ; to tenant farmer, 112; 
and interest, 123, 125-126, 137-138, 
404—405; provision of, as a function 
of government, 175-176; and the 
administration of justice, 195; and 
compensation to vested interests, 
388; for public debts, 403, 404, 
406. 
Seebohm, F., 105, 111, 261, 325. 
Seigniorage, 30: of silver in England, 
33-34, 40; abolished (1666), 40. 
Self-interest: a variable conception, 
223; and government interference, 
237, 246. 
Seligman, E. R. A., 261, 263 n, 264 n, 
265 n , 272, 275, 277, 282 n , 304 n . 
Senior, W. N., 316. 
Serfdom its most distinctive mark, 
261. (Cy. Villein.) 
Seventeenth century: Puritanism, 21, 
rents ill England, 112. 
Shakespeare, 222 n. 
Shaw, W. A., 34 n. 
Shetland, rents in, 106. 
" Shifting " of taxes, see Taxation, 
incidence. 
Shilling, 32, 48; first coined (1504), 
33, 36. 
Shipping, ocean: progress in, 96-98. 
Shopkeepers, a nation of, 228. 
Sidgwick, H., 25 n, 180, 182,185,197 n, 
235 n , 245 n . 
Silver: currency in England, history, 
31-43; pound and penny — fall in 
weight of penny till 1601, 32-34, 38, 
39, 49; seigniorage, 33-34; the real 
standard (1066-1696), 38, 49; coins 
clipped and worn (1694), 38; recoin-
age (1696), 41,43; displaced by gold 
(after 1717), 42, 43; legal tender by 
tale limited (1774), 42 N; becomes 
token money (1816), 42. (See also 
Depreciation.) 
Single tax, the, 287 N, 304 n . 
Sixteenth century, silver discoveries, 
57. 
Slavery: and disutility, 16, 22-23; and 
seventeenth century Puritanism, 21 ; 
a check to invention, 83; in ancient 
Greece, 124; in Roman Republic, 125, 
127 seq.; and later Empire, 131; 
under free government, 252 N. 
Smart, W., 147 n, 160 N. 
Smith, Adam: population and pros-
perity, 9; corruption of the Church, 
24; variation in value of silver, 49, 
50; wheat as a measure of, 60; prog-
ress and relative prices, 65, 76, 77, 
78; slavery checks progress, 83; cot-
ton manufacture, 87 n ; coals and 
wood, 88; approves of export duties 
on wool and bounties on internal 
transport of coal, IX); canals, 94; 
rent, 101, 104, 106-107; improve-
ments in transport, 115; profits and 
interest, 122; profits and prices, 
142, 143, 144, 146; wages highest in 
growing industries, 158; on Natural 
Liberty, 178-181; abolition of medi-
cal licenses, 193; separation of judi-
cial and executive power, 195; the 
State and religion, 197, 199; com-
petitive rewards give greatest effi-
ciency, 210; tacit associations of 
masters, 216; " a nation of shop-
keepers," 228 N; laws that were 
"wr i t ten in blood," 239; on smug-
gling, 243-244; on slavery, 252 K; 
his treatment of public expenditure, 
255-256; canons of taxation, 266-287; 
equality of taxation, 266-267, 268, 
269, 275; progressive taxation, 279; 
taxation of rent and ground-rent, 
279-280; " protection " basis of tax-
ation, 281; taxation of stimulants, 
283; canons of certainty, conven-
ience, and economy, 286-287; concen- /* 
tration of taxation, 287; inequality 
preferable to uncertainty, 289; his 
classification of taxes, 291-293; in-
ternational mobility of capital, 328; 
fluctuation in profit, 330; his canons 
transgressed before 1815,337; excep-
tions to free trade, 349 (c/. !K)); tax-
ation of luxuries, 349; convenience 
of taxes on commodities, 350, 351; 
taxation of necessaries, 353; free 
trade, 358, 359, 361; employments of 
capital, 363, 364, 366-368; public ex-
penditure for common benefit, 373; 
tolls, 395; public debt, 415; what 
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peopled America, 416 n ; monopoly 
of colonial trade, 417 ; imperial fed-
eration, 268, 423; exchange, 435. 
Smith, John, Memoirs of Wool, 77, 83, 
100. 
Smith, J . W., Mercantile Law, 213 n, 
242 n . 
Smith, Sydney, 337. 
Smuggling, 261, 355. 
Social dividend theory of taxation, 
281-282. 
Socialism: and the maximum utility 
principle, 185; and the Catholic 
Church, 187-188; and freedom of 
consumption, 192; socialistic criti-
cism of the present system, 201; and 
governmeutal provision of public 
works, 247, 377; and taxation, 283-
284; of unearned increments, 323; 
municipal, 409. 
Solon, his legislation in Athens, 124-
125. (Cf. 129.) 
/• Sovereign, the gold : transformation 
of silver pound into, 32-42; first 
coined (1489), 36; " c r o w n " gold 
issues, 37; new coinage (1S17), 42. 
Sovereignty: 175,258; as basis of taxa-
tion, 267-269, 392; and of public ex-
penditure, 370-371. 
Spain, the alcavala, 332. 
Speculation: in modem markets, 145; 
effects of a tax on gains of, 330; 
recentmunicipal, 400-401. (See also 
Contractors.) 
Spencer, Herbert, 9. 
Stamp duties, 332. 
Standard: monetary, history of Eng-
lish, 30-45; of comfort, 28, 152, of 
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cation of the general canons, 349-
353; comparison of direct and indi-
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